If you take the identity of a series, whether physical or psychical, this identity, considered as such, is not an event which happens.1 But, on the other hand, can we call it a fact of experience? To speak strictly, we cannot, since all identity is ideal. It, as such, is not directly experienced, even as occur- ring in the facts, and, still less, as something which happens alongside of or between them. It is an adjective which, as separate, could not exist, and its essence, we may say, consists in distinction. But, on the other side, this distinction, and, again the con- struction of a series, is an event. And it must happen in a soul 2; for where else could it exist? As a mental state, more than its mere content, it also must have a place, and duration, in the psychical series. And, otherwise, it could not be a part of experience. But the identity itself is but an aspect of the events, or event, and is certainly ideal.
11 No," I shall be told, " the identity and continuity of the soul must be more than this. It cannot fall in what is given, for all the given is discrete. And it cannot consist in ideal content, for, in that case, it would not be real. It must therefore come some- how along with phenomena, in such a way that it does not happen as an event within the psychical series." But, as soon as we consider this claim, its inconsistency is obvious. If anything is experienced, now or always, along with what is given, then this (whatever it is) is surely a psychical event, with a place, or places, in the series. But, if, on the other hand, it has not, in any sense, position or duration in my history, you will hardly persuade me that it 1 The whole scries itself will, in a sense, be one event since it has a place and duration. But it will not be throughout an ex- perienced fact.
* That the identity of a soul should be only so far as it exists for some soul, is one of the circles we have pointed out already.
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makes part of my experience at all. I do not see, in short, how anything can come there, unless it is prepared, from some side, to enter and to take its place there. And, if it is not to be an element in experience, it will be nothing. And I doubt if any one would urge a claim so suicidal and so absurd, unless for the sake of, and in order to defend, a pre- conceived doctrine. Because phenomena in time are not real, there must be something more than temporal. But because we wrongly assume that nothing is real, unless it exists as a thincr therefore the element, which transcends time, must be some- how and somewhere beside it. This element is a world, or a soul, or an Ego, which never descends into our series. It never comes down there itself, though we are forced, I presume, to say that it works, and that it makes itself felt. But this irrational in- fluence and position results merely from our false assumption. We are attempting to pass beyond the series, while we, in effect, deny that anything is real, unless it is a member there. For our other world, and our soul, and our Ego, which exist beside temporal events, have been taken themselves as but finite things. They merely reduplicate phenomena, they do but double the world of appearance. They leave on our hands unsolved the problem that vexed us before, and they load us beside with an additional puzzle. We have now, not only another existence no better than the first, but we have to explain also how one of these stands to, or works on, the other. And the result is open self-contradiction or thought- less obscurity. But the remedy is to purge our- selves of our groundless prejudice, and to seek reality elsewhere than in the existence of things. Continuity and identity, the other world and the Ego, do not, as such, exist. They are ideal, and, as such, they are not facts. But none the less they have reality, at least not inferior to that of temporal events. We must admit that, in the full sense, BODY AND SOUL. 32 1 neither ideality nor existence is real. But you can- not pass, from the one-sided denial of one, to the one-sided assertion of the other. The attempt is based on a false alternative, and, in either case, must result in self-contradiction.
It is perhaps necessary, though wearisome, to add some remarks on the Ego. The failure to see that continuity and identity are ideal, has produced efforts to find the Ego existing, as such, as an actual fact. This Ego is, on the one hand, to be somehow ex- perienced as a fact, and, on the other hand, it must not exist either as one or as a number of events. And the attempt naturally is futile. For most assuredly, as we find it, the self is determinate. It is always qualified by a content.1 The Ego and Non-ego are at any time experienced, not in general, but with a particular character. But such an appear- ance is obviously a psychical event, with a given place in the series. And upon this I urge the follow- ing dilemma. If your Ego has no content, it is nothing, and it therefore is not experienced; but, if on the other hand it is anything, it is a phenomenon in time. But " not at all," may be the answer, 4<since the Ego is outside the series, and is merely related to it, and perhaps acting on it" I do not see that this helps us. If, I repeat, your Ego has no content, then anywhere it is nothing; and the relation of something to this nothing, and again its action upon anything, are utterly unmeaning. But, if upon the other hand this Ego has a content, then, for the sake of argument, you may say, if you please, that it exists. But, in any case, it stands outside, and it does not come into, experience at all. " No, it does not come there itself; it never, so to speak, appears in person; but its relation to phenomena, or its action on them, is certainly somehow experienced, 1 I should add that I am convinced that the Ego is a derivative product (Mindy No. 47). But the argument above is quite inde- pendent of this conclusion.
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or at least known." In this answer the position seems changed, but it is really the same, and it does but lead back to our old dilemma. You cannot, in any sense, know, or perceive, or experience, a term as in relation, unless you have also the other term to which it is related. And, if we will but ponder this, surely it becomes self-evident. Well then, either you have not got any relation of phenomena to anything at all; or else the other term, your thing the Ego, takes its place among the rest. It becomes another event among psychical events.1 It would be useless to pursue into its ramifica- tions a view false at the root, and based (as we have seen) on a vicious alternative. That which is more than an event must also, from another side, exist, and must thus appear in, or as, one member of the temporal series. But, so far as it transcends time, it is ideal, and, as such, is not fact. The attempt to take it as existing somehow and somewhere along- side, thrusts it back into the sphere of finite parti- culars. In this way, with all our struggles, we never rise beyond some world of mere events, and we revolve vainly in a circle which brings us round to our starting-place. If it were possible for us to apprehend the whole series at once, and to take in its detail as one undivided totality, certainly then the timeless would have been experienced as a fact But in that case ideality on the one side, and events on the other, would have each come to an end in a higher mode of being.
The objections, which we have discussed, have all shown themselves ill-founded. There is certainly nothing experienced which is not an event, though 1 If action is attributed to the Ego things are made even worse, for activity has been shown to imply a sequence in time (Chapter vii.). I may perhaps remind the reader here that to speak of a relation between phenomena and the Reality is quite incorrect. There are no relations, properly, except between things finite. If we speak otherwise, it should be by a licence.
BODY AND SOUL. 323 we have seen that in events there is that which transcends them. All continuity is ideal, and the arguments brought against the oneness of a psychic- al series, we saw, were not valid. Nor could we find that our phenomenal view of the soul brought it down to be an adjective depending on the organism. For the organism itself is also phenomenal. Soul and body are alike in being only appearance, and their connection is merely the relation of phenomena. It is the special nature of this relation that we have next to discuss.
I will begin by pointing out a view from which we must dissent. The soul and body may be re- garded as two sides of one reality, or as the same thing taken twice and from two aspects of its being. I intend to say nothing here on the reasons which may lead to this conclusion, nor to discuss the various objections which might be brought against them. I will briefly state the ground on which I am forced to reject the proposed identity. In the first place, even if we confine our attention to phenomena, I do not see that we are justified in thus separating each soul with its body from the rest of the world (p. 358). And there is a fatal objection to this doctrine, if carried further. If in the end soul and body are to be one thing, then, with whatever justification, you have concluded to a plurality of finite reals within the Absolute. But we have seen that such a con- clusion is wholly indefensible. When soul and body come together in Reality, I utterly fail to perceive any reason why the special nature of each is, as such, to be preserved. It is one thing to be convinced that no element, or aspect of phenomena, can be lost in the Absolute. But it is quite another thing to maintain that every appearance, when there, continues to keep its distinctive character. To be resolved rather and to be merged, each as a factor in what is higher, is the nature of such things as the body and the soul.
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And with this we are brought to a well-known and much-debated question. Is there a causal con- nection between the physical and the psychical, and are we to say that one series influences the other? I will begin by stating the view which prima facie suggests itself, I will then briefly discuss some erroneous doctrines, and will end by trying to set out a defensible conclusion. And, first, the belief which occurs to the unbiassed observer is that soul acts upon body and body on soul. I do not mean by this that bare soul seems to work on bare body, for such a distinction is made only by a further reflection. I mean that, if without any theory you look at the facts, you will find that changes in one series (which- ever it is) are often concerned in bringing on changes in the other. Psychical and physical, each alike, make a difference to one another. It is obvious that alterations of the soul come from movements in the organism, and it is no less obvious that the latter may be consequent on the former. We may be sure that no one, except to save a theory, would deny that in volition mind influences matter. And with pain and pleasure such a denial would be even less natural. To hold that now in the individual pleasure and pain do not move, but are mere idle accompaniments, to maintain that never in past development have they ever made a difference to anything — surely this strikes the common observer as a wilful paradox. And, for myself, I doubt if most of those, who have accepted the doctrine in general, have fully realized its meaning.
This natural view, that body and soul have influ- ence on each other, we shall find in the end to be proof against attack. But we must pass on now to consider some opposing conclusions. The man who denies the inter-action in any sense of body and soul, must choose from amongst the possibilities which remain. He may take the two series as going on independently and side by side, or may BODY AND SOUL. 325 make one the subordinate and adjective of the other. And I will begin by making some remarks on the parallel series. But I must ignore the historical development of this view, and must treat it barely as if it were an idea which is offered us to-day.
I would observe, first, that an assertion or a denial of causation can hardly be proved if you insist on demonstration. You may show that every detail we know points towards one result, and that we can find no special reason for taking this result as false. And, having done so much, you certainly have proved your conclusion. But, even after this, a doubt remains with regard to what is possible. And, unless all other possibilities can be disposed of, you have failed to demonstrate. In the particular doctrine before us we have, I think, a case in point. The mere coincidence of soul and body cannot be shown to be impossible; but this bare possibility is, on the other hand, no good reason for supposing the coincidence to be fact Appearance points to a causal connection between the physical and psychical series. And yet this appearance might possibly be a show, produced in the following way. There might on each side be other conditions, escaping our view, which would be enough to account for the changes in each series. And we may even carry our supposition a step further on. There might on doth sides be, within each series, no causal connection between its events. A play of unknown conditions might, on either side, present the appearance of a series. The successive facts would in that case show a regular sequence, but they would not actually be members and links of any one connected series. I do not see how such a suggestion can be proved to be impossible; but that is surely no reason for regarding it as fact. And to this same result we are led, when we return to consider the idea of two coinciding series. The 326 REALITY.
idea seems baseless, and I do not think it necessary to dwell further on this point.1 We seem, therefore, driven to regard soul and body as causally connected, and the question will be as to the nature of their connection. Can this be all, so to speak, on one side? Is the soul merely an adjective depending on the body, and never more than an effect? Or is, again, the body a mere accom- paniment resulting from the soul? Both these ques- tions must be met by an emphatic negative. The suggested relation is, in each case, inconsistent and impossible. And, since there is no plausibility in the idea of physical changes always coming from, and never reacting on, the soul, I will not stop to con- sider it. I will pass to the opposite one-sidedness, a doctrine equally absurd, though, at first sight, seeming more plausible.
Psychical changes, upon this view, are never causes at all, but are solely effects. They are adjectives depending upon the body, but which at the same time make absolutely no difference to it. They do not quite fall outside causation, for they are events which certainly are produced by physical changes. But they enter the causal series in one character only. They are themselves pro- duced, but on the other hand nothing ever results from them. And this does not merely mean that, for certain purposes, you may take primary qualities as unaffected by secondary, and may consider second- 1 Of course, even on these hypotheses, one link of a series will be a cause of what follows, if you take that link in connection with the rest of the universe. Hence with regard to " occa- sionalism " we may say that, since every cause must be limited more or less artificially, every cause therefore is able to be called an "occasion." You may take in further and further conditions, until your partial cause seems an item unimportant, and even therefore ineffective. And here we are on the confines of absolute error. If the " occasion " is divided from the whole entire cause, and so held to be without an influence on the effect, that is at once quite indefensible.
BODY AND SOUL. 327 BODY AND SOUL. 327 ary qualities as idle adjectives which issue from primary. It means that all psychical changes are effects, brought about by what is physical, while themselves absolutely without any influence on the succession of phenomena. I have been forced to state this view in my own terms as, though widely held, I do not find it anywhere precisely expressed. Its adherents satisfy themselves with metaphors, and rest on half worked out comparisons. And all that their exposition, to me, makes clear, is the con- fusion which it springs from.
The falseness of this doctrine can be exhibited from two points of view. It involves the contra- diction of an adjective which makes no difference to its substantive,1 and the contradiction of an event in time, which is an effect but not a cause. For the sake of brevity I shall here confine myself to the second line of criticism. I must first endeavour, in my own way, to give to the materialistic doctrine a reasonable form; and I will then point out that its inconsistency is inherent and not removable.
If we agree to bring psychical events under the head of what is " secondary," we may state the proposed way of connection as follows: A—B—C.
A, /?, C is the succession of primary qualities, and it is taken to be a true causal series. Between the secondary products, a, /3, y, is no causal con- nection, nor do they make any difference to the sequence of C from B and of B from A, They are, each of them, adjectives which happen, but which 1 The same false principle, which is employed in the material- istic view of the soul, appears in the equally materialistic doctrine of the Real Presence.
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produce no consequence. But, though their succes- sion is not really causal, it must none the less appear so, because it is regular. And it must be regular, since it depends on a series which is unalterably fixed by causation. And in this way (it may be urged) the alleged inconsistency is avoided, and all is made harmonious. We are not forced into the conclusion that the self-same cause can produce two different effects. A is not first followed by mere B, B and then again by |, since a is, in fact, irremov- 0 able from A. Nor is it necessary to suppose that the sequence A — B must ever occur by itself. For a will, in fact, accompany A, and /8 will always occur with B. Still this inseparability will in no way affect our result, which is the outcome and expres- sion of a general principle. A — B — C is the actual and sole thread of causation, while a, /3, y are the adjectives which idly adorn it. And hence these latter must seem to be that which really they are not. They are in fact decorative, but either always or usually so as to appear constructional.
This is the best statement that I can make in defence of my unwilling clients, and I have now to show that this statement will not bear criticism. But there is one point on wnich I, probably, have exceeded my instructions. To admit that the sequence A — B — C does not exist by itself, would seem contrary to that view which is more generally held. Yet, without this admission, the inconsistency can be exhibited more easily.
The Law of Causation is the principle of Identity, applied to the successive. Make a statement involving succession, and you have necessarily made a statement which, if true, is true always. Now, if it is true universally that B follows A, then that sequence is what we mean by a causal law. If, on the other hand, the sequence is not universally true, BODY AND SOUL. 329 BODY AND SOUL. 329 then it is not true at all. For 2?, in that case, must have followed something more or less than A; and hence the judgment A — B was certainly false. Thus a stated fact of succession is untrue, till it has been taken as a fact of causation. And a fact of causation is truth which is, and must be, universal.1 It is an abstracted relation, which is either false always, or always true. And hence, if we are able to say ever that B follows mere A, then this proposi- tion A — B is eternal verity. But, further, a truth cannot be itself and at the same time something different. And therefore once affirm A — B, and you can not affirm also and as well A — Bfi, if (that is to say) in both cases you are keeping to the same A. For if the event ft follows, while arising from no difference, you must assert of mere A both " — B " and " — BP." But these two assertions are incom- patible. In the same way, if A a has, as a conse- quence, mere Bt it is impossible that bare A should possess the same consequence. If it seems other- wise, then certainly A was not bare, or else a was not relevant. And any other conclusion would imply two incompatible assertions with regard to B.1 Hence we may come to a first conclusion about the view which makes an idle adjective of the soul. If it asserts that these adjectives both happen, and do not happen, for no reason at all, if it will say that the physical sequence is precisely the same, both without them and with them, then such a view flatly contradicts itself. For it not only supposes differ- ences, which do not make any difference — a 1 The addition of " unconditional " would be surplusage. Cp. Principles of Logic ', p. 485.
* The judgments, " B follows from A " and " B follows from Aa," are, if pure, not reconcilable. The same effect cannot have two causes, unless "cause " is taken loosely. See Mr. Botaiiqtiefi Logic% Book I, Chapter vi. I have remarked further on this subject below in Chapter xxiv.
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supposition which is absurd; but it also believes in a decoration, which at one time goes with, and at another time stays away from its construction, and which is an event which, equally in either case, is without any reason.1 And, with this, perhaps we may pass on.
Let us return to that statement of the case which appeared to us more plausible. There is a succes- sion A—B—C A—B—C and in this the secondary qualities are inseparable from the primary. A — B — Cis, in fact, never found by itself, but it is, for all that, the true and the only causal sequence. We shall, however, find that this way of statement does but hide the same mistake which before was apparent. In the succession above, unless there really is more than we are sup- posed to take in, and unless a, /3, 7 are connected with something outside, we have still the old incon- sistency. If A — B — C is the truth, then the succes- sion, which we had, is in fact impossible; and, if the sequence is modified, then A — B — C can not possibly be true. I will not urge that, if it were true, it would at least be undiscoverable, since, by the hypothesis, a is inseparable from A. I admit that we may postulate sometimes where we cannot prove or observe; and I prefer to show that such a postulate is here self-contradictory. It is assumed that a is an adjective indivisible from A, but is an adjective which at the same time makes no differ- ence to its being. Or a, at any rate, makes no difference to the action of A, but is perfectly inert. But, if so, then, as before, A possesses two predi- cates incompatible with each other. We cannot 1 If there were a reason, then mere A would no longer be the cause of both B and B(3. I shall return to this lower down.
BODY AND SOUL. 33 1 indeed say, as before, that in fact it is followed first by mere B, and then again by Bfi. But we, none the less, are committed to assertions which clash. We hold that A produces B, and that A produces Bfi; and one of these judgments must be false. For, if A produces mere B, then it does not produce Bfi. Hence fi is either an event which is a gratui- tous accident, or else a must have somehow (indi- rectly or directly) made this difference in B. But, if so, a is not inert, but is a part-cause of B; and therefore the sequence of B from mere A is false.1 The plausibility of our statement has proved illu- sory.
I am loath to perplex the question by subtleties, which would really carry us no further; but I will notice a possible evasion of the issue. The secon- dary qualities, I may be told, do not depend each on one primary, but are rather the adjectives of rela- tions between these. They attend on certain relations, yet make no difference to what follows. But here the old and unresolved contradiction re- mains. It cannot be true that any relation (say of A to E\ which produces another relation (say of B to F), should both produce this latter naked, and also attended by an adjective, ft. One of these asser- tions must be false, and, with it, your conclusion. It is in short impossible to have differences which come without a difference, or which make no differ- ence to what follows them. The attempt involves a contradiction, explicit or veiled, but in either case ruinous to the theory which adopts it.
We have now finished our discussion of erroneous views.1 We have seen that to deny the active 1 The reader will remember that ft (by the hypothesis) cannot follow directly from a. It is taken as dependent solely on B.
* I may perhaps, in this connection, be expected to say some- thing on the Conservation of Energy. I am most unwilling to do this. One who, like myself, stands outside the scierx 1 win. h 33 2 REALITY.
connection of body and soul is either dangerous or impossible. It is impossible, unless we are pre-