EXPLANATORY NOTES. 619 would submit that the sense in which this or that writer uses such principles as those of Identity and Contradiction, and the way in which he develops them, cannot always safely be assumed d priori by any critic This is all I think it could be useful for me to say in this connection, except that I would end this Note with an expression of regret The view adopted by Mr. Hobhouse as to the nature of the criterion has, it seems to me (I dare say quite wrongly), so very much that is common to myself, as well as also to others,1 that I am the more sorry that I have not the advantage of his criticism on something which I could recognize as in any degree my own.
/. 407, Footnote. On the subject of Hedonism I would add references to the International Journal of Ethics^ Vol iv, pp.
//. 458-9. We cannot, if we abstract the aspects of pleasure and pain and confine ourselves to these abstractions, discover directly within them an internal discrepancy, any more than we could do this in every abstracted sensible quality. But since these aspects are as a fact together with, first, their sensible qualities and, next, the rest of the world, and since no relation or connection of any kind can be in the end merely external, it follows that in the end the nature of pleasure or pain must somehow go beyond itself.2 If we take pleasure and pain, or one of them, to be not aspects of sensation but themselves special sensations, that will of course make no real difference to the argument. For in any case such sensations would be mere aspects and adjectives of their whole psychical states. I would add that, even in psy- chology, the above distinction seems, to me at least, to possess very little importance. The attempt again to draw a sharp distinction between discomfort and pain would (even if it could be successful) make no difference to us here.
p. 463, Note. The account of Will, given in Mindy No. 49, has been criticised by Mr. Shand in an interesting article on Attention and Will, Mind, N.S. No. 16. I at once recognized that my state- ment in the above account was defective, but in principle I have not found anything to correct. I still hold Will always to be the self-realization of an idea, but it is necessary to provide that this idea shall not in a certain sense conflict with that which 1 Mr. Hobhouse seems to me (I suppose mistakenly) to adopt somehow in the end, as the criterion of truth and reality, the idea of a consistent all- inclusive system. If and so iar as he does this, I naturally think he is right, but I think he would be wrong if and so far as he simply assumed this principle as ultimate. But as to what his view in the end actually is I could nturc an opinion, partly perhaps because I have been able to give but a 1 imited time to his work.
1 Cf. the Note on p. 363, and Notes A and B of this Appendix.
620 EXPLANATORY NOTES.
in a higher sense is identified with the self. By 'higher* I do not mean 'more moral,' and I am prepared to explain what I do mean by the above. I would on this point refer to an article by Mr. Stout (in Mind, N.S. No. 19) with which I find myself largely though not wholly in agreement. I must however hope at some future time to deal with the matter, and will here state my main result. "It is will where an idea realizes itself, provided that the idea is not formally contrary to a present resolve of the subject" — so much seems certain. But there is uncertainty about the further proviso, "Provided also that the idea is not too contrary materially to the substance of the self." Probably, the meaning of " will " being really unfixed, there is no way of fixing it at a certain point except arbitrarily.
Since the above was written an enquiry into the nature of volition, with a discussion of many questions concerning conation, activity, agency, and attention, has appeared in Mind. See Nos. 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 49, and parts of 51.
p. 513. With regard to the "familiar Greek dilemma," the attentive reader will not have failed to observe that, when I later on, p. 544, maintain that no possible truth is quite true, I have explained that this want of truth is not the same thing as intellectual falsehood or fallibility. The "sceptical" critic therefore who still desires to show that I myself have fallen into this dilemma, will, I think, do well still to ignore pp. 544-7.
A probability, I may here go on to remark, of many millions to one against the truth of some statement may be a very good and sufficient reason for our putting that, for some purpose or purposes, on one side and so treating it as nothing. But no such probability does or can justify us in asserting the statement not to ' be true. That is not scepticism at all, but on the contrary it is mere dogmatism. Further I would here repeat that any probability in favour of general scepticism which rests on psychological grounds, must itself be based on an assumption of knowledge with regard to those grounds. Hence if you make your sceptical conclusion universal here, you destroy your own premises. And, on the other side, if you stop short of a universal conclusion, perhaps the particular doctrine which you wish to doubt is more certain by far than even your general psychological premises. I have (p. 137) remarked on this variety of would-be scepticism, and I find that a critic in the Psychological Review, Vol i, No. 3, Mr. A. Hodder, has actually treated these remarks as an attempted refutation on my part of scepticism in general. It probably did not occur to him that, in thus triumphantly proving my incompetence, he was really giving the measure of his own insight into the subject. With reference to another "sceptical" KXPLANATORY NOTES. 621 criticism by another writer I may perhaps do well to emphasize the fact that for me that which has no meaning is most certainly not possible. I had, I even thought, succeeded in laying this down clearly. See for instance p. 503.
/. 520. The reader will recall here that, so far as diversity does not imply actual relations, it involves presence as a mere aspect in a felt totality. See pp. 14 1-3 and Note B.
pp. 527-8. With regard to this question of some element of Reality falling outside of finite centres I find but little to add. The one total experience, which is the Absolute, has, as such, a character which, in its specific aspect of qualitative totality, must be taken not to fall within any finite centre. But the elements, which in their unity make and are this specific " quality," need not, so far as I see, to the least extent fall outside of finite centres. Such processes of and relations between centres, as more or less are not experienced by those particular centres, may, for all we know, quite well be experienced by others. And it seems more probable that in some form or other they are so experienced. This seems more probable because it appears to involve less departure from given fact, and because we can find no good reason for the additional departure in the shape of any theoretical advantage in the end resulting from it We may conclude then that there is no element in the process of making all harmonious within the Absolute which does not fall within finite centres. What falls outside, and is over and above, is not the result but the last specific character which makes the result what it is. But even if some of the matter (so to speak) of the Absolute fell outside of finite centres, I cannot see myself how this could affect our main result, or indeed what further conclusion could follow from such a hypothesis. The reader must remember that in the Absolute we in any case allow perfections beyond anything we can know, so long as these fall within the Absolute's general character. And on the above hypothesis, so far as I see, we could not go one single step further. It could not justify us in predicating of the Absolute any lower excellence, e.g. self-consciousness or will or personality, as such, and still less some feature alien to the Absolute's general nature. But to predicate of the Absolute, on the other hand, the highest possible perfection, is what in any case and already we are bound to da INDEX.
The reader who finds this collection of references useless, as well as faulty and incomplete, is requested to treat it as non- existent.
Absolute, and pleasure and pain. See Pleasure.
— contents of, 1 44 foil.
— contains and harmonizes all — knowledge of, 159 foil.
— knowledge, 536 foil.
— main aspects of, irreducible, 457 foil. Cf. Inexplicable.
— not itself without me, 260.
— not same as God, 448.
— not sum of things, 486 foil.
— perfection of. See Perfection.
Abstract, Abstraction, 17-18, Activity (Cf. Energy, Force, Resistance, Will), chap, Adjective, must make a differ- Appearance, all must appear in Appearance, degrees of reality — the highest is incapable of, — must qualify Reality, 13 1-2, — not explained away, 204.
Body, an ideal construction, — and secondary qualities, 268, — and soul, chap, xxiii — my, continuity of, 311.
— my, perception of, 263-4.
— not potentially the soul, 314.
Causation cannot be demon- strated, 335-6.
Cause and Effect, identity of, — and Effect, reciprocity ot, INDEX.
Cause implies abstraction from — is inconsistent, chap. vL, foil.
Change is ideal, 166.
— is inconsistent, chap, v., — perception of. See Succession.
Comparison, 113, 578. Compatible, 390-1. Conditions complete, not Real- Conditional. See Potential.
— and conditioned, 540-1. Consciousness. See Feeling, Self-consciousness.
istence, Ideal, Finite.
Contingent, 236-7.
Continuity, chap, iv., 319.
— and existence, 309 foil., 589.
— and velocity, 42. Contradiction, how got rid of, Contrary, 22, 562 foil.
Criterion (cf. Standard), 2, 136, — theoretical and practical, 147.
Degrees of a fact, what, 376.
— of goodness, chap. xxv.
« — of truth and reality, chap.
Desert, 432~3- Desirable, 408-9. Development. See Potential.
— and Validity, 137.
Difference. See Identity, Quality, Relation. Direction of time, 214 foil. Discord and pain, 157 foil., 610.
— theoretical and practical, 155 foil.
Discretion. See Continuity. Dispositions, psychical, 312, Distinction and Thought, 477 559, 620, and cf. Criterion.
End, The, every aspect may be — collision of, 430.
Energy, conservation of, 331.
Error, chapters xvi., xxiv., xxvi., xxvii. And see Truth, Appearance.
Event, 317.
— everything psychical is, 5 1-2, — how estimated, 370, 376. Evil. See Good. Evolution. See Potential, Pro- gress, Development.
— degree of truth in, 370, 377 foil. Experience and reality, 144.
— as only my states, chap. xxi.
— direct and indirect, ibid.
— in a sense all is my, 260, — main aspects of, 458 foil.
— outer and inner, 346.
INDEX.
Extension. See Space.
— of Nature, 267.
Fact, what, 317. See Existence, Event.
Faith, 443.
Fallibility, universal, 512, 620.
496. And see Abstraction. Finite centres of Experience, Activity, Energy, Resist- ance.
Form. See Relational.
Formal Act, 435-6.
Good, and desire, 402 foil, 409.
— and evil, chapters xvii., xxv.
— inconsistent, 409 foil. Goodness and truth, 402-3, — moral, 413 foil.
Habit, what, 355.
Humanity, 529.
Idea and its own existence, 169, Idea is what it means, 51, 398.
Ideality. See Finite and Re- lativity.
foil.
Ignorance. See Privation, Negation. Illusion. See Appearance. Imaginary and real, 212 foil., foil. Inconceivable. See Impossible. Individual, only one, 246. Individualistic attitude, 309.
Infinity of Nature, 176.
— of presented subject, 290 foil. Inherence, 19 foil. Inorganic, 270 foil. Intelligible, all is, 171, 174, 176, Introspection, 93, no, 232.
foil.
Knowledge, ambiguous, 159.
— absolute and conditional, 5 35 foil.
— perfect, 517.
SS INDEX.
Cf. Nature.
Metaphysics, Introduction, 453- Mine. See This.
foil., 431 foil.
— origin of, 431.
Motion is inconsistent. Chap.
Nature, chap, xxii., 490 foil., — extension of, 267.
— identity of, 281.
— infinite, 290 foil.
— is it beautiful, etc.? 490 foil.
— mere, not original, 261.
— philosophy of, 496 foil.
Necessity. See Chance, Possi- bility, Impossibility.
Negation and privation, 97- 100, 240. See Privation.
— implies unity, 228.
Now. See Time, Succession, or Appearance, Event, This.
Occasion, 65, 326. Ontological Proof, 149-50,394- Organism, 270. Cf. Body. Origin, irrelevant, 35, 62, 206- Other to thought, 175 foil.
Pain and Pleasure, and the Passivity. See Activity.
— only one thing has, 246.
— theoretical and practical, 147 foil., 373 foil.
— two aspects of, 363 foil., 411, 414 foil.
Self. Pleasure. See Pain. Pleasant and good, 403 foil. Possible and Possibility, 142, 512 foil.
Predication, 20. Cf. Judgment. Present. See Time, Succession. Principles cannot, as such, exist, 377 foil.
foil., 538. And cf. Nega- tion.
Probability, 504 foil., 620.
INDEX.
Psychology and Metaphysics, Quality and extension, 289, Cf. Relation. Qualities primary and second- — sensible, same for all? 344.
Real See Imaginary. Reality and appearances, 486 foil. See Appearance.
— and originality. See Origin.
— and thought See Thought.
CC Criterion.
Relations are all intrinsical, — and qualities, chap, iii., 142, 572 foil.
— hold only between phenomena, 322, 445 foil.
— origin of, 438.
Self, all is state of. See Ex- perience.
— and other selves, 254 foil.
— and pleasure, 407.
Self and series, 316 folL — meanings of, chap. ix.
folL — my past and future, 256 foil., — new might be made, 85, 503.
chap. xxiv. Solidity, 288-90. Solipsism, chap, xxi., 145, 523 foil., 615. Cf. Experience. Soul and souls, a what, 298 foil. J— an ideal construction, 306, — and finite centres, 226, 529, — connected with body, chap.
xxiii.
— identity of contents of, 344 foil.
— identity of several, 347 foil.
— interaction of, 343 folL — origin of, 337.
— separation of, 343 foil.
— suspension of, 338.
— origin of, 221.
— self-contradictory, chaps, iv., xviii.
INDEX.
Spiritual, what, 498-9. Spiritualism, 503, 506. Standard. See Criterion.
Succession, perception of, 49- — permanent in, 52.
Subject and object, 460.
Thisness, 175, chap. xix. Things, chap. viii.
— and properties, 19 foil. Thought and existence, 374, — and ideality, 472.
— and judgment, 366 foil.
— and reality, chap, xv., 276, — dualistic, 168 foil.
— more than its object, 169, foil., 460 foil.
— not primary or self-evident, Time, chaps, iv., xviil — disregarded by Science, 208.
Time, unity of, chap, xviii. Truth, chap, xv., 462, 544 foil — and existence, 166.
chap, xxvii.
— degrees of, chap. xxiv.
— must not exclude its own Unity, knowledge of, 159-60.
— substantial, 140.
— ultimate, 468 foil., 519 foil. Unknowable, 128. Unknown, how far possible, Vacuum. See Space.
— and resolve, 463.
— and thought, 89, 469 foil.
— not primary, 477 foil.
— supremacy of, 483 foil. World, our not = universe, 200, — our want of unity in, 2 1 3 foil., Standard, Perfection, Good.
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