short time, but ' familiarity breeds ' indifference. On the H 98 Affection as a Conscious Element other hand, a piece of vulgarity which at first offends us may be taken as a matter of course if constantly repeated among those into whose company we are thrown.
Habituation to an experience, then, weakens or destroys the pleasantness or unpleasantness which originally at- tached to it. There is no similar weakening or destruc- tion of sensations. The noise of the sewing machine is heard as clearly as ever, when a friend calls our attention to it; but we smile as we listen, thinking of our earlier unpleasant experience. That experience has gone, not to reappear. This is the second cardinal difference between the two processes.
' But/ it may be said, ' affection is the way in which the organ- ism receives its impressions. How, then, can anything be indiffer- ent? We must receive impressions somehow, whether we are accustomed to them or not.' We reply that the objection does not state the facts quite correctly. Affection is not the ^way,' but the * conscious process corresponding to the way ' in which the organism receives its impressions. Just as there are stimuli which do not arouse a sensation (§ 30), so there is a way of receiving impressions, to which no conscious process whatever corresponds. To explain this, we must emphasise the biological fact of adaptation. The organism is constantly exposed to a multitude of impressions: to sights, sounds, changes of tempera- ture, organic disturbances, etc. Every one of these does, un- doubtedly, exercise a definite effect upon it, for good or for harm. But nervous substance, at the same time that it is very impressionable, is eminently adaptable. The organism adjusts itself to its circumstances, — resigns itself, so to say, to their in- evitableness. When once adaptation or adjustment to surround- ings is complete, the surroundings cease to be taken either pleasantly or unpleasantly: their impressions are simply received, passively and unfeelingly.
'■ Adaptation ' is a biological term. Translated into physiology it § 32. Affect to Ji and Sensation 99 means that the disturbance of nervous equiUbrium (§31) caused by a particular set of stimuU can be adjusted by the lower nerve- centres, without appeal to the highest co-ordinating centre [see (4) below]. There is enough energy stored in these lower centres to repair damage done to the organism by stimulation; and they have functioned in one way so often that they no longer need direction, but can be trusted to do what is required of them when occasion arises.
(3) The more closely we attend to a sensation, the clearer does it become, and the longer and more accu- rately do we remember it. We cannot attend to an affec- tion at all. If we attempt to do so, the pleasantness or unpleasantness at once eludes us and disappears, and we find ourselves attending to some obtrusive sensation or idea which we had no desire to observe. If we wish to get pleasure from a beautiful picture, we must attend to the picture: if, with our eyes on it, we try to attend to our feelings, the pleasantness of the experience is gone.
This difference becomes intelligible when we remember that affection corresponds to the way in which the organism receives its impressions. We can never attend to a way, a manner or mode of acting or being acted on. Suppose that we wish to know ' how ' a steam-engine works. We attend to the parts of the machine, note the different positions which they assume, etc., and so form an idea of the manner in which the engine works. We can attend to this idea easily enough; we can attend to any idea. But the idea of the way is not the way: that, in the nature of things, cannot be attended to.
(4) We have seen that sensations arise in two ways (§ 7), — from peripheral stimulation (flash of yellow light) and from central excitation (remembrance or imagination of yellow). As a general rule, 'central' sensations are 100 Affection as a Conscious Element much fainter and weaker than 'peripheral.' A remem- bered noise has hardly anything of the intensity of the noise as heard. Affection can originate in the same two ways. But ' central ' pleasantness and unpleasantness are not only as strong as — they are in very many cases stronger than — 'peripheral.'
Pleasantness and unpleasantness can be set up peripherally by an impression affecting any sensory nerve. The balance of anabolism and catabolism, of loss and gain, may be disturbed at any point of the peripheral nervous system. They can be set up centrally, again, by an excitation within any sensory area of the cortex, — the visual centre, the auditory centre, etc. But it is necessary in both cases that the disturbance be carried to the highest ' co-ordinating centre ' of the brain, — the cortex of the frontal lobes. If the experience is indifferent, — if the stimulus is too weak to force its way through the lower centres, or has be- come habitual, i.e., can be disposed of by the lower centres, — the frontal lobes are unaffected. They are the scene of anabolic processes (well supplied with oxygenated blood) if the experience is pleasant; of catabolic (scantily supplied with oxygen and feebly irrigated by arterial blood), if it is unpleasant.
There are very few ' peripheral ' affections which can success- fully compete with the * central' affections in the civilised mind. Different men are differently constituted; we find one succumbing to the passion of sexual lust, another to the pleasures of the palate, etc. But the only peripheral affection which can be counted upon to conquer central affection in the average mind is the unpleasant- ness which accompanies an extreme intensity of the common sen- sation of pain: and even this rule has exceptions. Instances of the contrary are plentiful: pleasure in work (central) makes us for- get our dinner hour and the pleasure of eating (peripheral); the glow of pleasure attending a good action (central) leads us to go out of doors in bad weather (peripheral unpleasantness); fear of ridicule (central unpleasantness) prevents our rising to close a win- dow in a draughty concert hall (peripheral unpleasantness), etc.
§ 33- ^^^^ Methods of Investigating Affection loi We see, then, that there are strong reasons for regard- ing affection as different from sensation. It must be carefully noted that the statements just given of these reasons do not tell us hozv ' red,' a sensation, differs from ' pleasant,' an affection, in mental experience. They are sufficient indication that a real difference exists; but the difference itself cannot be described, — it must be expe- rienced.
§ 33. The Methods of investigating Affection. — There are two chief difficulties in the way of affective investigation. We cannot attend to a pleasantness or unpleasantness; and we can describe our affective experience only in a roundabout way. Hence if we were confined exclusively to the employment of psychological method, — the method of experimental introspection, — we should find it very hard to give an adequate account of affective experience. Fortunately, we can supplement this direct method by an indirect, physiological method, which allows us to infer the presence and intensity of affective processes from their bodily consequences.
The second difficulty — that of describing affection — must not be confused with the difficulty of defining affection. It is just as easy to define affection as to define sensation, if we understand by definition a statement (i) of the simplicity of the processes^ (2) of their bodily conditions and (3) of their qualities.
The difficulty of describing affection lies in the fact that spoken language — words and sentences — communicates ideas, and ideas only. If I say ' I am very angry,' you know that I am angry, but you do not feel my anger. A verbal description of affection is therefore always a description at second hand; it translates the affection into an idea of affection, and conveys to the hearer not a pleasantness or unpleasantness, but simply an idea of pleasant- ness or unpleasantness.
I02 Affection as a Conscious Element There is, however, an affective language proper: the language of exclamation and gesture. We have learnt, in the course of civilisation, to repress our emotions: we rarely use this language, and if on occasion we wish to do so, are apt to make ourselves ridiculous. But that the language might have been developed cannot be doubted by any one who has observed dogs and mon- keys, or has seen the effect produced upon an audience by some great actor's presentation of pity or despair.
(i) Psychological Method, — A series is formed of stimuli which belong to the same sense department (col- oured papers, woollen fabrics, etc.). Each in turn is pre- sented to the observer, who gives it his complete attention, and when it has produced its full effect for sensation, asks himself whether it is pleasant or vmpleasant, and whether it is more or less pleasant or unpleasant than preceding impressions. The rule of experimental introspection in the sphere of affection will accordingly run as follows {cf. § 9): Have yottrself placed under such conditions that there is as little likelihood as possible of external interference with the test to be made. Attend to each stimulus as it is pre- sented^ andy when it is remove d^ form an idea (§ ^^ of the pleasantness or unpleasantness zvhich yoic felt during its observation. Put this idea into words ^ stating {\) whether it is an idea of pleasjirable affection, itnpleasiLrable affection or indifference, and (2) in the tzvo former cases, whether it is an idea of m,uch or little, more or less, pleasantriess or unpleasantness. The assistant's account of the conditions, and your own verbal translation {i.e., translation into ideas) of your affective experience furnish data from which other psychologists can work.
It is probable that in every series of stimuli, such as this method requires, there will be some accustomed or habitual impressions.
§ 33- '^^^^ Methods of Investigating Affectioji 103 which are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. These must be marked 'indifferent.' Indifference is not a third affective quality: the indifferent impression is one from which affection has ' worn off.'
(2) Physiological Method. — Affection appears when there is a general alteration of the nervous system, in- cluding its highest co-ordinating organ, by way of anabo- lism or catabolism: in the one case we have pleasantness, in the other unpleasantness. Such an alteration will, of course, show itself in certain bodily effects. Seeing these effects, and knowing that the cause of them • — the nervous change — is the bodily condition of affection, we are able to turn them to account for psychological purposes.
The principal bodily effects are four in number. We find that pleasantness is attended (i) by increase of bodily volume, due to the expansion of arteries running just beneath the skin; (2) by deepened breathing; (3) by heightened pulse; and (4) by increase of muscular power. Unpleasantness is accompanied by the reverse phenom- ena of lessened volume, light breathing, weak pulse, and diminished muscular power. There are special physio- logical instruments by which each of these manifestations can "be measured. If we arrange them so that they record the state of the subject's pulse, muscular strength, etc., and then bring to bear upon him various forms of stimula- tion, calculated to call up pleasantness and unpleasantness in varying degrees, we can infer from the changes in the records how he has * felt ' from moment to moment of the experiment. Introspection is here altogether unnecessary.
Let us suppose that the subject is ' in position ': the chest con- nected with an instrument which writes the respiration curve, the rise and fall of the chest in inspiration and expiration, the left wrist with another, which marks the pulse beats, the right leg with I04 Affection as a Conscious Ele^jient a third, which registers volume, and the right hand ready at com- mand to grip the handle of a * dynamometer,' which will record the amount of muscular force that the hand can put forth. He is told that, whatever happens, he must remain still, in order that the various instruments may not be deranged; and he is told further that the unpleasant stimuli to be employed are not so very unpleasant that he need have any great apprehension of what will happen to him. After a short time has elapsed, a spoonful of some colourless liquid is poured into his mouth. In spite of the assurances given, the records will probably show some trace of agitation at this moment. However, if the liquid is sweet, the pleasantness of the stimulus will at once make itself apparent in the curves, and on the scale of the dynamometer. After another brief interval another stimulus is given: perhaps another sweet, perhaps a bitter, perhaps a tasteless solution. The resulting pleas- antness, unpleasantness or indifference will be clearly marked by the instruments.
The general rules for the introspection of affection are the same as those for the introspection of sensation. We must be (i) impartial, (2) closely attentive to the stimuli, (3) fresh and (4) well-disposed. The last condition is es- pecially important. For the way in which we receive impressions must naturally vary as our * mood ' varies. If we are unusually cheerful, all the stimuli of the series will tend to be pleasant; if we are depressed and melan- choly, the experiment and everything connected with it are likely to be unpleasant. The subject's mood must be care- fully observed and noted by the assistant before the ex- perimental series is begun.
This last rule applies, with even greater stringency, to investigation by the physiological method. We must be quite certain that the pulse, volume, etc., recorded by the various instruments at the beginning of the experiments represent a mental indifference on the part of the observer. The bodily expressions of affection have no value at all, unless we know precisely what the state of the body is before affection appears in consciousness. If we always begin with indifference, increase or decrease of pulse, mus- cular strength, etc., as recorded by the instruments from day to day, gives us a reliable measure of the variations in quality and intensity of the affective process under different experimental conditions.
§ 34. The Attributes of Affection. — Affection has two qualities^ — pleasantness and unpleasantness. Each of these qualities may appear at very different degrees of intensity, and, when present, may last for a longer or shorter time. Neither, of course, has the attribute of spa- tial extent, though we may say, in metaphorical language, that the affection of any moment is ^ coextensive with con- sciousness.'
All three attributes — quality, intensity and duration — call for brief notice here. "" ^ (i) Quality. — We have already spoken of the general bodily conditions under which the two affective qualities appear in consciousness. But we cannot say anything certainly of the degree of nervous loss or gain which cor- responds to a particular intensity of pleasantness or un- pleasantness. Hence in practical life we always refer affections to stimuli, to the external occurrences which eem to give rise to them. And in recording the results f experiments upon affection — whether made by the psychological or the johysiological method — we find it necessary to give the special conditions of their appear- ance, i.e., to name the external stimuli which called them forth on each particular occasion. A general rule has lo6 Affection as a Conscious Element been formulated, on the basis of experiments thus re- corded, to the effect that, other things equal, weak stimuli are indifferent, stimuli of moderate intensity pleasant, and strong stimuli unpleasant.
" Other things equal " is a very needful qualification. If other things are not equal, — if the peripheral affection be reinforced or checked by a central, — the rule does not hold. Thus, if we are seeking to ascertain the minimal sensation intensity, a weak stim- ulus may be absorbingly interesting, instead of being indifferent, as the rule says.
The ' weak ' stimuli of the rule are those which cannot over- come the resistance of the lower nerve-centres, and force their way through them to the frontal lobes. Stimuli of this sort are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. ' Moderate ' stimuli are those which call upon the bodily organs to exercise their normal func- tion, and thus further growth and development. ' Strong ' stimuli are those which make too severe demands upon the organs, /.<?., favour cataboHsm. The rule cannot be made more definite, since ' strong ' and ' weak,' always relative terms, are here doubly relative. ( I ) They are relative in that they vary with the quality of sensa- tion. It takes far more sweet to make a strong sweet than it takes bitter to make a strong bitter; it takes a far louder bass note than treble note to make a strong auditory stimulus. (2) They are relative in that they vary with the excitability of nervous sub- stance. What is strong to one man may be weak to another, or even to the same nervous system at another time. ' Strong ' and ' weak,' that is, change in meaning as the conditions change under which they are applied.
The rule only holds good, again, for stimuli of certain dura- tions. A weak stimulus, long continued, has the same effect upon the organism as a moderate stimulus, operative for a short time. A stimulus of moderate intensity ceases to be pleasant if its opera- tion is prolonged. We either grow accustomed, z>,, become indif- ferent, to it, or we find it unpleasant. Physiology teaches us that a continued stimulation, to which the organism has not adapted itself, decreases the excitability of nervous substance, making towards catabolism. For the same reason an irregular recurrence of stim- ulation, in whatever sense department, is unpleasant: flickering light, ' pins and needles,' jarring sounds, etc. Lastly, a strong stimulus, if it act only for a short time, may be sensed and felt as would a moderate stimulus, longer continued. This is seen, e.g.^ in the carrying or lifting of weights.
(2) Intensity. — It has been suggested — and the sug- gestion is not improbable — that if the intensity of pleas- antness or unpleasantness is to be increased by equal amounts, its stimuli must increase by relatively equal amounts (Weber's law). If my library contains 100 vol- umes, and 10 more are given me, I am as pleased as I should be by an addition of 100 to a library of 1000. At any rate, it is true, as a general rule, that what causes us pleasure and displeasure is proportional to our income, station in life, etc. A child is pleased by a gift to which an adult would be indifferent.
The stamp which completes a *set' in the school-boy's album gives him as much pleasure as the acquisition of the last farm which completes the ring-fence gives the wealthy landed pro- prietor. And an ironical phrase or sarcastic expression of face wounds a sensitive mind as much as an open rebuff or direct affront affects one of coarser fibre.
(3) Duration. — The duration of a pleasantness or un- pleasantness can hardly be estimated. It is very difficult to say just when we cease to be affected by an event and become indifferent to it. Moreover, a peripheral affection is almost invariably blended with and continued in a central; and as the two are precisely the same in quality, nothing can be said of the time at which the one ceases and the other begins.
io8 Affection as a Conscious Element ^'How delightful! — Who could have sent it! " is the exclama- tion that we all make when we receive an unexpected present from an unknown giver. The peripheral pleasantness is hardly there before we begin to imagine reasons for the gift, cast round for the giver, etc., i.e., before a central affection is added to ito And on the other side: how much of our chagrin at a fall on a slippery path is due to peripheral unpleasantness accompanying the pain of the bruise, and how much to central unpleasantness — "How stupid of me to slip!"? Only in very extreme cases, during intense pain, is the affection exclusively peripheral, and in these cases there is generally a rapid passage to unconsciousness (swoon or faint).
CHAPTER VI Conation and Attention § 35. Bodily Tendency and Mental Constitution. — In the last chapter we dwelt upon the fact that the organism receives impressions in a certain way: the consciousness of any moment is made up, not of sensations alone, but of sensations and affection. Having now examined the con- scious processes which correspond to the ' impressions ' and to the 'way in which they are received,' we have, in the present chapter, to consider the nature of the ' or- ganism * itself, — to enquire whether there are any organic functions or processes, altogether independent of stimu- lus, with which other specific conscious processes are connected.
We may define an organism, from our present stand- point, as a bundle of tendencies. A tendency is, by deriva- tion, a * stretching towards.' The living body, as we have regarded it hitherto, consists of two things: the sense- organs and the nervous system. The sense-organs are instruments which work in pretty much the same way for all normal persons. The same sense stimulus will always give rise to the same sensation: a certain ether-wave arouses the sensation of blue in all normal eyes, a body of a certain chemical constitution arouses the sensation of sweet on all normal tongues. And at any given time, each man's nervous system — the most complicated and most no Conation and Attention highly developed part of his body — responds, as a whole, in the same way to the same attributes of stimulus. Mod- erate stimulation is pleasant, excessive or intermittent stimulation unpleasant. But we have seen that there is a great difference between different nervous systems, and in the same nervous system at different times: a particular sense stimulus, while it always produces the same effects in the sense-organ and the part of the brain with which the organ is most directly connected, does 7tot always pro- duce the same effect upon the total nervous system. What is pleasant to one man now may be unpleasant or indifferent to another, and to himself at another time. As between different nervous systems, these differences show themselves antecedently to any habituation of the organ- ism to the impression.
In biological language, the differences are differences of tendency. The nervous system has, in every individual case, certain definite leanings, a bias in certain definite directions. It is more inclined, better fitted, to receive certain impressions than to receive others. In physio- logical language, the functions of the nervous system dif- fer, in degree if not in kind, in every individual case. The nervous system, regarded as a machine, is a machine which can do one kind of work and not another, — or, if it does this other, can do it less thoroughly; and the kind of work, or the thoroughness of its doing, varies from man to man.
We may compare different nervous systems to different languages. The general function of all languages is the same, — the communication of ideas; and the general function of all nervous systems is the same. But just as different languages are differently adapted to the perform- § 35- Bodily Tendertcy aitd Mental Constitution in ance of special functions, — Italian is the language to sing in, German the language to philosophise in, French the language for science, English the language of commerce and practical intercourse, — so different nervous systems are differently adapted to the performance of special func- tions. They have a * tendency ' towards the performance of one, while there is friction of the machinery, more or less serious, if they are called upon to perform others.
The question how tendencies originate is one for the biologist, not the psychologist, to answer. We can merely note here that some are ' natural ' and some ' acquired.'
(i) Natural Tendencies. — The history of an individual does not begin with his first appearance in the world as an individual, an independent centre of experiences, but goes far back to the very beginnings of hfe. Our natural, i.e., inherited tendencies are derived largely from our parents, but in part also from their parents, and in part from remote ancestors. Plainly, we cannot trace the history of such tendencies very fully or very far. But it is sufficient for our present purpose to recognise that every living being is naturally ' selective,' in greater or less degree, — has ' affinities ' for certain stimuli, as chemical elements have ' affinities ' for cer- tain other elements: its surroundings do not all appeal to it with equal force; there are lines of less resistance and Hnes of greater resistance along which its functions may be discharged.
(2) Acqui^-ed Tendencies. — The strength of the natural ten- dencies, however, is very different in different individuals; and the child's nervous system is very plastic, very easily moulded. Hence habit may become second nature: a tendency engrafted on the organism from without may come to such a growth as entirely to overshadow its natural or hereditary leanings. Many a young man whose * taste ' is for art has entered upon a business life with great reluctance and only under the pressure of necessity; but when he has assured himself a competency, and is in a position to relinquish business for his old pursuits, the routine of work has so strong a hold upon him that there is no question of any change of occupa- tion.
112 Conation and Attention Now as we have found that certain local excitations within the nervous system are attended by a specific con- scious process, — sensation; and that the change of equi- librium brought about in the nervous system as a whole by the action of stimuli is also attended by a specific conscious process, — affection; we might naturally suppose that there would be a specific conscious process, a third elementary process, alongside of sensation and affection, correspond- ing to the bias or leaning of the nervous system. But intro- spection affords no confirmation of this view. It does not reveal any trace of a third conscious element, accompany- ing the bodily tendency, the *set' of the nervous system for the discharge of particular functions.
On the other hand, there can be no doubt that, as the condition of mental ' constitution,' bodily tendencies are of great importance for psychology. They mark out the paths, so to speak, which mental processes in general are to follow. No specific mental process is due to them, in the sense in which the specific sensation of red is due to a special ex- citation of retina and visual brain centre; but they cut the channels in which the stream of conscious processes flows, and consequently determine the direction which the stream is to take.
That minds differ, although the processes which make them up are of the same nature, is obvious. Differences of mental consti- tution show themselves in differences of character, temperament, ability, preferred employment, etc. One man is ' steady,' another ' unreliable '; one is ' emotional,' another ' phlegmatic '; one ' tal- ented,' another ' stupid '; one devoted to music, another equally enamoured of the study of medicine.
Many proverbial expressions bear witness to the same fact. "The poet is born, not made" and "The child' is father of the man " point to the existence and persistence of a peculiar mental § 35- Bodily Tendency and Mental ConstittUion 113