The " this " appears to retain content solely through our failure. I may express this otherwise by calling it the region of chance; for chance is something given and for us not yet comprehended.1 So far as any element falls outside of some ideal whole, then, in relation with that whole, this element is chance. Contingent matter is matter regarded as that which, as yet, we cannot connect and include. It has not been taken up, as we know that it must be, within some ideal whole or system. Thus one and the same matter both is, and is not, contingent. It is chance for one system or end, while in relation with another it is necessary. All chance is relative; and the content which falls in the mere " this " is relative chance. So far as it remains there, that is through our failure to refer it elsewhere. It is merely " this " so far as it is not yet comprehended; and, so far as it is taken as a feature in any whole beyond itself, it has to change its character. It is, in that respect at least, forthwith not of the " this," but only in it, and appearing there. And such ap- pearance, of course, is not always presentation to outer sense. All that in any way we experience, we must experience within one moment of presentation. However ideal anything may be, it still must appear in a " now." And everything present there, so far as in any respect it is not subordinated to an ideal whole — no matter what that whole is — in rela- tion to that defect is but part of the given. It may be as ideal otherwise as you please, but to that ex- tent it fails to pass beyond immediate fact. Such an element so far is still immersed in the " now," " mine," and " this." It remains there, but, as we have seen, 1 For a further discussion of the meaning of Chance see Chapter xxiv.
THE THIS AND THE MINE. 235 it is not owned and appropriated..It lingers, we may say, precariously and provisionally.
But at this point we may seem to have encoun- tered an obstacle. For in the given fact there is always a co-existence of elements; and with this co-existence we may seem to ascribe positive content to the " this." Property, we asserted, was lacking to it, and that assertion now seems questionable. For co-existence supplies us with actual knowledge, and none the less it seems given in the content of the " this." The objection, however, would rest on mis- understanding. It is positive knowledge when I judge that in a certain space or time certain features co-exist. But such knowledge, on the other hand, is never the content of the mere " this." It is already a synthesis, imperfect no doubt, but still plainly ideal. And, at the cost of repetition, I will point this out briefly.
(a) The place or time, first, may be characterised by inclusion within a series. We may mean that, in some sense, the place or time is " this one," and not another. But, if so, we have forthwith transcended the given. We are using a character which implies inclusion of an element within a whole, with a refer- ence beyond itself to other like elements. And this of course goes far beyond immediate experience. To suppose that position in a series can belong to the mere u this," is a misunderstanding.1 (6) And more probably the objection had some- thing else in view. It was not conjunction in one moment, as distinct from another moment, which it urged was positive and yet belonged to the " this." It meant mere coincidence within some " here " or some "now," a co- presentation immediately given without regard to any " there " or " then." Such a bare conjunction seems to be something possessed by the " this," and yet offering on the other side a 1 See above, and compare also Chapter xxL 236 REALITY.
positive character. But again, and in this form, the objection would rest on a mistake.
The bare coincidence of the content, if you take it as merely given within a presentation, and if you consider it entirely without any further reference beyond, is not a co-existence of elements. I do not mean, of course, that a whole of feeling is not posi- tive at all. I mean that, as soon as you have made assertions about what it contains, as soon as you have begun to treat its content as content, you have transcended its felt unity. For consider a " here " or " now," and observe anything of what is in it, and you have instantly acquired an ideal synthesis (Chapter xv.). You have a relation which, however impure, is at once set free from time. You have gained an universal which, so far as it goes, is true always, and not merely at the present moment; and this universal is forthwith used to qualify reality be- yond that moment. And thus the co-existence of a and b, we may say, does not belong to the mere " this," but it is ideal, and appears there. Within mere feeling it has doubtless a positive character, but, excluding distinctions, it is not, in one sense, coincidence at all. In observing, we are compelled to observe in the form of relations. But these in- ternal relations properly do not belong to the " this" itself. For its character does not admit of separation and distinction. Hence to distinguish elements within this whole, and to predicate a relation of co- existence, is self-contradictory. Our operation, in its result, has destroyed what it acted on; and the product which has come out, was, as such, never there. Thus, in claiming to own a relation of co- existence and a distinction of content, the mere "this " commits suicide.
From another point of view, doubtless, the ob- served is a mere coincidence, when compared, that is, with a purer way of understanding. The rela- tion is true, subject to the condition of a confused THE THIS AND THE MINE. 237 context, which is not comprehended. And hence the connection observed is, to this extent, bare con- junction and mere co-existence. Or it is chance, when you measure it by a higher necessity. It is a truth conditioned by our ignorance, and so contin- gent and belonging to the " this." But, upon the other side, we have seen that the " this " can hold nothing. As soon as a relation is made out, that is universal knowledge, and has at once transcended presentation. For within the merely " this " no relation, taken as such, is possible. The content, if you distinguish it, is to that extent set free from felt unity. And there is no " what " which essentially adheres to the bare moment So far as any element remains involved in the confusion of feeling, that is but due to our defect and ignorance. Hence, to repeat, the " this," considered as mere feeling, is certainly positive. As the absence of universal relations, the " this " again is negative. But, as an attempt to make and to retain distinctions of content, the "this " is suicidal.
It is so too with the " mere mine." We hear in discussions on morality, or logic, or aesthetics, that a certain detail is u subjective," and hence irrelevant. Such a detail, in other words, belongs to the " mere mine." And a mistake may be made, and we may imagine that there is matter which, in itself, is contingent1 It may be supposed that an element, such perhaps as pleasure, is a fixed part of some- thing called the " this-me." But there is no content which, as such, can belong to the " mine." The " mine " is my existence taken as immediate fact, as an integral whole of psychical elements which simply are. It is my content, so far as not freed from the feeling moment And it is merely my content, because it is not subordinate to this or that ideal whole. If I regard a mental fact, say, from the side 1 Or again, having no clear ideas, we may try to help ourselves with such phrases as " the individuality of the individuals."
238 REALITY.
of its morality, then whatever is, here and now, not relevant to this purpose, becomes bare existence. It is something which is not the appearance of the ideal matter in hand. And yet, because it exists somehow, it exists as a fact in the mere "mine." The same thing happens also, of course, with aesthetics, or science, or religion. The same detail which, in one respect, was essential and necessary, may, from another point of view, become immaterial. And then at once, so far, it falls back into the merely felt or given. It exists, but, for the end we are regarding, it is nothing.
This is still more evident, perhaps, from the side of psychology. No particle of my existence, on the one hand, falls outside that science; and yet, on the other hand, for psychology the mere " mine " remains. When I study my events so as to trace a particular connection, no matter of what kind, then at any moment the psychical "given" contains features which are irrelevant. They have no bear- ing on the point which I am endeavouring to make good. Hence the fact of their co-existence is con- tingent, and it is by chance that they accompany what is essential. They exist, in other words, for my present aim, in that self which is merely given, and which is not transcended. On the other hand, obviously, these same particulars are essential and necessary, since (at the least) somehow they are links in the causal sequence of my history. Every particular in the same way has some end beyond the moment. Each can be referred to an ideal whole whose appearance it is; and nothing whatever is left to belong merely to the " this- mine." The simplest observation of what co-exists removes it from that region, and chance has no positive content, except in relation to our failure and ignorance.
And any psychology, which is not blind or else biassed by false doctrine, forces on our notice this THE THIS AND THE MINE. 239 alienation of content. Our whole mental life moves by a transcendence of the " this," by sheer disregard of its claim to possess any property. The looseness of some feature of the u what " from its fusion with the " that " — its self- reference to, and its operation on, something beyond — if you leave out this, you have lost the mainspring of psychical movement But this is the ideality of the given, its non-possession of that character with which it appears, but which only appears in it. And Association — who could use it as mere co-existence within the "this"? But, if anything more, it is at once the union of the ideal, the synthesis of the eternal. Thus the " mine " has no detail which is not the property of connections beyond. The merest coincidence, when you observe it, is a distinction which couples universal ideas. And, in brief, the "mine" has no content except that which is left there by our impotence. Its character in this respect is, in other words, merely negative.
Hence to urge such a character against our Absolute would be unmeaning. It would be to turn our ignorance of system into a positive objection, to make our failure a ground for the denial of possi- bility. We have no basis on which to doubt that all content comes together harmoniously in the Absolute. We have no reason to think that any feature adheres to the " this," and is unable to transcend it. What is true is that, for us, the incomplete diversity of various systems, the perplexing references of each same feature to many ideal wholes, and again that positive special feeling, which we have dealt with above — all this detail is not made one in any way which we can verify. That it all is reconciled we know, but how, in particular, is hid from us. But because this result must be, and because there is nothing against it, we believe that it is.
We have seen that in the " this," on one side, there 24O REALITY.
is no element but content, and we have found that no content, on the other side, is the possession of the "this." There is none that sticks within its precincts, but all tends to refer itself beyond. What remains there is chance, if chance is used in the sense of our sheer ignorance. It is not opposition, but blank failure in regard to the claim of an idea.1 And opposition and exclusiveness, in any sense, must transcend the bare "this." For their essence always implies relation to a something beyond self; and that relation makes an end of all attempt at solid singleness. Thus, if chance is taken as involv- ing an actual relation to an idea, the " this " already has, so far, transcended itself. The refusal of some- thing given to connect itself with an idea is a positive fact. But that refusal, as a relation, is evidently not included and contained in the " this." On the other hand, entering into that relation, the internal content has, so far, set itself free. It has already transcended the " this " and become univer- sal. And the exclusiveness of the " this " every- where in the same way proves self-contradictory.
And we had agreed before that the mere " this " in a sense is positive. It has a felt self-affirmation peculiar and especial, and into the nature of that positive being we entered at length. But we found no reason why such feelings, considered in any feature or aspect, should persist self-centred and aloof. It seemed possible, to say the least, that they all might blend with one another, and be merged in the experience of the one Reality. And with that possibility, given on all sides, we arrive at our conclusion. The " this " and " mine " are now absorbed as elements within our Absolute. For their resolution must be, and it may be, and so certainly it is.
1 Chance, in this sense of mere unperceived failure and pri- vation, can hardly, except by a licence, be called chance. It can- not, at all events, be taken as qualifying the " this."
CHAPTER XX.
RECAPITULA TJON.
It may be well at this point perhaps to look back on the ground which we have traversed. In our First Book we examined some ways of regarding reality, and we found that each of them contained fatal inconsistency. Upon this we forthwith denied that, as such, they could be real. But upon reflection we perceived that our denial must rest upon positive knowledge. It can only be because we know, that we venture to condemn. Reality therefore, we are sure, has a positive character, which rejects mere appearance and is incompatible with discord. On the other hand it cannot be a something apart, a position qualified in no way save as negative of phenomena. For that leaves phenomena still contra- dictory, while it contains in its essence the contradic- tion of a something which actually is nothing. The Reality, therefore, must be One, not as excluding diversity, but as somehow including it in such a way as to transform its character. There is plainly not anything which can fall outside of the Real. That must be qualified by every part of every predicate which it rejects; but it has such qualities as counter- balance one another's failings. It has a super- abundance in which all partial discrepancies are re- solved and remain as higher concord.
And we found that this Absolute is experience, because that is really what we mean when we pre- dicate or speak of anything. It is not one-sided experience, as mere volition or mere thought; but it 242 REALITY.
is a whole superior to and embracing all incomplete forms of life. This whole must be immediate like feeling, but not, like feeling, immediate at a level below distinction and relation. The Absolute is immediate as holding and transcending these differ- ences. And because it cannot contradict itself, and does not suffer a division of idea from existence, it has therefore a balance of pleasure over pain. In every sense it is perfect.
Then we went on to enquire if various forms of the finite would take a place within this Absolute. We insisted that nothing can be lost, and yet that everything must be made good, so as to minister to harmony. And we laid stress on the fact that the how was inexplicable. To perceive the solution in detail is not possible for our knowledge. But, on the other hand, we urged that such an explanation is not necessary. We have a general principle which seems certain. The only question is whether any form of the finite is a negative instance which serves to overthrow this principle. Is there any- thing which tends to show that our Absolute is not possible? And, so far as we have gone, we have discovered as yet nothing. We have at present not any right to a doubt about the Absolute. We have got no shred of reason for denying that it is possible. But, if it is possible, that is all we need seek for. For already we have a principle upon which it is necessary; and therefore it is certain.
In the following chapters I shall still pursue the same line of argument. I shall enquire if there is anything which declines to take its place within the system of our universe. And, if there is nothing that is found to stand out and to conflict, or to im- port discord when admitted, our conclusion will be attained. But I will first add a few remarks on the ideas of Individuality and Perfection.
We have seen that these characters imply a RECAPITULATION. 243 negation of the discordant and discrepant, and a doubt, perhaps, may have arisen about their positive aspect. Are they positive at all? When we pre- dicate them, do we assert or do we only deny? Can it be maintained that these ideas are negative simply? It might be urged against us that reality means barely non-appearance, and that unity is the naked denial of plurality. And in the same way individu- ality might be taken as the barren absence of discord and of dissipation. Perfection, again, would but deny that we are compelled to go further, or might signify merely the failure of unrest and of pain. Such a doubt has received, I think, a solution be- forehand, but I will point out once more its cardinal mistake.
In the first place a mere negation is unmean- ing (p. 1 38). To deny, except from a basis of posit- ive assumption, is quite impossible. And a bare negative idea, if we could have it, would be a relation without a term. Hence some positive basis must underlie these negations which we have mentioned. And, in the second place, we must remember that what is denied is, none the less, somehow predicated of our Absolute. It is indeed because of this that we have called it individual and perfect.
1. It is, first, plain that at least the idea of affir- mative being supports the denial of discrepancy and unrest. Being, if we use the term in a re- stricted sense, is not positively definable. It will be the same as the most general sense of experience. It is different from reality, if that, again, is strictly used. Reality (proper) implies a foregone distinc- tion of content from existence, a separation which is overcome. Being (proper), on the other hand, is immediate, and at a level below distinctions l; though I have not thought it necessary always to 1 Compare here p. 225, and for the stricter meaning of some other phrases see p. 317.
^44 REALITY.
employ these terms in a confined meaning. How- ever, in its general sense of experience, being under- lies the ideas of individuality and perfection. And these, at least so far, must be positive.
2. And, in the second place, each of them is positively determined by what it excludes. The aspect of diversity belongs to the essence of the in- dividual, and is affirmatively contained in it. The unity excludes what is diverse, so far only as that attempts to be anything by itself, and to maintain isolation. And the individual is the return of this apparent opposite with all its wealth into a richer whole. How in detail this is accomplished I repeat that we do not know; but we are capable, notwith- standing, of forming the idea of such a positive union (Chapters xiv. and xxvii.). Feeling supplies us with a low and imperfect example of an immediate whole. And, taking this together with the idea of qualification by the rejected, and together with the idea of unknown qualities which come in to help — we arrive at individuality. And, though depending on negation, such a synthesis is positive.
And, in a different way, the same account is valid of the Perfect. That does not mean a being which, in regard to unrest and painful struggle, is a simple blank. It means the identity of idea and existence, attended also by pleasure. Now, so far as pleasure goes, that certainly is not negative. But pleasure is far from being the only positive element in perfec- tion. The unrest and striving, the opposition of fact to idea, and the movement towards an end — these features are not left outside of that Whole which is consummate. For all the content, which the struggle has generated, is brought home and is laid to rest un- diminished in the perfect. The idea of a being quali- fied somehow, without any alienation of its "what" from its "that" — a being at the same time fully possessed of all hostile distinctions, and the richer for their strife — this is a positive idea. And it can RECAPITULATION. 245 be realised in its outline, though certainly not in detail.
I will advert in conclusion to an objection drawn from a common mistake. Quantity is often intro- duced into the idea of perfection. For the perfect seems to be that beyond which we cannot go, and this tends naturally to take the form of an infinite num- ber. But, since any real number must be finite, we are at once involved here in a hopeless contra- diction. And I think it necessary to say no more on this evident illusion; but will pass on to the objection which may be urged against our view of the perfect. If the perfect is the concordant, then no growth of its area or increase of its pleasantness could make it more complete. We thus, apparently, might have the smallest being as perfect as the largest; and this seems paradoxical. But the para- dox really, I should say, exists only through mis- understanding. For we are accustomed to beings whose nature is always and essentially defective. And so we suppose in our smaller perfect a condition of want, or at least of defect; and this condition is diminished by alteration in quantity. But, where a being is really perfect, our supposition would be absurd. Or, again, we imagine first a creature com- plete in itself, and by the side of it we place a larger completion. Then unconsciously we take the greater to be, in some way, apprehended by the smaller; and, with this, naturally the lesser being becomes by contrast defective. But what we fail to observe is that such a being can no longer be perfect. For an idea which is not fact has been placed by us within it; and that idea at once involves a collision of ele- ments, and by consequence also a loss of perfection. And thus a paradox has been made by our misun- derstanding. We assumed completion, and then surreptitiously added a condition which destroyed it. And this, so far, was a mere error.
246 REALITY.
But the error may direct our attention to a truth. It leads us to ask if two perfections, great and small, can possibly exist side by side. And we must answer in the negative. If we take perfection in its full sense, we cannot suppose two such perfect exist- ences. And this is not because one surpasses the other in size; for that is wholly irrelevant. It is because finite existence and perfection are incom- patible. A being, short of the Whole, but existing within it, is essentially related to that which is not- itself. Its inmost being is, and must be, infected by the external. Within its content there are rela- tions which do not terminate inside. And it is clear at once that, in such a case, the ideal and the real can never be at one. But their disunion is precisely what we mean by imperfection. And thus incom- pleteness, and unrest, and unsatisfied ideality, are the lot of the finite. There is nothing which, to speak properly, is individual or perfect, except only the Absolute.
CHAPTER XXI.
SOLIPSISM.
In our First Book we examined various ways of taking facts, and we found that they all gave no more than appearance. In the present Book we have been engaged with the nature of Reality. We have been attempting, so far, to form a general idea of its character, and to defend it against more or less plausible objections. Through the remainder of our work we must pursue the same task. We must endeavour to perceive how the main aspects of the world are all able to take a place within our Absolute. And, if we find that none refuses to accept a posi- tion there, we may consider our result secure against attack. I will now enter on the question which gives its title to this chapter.
Have we any reason to believe in the existence of anything beyond our private selves? Have we the smallest right to such a belief, and is it more than literally a self-delusion? We, I think, may fairly say that some metaphysicians have shown unwilling- ness to look this problem in the face. And yet it cannot be avoided. Since we all believe in a world beyond us, and are not prepared to give this up, it would be a scandal if that were something which upon our theory was illusive. Any view which will not explain, and also justify, an attitude essential to human nature, must surely be condemned. But we shall soon see, upon the other hand, how the supposed difficulties of the question have been created by false 248 REALITY.
doctrine. Upon our general theory they lose their foundation and vanish.
The argument in favour of Solipsism, put most simply, is as follows. " I cannot transcend experi- ence, and experience must be my experience. From this it follows that nothing beyond my self exists; for what is experience is its states."
The argument derives its strength, in part, from false theory, but to a greater extent perhaps from thoughtless obscurity. I will begin by pointing out the ambiguity which lends some colour to this appeal to experience. Experience may mean experience only direct, or indirect also. Direct experience I understand to be confined to the given simply, to the merely felt or presented. But indirect experi- ence includes all fact that is constructed from the basis of the " this " and the " mine." It is all that is taken to exist beyond the felt moment. This is a distinction the fatal result of which Solipsism has hardly realized; for upon neither interpretation of experience can its argument be defended.
I. Let us first suppose that the experience, to which it appeals, is direct. Then, we saw in our ninth chapter, the mere "given" fails doubly to support that appeal. It supplies, on the one hand, not enough, and, on the other hand, too much. It offers us a not-self with the self, and so ruins Solipsism by that excess. But, upon the other side, it does not supply us with any self at all, if we mean by self a substantive the possessor of an object or even its own states. And Solipsism is, on this side, destroyed by defect. But, before I develope this, I will state an objection which by itself might suffice.
My self, as an existence to which phenomena belong as its adjectives, is supposed to be given by a direct experience. But this gift plainly is an illu- sion. Such an experience can supply us with no reality beyond that of the moment. There is no faculty which can deliver the immediate revelation SOLIPSISM. 249 SOLIPSISM. 249 of a self beyond the present (Chapter x.). And so, if Solipsism finds its one real thing in experience, that thing is confined to the limits of the mere M this." But with such a reflection we have already, so far, destroyed Solipsism as positive, and as anything more than a sufficient reason for total scepticism. Let us pass from this objection to other points.
Direct experience is unable to transcend the mere " this." But even in what that gives we are, even so far, not supplied with the self upon which Solip- sism is founded. We have always instead either too much or too little. For the distinction and separa- tion of subject and object is not original at all, and is, in that sense, not a datum. And hence the self cannot, without qualification, be said to be given (ibid.). I will but mention this point, and will goon to another. Whatever we may think generally of our original mode of feeling, we have now verifiably some states in which there is no reference to a sub- ject at all (ibid.). And if such feelings are the mere adjectives of a subject-reality, that character must be inferred, and is certainly not given. But it is not necessary to take our stand on this disputable ground. Let us admit that the distinction of object and subject is directly presented — and we have still hardly made a step in the direction of Solipsism. For the subject and the object will now appear in correlation; they will be either two aspects of one fact, or (if you prefer it) two things with a relation between them. And it hardly follows straight from this that only one of these two things is real, and that