As I lean back in my chair to think out a psychological problem, I am subject to all sorts of sensory stimuli: the temperature of the room, the pressure of my clothes, the sight of various pieces of furniture, sounds from house and street, scents coming from carpet and wood- work, or borne in through the open window, etc. I could easily lapse into a reminiscent mood, letting these impres- sions suggest to me scenes from my past life. I could easily give the rein to my imagination, thinking of the further business of the day, anticipating some event which is to happen in the near future, etc. But I am perfectly well able to neglect all these distractions, and to devote mysfelf entirely to the one centrally aroused idea, — the idea of the problem which awaits solution.
Attention has two forms. It may be what is called * passive ' or ' involuntary ' attention, or it may be ' active ' and ' voluntary ' attention. We cannot understand its real nature until we understand how these two forms differ, and what are the reasons for their occurrence.
(i) Passive Attention. — There are, many occasions when we ' cannot help ' attending to an impression, — when a stimulus takes the attention by storm. A very^ loud sound will, almost infallibly, attract the attention, ' however absorbing the occupation of the time. So with movement: the animal or bird that crosses the landscape, the melody that rises and falls to a steady, uniform accom- paniment {i.e.^ that moves, while its accompaniment is stationary), the insect that crawls over our hand as we lie upon the grass, — all these constrain us to attend to them. Interesting things catch the attention, whether their interest come from their pleasantness or unpleasant- ness: a beautiful face arrests, our eyes, as a matter of course, and the newspaper accounts of fires and murders have a ' morbid fascination ' for us. Things which fit in with our present train of thought hold the attention: if § 38- TJie Nature and Forms of Attention 127 we are feeling ourselves ill used, we notice a thousand little annoyances that we should otherwise have let pass unnoticed, — if we are trying to prove a scientific theory, facts offer themselves to our attention whose significance we should otherwise have missed. Contrast, like move- ment, draws the attention: the one tree on a level plain, the one civilian's dress among a mass of military uniforms. So with strange things in familiar settings, and familiar things in strange settings: a new picture upon our study wall obtrudes itself upon us, and a few words of English, heard amid a crowd of holiday-making Germans, force our attention irresistibly upon the speaker.
Any one of these conditions — contrast or movement; a high intensity, novel quality, etc., of sensation; the ' in- terest ' attaching to an impression; a close relation of the idea aroused by the impression to the ideas forming the consciousness of the moment — is able to give a defi- nite direction to the attention; an object which fulfils any one of them has the power of attracting the attention to itself. The attention is passive: we have to attend, what- ever grounds we may have for attending to something else.
(2) Active Attention. — There are, however, many occa- sions when, so far from the idea's drawing and riveting our attention, it seems that we are holding our attention by main force upon the idea. A problem in geometry does not appeal to us as a thunder-clap does. The thunder-clap takes unquestioned possession of conscious- ness. The problem has only a divided claim upon the attention: there is a constant temptation to wander away from it and attend to something else. Only gradually, as we grow interested and 'absorbed,' — as the active atten- 128 Conation and Attention tion becomes passive, — does it gain that forcible hold over us which the thunder-clap has from the moment of its appearance in consciousness. In many of the psy- chological experiments which we have described, the object of attention is something which of itself, so far from attracting notice, would be eminently fitted to escape it: an obscure organic sensation, a minute quali- tative difference, etc. Attention to such an object is active attention.
Let us see, now, how the psychologist who finds in attention the specific activity-process, the experience of mental spontaneity, regards these two forms of the atten- tive consciousness. " Both kinds of attention are alike," he will tell us, '* in the fact that they involve a change in our ideas. The idea attended to becomes the clearest, strongest and most permanent idea in consciousness. But the two kinds differ in this: that the change in ideas is brought about in the one case (passive attention) by the nature of the stimulus, while in the other case (active attention) it is the result of the mind's own activity, — the mind is moulding its ideas for its own purposes. There is clear evidence of the difference in the two ex- periences; in passive attention we have the action of stimulus and the resulting change of ideas, — and noth- ing more; in active attention the mind's activity shows it- self in a definite mental process, an active process, which accompanies the change of ideas. Every one who has ever been actively attentive must be aware that he has experienced this definite process, of active quality."
Here, then, are two facts for us to examine: the change of ideas, and the alleged activity-process. We will take the latter first.
§ 38. TJie Nature and Forms of Atte7ttio7i 129 (i) TJie Alleged Experience of Activity^ in Active Atten- tion. — If we try to ascertain, by the aid of introspection, the processes of which the attentive consciousness is com- posed, we come at once upon a mass of organic sensa- tions combined with affection into a total which very nearly resembles the conation of the previous section. There is a brace of the whole body; the muscles are tense, ready for movement. More especially is there muscular tension in and about the head. If the object of attention is visual, the eyes are fixed steadily upon it, the eyebrows lowered, the scalp muscles tightened, the head settled squarely back upon the shoulders. If its object is auditory, the head is turned toward one side and thrust forward, the muscles which move the drum of the ear drawn taut, etc. In both instances the breath will be held, from time to time. All this means a complex of sensations from skin, muscle, sinew and joint, and an accompanying affection. It means an experience of effort; and the only difference between this effort and the effort of the last Section is that this is, as a gen- eral rule, a more localised effort, whose components are not spread over the whole body in equal degree, but are centred round some particular sense-organ, eye or ear, etc.
It is an effort which involves, not so much an adjustment of the whole muscular system, for locomotion, as an adjust- ment of a special organ for the best reception of stimulus. But it is none the less a form of conation, and may rightly be termed effort.
And, again, introspection stops short at this point. When we have taken the sensations and affections from the * activity experience,' there is nothing left. There is no evidence of the third conscious process, however K 130 Conation and Attention often we may analyse and reconstruct in our search for it.
More than this: introspection does not show any radical difference between active and passive attention. In pas- sive attention, too, we find muscular adjustment; the turn of the head, the brace of the body, the fixing of the gaze, etc. True, the effort is not so great as it is in active attention; but effort is undoubtedly present. It is less, because there is only one idea to be attended to, whereas in active attention several ideas are claimants for the attention.
To sum up: There is only one attention, not two. The differ- ences between passive and active attention are differences of * degree' {iiutnbe}' of ideas, amount of effort), not of ' kind.' The terms * passive ' and ' active ' are misnomers. In passive attention, one idea takes unresisted possession of consciousness; in active attention, there is a conflict of ideas for the favours of the atten- tion. In the latter case, the experience of effort is pronounced and well marked; in the former it is present, but less strong. These are the only differences between the two forms of attention.
(i) Passive Attention. — The reasons why certain things or attributes of things compel the attention, while others are left un- noticed, are, in the last resort, biological reasons. Some of them are of a general nature, applying to all living organisms alike. The animal which is to survive ifttcst attend to movement, contrast, very intensive impressions, etc. Hence we all attend to these; attention to them is ingrained in our nervous constitution. It is a more special reason, of course, which accounts for the entomolo- gist's attention to the beetle. Here we have a particular animal with particular tendencies; tendencies in the first place natural, and now confirmed by education and habit.
(2) Active Attention. — ^The reasons for the phenomena of active attention are also, in the last resort, biological. As soon as an organism comes to have a system of sense-organs, each with its § 38- The Nature and Forms of Attention 131 peculiar attachment to the central nervous system, there must necessarily be times when its attention is called simultaneously by two different stimuli, — say, by a visual movement in front of it, and by a loud sound at its side. On the occurrence of this two- fold stimulation, the attention will travel in quick succession from source of movement to source of sound, and vice versa. (Whether it go first to the one or the other will depend upon circumstances, — upon the organism's previous experience, upon the intensity of the affection attaching to the two stimuh, etc.) The effort must plainly be greater than in the case of attention to either stimulus alone; there is more bodily movement, adjustment of organs, etc., required.
The more complex the organism becomes, the more frequently must it happen that stimuh are simultaneously presented, which cannot be attended to in this see-saw way, though both have strong claims upon the attention. Suppose, e.g., that I am sitting in my room, preparing for to-morrow's examination, and that I hear an alarm of fire in a neighbouring street. I cannot run from work to window, and from window to work, in quick succession; if the work is to be done, the attention to it must be sustained. In a case like this, one claimant must give way to the other; there is a real conflict. The cortex is * set ' in one part for work; and this setting is reinforced by a large number of excitations, — the processes corresponding to ideas of my examination mark, the con- sequences of failure, etc. The cortex is ' set ' in another part for looking at the fire; and this setting is reinforced by other excita- tions,— the processes corresponding to the ideas of a run in the fresh air, an exciting scene, the meeting with friends, etc. Which side wins depends upon the strength of the tendencies and of their temporary auxiliaries. Again, the effort experience must plainly be more distinct than in the case of attention to either stimulus alone.
Additional ground for thinking that there is no radical differ- ence between passive and active attention is to be found in the fact that what begins as active attention may quite well end as passive. If we once ' settle down ' to our work, we may grow so ' sunk ' and ' absorbed ' in it that the fire-bell passes unnoticed.
132 Conation and Attention This fact can hardly be explained by those who assume the pres- ence of the activity-process in active attention; for why should that process disappear, as attention is continued?
It may be remarked here that the reduction of active to passive attention is the condition of all thorough intellectual work. The passive attention of the animal or the child is the first stage of attentional development. Then comes the active attention, dur- ing which the mind is held by a certain stimulus, but held in face of opposition from other stimuli. Finally, this stimulus gains an unquestioned ascendency over its rivals, and the attention is once more passive. The stage of active attention is itself a stage of transition, of conflict, of waste of mental energy; but it is the necessary preliminary to a stage of achievement.
(2) TJie Change of Ideas in Attention. — Whenever we attend to an idea, certain changes are brought about in that idea and in the other ideas of the time, {a) The idea attended to becomes clearer and more distinct. If I am listening to a four-part choriis, and suddenly give my full attention to the tenors, the tenor part stands out dis- tinctly from the whole mass of sound. It does not become stronger, louder; but its tone qualities are detached from the tone qualities of the other parts. (^) Sometimes, how- ever, the idea attended to does increase in intensity. A very faint light grows noticeably brighter, as we attend to it; a very faint sound, noticeably louder, {c) The other ideas of which consciousness is composed are rendered less distinct and, apparently, weaker than they previously were. As we listen to the tenor part, the three other parts blur, and fade out.
The activity-theory explained these three facts as the effects of mental activity; the mind, of its own accord, assisted some ideas and repressed others. We have been unable to find an activity- process, and have accounted for the manifestations of attention in § 3 8. TJie NaUire and Forms of Attention 133 general by emphasising the natural Selectiveness ' (§ 35) of the nervous system, the presence of organic tendencies. We have now to ask for the special physiological conditions of these three manifestations of attention. They appear both in passive and active attention.
Physiologists have discovered that one nerve-cell can influence another in two different ways. It can inhibit or check the pro- cesses going on in the other, or it can facilitate or reinforce them. We do not know precisely how these influences are exerted; but there can be no question that they exist. During attention, both of them appear to be at work. There is facilitation or reinforce- ment of cerebral function on the one hand (the idea attended to becomes clearer or stronger); there is widespread inhibition of cerebral function on the other hand (the remaining ideas grow dim and weak).
It is natural to look for the origin of the reinforcing and inhib- itory processes in the frontal lobes, the supreme co-ordinating centre of the brain. However they arise, we should suppose that they arise there. Now we have seen that an excitation of the frontal lobes is the necessary condition of the affective processes. Our supposition will, then, be greatly strengthened, if we can find any close relation between affection and attention as facts of men- tal experience.
We find, as a matter of fact, that it is only when we attend to im- pressions that we feel them to be pleasant or unpleasant. Impres- sions which are not attended to are indifferent. If we can ' forget ' our toothache, z>., find something more interesting and absorbing, and so cease to attend to the tooth, the unpleasantness vanishes. Impressions which have grown habitual, /.<?., whose affective at- tribute has worn off, are impressions which have ceased to attract the attention. Hence, when we say that an ' interesting ' thing catches the attention, we are really speaking tautologically. A thing is 'interesting' when it is ' a thing to be attended to.' It is not that the pleasantness or unpleasantness comes first, and that we then attend to the impression: the two parts of our experi- ence, the affective and the attentive, are simultaneous. In popular parlance, we attend because the thing is interesting; in psycho- 134 Conation and Attention logical language, the interest and the attention are two sides of the same experience.
Putting the physiological and psychological together, we may say that attention to a pleasant theme corresponds to an exercise of function by well-nourished frontal lobes (§ 32), and attention to an unpleasant theme, to the exercise of function by ill-nourished frontal lobes. Since attention is always attention to something, there must also be an excitation set up in some sensory cortical centre (visual, auditory, etc.); and in the same way, any pleas- antness or unpleasantness implies the excitation of the cortical centre, to which the pleasant or unpleasant idea belongs. And just as it is one effect of the adjustment or adaptation of the nervous system that its surroundings are indifferent, and the nour- ishment of the frontal lobes unaffected by them, so it is another result of adaptation that the organism gradually ceases to attend to frequently repeated impressions, and that the frontal lobes are not called upon to perform their functions, — the lower brain centres meeting all the requirements of the occasion. Lastly, we now see the special reason for the impossibility of attending to an affection. Attention and affection are two sides of one and the same process.
The results of this Section may be summarised as fol- lows. Attention to an impression means three things. It means (i) that consciousness is conative, i.e,^ made up in large part of the complex experience of effort; (2) that a particular idea or perception, or small group of ideas or perceptions, becomes clearer, more lasting and (perhaps) stronger than it v^as before; and (3) that the remaining processes which go to make up the consciousness of the moment become fainter, more transient and less distinct than they otherwise would be. On the physiological side we have: (i) a tension or set of the muscles, extending more or less widely over the whole body, but especially well marked in some particular organ {cf. the attitude of the eavesdropper, or the set of the eyes, wrinkling of the forehead, etc., in attentive thinking); (2) central rein- forcement or facilitation of particular excitations; and (3) central inhibition of other excitatory processes.
There is no trace in attention of a third elementary conscious process, co-ordinate with sensation and affection, § 39. The Attributes of Attention. — It is evident that we cannot speak of ' attributes ' of attention in precisely the same sense in which we have spoken of the attributes of sensation and affection. Attention is not a simple, elemental process: it is a complex of elementary pro- cesses (the sensations and affection which make up the experience of effort) accompanied by changes (changes of intensity, distinctness, duration, etc.) in other mental processes. Nevertheless we can look at attention, as we can at sensation, from different points of view. It will be well, therefore, to ask whether the differences which it presents in any way resemble the differences of quality, intensity, etc., which exist between sensations and affec- tions.
(i) To speak of the quality of attention would be mean- ingless. The qualities present in attention are {a) the sensation qualities contained in the experience of effort, qualities of strain, etc., — whether peripheral (coming from actual bodily adjustment) or central (coming from remembrance or imagination of bodily adjustment); {U) an affective quality, pleasantness or unpleasantness; and {c) the quality (or qualities) of the sensation (or perception or idea) attended to. Although the quality of strain is always present, it need not be the predominant quality in atten- tion: the predominant quality may be that of the sensation or idea attended to. And as any sensation or idea may be 136 Conation and Attention attended to, there cannot be any specific or characteristic 'attention quality.'
(2) We might attribute intensity to attention, meaning by it the effectiveness with which the object of attention (the idea attended to) is reinforced, and the remaining conscious processes inhibited, in a given case. That dif- ferences of this kind exist is obvious. We may be com- pletely absorbed in a subject (very high degree of rein- forcement, with very effective inhibition), fairly attentive (high degree of reinforcement, less effective inhibition), little attentive (little reinforcement, weak inhibition), or entirely inattentive (no reinforcement and no inhibition). But as intensity is here used in a new sense, to mean the intensity of a total complex process, and not of one of its simple components, it will be better to avoid the term, and to speak rather of the degree of attention.
(3) Attention cannot be maintained for an indefinite length of time; it 'tires' or 'relaxes.' Moreover, it varies greatly in duration^ shifting from object to object at irregular intervals, altogether irrespectively of fatigue. We may attend to a lecture, without tiring, for a whole hour; but we may also attend for a few seconds only. We must enquire, then, for how long a time the rein- forcing and inhibitory processes can co-operate, without relaxation, i.e.^ what is the maximal duration of atten- tion to one object; and try to ascertain the reasons for relaxation, when it appears.
(4) Attention has no extent^ in the sense in which visual and tactual (cutaneous and articular) sensations have ex- tent. But it has a different range in different cases: we may attend to a single sensation of red, or to a water- colour drawing which shows all the colours of the spec- § 40. TJie Degree of Attention 137 trum. The question of the maxmial range of attention thus arises: the question, i.e., to how many impressions we can attend, without slurring over any one of them.
We previously noticed the fact that it is possible to speak of the intensity, duration, etc., of complex as well as of simple con- scious processes (§ 8). Attention offers an instance of this usage.
§ 40. The Degree of Attention. — We can say nothing very definitely of the different degrees of attention. Lan- guage makes certain rough distinctions: ' close ' or ' rapt ' or ' absorbed ' attention is opposed to ' wandering ' or ' fit- ful ' attention or to inattention, ' complete ' attention to ' divided ' attention, etc. But these phrases give us no better idea of the number of possible attention degrees than do the expressions 'light grey,' 'grey,' 'dark grey,' of the number of distinguishable qualities of brightness sensation.
Since attention always includes the effort experience, it might be thought that the intensity of effort would furnish a measure of the degree of attention. But a little con- sideration shows that intensity of effort and degree of attention do not run parallel to each other. We very easily become absorbed in our favourite topic (high degree of attention, containing but slight effort); while a small amount of attention bestowed upon an uninteresting sub- ject renders the effort-complex exceedingly prominent in consciousness.
The reason is, that effort is only a part, not the whole, of attention. It does not follow that because effort is strong or weak the whole process of attention must be strong or weak. The experience of effort is one side of 1 33 Conation and Attention attention; the changes in the idea attended to, by rein- forcement, and in other ideas, by inhibition, are the other side. If the processes of reinforcement and inhibition are materially aided by tendency, by the ' set ' of the cortex, we may get great attention (total conscious process) with but little effort (part-process); if they are not, we may have a considerable effort and yet but scant attention.
Thus we may listen to a tedious speaker — because it is 'good manners ' to listen — while our attention is more than half taken up with our own thoughts. Here the amount of effort (part- process) experienced is by no means proportional to the amount of attention (total process) given. A certain acquired tendency is reinforcing the excitations which correspond to the ideas of social propriety, respect for age, etc., while natural tendencies are reinforcing other excitations which correspond to the subject of our thoughts. There is a conflict (§ t^^^^ and the former wins; but wins by a narrow margin. Hence a high degree of effort occurs in conjunction with slight reinforcement of the speaker's words and slight inhibition of the listener's thoughts: a weak attention includes a strong effort.
On the other hand, the * born ' naturalist follows the line of least resistance when he stops his conversation to watch the ma- noeuvres of a spider on the window-pane. A natural tendency has * prepared ' the cortex for the reinforcement of the excitations corresponding to the perception of the spider, and the inhibition of other excitations. Here, there is a strong attention, including but a slight effort.
The term ' inattention ' is used in two senses. Strictly defined, it is the lowest degree of attention. In this signifi- cance, it is the obverse of extreme attention: absorption in one topic means inattention to all others. In its second- ary sens^, inattention is used to denote a fact of mental constitution as a whole, and indicates a low stage of men- tal development.
(i) Those who are capable of sustained attention, and whose occupations giv^e constant exercise to this capacity, are rarely inattentive (to one thing) unless they are closely attentive (to another). We have the extreme form of inattention (and of attention) in absent-mindedness or ' brown study.' Here the attention is so exclusively concentrated upon a congenial topic that all impressions which are not connected with it pass unat- tended to.
(2) Animals are 'constitutionally' inattentive, in the second sense of the word. Although the organism is ' selective ' (§35), i.e., has definite tendencies, there is no conscious co-ordination of these tendencies for a scheme or plan of life. In the most highly developed mind, on the other hand, — the mind of civihsed man, — the natural tendencies are pressed, during education, into the service of some life-plan. We may express the difference meta- phorically by saying that in ourselves the tendencies are focussed upon some definite object, or that the attention is trained in some one direction; whereas, in the animal, tendencies subsist side by side, and are focussed or converged upon a particular object only at the instigation of sheer necessity, and only for so long as the n.ecessity lasts. Or again: we have a conscious end (ambition, ideal, etc.) before us; the animal has none.
There are, however, many members of civihsed communities who are thus 'constitutionally inattentive,' i.e., who are incapable of sustained attention, whose attention is caught by anything and everything, and relaxed as lightly as it is caught. We term them ' scatter-brained,' ' unreliable,' ' forgetful,' ' capricious,' ' uncertain,' ' changeable,' etc., according to the circumstances in which their constitutional lack of attention is manifested. The mental type is illustrated more often in children than in adults, — indeed, it is natural to children at a certain stage of mental development, — and more often in women than in men.
Mental pathology gives us an extreme instance of this constitu- tional inattention in the dream consciousness, and an instance of exclusive concentration in the hypnotic consciousness. Unfortu- nately, both dreaming and hypnosis present conditions which are unfavourable to introspection.
140 Conation and Attention § 41. The Duration of Attention. — We can attend to the same topic for a considerable length of time. Music lovers will sit out a five hours' opera without letting their atten- tion wander from the music; and there are many things — an interesting public ceremony, a baffling mechanical puzzle, the last work of a popular author, a newly invented machine — which will hold the attention for a long time. Hence we might be tempted to suppose that attention is a relatively permanent state of consciousness.
But if we look closely at experiences of the kind, we see that the object of attention is, in reality, constantly changing. The musical themes vary, the ceremony pro- ceeds, the puzzle is tried now in one way and now in another, the plot of the story develops, the machine becomes intelligible part by part. Attention, in each instance, is attention not to a single impression, but to a series of different impressions. Consequently, the ex- periences tell us nothing of the duration of * an ' attention, if the phrase be permissible, — of a single attentive con- sciousness.