§ 97- Function of the Reaction Experiment 333 tion; it is a secondary reflex, derived directly from an artificial selective or volitional action.
If, then, we continue a choice reaction until it becomes automatic, we gain opportunity to observe introspectively the emergence of a secondary reflex. The experimenta- tion is further valuable as illustrating the course of prac- tice.
In cases of extreme automatism, the discrimination of two known colours has been found to require only 1 1 o-; that of the locality of a sound, only 150-.
The tendency of the reactor towards automatism is one of the greatest difficulties which the investigator of compound reactions has to encounter. He must secure thoroughly practised subjects, and yet take care that their practice does not go too far.
§ 97. The Function of the Reaction Experiment. — The reaction, as we have described it in preceding Sections, is an artificial, schematic, simplified action, — an action which may be impulsive, selective, volitional or approxi- mately reflex, as the experimenter desires.
For psychological purposes, this artificial action pre- sents many advantages over the action of real life. In the first place, it is action reduced to its lowest terms. The stimulus which starts it, and the movement with which it ends, are both exceedingly simple. In the second place, it is pure action, action unmixed with any other complex conscious experience. It follows from these two facts that, under the conditions of the reaction experi- ment, the subject can introspect the action-consciousness in a way which is altogether impossible under ordinary circumstances. Thirdly, the reaction is action, the precise duration of which is recorded. This fact also is an aid to introspection. Not only, that is, has the reactor the 334 Synthesis of Action. Reaction Experiment means of complete introspective control of his action: the experimenter, who notes the time which the reaction takes, can assist him by the information that the times are different in this and the other case, and that there- fore the processes constituting the action-consciousness in those cases must have been different.
This, then, is what we may call the intrinsic function of the reaction experiment, — to bring together the pro- cesses which make up the action-consciousness, under conditions which are as favourable as possible to their introspection. Incidentally, however, the reaction method has been turned to account in various ways for the illus- tration of other psychological facts or laws. Thus it has been found that the * cognition ' of intensities requires a longer time than the ^ cognition ' of qualities of sensation. This is in entire agreement with a conclusion at which we arrived on other grounds, — the conclusion that the quality of a sensation is its ' absolute ' attribute, while the other attributes are only relative or comparative (§ 26). The reaction method has also been employed to compare different clangs with respect to their unitariness or single- ness of effect. It is found that we cognise a minor third {c-\l.e^ more quickly than we cognise the corresponding major third {c-e\ The minor third, that is, is less single, less unitary, a less complete 'fusion' than the major (§ 49). Again, the reaction method allows us to follow with great accuracy the course of expectation, practice and fatigue, — processes which, as we have seen (§§ 10, etc.), are of extreme importance, owing to their marked influence upon introspection in general.
We have a good illustration of this ' incidental ' value of the reaction experiment in the figures quoted above, § 95 (i) (c^.
§ 9^. The Association Reaction 335 The naming of an unknown colour required 2500-; the naming of an unknown letter or short word, no more than 90 and 70 cr respectively. The reactors in these experiments stated that it was easier to name letters and words than colours, and especially such equivocal colours as rose, brown and violet. A statement of this kind, borne out as it is by the chronoscope figures, throws light upon what we may call the mechanism of mind.
This fact, that it is easier to name a word than a colour, may seem to conflict with the fact, previously noticed (§ 94), that it is easier to cognise a colour than a word. There is no contradic- tion, however. It is easy to cognise a colour because the colour stimulus presents a uniform surface, and asks but little of the active attention. The word-stimulus, on the other hand, is com- posed of letters, which may be very much alike, and which are both small and discontinuous. It therefore puts a greater strain upon the visual attention of the reactor.
There is, finally, one complex mental process for the investigation of which the reaction experiment is espe- cially valuable. This is the successive association of ideas. The method of reaction has proved so useful in the study of the successive association, that psychologists have distinguished a special type of compound reaction, the 'association reaction.' We will devote a Section to its consideration.
§ 98. The Association Reaction. -^ In this experiment, the reactor is told that he will be shown a letter, colour, etc., and that he is to withhold the reaction movement until some one, two, etc., ideas have arisen in his mind at the suggestion of the stimulus. The association reaction, that is, is an extension of the cognition reaction: the stimulus, which is unknown to the reactor at the beginning of the experiment, must be cognised, and then succeeded in con- sciousness by another, centrally aroused idea.
33^ Synthesis of Action. Reaction Experiment The successive association introduced into the course of the reaction experiment may be (i) an association of the kind occurring in the train of ideas, or (2) an associa- tion after disjunction.
(i) The first type of association presents three typical forms. We may leave the reactor entirely free, directing him to wait until the stimulus has suggested some idea, but not limiting the asso- ciation in any way. He has to ' think of something ' before he reacts; but nothing is said as to what the thought must be. An association of this sort is termed a * free ' association. Secondly, we may restrict the range of association somewhat, telling the reactor that he is to think of something which stands to the stimu- lus as part to whole, as attribute, as instance, etc. Thus if the stimulus were the word * chair,* the idea suggested might be chair- seat or chair-leg (part to whole), comfortable (attribute), the reac- tion chair (instance), etc. An association of this sort is termed a ^ partially constrained ' association. Thirdly, the association may be altogether ' constrained.' We may tell the reactor that he is to name the given stimulus, if it be a colour; to translate it into another language, if it be a word^ etc. In such cases there is no choice; the association is constrained to follow one special line.
When we put a question to which there is an unlimited num- ber of answers, the answer actually given is a ' free ' association. When we put a question which admits of several answers, but not of an unlimited number, the answer given is a partially constrained association. When we ask a question to which only a single answer can be returned, we get a constrained association. Ques- tions of these three kinds are asked, as it were, by the stimuli in the association experiment.
{a) Free Associations. — The average time of reaction which includes these associations, in cases where the stimulus used is a short word, is i sec. We must subtract from this total time 2700- for the simple sensorial reaction, and 500- for the 'cogni- tion ' of the stimulus. This leaves us with 6800- as the time taken by the association alone.
§ gS. The Association Reaction 337 {b) Partially constrained Associations. — The duration of this type of association varies very greatly, according to the nature of the stimulus and the character of the directions given to the reactor. Thus if the word ' chair ' is shown, and the reactor required to think of some part of it, the range of possible asso- ciations is very hmited: a chair has at most only back, legs, arms and seat. In such experiments the whole association reaction does not require more than from 650 to 8500-, i.e., the association itself takes place in 330-5300-. If the stimulus word had been less familiar, and the range of possible association similarly limited, the time would have been much greater. Suppose, e.g., that the word ' pen ' is shown, and the reactor required to think of a par- ticular kind of pen. He is probably familiar with half-a-dozen different varieties; but if he has not given much attention to them, it may take him a relatively long time to call any special sort to mind.
If, on the other hand, the word ' white ' is shown, and the re- actor required to think of some substantive to which the adjective is applicable, the range of possible associations is very large. In such cases, there is very little difference between the duration of the partially constrained and of the free association.
{c) Cotistrained Associations. — A constrained association, like the more restricted type of partially constrained associations, may require a very short or a very long time, according to the nature of the stimulus. Suppose, e.g., that names of countries are being shown, and the reactor is associating their capital towns to them. The capital of France would come to consciousness almost automatically (§ 96), in perhaps 3000-; the word 'Paris' is one of the supplementary ideas which we ordinarily associate simul- taneously to the word ' France.' But it might take us a full 7000- to think of the capital of Siam or of Corea.
(2) The second type of association, association after dis- junction, can be introduced into the course of the reaction ex- periment only in its most familiar form, as a simple judgment. Thus the reactor may be told: ' You will be shown words, names of objects, and you are not to react till you have thought of the most important part of each object.' Then, if the word 'chair' 33^ Synthesis of Action. Reaction Experiment is shown, he cannot associate to it the first part of a chair which comes to his mind, but must let his attention play upon the whole idea of chair, and select the most important part. He must pass a simple judgment. It is found that a reaction of this kind lasts about 1500- longer than a 'free association' reaction.
The value of the association reaction, like that of the reaction experiment in general, is twofold. In the first place, it gives opportunity for the introspection of the associative consciousness. In the second place, it confirms, in an objective way, many of the facts with regard to association which introspection had revealed. Thus we learn that it takes longer to argue deductively than to argue inductively; it is less easy to illustrate a principle than to build up a theory from individual facts. Again, the time required for various free associations are indications of the reactor's in- tellectual temperament or constitution (§ 54); and so on.
CONCLUSION CHAPTER XV The Ultimate Nature of Mind. Mind and Body § 99. The Mind of Psychology. — We defined psychology, at the outset of our enquiry, as the science of mental pro- cesses. Mind, we said, is the sum total of mental pro- cesses experienced during a lifetime; or, if looked at from our own special point of view, the sum total of mental processes experienced between the limits of childhood and senility.
We have, however, more than once had occasion to notice the fact that in popular thought and language mind is something more than a sum of mental processes: that it is regarded as a permanent background, against which the processes stand out, or an active and directive prin- ciple, by which the processes are originated or regulated. We have ourselves refused as psychologists to accept the popular view, and have kept within the limits laid down by our definition. But now that our survey of mental processes is concluded, we may pause for a moment to ask whether our rejection is warranted, or whether there is not this one question that still remains to be examined, this one important psychological problem which we have ignored, and which nevertheless calls for explanation.
It is to be noted in the first place that, whether we have or have not faced all the questions that a psychologist is in duty bound to face, we have, so far as we have gone, justi- 340 Ultimate Nature of Miitd. Mind and Body fied 1?he claim of psychology to be called a science. We have ascertained the nature and attributes of the simplest mental functions and processes, and of the bodily func- tions and processes to which they correspond; we have seen how the developed mind is built up from its elements; we have found that there are psychological laws, uniform- ities of mental occurrence, which have as their condi- tion certain physiological laws, uniformities of occurrence within the living body, etc. In short, we have proved that mental phenomena can be arranged in as orderly and systematic fashion as the phenomena dealt with by phy- sics or physiology. There is no fact of mind, as we have defined mind, which has resisted our methods of investi- gation; no process of which we have been compelled to say * We cannot see any hope of accounting for this; it contradicts what we have previously said.' — It may per- haps be, then, that we have neglected a question w^hich we should have raised. But, so far as we have asked questions, we have been able to offer consistent answers.
In the second place, however, there does remain the doubt whether our definition of mind is warranted; whether we should not take up the popular view of mind, and try to give reasons for it, — to reconcile it with our psychology, if reconciliation is possible; to show cause for persisting in our opinions, if reconciliation is impossible. Is there not a mind, behind mental processes } Is not mind active "^ Is not mind single, unitary, — continuous and not disjointed, coherent existence and not a mere aggregate of discon- nected consciousnesses.'* These are all important questions. If psychology can reply to them, and if our psychology has not replied to them, then most certainly our procedure has been unwarranted, and our description of mind is one-sided and incomplete. But can psychology reply to them? Let us consider them in order. — In doing this we must remember always that, within the sphere of psychology, introspec- tion is the final and only court of appeal, that psychologi- cal evidence cannot be other than introspective evidence. On this point all psychologists would be agreed.
(i) There is no psychological evidence of a mind which lies behind mental processes. Introspection reveals no trace of it: whenever we look inward, we find nothing but processes, of varying degrees of complexity. Yet many psychologists believe in the existence of a mind, distinct from mental processes. Here is a riddle, then, which psychology is plainly unable to read.
(2) There is no psychological evidence of a mental * activity,' above or behind the stream of conscious pro- cesses (Ch. VI). Yet many psychologists believe in its existence. Here, again, is a fact which cannot be ex- plained by psychology.
(3) There is no psychological evidence of mental con- tinuity and coherence which cannot be met by evidence of a contrary tenor. It is true that memory-ideas connect the present with the past; but it is equally true that one con- sciousness may be succeeded by another which is totally different from it. It is true that organic sensations, often pleasant or unpleasant, are constituents of all my conscious- nesses; and that I am always called by the same name, always treated as the same self. Yet I know from those- very persons who call me by one and the same name that I have * forgotten ' many incidents of my life; and I know that my selfhood lapses every night in sleep; — I know, that is, that there are great gaps in my mental experi- 342 Ultimate Nature of Mind. Mind and Body ence. Psychology cannot reconcile the conflicting testi- mony.
The three questions, then, are not to be answered by an appeal to introspection. Nor are they answered by any other special science, — e.g., by biology. They cannot be answered till we have brought together the facts of psy- chology a7td the facts of otJier sciences: the facts of the natural sciences, physics and chemistry and physiology and the rest, on the one hand; and the facts of the remaining philosophical sciences, ethics and logic and aesthetics and the rest, on the other. N.ow this co-ordina- tion of all kinds of scientific facts belongs to metaphysics. Our three questions, therefore, must be handed over to the metaphysician.
§ 100. Mind and Body. — We have laid it down as a rule without exception that every mental process has as its condition a bodily process, some change in the centra] nervous system and, more particularly, in the cerebral cortex. ** No psychosis without neurosis: " there is no mental state which has not a peculiar nervous state cor- responding to it.
This rule — the principle of 'psychophysical parallel- ism,' as it is termed — is simply a statement of fact, not an explanation of the relation of mind and body. The bodily process explains the corresponding mental process, because it is the condition under which the mental process appears (§ 4). But the principle of parallelism does not explain itself: it takes mind for granted, in the psycho- logical sense; and it takes body for granted, in the physio- logical definition of 'body.' It merely says: Where there is a mental process, there is also a process in a living body.
It is clear, however, that we have a right to ask for something more than this bare statement of fact; we have a right to ask how mind and body are related in the world at large, how they stand to each other in the general order of events in the universe. This enquiry, like the questions concerning the ultimate nature of mind, belongs to metaphysics. We shall do no good, but rather confuse ourselves, if we attempt to introduce it into psychology. Especially must we be careful to avoid, as psychologists, the popular view that bodily states are the causes of mental, and mental states the causes of bodily: that a ray of light is the cause of a sensation of sight, or an im- pulse the cause of a physical movement. The word * cause' has a very definite meaning, — a meaning which we have no right to read into the phenomena of parallelism, — and a definitely restricted sphere of application.
(i) 'Cause ' is defined by the three concepts of time-sequence, invariability and equivalence. The effect follows the cause; the effect always follows the cause; the effect is equal to the cause. Now although a mental process is always given together with a bodily process, there is no jot of evidence to show that the two are equal, and there is much evidence to show that they are simultaneous and not successive. Hence it is plainly wrong to say that a bodily state is the cause of a mental state, — unless we arbitrarily alter the meaning of the term 'cause ' to fit our problem. (2) Logic does not allow us to reason from one kind of fact to another. It is fallacious to say that because a man is a good hus- band and father, therefore he will be a good monarch, — to argue, i.e., from domestic virtue (one kind of fact) to political ability (another kind). Mental processes are facts of one kind; bodily processes facts of quite another kind. It may be that metaphysics would bring the two orders of fact together; but it is not allow- able to do so within the limits of a special science.
344 Ultimate Nature of Mind. Mind and Body § 10 1. The Mind of Metaphysics. — We might consider that our task is now completed. We have our science in outUne before us; the problems that arise out of it we have passed on to another philosophical discipline, to metaphysics. Nevertheless, it is not satisfactory to ask questions and receive no sort of answer.
We will conclude, then, with a glance at the opinion of a representative metaphysician. And we shall turn nat- urally to the works of Hermann Lotze, — a man who not only exercised a greater influence upon general philosophic thought than any other philosopher of the last generation, but who also did much to advance the special cause of modern psychology. On the question of the ultimate nature, and especially of the unity of mind, Lotze writes as follows: " It is impossible to speak of a bare movement without thinking of the mass whose movement it is; and it is just as impossible to conceive a sensation existing without the accompanying idea of that which has it...Any comparison of two ideas which ends by our finding their contents like or unlike, presupposes the abso- lute indivisibility of that which compares them...And so our whole inner world of thoughts is built up; not as a mere collection of manifold ideas existing with or after one another, but as a world in which these individual members are held together and arranged by the relating activity of this single pervading principle. This then is what we mean by the unity of consciousness: and it is this which we regard as the sufficient ground for assuming an indivisi- ble mind...It is only an indivisible unity which can produce or experience effects at all...Every judgment, whatever it may assert, testifies by the mere fact that it is pronounced at all, to the indivisible unity of the subject which utters it."
And in the course of a discussion of the relation of mind to body: § lOi. The Mind of Metaphysics 345 " We have given up that simple and thorough division of reaUty, which places matter on one side and mind on the other...Everything we supposed ourselves to know of matter as an obvious and independent existence has...been dissolved in the convic- tion that matter itself, together with the space, by filling which it seemed most convincingly to prove its peculiar nature, is nothing but an appearance for our perception, and that this appearance arises from the reciprocal effects which existences, in themselves supersensuous, produce on one another, and consequently also upon the mind." ^ These are the words of a man who was both a psy- chologist and a metaphysician. It is evident, however, that Lotze is speaking here not from the point of view of introspection, but from that of metaphysics. And speaking from this standpoint he uses expressions, some, at least, of which indicate a belief which is not very far different from the view of mind taken by popular thought. The difference is that the philosopher can give reasons for his opinions, whereas in popular thinking a current or traditional belief is accepted unreasoningly; and that the philosopher knows that he is attacking a metaphysical problem, whereas popular thinking draws no line of dis- tinction between metaphysics and psychology.
1 H. Lotze: Metaphysic. 2d ed. Oxford, 1887. Vol. II., pp. 169 ff., 175 f., 190. I have followed the English trans., with the single exception that 1 have rendered Seele by mind. — Cf. the corresponding passages in the Micro- cosmus. 3d ed. Edinburgh, 1888. Vol. I. Bk. ii. chs. i. ii.; bk. iii. ch. i.
INDEX Abstraction, process of, 303; see Idea, abstract.
Action, instance of an, 8, 22; said to give evidence of mental activity, 121; defi- nition and analysis of, 237; upon pres- entation, 239, 243; condition of, 239; upon representation, 240, 243; stages in impulsive, 240; refiex, development of, 248, 250; instinctive, 253; instinc- tive vs. impulsive, 253; selective, 254; volitional, 255; automatic, 256; forms of, 257; synthesis of, 319; see Reaction.
Activity, alleged fact of mental experi- ence, 119, 120, 341; inferred from men- tal experience, 117, 120, 292; supposed physiological condition of, as mental process, 120; said to be present in effort, 121; in active attention, 129; see Mind.
Esthetic sentiments, of beauty, 207; of sublimity, 311; of the tragic and comic, 311; classification of, 312; basis of, 312; in literature, 316.
Affection (conscious element), instance of its investigation, 25; contrast of qualities, 56, 219; definition of, 94, loi; bodily correlates of, 93, 100, 103, 106; qualities of, 94, 105; relation of, to sensation, 96, 98, 99, 100; central and peripheral, 97, 99, 108; methods of investigating, 102, 103, 224, 318; de- scription of, loi; attributes of, 105; and stimulus, 106; intensity of, 107; duration of, 107; Weber's law for, 107; in effort, 124; relation of, to attention, 133, 146, 239, 260; cannot serve as associative link, 229; cannot be di- rectly revived, 281.
Affection, as emotion, 232, impulse, 247.
After-image, duration of, 73; function of, in the time sense, 85; in the idea of movement, 168.
Analysis, the beginning of science, i; is at first analysis of the outward, 2; in psychology, 9, 12, 14, 60; of idea, 68, 150, 288; in association after disjunc- tion, 205, 303, 304; of conation, 122; of attention, 129; of emotion, 219, 229; of action, 237, 324, 326; of recognition, 263; of memory, 271; of sentiment, 304.
Aristotle, 163.
Aristotle, 163.
Association, instance of a successive, 7; nature of, 188; forms of, 189, 190, 211; misleading character of the term, 190; simultaneous, 191, 284; associative sup- plementing, 194, 206, 208, 277; attri- butes of simultaneous, 196; verbal association, 198, 208; illusions, 200; successive, 202, 284; train of ideas, 203, 209; after disjunction, 205, 209, 296; hallucination, fallacy, delusion, 207; law of, 208, 211; formula of, 210, 230; conditions of, 210, 242; alleged law of, for feelings, 229; secondary, in abstract ideas, 298; free, duration of, 336; partially constrained, duration of, 337; constrained, duration of, 337; after disjunction, duration of, 338; re- action, value of, 338.
Attention, variations of, 8; importance of, 33, 39, 125; to affection, impossible, 99; forms of, 126; passive, 126, 130; active, 127, 130, 305; said to give evi- dence of activity as mental process, 128; effort in, 129; development of active from passive, 131; of passive from active, 132, 256, 312, 317, 332; change of ideas in, 132; and affection, 133, 146; final analysis of, 134; attri- butes of, 135; quality of, 135; intensity of, 136; duration of, 136, 140; extent of, 136; degree of, 137; fluctuations of, 141, 142; range of, 144, 174; in selec- tive action, 255; see Reaction.
Index Index Auditory sensations, quality of, 50; of tone, 50; of noise, 51; total number of, 51; explanation of, 52; relation of tone to noise, 53; contrast of, 56; Weber's law for, 81; ideas founded upon, 150, 152; and temporal ideas, 172; and affection, 215,308; reaction Averages, their value in psychology, 41; average and mean variation, in reac- tion experiments, 327.
Biology, its importance for psychology, Blind spot, problem of, 165. Body, why psychology treats of it, 16; and the idea of self, 289; and mind, Buridan, 258.
Cause, body and mind not causally re- lated, 343; definition of, 343; sphere of causation, 343, Clang, a qualitative idea, 176, 180; sim- ple and compound, 177; composition of, 177; clang-tint, 179; of human voice, 179; tonal fusion in, 177, 180, Cognition, development of, from recog- nition, 266; analysis of, 267; devel- opment of, from memory, 278; see Reaction.
Colours, primary, 49; principal, 50; mixture of, 50; aesthetics of, 309, 313; cognition of, 329, 335.
Common sensation, quality of pain, 65; always local, 96.
Comparison, process of, 301; mood in, Conation, definition of, 120; see Effort.
Concept, definition of, 297; see Lan- guage.
Conscious elements, definition of, 13; are never experienced singly, 13, 59, 149, 213; are processes, 15; total number of sensations, 67; affection, 94, loi; is there a third? 116, 119, 120.
Consciousness, popular view of, 4; scien- tific view of, II; artificial and natural, II; always complex, 13, 59, 150; never wholly affective, 213.
Curiosity, sentiment of, i, 315.
Cutaneous sensations, quality of, 56; of pressure, 56, 66, 151; of temperature, 58; Weber's law for, 81; their part in ideas, 152; and spatial ideas, 155, 157, 159, 164, 169; and temporal ideas, 172, 175; and affection, 217; reaction to, Darwin, 21.
Description, part of the problem of psy- chology, 17; of affection, difficult, loi.
Discrimination, process of, 301; see Weber's law. Eye measurement. Time sense. Reaction.
Disposition, importance of general, 40; functional, 277; see Mental constitution.