lessly and to love it knows not what; when, in short, twilight has no charm — then metaphysics will be worthless. For the question (as things are now) is not whether we are to reflect and ponder on ultimate truth — for perhaps most of us do that, and are not likely to cease. The question is merely as to the way in which this should be done. And the claim of metaphysics is surely not unreasonable. Metaphysics takes its stand on this side of human nature, this desire to think about and comprehend reality. And it merely asserts that, if the attempt is to be made, it should be done as thoroughly as our nature permits. There is no claim on its part to supersede other functions of the human mind; but it protests that, if we are to think, we should sometimes try to think properly. And the opponent of metaphysics, it appears to me, is driven to a dilemma. He must either condemn all reflection on the essence of things, — and, if so, he breaks, or, rather, tries to break, with part of the highest side of human nature, — or else he allows us to think, but not to think strictly. He permits, that is to say, the exercise of thought so long as it is entangled with other functions of our being; but as soon as it attempts a pure development of its own, guided by the principles of its own distinc- tive working, he prohibits it forthwith. And this appears to be a paradox, since it seems equivalent to saying, You may satisfy your instinctive longing to reflect, so long as you do it in a way which is unsatisfactory. If your character is such that in youf thought is satisfied by what does not, and cannot, pretend to be thought proper, that is quite legiti- mate. But if you are constituted otherwise, and if in you a more strict thinking is a want of your nature, that is by all means to be crushed out. And, speaking for myself, I must regard this as at once dogmatic and absurd.
But the reader, perhaps, may press me with a INTRODUCTION. 5 different objection. Admitting, he may say, that thought about reality is lawful, I still do not under- stand why, the results being what they are, you should judge it to be desirable. And I will try to answer this frankly. I certainly do not suppose that it would be good for every one to study metaphysics, and I cannot express any opinion as to the number of persons who should do so. But I think it quite necessary, even on the view that this study can pro- duce no positive results, that it should still be pur- sued. There is, so far as I can see, no other certain way of protecting ourselves against dogmatic super- stition. Our orthodox theology on the one side, and our common-place materialism on the other side (it is natural to take these as prominent instances), vanish like ghosts before the daylight of free scepti- cal enquiry. I do not mean, of course, to condemn wholly either of these beliefs; but I am sure that either, when taken seriously, is the mutilation of our nature. Neither, as experience has amply shown, can now survive in the mind which has thought sincerely on first principles; and it seems desirable that there should be such a refuge for the man who burns to think consistently, and yet is too good to become a slave, either to stupid fanaticism or dishonest sophistry. That is one reason why I think that metaphysics, even if it end in total scepti- cism, should be studied by a certain number of persons.
And there is a further reason which, with myself perhaps, has even more weight. All of us, I pre- sume, more or less, are led beyond the region of ordinary facts. Some in one way and some in others, we seem to touch and have communion with what is beyond the visible world. In various manners we find something higher, which both supports and humbles, both chastens and transports us. And, with certain persons, the intellectual effort to under- stand the universe is a principal way of thus ex- 6 INTRODUCTION.
periencing the Deity. No one, probably, who has not felt this, however differently he might describe it, has ever cared much for metaphysics. And, where- ever it has been felt strongly, it has been its own justification. The man whose nature is such that by one path alone his chief desire will reach con- summation, will try to find it on that path, whatever it may be, and whatever the world thinks of it; and, if he does not, he is contemptible. Self-sacrifice is too often the " great sacrifice " of trade, the giving cheap what is worth nothing. To know what one wants, and to scruple at no means that will get it, may be a harder self-surrender. And this appears to be another reason for some persons pursuing the study of ultimate truth.
(c) And that is why, lastly, existing philosophies cannot answer the purpose. For whether there is progress or not, at all events there is change; and the changed minds of each generation will require a difference in what has to satisfy their intellect. Hence there seems as much reason for new philo- sophy as there is for new poetry. In each case the fresh production is usually much inferior to something already in existence; and yet it answers a purpose if it appeals more personally to the reader. What is really worse may serve better to promote, in cer- tain respects and in a certain generation, the exercise of our best functions. And that is why, so long as we alter, we shall always want, and shall always have, new metaphysics.
I will end this introduction with a word of warn- ing. I have been obliged to speak of philosophy as a satisfaction of what may be called the mystical side of our nature — a satisfaction which, by certain per- sons, cannot be as well procured otherwise. And I may have given the impression that I take the metaphysician to be initiated into something far higher than what the common herd possesses. Such a doctrine would rest on a most deplorable error, INTRODUCTION. 7 INTRODUCTION. 7 the superstition that the mere intellect is the highest side of our nature, and the false idea that in the in- tellectual world work done on higher subjects is for that reason higher work. Certainly the life of one man, in comparison with that of another, may be fuller of the Divine, or, again, may realize it with an intenser consciousness; but there is no calling or pursuit which is a private road to the Deity. And assuredly the way through speculation upon ultimate truths, though distinct and legitimate, is not superior to others. There is no sin, however prone to it the philosopher may be, which philosophy can justify so little as spiritual pride.
BOOK I. APPEARANCE CHAPTER I.
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES.
The fact of illusion and error is in various ways forced early upon the mind; and the ideas by which we try to understand the universe, may be considered as attempts to set right our failure. In this division of my work I shall criticize some of these, and shall endeavour to show that they have not reached their object. I shall point out that the world, as so understood, contradicts itself; and is therefore appearance, and not reality.
In this chapter I will begin with the proposal to make things intelligible by the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. This view is old, but, I need hardly say, is far from obsolete, nor can it ever disappear. From time to time, without doubt, so long as there are human beings, it will reappear as the most advanced and as the one scientific theory of first principles. And I begin with it, because it is so simple, and in the main so easily disposed of. The primary qualities are those aspects of what we perceive or feel, which, in a word, are spatial; and the residue is secondary. The solution of the world s enigma lies in taking the former as reality, and everything else somehow as derivative, and as more or less justifiable appear- ance.
The foundation of this view will be known to the reader, but for the sake of clearness I must trace it in outline. We assume that a thing must be self- / / 1 2 APPEARANCE.
consistent and self-dependent. It either has a quality or has not got it And, if it has it, it can not have it only sometimes, and merely in this or that relation. But such a principle is the condem- nation of secondary qualities.
It matters very little how in detail we work with it. A thing is coloured, but not coloured in the same way to every eye; and, except to some eye, it seems not coloured at all. Is it then coloured or not? And the eye—- relation to which appears somehow to make the quality — does that itself possess colour? Clearly not so, unless there is another eye which sees it. Nothing therefore is really coloured; colour seems only to belong to what itself is colourless. And the same result holds, again, with cold and heat. A thing may be cold or hot according to different parts of my skin; and, without some relation to a skin, it seems without any such quality. And, by a like argument, the skin is proved not itself to own the quality, which is hence possessed by nothing. And sounds, not heard, are hardly real; while what hears them is the ear, it- self not audible, nor even always in the enjoyment of sound. With smell and with taste the case seems almost worse; for they are more obviously mixed up with our pleasure and pain. If a thing tastes only in the mouth, is taste its quality? Has it smell where there is no nose? But nose and tongue are smelt or tasted only by another nose or tongue; nor can either again be said to have as a quality what they sometimes enjoy. And the pleasant and disgusting, which we boldly locate in the object, how can they be there? Is a thing delightful or sickening really and in itself? Am even I the constant owner of these wandering adjectives? — But I will not weary the reader by insistence on detail. The argument shows every- where that things have secondary qualities only for an organ; and that the organ itself has these \ PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES. 1 3 qualities in no other way. They are found to be adjectives, somehow supervening on relations of the extended. The extended only is real. And the facts of what is called subjective sensation, under which we may include dream and delusion of all kinds, may be adduced in support. They go to show that, as we can have the sensation without the object, and the object without the sensation, the one cannot possibly be a quality of the other. The secondary qualities, therefore, are appearance, coming from the reality, which itself has no quality but extension.
This argument has two sides, a negative and a positive. The first denies that secondary qualities are the actual nature of things, the second goes on to make an affirmation about the primary. I will enquire first if the negative assertion is justified. I will not dispute the truth of the principle that, if a thing has a quality, it must have it; but I will ask whether on this basis some defence may not be made. And we may attempt it in this way. All the arguments, we may protest, do but show defect in, or interference with, the organ of perception. The fact that I cannot receive the secondary qualities except under certain conditions, fails to prove that they are not there and existing in the thing. And, supposing that they are there, still the argument proves their absence, and is hence unsound. And sheer delusion and dreams do not overthrow this defence. The qualities are constant in the things themselves; and, if they fail to impart themselves, or impart themselves wrongly, that is always due to something outside their nature. If we could per- ceive them, they are there.
But this way of defence seems hardly tenable.
For, if the qualities impart themselves never except under conditions, how in the end are we to say what they are when unconditioned? Having once in, and having been compelled, to take their C4 APPEARANCE.
appearance into the account, we cannot afterwards strike it out. It being admitted that the qualities come to us always in a relation, and always as appearing, then certainly we know them only as appearance. And the mere supposition that in themselves they may really be what they are, seems quite meaningless or self-destructive. Further, we may enforce this conclusion by a palpable instance. To hold that one's mistress is charming, ever and in herself, is an article of faith, and beyond reach of question. But, if we turn to common things, the result will be otherwise. We observed that the disgusting and the pleasant may make part of the character of a taste or a smell, while to take these aspects as a constant quality, either of the thing or of the organ, seems more than unjustifiable, and even almost ridiculous. And on the whole we must admit that the defence has broken down. The secondary qualities must be judged to be merely appearance.
But are they the appearance of the primary, and are these the reality? The positive side of the contention was that in the extended we have the essence of the thing; and it is necessary to ask if this conclusion is true. The doctrine is, of course, materialism, and is a very simple creed. What is extended, together with its spatial relations, is sub- stantive fact, and the rest is adjectival. We have not to ask here if this view is scientific, in the sense of being necessarily used for work in some sciences. That has, of course, nothing to do with the ques- tion now before us, since we are enquiring solely whether the doctrine is true. And, regarded in this way, perhaps no student would call materialism scientific.
I will indicate briefly the arguments against the sole reality of primary qualities, (a) In the first place, we may ask how, in the nature of the extended, the terms stand to the relations which have to hold PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES. 1 5 between them. This is a problem to be handled (Chapter iv.), and I will only remark here that its result is fatal to materialism. And, {b) in the second place, the relation of the primary qualities to the secondary — in which class feeling- and thought have presumably to be placed — seems wholly unin- telligible. For nothing is actually removed from existence by being labelled " appearance." What appears is there, and must be dealt with; but materialism has no rational way of dealing with appearance. Appearance must belong, and yet can- not belong, to the extended. It neither is able to fall somewhere apart, since there is no other real place; nor ought it, since, if so, the relation would vanish and appearance would cease to be derivative. But, on the other side, if it belongs in any sense to the reality, how can it be shown not to infect that with its own unreal character? Or we may urge that matter must cease to be itself, if qualified essentially by all that is secondary. But, taken otherwise, it has become itself but one out of two elements, and is not the reality.
And, (c) thirdly, the line of reasoning which showed that secondary qualities are not real, has equal force as applied to primary. The extended' comes to us only by relation to an organ; and, whether the organ is touch or is sight or muscle- feeling — or whatever else it may be — makes no difference to the argument For, in any case, the thing is perceived by us through an affection of our body, and never without that. And our body itself is no exception, for we perceive that, as extended,; solely by the action of one part upon another per- cipient part. That we have no miraculous intuition of our body as spatial reality is perfectly certain. But, if so, the extended thing will have its quality only when perceived by something else; and the percipient something else is again in the same case. Nothing, in short, proves extended except in relation 1 6 APPEARANCE.
to another thing, which itself does not possess the quality, if you try to take it by itself. And, further, the objection from dream and delusion holds again. That objection urges that error points to a necessary relation of the object to our knowledge, even where error is not admitted. But such a relation would reduce every quality to appearance. We might, indeed, attempt once more here to hold the former line of defence. We might reply that the extended thing is a fact real by itself, and that only its relation to our percipience is variable. But the inevitable conclusion is not so to be averted. If a thing is known to have a quality only under a certain con- dition, there is no process of reasoning from this which will justify the conclusion that the thing, if unconditioned, is yet the same. This seems quite certain; and, to go further, if we have no other source of information, if the quality in question is non-existent for us except in one relation, then for us to assert its reality away from that relation is more than unwarranted. It is, to speak plainly, an attempt in the end without meaning. And it would seem that, if materialism is to stand, it must somehow get to the existence of primary qualities in a way which avoids their relation to an organ. But since, as we shall hereafter see (Chapter iv.), their very essence is relative, even this refuge is closed.
(d) But there is a more obvious argument against the sole reality of spatial qualities; and, if I were writing for the people an attack upon materialism, I should rest great weight on this point. Without secondary quality extension is not conceivable, and no one can bring it, as existing, before his mind if he keeps it quite pure. In short, it is the violent abstraction of one aspect from the rest, and the mere confinement of our attention to a single side of things, a fiction which, forgetting itself, takes a ghost for solid reality. And I will say a few words on this obvious answer to materialism.
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES. 1 7 That doctrine, of course, holds that the extended can be actual, entirely apart from every other quality. But extension is never so given. If it is visual, it must be coloured; and if it is tactual, or acquired in the various other ways which may fall under the head of the " muscular sense," — then it is never free from sensations, coming from the skin, or the joints, or the muscles, or, as some would like tc add, from a central source. And a man may say what he likes, but he cannot think of extension without thinking at the same time of a " what " that is extended. And not only is this so, but particular differences, such as " up and down," " right and left," are necessary to the terms of the spatial re- lation. But these differences clearly are not merely spatial. Like the general " what," they will consist in all cases of secondary quality from a sensation of the kinds I have mentioned above. Some psycho- logists, indeed, could go further, and could urge that the secondary qualities are original, and the primary derivative; since extension (in their view) is a con- struction or growth from the wholly non-extended. I could not endorse that, but I can appeal to what is indisputable. Extension cannot be presented, or thought of, except as one with quality that is secondary. It is by itself a mere abstraction, for some purposes necessary, but ridiculous when taken as an existing thing. Yet the materialist, from defect of nature or of education, or probably both, worships without justification this thin product of his untutored fancy.
44 Not without justification," he may reply, 44 since in the procedure of science the secondary qualities are explained as results from the primary. Obviously, therefore, these latter are independent and prior." But this is a very simple error. For suppose that you have shown that, given one element, A, an- other, 6, does in fact follow on it; suppose that you can prove that b comes just the same, whether A is 1 8 APPEARANCE.
attended by c, or d> or e, or any one of a number of other qualities, you cannot go from this to the re- sult that A exists and works naked. The secondary b can be explained, you urge, as issuing from the primary A, without consideration of aught else. Let it be so; but all that could follow is, that the special natures of A's accompaniments are not concerned in the process. There is not only no proof, but there is not even the very smallest presumption, that A could act by itself, or could be a real fact if alone. It is doubtless scientific to disregard certain aspects when we work; but to urge that therefore such as- pects are not fact, and that what we use without regard to them is an independent real thing, — this is barbarous metaphysics.
We have found then that, if the secondary quali- ties are appearance, the primary are certainly not able to stand by themselves. This distinction, from which materialism is blindly developed, has been seen to bring us no nearer to the true nature of reality.
CHAPTER II.
SUBSTANTIVE AND ADJECTIVE.
We have seen that the distinction of primary from secondary qualities has not taken us far. Let us, without regard to it, and once more directly turning to what meets us, examine another way of making that intelligible. We find the world's contents grouped into things and their qualities. The sub- stantive and adjective is a time-honoured distinction and arrangement of facts, with a view to understand them and to arrive at reality. I must briefly point out the failure of this method, if regarded as a serious attempt at theory.
We may take the familiar instance of a lump of sugar. This is a thing, and it has properties, adjec- tives which qualify it. It is, for example, white, and hard, and sweet The sugar, we say, is all that; but what the is can really mean seems doubtful. A thing is not any one of its qualities, if you take that quality by itself; if "sweet" were the same as "simply sweet," the thing would clearly be not sweet. And, again, in so far as sugar is sweet it is not white or hard; for these properties are all distinct Nor, again, can the thing be all its properties, if you take them each severally. Sugar is obviously not mere whiteness, mere hardness, and mere sweetness; for its reality lies somehow in its unity. But if, on the other hand, we inquire what there can be in the thing beside its several qualities, we are baffled once more. We can discover no real unity existing out- side these qualities, or, again, existing within them.
20 APPEARANCE.
But it is our emphasis, perhaps, on the aspect of unity which has caused this confusion. Sugar is, of course, not the mere plurality of its different adjec- tives; but why should it be more than its properties in relation? When " white," " hard," " sweet," and the rest co-exist in a certain way, that is surely the secret of the thing. The qualities are, and are in re- lation. But here, as before, when we leave phrases we wander among puzzles. " Sweet," " white," and "hard" seem now the subjects about which we are saying something. We certainly do not predicate one of the other; for, if we attempt to identify them, they at once resist. They are in this wholly incom- patible, and, so far, quite contrary. Apparently, then, a relation is to be asserted of each. One quality, A, is in relation with another quality, B. But what are we to understand here by is? We do not mean that " in relation with B " is A, and yet we assert that A is "in relation with B." In the same way C is called " before D," and E is spoken of as being " to the right of F? We say all this, but from the interpretation, then " before D " is C, and " to the right of F"is £, we recoil in horror. No, we should reply, the relation is not identical with the thing. It is only a sort of attribute which inheres or belongs. The word to use, when we are pressed, should not be is, but only has. But this reply comes to very little. The whole question is evidently as to the meaning of has; and, apart from metaphors not taken seriously, there appears really to be no answer. And we seem unable to clear ourselves from the old dilemma, If you predicate what is different, you as- cribe to the subject what it is not; and if you predi- cate what is not different, you say nothing at all.
Driven forward, we must attempt to modify our statement. We must assert the relation now, not of one term, but of both. A and B are identical in such a point, and in such another point they differ; or, again, they are so situated in space or in time. And SUBSTANTIVE AND ADJECTIVE. 21 thus we avoid is, and keep to are. But, seriously, that does not look like the explanation of a difficulty; it looks more like trifling with phrases. For, if you mean that A and Bf taken each severally, even " have " this relation, you are asserting what is false. But if you mean that A and B in such a relation are so related, you appear to mean nothing. For here, as before, if the predicate makes no difference, it is idle; but, if it makes the subject other than it is, it is false.
But let us attempt another exit from this be- wildering circle. Let us abstain from making the relation an attribute of the related, and let us make it more or less independent. " There is a relation C, in which A and B stand; and it appears with both of them." But here again we have made no pro- gress. The relation C has been admitted different from A and B, and no longer is predicated of them. Something, however, seems to be said of this relation C, and said, again, of A and B. And this something is not to be the ascription of one to the other. If so, it would appear to be another relation, D% in which C, on one side, and, on the other side, A and B, stand. But such a makeshift leads at once to the in- finite process. The new relation D can be predicated in no way of C, or of A and B; and hence we must have recourse to a fresh relation, E% which comes between D and whatever we had before. But this must lead to another, F\ and so on, indefinitely. Thus the problem is not solved by taking relations as independently real. For, if so, the qualities and their relation fall entirely apart, and then we have said nothing. Or we have to make a new relation between the old relation and the terms; which, when it is made, does not help us. It either itself demands a new relation, and so on without end, or it leaves us where we were, entangled in difficulties.