_Quickly_. Doth he drink much wine? Then say not, _Wrongly_, but _Much_.
For whence do you know if it were ill done till you have understood his opinion?
2. Thus it shall not befall you to assent to any other things than those whereof you are truly and directly sensible.[1] 3. What is the cause of assenting to anything? The appearance that it is so. But if it appear to be not so, it is impossible to assent to it.
Wherefore? For that this is the nature of the mind, to receive the true with favor, the false with disfavor, and the uncertain with indifference. The proof of this? Be sure, if you can, at this moment, that it is night. You cannot. Cease to be sure that it is day. You cannot. Be sure that the stars are odd in number, or that they are even.
You cannot. When, therefore, any man shall assent to what is false, know that he had no will to consent to falsehood; for, as saith Plato, no soul is willingly deprived of the truth, but the false appeared to it to be true. Come, then, what have we in actions corresponding to this true and false? The seemly and the unseemly, the profitable and the unprofitable, that which concerns me and that which doth not concern me, and such like. Can any man think that a certain thing is for his profit, and not elect to do it? He cannot. How, then, is it with her who saith-- "And will I know the evils I shall do, But wrath is lord of all my purposes?"
_Medea_, 1079.
For, did she hold this very thing, to gratify her wrath and avenge herself on her husband more profitable than to spare her children? Even so: but she was deceived. Show her clearly that she was deceived, and she will not do it; but so long as you show it not, what else hath she to follow than the thing as it appears to her? Nothing. Wherefore, then, have you indignation with her, that the unhappy wretch has gone astray concerning the greatest things, and has become a viper instead of a human being? If anything, will you not rather pity, as we pity the blind and the lame, those that are blinded and lamed in the chiefest of their faculties?
4. ----"So that all these great and dreadful deeds have this same origin in the appearance of the thing?"
The same, and no other. The _Iliad_ is nought but appearance, and the use of appearances. The thing that appeared to Paris was the carrying off of the wife of Menelaus; the thing that appeared to Helen was to accompany him. Had it, then, appeared to Menelaus to be sensible that it was a gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have happened? Not only had there been no _Iliad_, but no _Odyssey_ neither.
----"On such a little thing do such great ones hang?"
But what talk is this of great things? Wars and seditions and destructions of many men, and overthrow of cities? And what is there of great in these? Nothing. For what is there of greatness in the deaths of many oxen and sheep, and the burning or overthrow of many nests of swallows or storks?
----"But are these things like unto those?"
They are most like. The bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of oxen and of sheep. The dwellings of men are burned, and the nests of storks. What is there great, what is there awful in this? Or show me wherein differeth the dwelling of a man, as a dwelling, from the nest of a stork, save that the one buildeth his little houses of planks and tiles and bricks, and the other of sticks and mud?
----"Are a stork and a man, then, alike?"
What say you? In body they are most like.
----"Doth a man, then, differ in no respect from a stork?"
God forbid; but in these matters there is no difference.
----"Wherein, then, doth he differ?"
Seek, and you shall find that in another thing there is a difference.
Look if it be not in the observing and studying of what he doth; look if it be not in his social instinct, in his faith, his reverence, his steadfastness, his understanding. Where, then, is the great Good or Evil for man? There, where the difference is. If this be saved, and abide, as it were, in a fortress, and reverence be not depraved, nor faith, nor understanding, then is the man also saved. But if one of these things perish, or be taken by storm, then doth the man also perish. And in this it is that great actions are done. It was a mighty downfall, they say, for Paris, when the Greeks came, and when they sacked Troy, and when his brothers perished. Not so: for through another's act can no man fall--that was the sacking of the storks' nests. But the downfall was then when he lost reverence and faith, when he betrayed hospitality and violated decorum. When was the fall of Achilles? When Patroclus died?
God forbid; but when he was wrathful, when he bewept the loss of his girl, when he forgot that he was there not to win mistresses but to make war. These, for men, are downfall and storming and overthrow, when right opinions are demolished or depraved.
CHAPTER XVII.
THAT THE PHILOSOPHER SHALL EXHIBIT TO THE VULGAR DEEDS, NOT WORDS.
1. Thou shalt never proclaim thyself a philosopher, nor speak much among the vulgar of the philosophic maxims; but do the things that follow from the maxims. For example, do not discourse at a feast upon how one ought to eat, but eat as one ought. For remember that even so Socrates everywhere banished ostentation, so that men used to come to him desiring that he would recommend them to teachers of philosophy, and he brought them away and did so, so well did he bear to be overlooked.
2. And if among the vulgar discourse should arise concerning some maxim of thy philosophy, do thou, for the most part, keep silence, for there is great risk that thou straightway vomit up what thou hast not digested. And when some one shall say to thee, _Thou knowest naught_, and it bites thee not, then know that thou hast begun the work.
3. And as sheep do not bring their food to the shepherds to show how much they have eaten, but digesting inwardly their provender, bear outwardly wool and milk, even so do not thou, for the most part, display the maxims before the vulgar, but rather the works which follow from them when they are digested.
CHAPTER XVIII.
ASCESIS.
When you have adapted the body to a frugal way of living, do not flatter yourself on that, nor if you drink only water, say, on every opportunity, _I drink only water_. And if you desire at any time to inure yourself to labor and endurance, do it to yourself and not unto the world. And do not embrace the statues; but some time when you are exceedingly thirsty take a mouthful of cold water, and spit it out, and say nothing about it.
CHAPTER XIX.
TOKENS.
1. The position and token of the vulgar: he looks never to himself for benefit or hurt, but always to outward things. The position and character of the philosopher: he looks for benefit or hurt only to himself.
2. The tokens of one that is making advance: he blames none, he praises none, he accuses none, he complains of none; he speaks never of himself, as being somewhat, or as knowing aught. When he is thwarted or hindered in aught, he accuseth himself. If one should praise him, he laughs at him in his sleeve; if one should blame him, he makes no defense. He goes about like the sick and feeble, fearing to move the parts that are settling together before they have taken hold. He hath taken out of himself all pursuit, and hath turned all avoidance to things in our power which are contrary to nature. Toward all things he will keep his inclination slack. If he is thought foolish or unlearned, he regardeth it not. In a word, he watches himself as he would a treacherous enemy.
CHAPTER XX.
THAT THE LOGICAL ART IS NECESSARY.
1. Since Reason is that by which all other things are organized and perfected,[1] it is meet that itself should not remain unorganized. But by what shall it be organized? For it is clear that this must be either by itself or by some other thing. But this must be Reason; or something else which is greater than Reason, which is impossible.
2. "Yea," one may say, "but it is more pressing to cure our vices, and the like."
You desire, then, to hear something of these things? Hear then; but if you shall say to me, _I know not if you are reasoning truly or falsely?_ or if I utter something ambiguous, and you shall bid me distinguish, shall I lose patience with you and tell you, _It is more pressing to cure our vices than chop logic_?
3. For this reason I think the logical are set at the beginning of our study, even as before the measuring of corn we set the examination of the measure. For unless we shall first establish what is a modius[2] and what is a balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh anything?
4. In this case, then, if you have not understood and accurately investigated the criterion of all other things, and that through which they are understood, shall we be able to investigate and understand anything else? and how could we? _Yea, but a modius is a wooden thing, and barren._ But it measures corn. _And logic is also barren._ As regards this, indeed, we shall see. But even if one should grant this, it sufficeth that logic is that which distinguishes and investigates other things, and, as one may say, measures and weighs them. Who saith these things? is it Chrysippus alone and Zeno and Cleanthes? but doth not Antisthenes[3] say it? And who wrote that the investigation of terms is the beginning of education?--was it not Socrates? and of whom doth Xenophon write that he began with the investigation of terms, what each of them signified?
CHAPTER XXI.
GRAMMARIAN OR SAGE.
When some one may exalt himself in that he is able to understand and expound the works of Chrysippus, say then to thyself: If Chrysippus had not written obscurely, this man would have had nothing whereon to exalt himself. But I, what do I desire? Is it not to learn to understand Nature and to follow her? I inquire, then, who can expound Nature to me, and hearing that Chrysippus can, I betake myself to him. But I do not understand his writings, therefore I seek an expounder for them. And so far there is nothing exalted. But when I have found the expounder, it remaineth for me to put in practice what he declares to me, and in this alone is there anything exalted. But if I shall admire the bare exposition, what else have I made of myself than a grammarian instead of a philosopher, save, indeed, that the exposition is of Chrysippus and not of Homer? When, therefore, one may ask me to lecture on the philosophy of Chrysippus, I shall rather blush when I am not able to show forth works of a like nature and in harmony with the words.
CHAPTER XXII.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
1. The clearer be the characters in which a book is writ, the more pleasantly and conveniently shall any man read it. Thus also a man shall listen more conveniently to any discourse if it be conveyed in well-ordered and graceful words. Be it not said, then, that there is no faculty of expression, for this is the thought of a man both impious and cowardly[1]--impious, for he holds in disesteem the gracious gifts of God, as if he would take away the serviceable faculty of seeing, or of hearing, or indeed this of speaking. Did God give the eyes for nothing?
And was it for nothing that He mingled in them a spirit of such might and cunning as to reach a long way off and receive the impression of visible forms--a messenger so swift and faithful? Was it for nothing that He gave the intervening air such efficacy, and made it elastic, so that being, in a manner, strained,[2] our vision should traverse it? Was it for nothing that He made Light, without which there were no benefit of any other thing?
2. Man, be not unthankful for these things, nor yet unmindful of better things. For seeing and hearing, and, by Zeus, for life itself, and the things that work together to maintain it, for dried fruits, for wine, for oil, do thou give thanks to God. But remember that He hath given thee another thing which is better than all these--that, namely, which uses them, which approves them, which taketh account of the worth of each. For what is that which declareth concerning all these faculties how much each of them is worth? Is it the faculty itself? Heard you ever the faculty of vision tell aught concerning itself? or that of hearing? or wheat, or barley, or a horse, or a dog? Nay, but as ministers and slaves are they appointed, to serve the faculty which makes use of appearances. And if you would learn how much any of them is worth, of whom will you inquire? who shall give answer? How then shall any other faculty be greater than this, which both useth the others as its servants, and the same approveth each of them and declareth concerning them? For which of them knoweth what itself is, and what it is worth? Which of them knoweth when it behooves to make use of it, and when not? What is that which openeth and closeth the eyes, turning them away from things which they should not behold, and guiding them towards other things? Is it the faculty of vision? Nay, but the faculty of the Will. What is that which closeth and openeth the ears?--that in obedience to which they become busy and curious, or again, unmoved by what they hear? Is it the faculty of hearing? It is no other than that of the Will.
3. Being then so great a faculty, and set over all the rest, let it come to us and tell us that the best of existing things is the flesh! Not even if the flesh itself affirmed that it was the best, would any man have patience with it. Now what is it, Epicurus, which declares this doctrine, that the flesh is best, which wrote concerning the _End of Being_, and on _Laws of Nature_, and on the _Canon of Truth_?--which let thy beard grow? which wrote, when dying, that it was spending its last day and a happy one?[3] Is it the flesh or the Will? Wilt thou affirm, then, that thou hast aught better than the Will? Nay, but art thou not mad--so blind, in truth, and deaf as thou art?
4. What then? Shall any man contemn the other faculties? God forbid!
Doth any man say that there is no use or eminence in the faculty of eloquence? God forbid--that were senseless, impious, thankless towards God. But to each thing its true worth. For there is a certain use in an ass, but not so much as in an ox; and in a dog, but not so much as in a slave; and in a slave, but not so much as in a citizen; and in citizens, but not so much as in governors. Yet not because other things are better is the use which anything affords to be contemned. There is a certain worth in the faculty of eloquence, but not so much as in the Will. When, then, I speak thus, let no man deem that I would have you neglect the power of eloquence, for I would not have you neglect your eyes, or ears, or hands, or feet, or raiment, or shoes. But if one ask me which is, then, the best of existing things, what shall I say? The faculty of eloquence I cannot say, but that of the Will, when it is made right. For this is that which useth the other, and all the other faculties, both small and great. When this is set right, a man that was not good becomes good; when it is not right, the man becomes evil. This is that whereby we fail or prosper--whereby we blame others, or approve them; the neglect of which is the misery, and the care of it the happiness, of mankind.
5. But to take away the faculty of eloquence, and to say that there is in truth no such faculty, is not only the part of a thankless man toward Him who hath given it, but also of a cowardly. For such a one seemeth to me to fear lest if there be any faculty of this kind we shall not be able to despise it. Such are they also which say that there is no difference between beauty and ugliness. Then were a man to be affected in like manner on seeing Thersites and Achilles, or on seeing Helen and any common woman?[4] Truly, a thought of fools and boors, and of men who know not the nature of each thing, but fear lest, if one perceive the difference, he shall be straightway swept away and overpowered by it.
But the great thing is this--to leave to each the faculty that it hath, and so leaving it to scan the worth of the faculty, and to learn what is the greatest of existing things; and everywhere to pursue this, and be zealous about this, making all other things accessory to this, albeit, according to our powers, not neglecting even these. For of the eyes also must we take care, yet not as of the best thing; yet of these, too, by the very exercise of the best thing; since that shall in no other wise subsist according to Nature save by wise dealing in these matters, and preferring certain things to others.
6. But what is done in the world? As if a man journeying to his own country should pass by an excellent inn, and the inn being agreeable to him, should stay, and abide in it. Man, thou hast forgotten thy purpose; thy journeying was not to this, but through this. _But this is pleasant._ And how many other inns are pleasant, and how many meadows?
yet merely for passing through. But thy business is this, to arrive in thy native country, to remove the fears of thy kinsfolk, to do, thyself, the duties of a citizen, to marry, to beget children, to fill the customary offices. For thou art not come into this world to choose out its pleasanter places, but to dwell in those where thou wast born, and whereof thou wast appointed to be a citizen. And so in some wise it is with this matter. Since, by the aid of speech and such like deliverance, we must come to our aim, and purify the Will, and order aright the faculty which makes use of appearances; and it is necessary that this deliverance of the doctrines come to pass by a certain use of speech, and with a certain art and trenchancy of expression, there are some which are taken captive by these things themselves, and abide in them--one in the gift of speech, one in syllogisms, one in sophisms, one in some such another of these inns, and there they linger and molder away, as though they were fallen among the Sirens.
7. Man, thy business was to make thyself fit to use the appearances that encounter thee according to Nature, not missing what thou pursuest, nor falling into what thou wouldst avoid, never failing of good fortune, nor overtaken of ill fortune, free, unhindered, uncompelled, agreeing with the governance of Zeus, obedient unto the same, and well-pleased therein; blaming none, charging none, able of thy whole soul to utter these lines:-- "Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, Destiny!"
Then, having this for thy business, if some little matter of eloquence please thee, or certain speculations, wilt thou stay and abide in them, and elect to settle in them, forgetting all that is at home? and wilt thou say, _These things are admirable_? Who saith they are not admirable? but for passing through, like inns. What should hinder one that spoke like Demosthenes to be unfortunate? or one that could resolve syllogisms like Chrysippus to be miserable, to grieve, to envy; in a word, to be troubled and unhappy? Nothing. Thou seest now that all these things are but inns, and of no worth; but our business was another thing. When I say these things to certain persons, they think I am rejecting all care about language or speculation. But I do not reject this; I reject the endless occupation with them, the putting our hopes in them. If a man by this teaching injureth those who hear him, reckon me also among those who do this injury. For I cannot, in order to please you, see that one thing is best and chief of all, and say that another is.[5] CHAPTER XXIII.
CONSTANCY.
Abide in the precepts as in laws which it were impious to transgress.
And whatsoever any man may say of thee, regard it not; for neither is this anything of thine own.
CHAPTER XXIV.
HOW LONG?
1. How long wilt thou delay to hold thyself worthy of the best things, and to transgress in nothing the decrees of Reason? Thou hast received the maxims by which it behooves thee to live; and dost thou live by them? What teacher dost thou still look for to whom to hand over the task of thy correction? Thou art no longer a boy, but already a man full grown. If, then, thou art neglectful and sluggish, and ever making resolve after resolve, and fixing one day after another on which thou wilt begin to attend to thyself, thou wilt forget that thou art making no advance, but wilt go on as one of the vulgar sort, both living and dying.
2. Now, at last, therefore hold thyself worthy to live as a man of full age and one who is pressing forward, and let everything that appeareth the best be to thee as an inviolable law. And if any toil or pleasure or reputation or the loss of it be laid upon thee, remember that now is the contest, here already are the Olympian games, and there is no deferring them any longer, and that in a single day and in a single trial ground is to be lost or gained.
3. It was thus that Socrates made himself what he was, in all things that befell him having regard to no other thing than Reason. But thou, albeit thou be yet no Socrates, yet as one that would be Socrates, so it behooveth thee to live.
CHAPTER XXV.
PARTS OF PHILOSOPHY.
1. The first and most necessary point in philosophy is the use of the precepts, for example, not to lie. The second is the proof of these, as, Whence it comes that it is wrong to lie? The third is that which giveth confirmation and coherence to the others, such as, Whence it comes that this is proof? for what is proof? what is consequence? what is contradiction? what is truth? what is falsehood?
2. Thus the third point is necessary through the second, and the second through the first. But the most necessary of all, and that when we should rest, is the first, But we do the contrary. For we linger on the third point, and spend all our zeal on that, while of the first we are utterly neglectful, and thus we are liars; but the explanation of how it is shown to be wrong to lie we have ever ready to hand.
CHAPTER XXVI.
MEMORABILIA.
Hold in readiness for every need, these-- "Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, Destiny, whithersoever ye have appointed me to go, and may I follow fearlessly. But if in an evil mind I be unwilling, still must I follow."
"That man is wise among us, and hath understanding of things divine, who hath nobly agreed with Necessity."
But the third also-- "O Crito, if so it seem good to the Gods so let it be.
Anytus and Meletus are able to kill me indeed, but to harm me, never."[1] THE END.
NOTES.
CLEANTHES HYMN TO ZEUS.
[1] Professor Mahaffy, in his _Greek Life and Thought_, quotes the full text of this noble Hymn, which, he thinks, "would alone redeem the Hellenistic age, as it stands before us, from the charge of mere artificiality and pedantry."
[2] [Greek: iês mimêma lachontes mounon]. This is Zeller's reading, but not Professor Mahaffy's, who has [Greek: henos mimêma].
NOTES.
BOOK I.
CHAPTER I.
1. "Enter by the door" (_cf._ S. John, x. 1). The parallelisms in thought and expression between Epictetus and the New Testament have often been noticed, and the reader will discover many others, to which I have not thought it necessary to draw attention.
"Conceit:" [Greek: oiêsis], _Einbildung_.
3. "To be elated:" [Greek: epairesthai]. One might translate, "to be puffed up," except that that expression is only used in a bad sense, and one may be "elated" in anything that is truly of the nature of the good.
The Stoics distinguished between [Greek: chara], joy, and [Greek: hêdonê], pleasure; not rejecting or despising the former.
CHAPTER II.
1. [Greek: ta men eisin eph' hêmin, ta de ouk eph' hêmin]. A fundamental distinction in the Epictetean system, which he sometimes expresses by the phrases, [Greek: ta hêmetera] and [Greek: ta tôn allôn]--things that are our own and things that belong to others; or [Greek: ta idia] and [Greek: ta allotria]--things that are our proper concern, and things that are alien to us.
2. On the Mons Palatinus in Rome there stood a temple to Fever. Upton quotes from Gruter, p. xcvii., an interesting inscription to this divinity: Febri. Divæ. Febri. Sanctæ. Febri. Magnæ. Camilla. Amata. Pro.
Filio. Male. Affecto. P.
CHAPTER III.
1. There is excellent MS. authority for this reading of the passage, which, however, is not Schweighäuser's. The latter reads: "Be content with them, and pray to the Gods."
2. "Steward of the winds." A quotation from Homer, _Od._ x. 21.
CHAPTER IV.
1. "Through not being dazzled," etc. [Greek: An tas hylas mê thaumasê].
CHAPTER VI.
1. Note that in this passage "God" and "the Gods" and "the Divine" are all synonymous terms.
2. Or "of names."
3. Some texts add "such as Good or Evil."
CHAPTER VII.
1. Apparently a proverb, which maybe paralleled in its present application by Luther's "Pecca fortiter."
2. A complex or conjunctive proposition is one which contains several assertions so united as to form a single statement which will be false if any one of its parts is false--_e.g._, "Brutus was the lover and destroyer both of Cæsar and of his country." The disjunctive is when alternative propositions are made, as "Pleasure is either good or bad, or neither good nor bad."
3. I have followed Lord Shaftesbury's explanation of this passage, which the other commentators have given up as corrupt. It seems clear that whether the passage can stand exactly in the form in which we have it, or not, Lord Shaftesbury's rendering represents what Epictetus originally conveyed.
4. According to the usual reading, a scornful exclamation--"_Thou_ exhort them!" I have followed the reading recommended by Schw. in his notes, although he does not adopt it in his text.
CHAPTER VIII.
1. The founder of the Cynic school was Antisthenes, who taught in the gymnasium named the Cynosarges, at Athens; whence the name of his school. Zeller takes this striking chapter to exhibit Epictetus's "philosophisches Ideal," the Cynic being the "wahrer Philosoph," or perfect Stoic. (Phil. d. Gr. iii. S. 752.) This view seems to me no more true than that the missionary or monk is to be considered the ideal Christian. Epictetus takes pains to make it clear that the Cynic is a Stoic with a special and separate vocation, which all Stoics are by no means called upon to take up. Like Thoreau, that modern Stoic, when he went to live at Walden, the Cynic tries the extreme of abnegation in order to demonstrate practically that man has resources within himself which make him equal to any fate that circumstances can inflict.
2. [Greek: tribônion], a coarse garment especially affected by the Cynics, as also by the early Christian ascetics.
3. "Nor pity." Upton, in a note on _Diss._ i. 18. 3. (Schw.), refers to various passages in Epictetus where pity and envy are mentioned together as though they were related emotions, and aptly quotes Virgil "Aut doluit miserans inopem, aut invidit habenti."
It will be clear to any careful reader that when Epictetus asserts that certain emotions or acts are unworthy of a man, he constantly means the "man" to be understood as his highest spiritual faculty, his deepest sense of reason, his soul. That we are not to pity or grieve means that that side of us which is related to the divine and eternal is not to be affected by emotions produced by calamities in mere outward and material things. St. Augustine corroborates this view in an interesting passage bearing on the Stoic doctrine of pity (_De Civ. Dei._ ix. 5; _Schw._ iv.
132):-- "Misericordiam Cicero non dubitavit appellare virtutem, quam Stoicos inter vitia numerare non pudet, qui tamen, ut docuit liber Epicteti nobilissimi Stoici ex decretis Zenonis et Chrysippi, qui hujus sectæ primas partes habuerunt, hujuscemodi passiones in animum Sapientis admittunt, quem vitiis omnibus liberam esse volunt. Unde fit consequens, ut hæc ipsa non putent vitia, quando Sapienti sic accidunt, ut contra virtutem mentis rationemque nihil possunt."
The particular utterances of Epictetus here alluded to by St. Augustine must have been contained in some of the lost books of the _Dissertations_, as nothing like them is to be found explicitly in those which survive, although the latter afford us abundant means for deducing the conclusion which St. Augustine confirms.
4. This cake seems to form a ridiculous anti-climax. But it appears to have been a vexed question in antiquity whether an ascetic philosopher might indulge in this particular luxury ([Greek: plakous]). Upton quotes Lucian and Diogenes Laertius for instances of this question being propounded, and an affirmative answer given (in one instance by the Cynic, Diogenes). The youth in the text is being addressed as a novice who must not use the freedom of an adept.
Upton quotes from Cymbeline:-- "Hath Britain all the sun that shines? Day, night, Art they not, but in Britain? Prythee, think, There's living out of Britain!"
But Epictetus means more than this in his allusion to sun and stars.--See Preface, xxiv. This passage would lead us to suppose that Epictetus believed in a personal existence continued for some time after death. In the end, however, even sun and stars shall vanish.--See ii.
13, 4.
6. Being arrested by Philip's people, and asked if he were a spy, Diogenes replied, "Certainly I am, O Philip; a spy of thine ill-counsel and folly, who for no necessity canst set thy life and kingdom on the chances of an hour."
7. According to Upton's conjecture, these were gladiators famous for bodily strength; and also, one would suspect, for some remarkable calamity.
8. This highly crude view of the Trojan war might have been refuted out of the mouth of Epictetus himself. Evil-doers are not to be allowed their way because they are unable to hurt our souls, but the hurt may be in the cowardice or sloth that will not punish them.
9. By wearing his cloak half falling off, in negligent fashion. Nothing is finer or more characteristic in Epictetus than his angry scorn of the pseudo-Stoics of his day.
10. [Greek: anakrinon to daimonion]. The allusion evidently is to the genius or divine spirit by which Socrates felt himself guided.
11. Crates was a disciple of Diogenes. His wife was named Hipparchia.
Upton quotes Menander (_apud Diog. L._), "Thou wilt walk about with me in a cloak as once did his wife with Crates the Cynic."
12. Danaus, father of the fifty Danaidæ. Æolus is mentioned in _Od._ x.
as having six sons and six daughters.
13. [Greek: trapezêas pylaôrous]. _Il._ xxi. 69.
14. That is, he capped the quotation by quoting the following line (_Il._ ii. 24, 25). Not a very striking intellectual effort; but Epictetus evidently considered it a meritorious thing to know Homer well enough to quote him in one's sleep, and he was right.
15. From a poem of Cleanthes.
BOOK II.
CHAPTER I.
1. According to the view of James Harris, in a long and valuable note communicated to Upton, the "master-argument" was so called from the supreme importance of the issues with which it dealt. On these issues different leaders of the Stoics took different sides, Diodorus holding both future and past things to be _necessary_, Cleanthes both _contingent_, and Chrysippus past things to be necessary and future contingent. Any two of the three propositions mentioned in the text exclude the third. For modern philosophy the distinction between the possible and the certain in the phenomenal world has, of course, no real existence; the possible being simply that of which we do not know whether it will come to pass or not.
2. Of course Epictetus here speaks ironically; all this is just what it _is_ the business of a thinker to do.
3. Epictetus, I suppose, means to complain that the current phrases of philosophy are dealt out in glib answer to great ethical questions, just as Homer might be quoted for an event in the life of Odysseus, by persons who in neither case think of gaining that vital conviction which only the strenuous exercise of one's own reason can produce. A little later he represents Hellanicus, the historian, as quoted on the distinction between good and evil, who never treated that subject. If it is to be a mere question of _authority_, one _name_ is as good as another, since none is any use at all.
"Indifferent," be it observed, is _morally_ indifferent--that which has in _itself_ no bearing on our moral state. See Chap. II. 2.
4. The followers of Aristotle called themselves Peripatetics.
CHAPTER II.
1. The word in the Greek is [Greek: peristaseis], literally _circumstances_, but the word is evidently used in a bad sense, as equivalent to afflictions. Doom is likewise etymologically a neutral word, but one which has received an evil meaning.
2. Socrates's faith in his genius or "Dæmon" was well known. In this passage from his _Apologia_ (which Epictetus gives from a bad text), it is doubtless the manner only that conveyed the idea of mockery. Neither Socrates nor any one else ever had better evidence of God's existence than His voice in our conscience.
CHAPTER IV.
1. Briefly, the three divisions seem to be Action, Character, and Judgment. The last is to be approached through training in logic, in the penetration of fallacies, etc., by which means a man is to arrive at such an inward and vital conviction of the truth that he can never for a moment be taken off his guard by the delusion of Appearance.
2. Passions, passionless, [Greek: ta pathê, apathês].--See Index of Philosophic Terms.
CHAPTER V.
1. Euripides.--Musonius Rufus, the teacher of Epictetus, is reported to have said, "Take the chance of dying nobly when thou canst, lest after a little death indeed come to thee, but a noble death no more."
2. This phrase of the "open door" occurs frequently in Epictetus, usually when, as here, he is telling the average non-philosophic man that it is unmanly to complain of a life which he can at any time relinquish. The philosopher has no need of such exhortation, for he does not complain, and as for death, is content to wait God's time. But the Stoics taught that the arrival of this time might be indicated by some disaster or affliction which rendered a natural and wholesome life impossible. Self-destruction was in such cases permissible, and is recorded to have been adopted by several leaders of the Stoics, generally when old age had begun to render them a burden to their friends.
3. _Nay, thou shalt exist_, etc.--This is the sense given by Zeller's punctuation. Schweighäuser's text would be rendered, "Thou shalt not exist, but something else will," etc. Upton changes the text (on his own authority) by transposing an [Greek: ouk]. "Thou shalt exist, but as something else, whereof the universe has now no need."
4. This does not appear to have been the law in Epictetus's time, for he himself was educated while a slave. But it was a common provision in antique states.
5. The ceremony in manumitting a slave.
CHAPTER VI.
1. Chap. VI. i. is a passage from the lost Fifth Book of the Discourses, preserved for us in a rather obscure Latin translation by Aulus Gellius.
During a storm at sea, a certain Stoic on board was observed by him to look pale and anxious, though not indeed showing the signs of panic