THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E.G. 4 GLASGOW NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS CAPE TOWN Geoffrey Cumberlege, Publisher to the University THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC BY O.M., LL.D., LATE FELLOW OF MERTON COLLEGE, OXFORD SECOND EDITION REVISED, WITH COMMENTARY AND TERMINAL ESSAYS VOL. I OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON: GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE FIRST EDITION, 1883 SECOND EDITION, IQ22 CORRECTED IMPRESSION OF IQ28 REPRINTED, 195° SET IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REPRINTED FROM PLATES IN GREAT BRITAIN AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD BY CHARLES BATEY, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY TO MY FRIEND THESE VOLUMES ARE DEDICATED PREFACE IT is with mixed feelings that this reissue of an old work is offered to the public. I am happy to find that a book of mine is still alive, and that after some forty years it has seemed worthy to reappear. On the other hand I regret that, while Logic during this interval has lived and moved, I myself have failed, except partially, to follow its advance. My available energy has been expended mainly in fields which more or less fall outside Logic proper. And it is too late for me now to make good my shortcoming, and to endeavour to master those more recent works which have succeeded in throwing, at the lowest estimate, much light on their subject.
Hence I could not rewrite my book so as to offer it as an adequate account of contemporary Logic. And on the other hand simply to reprint it, or again, so far as I am concerned, to let it die, seemed alike open to objection. I therefore de cided, while reissuing the old volume, to add to it some notes and an appendix with a view to correct and supplement some part of its defects. At the same time I saw clearly that any such addition would still leave the book largely incomplete.
The course which I have followed may even perhaps result in some gain to the reader. He can, if he pleases, now verify any advance which in 1883 may have been made by my work. And its faults both of manner and matter — faults which recall to me those days when I was young — may possibly with some readers themselves be of service. They may be more than excused if anywhere they help in any way to excite a more living and personal interest in logical problems.
It is not that in this book or elsewhere I lay a claim to original discovery. In these pages there is perhaps no result which I do not owe, and where, if my memory served me better, I could not acknowledge my debt. But when a man has studied, however little, the great philosophers, and felt vii Vlll PREFACE vii Vlll PREFACE the distance between himself and them, I hardly understand how, except on compulsion, he can be ready to enter on claims and counterclaims between himself and his fellows. And all I care to say for myself is that, if I had succeeded in owing more, I might then perhaps have gained more of a claim to be original.
The present volumes contain a reprint of the book published in 1883. The text has not been altered except occasionally in the punctuation, and by the removal of mere misprints and of one or two obvious grammatical errors. The Commentary, which is new, has been placed after each chapter in the form of Additional Notes, and the Terminal Essays have none of them been published before. The Index, which I hope will be of service, is also new. But for this, however great its merits, I cannot claim to be responsible.
I regret that Dr. Bosanquet's Implication and Linear In ference came too late to be used. But I cannot end this Preface without some expression of my gratitude to Dr. Bosanquet for all that, since 1883, I have owed to him, and without some acknowledgment of how deeply this reissue is in debt to his invaluable works on Logic.
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION THE following work makes no claim to supply any sys tematic treatment of Logic. I could not pretend to have acquired the necessary knowledge; and in addition I confess that I am not sure where Logic begins or ends. I have adopted the title Principles of Logic, because I thought that my enquiries were mainly logical, and, for logic at least, must be fundamental.
I feel that probability is against me. Experience has shown that most books on Logic add little to their subject. There is however one reflection which may weigh in my favour. Both in England and in Germany that subject is in motion. Logic is not where it was, and can not remain where it is. And when one works with the stream a slight effort may bring progress.
I have in general not referred to those works to which I have been indebted. Amongst recent writers I owe most to Lotze, and after him to Sigwart. Wundt's book would have been more useful had it come to me earlier; and I may say the same of Bergmann's. I am under obligations to both Steinthal and Lazarus. And amongst English writers I have learned most from the late Professor Jevons. I may mention here that I should have owed certain observations to Mr. Balfour's able work, had I not seen it first when my book was completed. I should be glad to state my debts in detail, and in this way to express the gratitude I feel, but I doubt if it is now possible. I could not everywhere point out the original owners of my borrowed material, and I could not clearly state how much is not borrowed. I lay no claim to originality, except that, using the result of others' labour, I in some respects have made a sensible advance.
I wished at first to avoid polemics altogether. But, though I have not sought out occasions of difference, it is plain that ix X PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION too much of my book is polemical. My impression is that it will not suffice to teach what seems true. If the truth is not needed the reader will not work for it, nor painfully learn it. And he hardly will need it where he stands possessed of what seems an easy solution. Philosophy now, as always, is con fronted with a mass of inherited prejudice. And, if my polemics bring uneasiness to one self-satisfied reader, I may have done some service.
I fear that, to avoid worse misunderstandings, I must say something as to what is called " Hegelianism." For Hegel himself, assuredly I think him a great philosopher; but I never could have called myself an Hegelian, partly because I can not say that I have mastered his system, and partly because I could not accept what seems his main principle, or at least part of that principle. I have no wish to conceal how much I owe to his writings; but I will leave it to those who can judge better than myself, to fix the limits within which I have followed him. As for the " Hegelian School " which exists in our reviews, I know no one who has met with it anywhere else.
What interests me is something very different. We want no system-making or systems home-grown or imported. This life-breath of persons who write about philosophy is not the atmosphere where philosophy lives. What we want at present is to clear the ground, so that English Philosophy, if it rises, may not be choked by prejudice. The ground can not be cleared without a critical, or, if you prefer it, a sceptical study of first principles. And this study must come short, if we neglect those views which, being foreign, seem most unlike our own, and which are the views of men who, differing from one another, are alike in having given an attention to the subject which we have not given. This, I think, is a rational object and principle, and I am persuaded that a movement which keeps to this line will not be turned back.
In conclusion I may be allowed to anticipate two criticisms which will be passed on my work. One reader will lament that he is overdone with metaphysics, while another will stand on his right to have far more. I would assure the first that I have stopped where I could, and as soon as I was able. And in answer to the second I can only plead that my metaphysics PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION XI are really very limited. This does not mean that, like more gifted writers, I verify in my own shortcomings the necessary defects of the human reason. It means that on all questions, if you push me far enough, at present I end in doubts and perplexities. And on this account at least no lover of meta physics will judge of me hardly. Still in the end perhaps both objectors are right. If I saw further I should be simpler. But I doubt if either would then be less dissatisfied.
VOLUME I Jn this Table the numbeis in parentheses refer to the sections of each chapter in Bocks I-III, while in Essays I-XII the numbers refer to the pages.
BOOK I JUDGMENT CHAPTER I THE GENERAL NATURE OF JUDGMENT What judgment is. It implies ideas, and these are signs (1-3). A sign, what (4-6). Two senses of "idea" (6-£). In Judgment ideas are meanings (9). Judgment defined (10), and errors refuted (11-12).
Mistaken views criticized. Judgment not "association" (13-14); nor practical influence (15); nor a mere junction, nor an equation of ideas (16). Truths contained in the above errors (17).
Development of Judgment. It is a late product (18), because at first the mind has no ideas proper (19-20). Conditions required for origin of Judgment (21-22). If the Association-theory were true it could never have appeared (23); but from the first universals operate in the mind (24-26) Pages 1-38 Additional Notes 38-40 CHAPTER II THE CATEGORICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL FORMS OF JUDGMENT Judgment is about fact (i). Preliminary objections answered (2). But how if all judgment is hypothetical (3)? And if judgment keeps to ideas it all is hypothetical (4-6). This true of universal and again of both classes of singular judgments (7-8).
But judgment is not confined to ideas. It refers to present reality (9). On the other hand it does not refer to reality as present (10). This explained and defended (11-14).
Search for Categorical Judgment. I. Analytic Judgments of sense, and their varieties (15-16). Superstition as to names of Individuals (17-18). II. Synthetic judgments of sense. How can these refer to present reality (19)? But they can not refer to mere ideas (20- 21 ). Their true subject is unique. Thisness and This. Idea of "this" how used (21-27).
xiii XIV CONTENTS But how then can Synthetic Judgments be true of this given reality (28)? Because the reality is not the mere appearance (29-30). These judgments rest on continuity of content (31), and that upon ideal identity (32-33). Past and future are not phenomena (34).
Recapitulation (35). Memory and prediction not mere imagination (36-37)- Idea of Individual, what (38-39). Non-phenomenal Sin gular Judgments (41). Existential Judgments (42). Transition to Abstract Universal Judgments (43).
These are hypothetical (44). Collective Judgments really singular (45). Hypothetical can not be reduced to Categoricals (46-47). A sup position, what (48). Real assertion contained in Hypothetical Judg ments (49-52). They are all universal (53-55). Result (56).
Pages 41-90 Pages 41-90 CHAPTER II (Continued) With hypothetical we seem to have left the real world, but have reached the world of Science (57). Presumption against the sin gular judgment of sense (58). Its claim (59-60) is untenable be cause it mutilates the facts (61-67). It is conditioned (68-70), and conditional (71); and is even false (72-73). It is an impure and imperfect hypothetical (74-78). Result (79-80). Remaining class of Judgments (81) Pages 91-107 Additional Notes 107-113 CHAPTER III THE NEGATIVE JUDGMENT Negation depends on the real (i), but is more ideal than affirmation is (2-3). It is not the denial of an affirmation (4), nor is it a kind of affirmation (5), nor an affection of the copula (6). It has a positive ground which is not explicit (6-7).
Opposition and Privation. These distinctions here not vital (8), but call for explanation (9-11). Varieties of negative judgment. Nega tive Existentials (12).
Logical negation is subjective, and is no real determination (13-14). It does not assert the existence of the contradictory (15). Idea of the contradictory, what (16). The asserted contrary not explicit (17). Contrary opposition not dual (18). Ambiguity of denial. It rests on covert assertion (19-20) Pages 114-125 Additional Notes 125-127 CHAPTER IV THE DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENT It is not a mere combination of hypotheticals (1-2). Its basis is always categorical (3-6). Alternatives are rigidly exclusive. Erroneous views on this point (7-12). What disjunction presupposes (13). Recapitulation (14) Pages 128-137 Additional Notes 137-140 CONTENTS XV CHAPTER V PRINCIPLES OF IDENTITY, CONTRADICTION, EXCLUDED MIDDLE, AND DOUBLE NEGATION Principle of Identity must- not be a tautology (1-3). What (if any thing) it should mean (4-9). Principle of Contradiction does not explain anything (10). What it means (11-14). Further criticism and explanation (15-16). Principle of Excluded Middle is one special case of disjunction (16-19). Goes beyond it, how (20-21). Is wrongly objected to (22). Criticism of mistaken views (23-27). Double Negation, wrong account of (28). True explanation (29- 31). Erroneous use of (Note) Pages 141-164 Additional Notes 164-167 CHAPTER VI THE QUANTITY OF JUDGMENTS Extension and intension (1-2). Mistakes about "connotation" (3-5).
Law of inverse proportion of intent to extent, shown to be erroneous (6-10). Every judgment has two aspects, and can be taken both extensionally and in intension (11-12). The first defended against erroneous views (13-21). The second explained, and mistakes removed Universal, particular, and singular; what these mean, and how far they can be real (30-36). The corresponding judgments, what (37-43).
Additional Notes 193-196 CHAPTER VII THE MODALITY OF JUDGMENTS Modality affects not the form but the content of Judgment (1-3). Logical modality, what (4-5). The Assertorical (6). The Neces sary is hypothetical (7-11). And so is the Possible (12). Varieties of the latter (13-15).
Modality does not exist in fact (16). This shown of the necessary (17), and the possible (18-19). But there must be a real basis for neces sity (20), and for possibility (21-22).
Further explanations. The Potential not real (23). Conditions, as such, not facts (24). Permanent Possibilities ambiguous (25). The Problematic and Particular Judgments identical (26). The Impossible, what (27). The possible not the same as the mere not- impossible (28-31).
Probability. Its principles logical (32). Is neither objective nor sub jective (33). Rests on an exhaustive disjunction (34~36), each alternative of which is equally credible (37-38). Expression of the XVI CONTENTS chances by fractions (39-41). Inductive probability implies no fresh principle (42-43).
Errors refuted. Probability objective as well as subjective (44-45). It does not in its essence imply a series (46-50); nor a knowledge of the future (51). Fiction of the "long run" (52-54), and the truth which underlies this (55-57). Superstitious beliefs (58-59). Transi tion to Inference (61-63) Pages 197-236 Additional Notes 236-242 BOOK IL— PART I THE GENERAL NATURE OF INFERENCE CHAPTER I SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF REASONING We are really agreed on three features of inference. What these are CHAPTER II SOME ERRONEOUS VIEWS The major premise is a superstition (i). And the syllogism is not the one type of reasoning (2). The ordinary syllogism in extension criticized (3-5). Principle of nota notes (6). Possible reform of the syllogism (7-8). Principle of "Related to same are related to each other" criticized (9-10) Pages 247-254 Additional Notes 254-255 CHAPTER III A GENERAL IDEA OF INFERENCE Inference a perception ensuing on a synthesis (i). Demonstration is seeing in a logical preparation, and that is an ideal construction (2-4) Examples (5). Superstitions to be abandoned (6).
Additional Notes 260-261 CHAPTER IV PRINCIPLES OF REASONING These are special principles of interrelation (1-2). Examples of syn theses (3). But in what sense are they principles (4)? Not as canons and tests of individual inferences (5-6). No art of Reason- CONTENTS XV11 ing (7). Illustration from Casuistry (8-9). Inadequacy of the syllogism (10) Pages 262-271 Additional Notes 271-273 CHAPTER V NEGATIVE REASONING Its general nature (i) and special principles (2). Can you argue from two negative premises? Yes, but not from two bare denials (3-7) • When one premise is negative can the conclusion be affirmative? On one special condition, yes (8-9) Pages 274-283 Additional Notes 283-284 CHAPTER VI TWO CONDITIONS OF INFERENCE Result reached (i). An identical point required in all reasoning (2).
Mere likeness not enough (3). Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles stated and defended (4-9).
And one premise at least must be universal (10-13). Pages 285-297 Additional Notes 297-298 BOOK II.— PART II INFERENCE— CONTINUED CHAPTER I THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS The fact of psychical association is certain, but the theory which ex plains reproduction by the "Laws of Association" is false (1-7). Main ground of objection (8). The true explanation of the fact Errors refuted. No association by Contiguity (13-17), even if assisted by Similarity (18). Similarity alone is left (19), and this too is a fiction (20-22), which the facts do not require (23-25). The true explanation (26-27). Misunderstandings removed (28-31). Wolff and Maas adduced (32). An objection answered (33). Practical conclusion (34-36).
Note. Indissoluble Association and the Chemistry of Ideas.
Additional Notes 346-347 XV111 CONTENTS CHAPTER II THE ARGUMENT FROM PARTICULARS TO PARTICULARS This discussion has been anticipated (1-2). Supposed evidence for the Argument (3) is an ignoratio elenchi (4-5). We never argue from particulars as such (6-9), but from an universal (10-11). And we can not do otherwise (12-13). Mr. Spencer's theory of inference to be passed over (14) Pages 348-354 Additional Notes 054 CHAPTER III THE INDUCTIVE METHODS OF PROOF The question limited (1-2). Complete Induction (3). Mill's Canons of Induction. Their claim to be demonstrative (4-5). But (I) they can not start from fact (7-9). And (II) their conclusion need not be more general than some of their premises (10). And (III) they all have a logical flaw unless you confine them to the case in hand Additional Notes 368-369 CHAPTER IV JEVONS' EQUATIONAL LOGIC The Enquiry limited and subdivided (1-2). A. Propositions are not equations, and can not assert mere identity (3-7). B. Reasoning does not consist in Substitution of Similars. It rather connects dif ferences (8-13). C. The Indirect Method (14) can not be reduced to Substitution (15-18). The Logical Machine. Its merits and defects (19-22). Result (23) Pages 370-387 Additional Notes t..*,...„.. 387-388 VOLUME II BOOK III.— PART I INFERENCE— CONTINUED CHAPTER I THE ENQUIRY REOPENED Our former account of inference was insufficient. There are infer ences which will not come under our formula (1-9) Pages 389-392 Additional Notes 392-393 CHAPTER II FRESH SPECIMENS OF INFERENCE Tests of the existence of inference (1-3). Claim of fresh specimens. A. Three-term Constructions (4-5). B. Arithmetic and Geometry (6-15). C. Comparison and Distinction (16-17). D. Recognition (18). E. Dialectic (19-22). F. Abstraction (23-24). G. Disjunc tive Inference (25-29). H. Immediate Inferences (30-37).
Additional Notes 423-430 CHAPTER III GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INFERENCE Further character of inference as an ideal experiment (1-4). This type verified throughout our fresh instances (5-10).
Not every mental activity is reasoning (n). Judgment is not inference (12-18); nor is all Reproduction (19-22); nor is Imagination (23- 24). Result obtained (25) Pages 431-446 Additional Notes 446-449 CHAPTER IV THE MAIN TYPES OF INFERENCE Analysis and Synthesis are two main types (i). This not apparent (2), but shown throughout the whole of our instances (3-7). Tabular statement (8) Pages 45O-455 Additional Notes 456 XX CONTENTS CHAPTER V ANOTHER FEATURE OF INFERENCE A central identity required for each process of experiment (i). Dif ficulties (2-3). The identity shown in Recognition and Dialectic (4); and in Comparison and Distinction (5-6). This further ex plained (7-9). The identity shown in spatial Construction and in Arithmetic (10-12); and in Abstraction (13); and in Disjunctive Inference (14). Result (15) Pages 457-467 Additional Notes 467-469 CHAPTER VI THE FINAL ESSENCE OF REASONING Principles of our processes (i). Analysis and Synthesis are two sides of one process (2). Their sameness shown (3), and their differences pointed out (4-7). Analytic and Synthetic Methods (8-10).
Judgment and Inference, how related (n). Every judgment involves synthesis and analysis (12-14); but itself is not inference (15). If however we go back far enough, judgment and inference seem two sides of one process (16-22). Their connection shown in the work ing of Reproduction (23-24).
Beside Analysis and Synthesis there is a third principle of reasoning (25). Defects of Analysis and Synthesis (25-28). These defects suggest a self -developing function (29-30), which appears in our third principle (31-32). Recapitulation (33). Self-developement shows itself through the whole process of reasoning (34-35).
Additional Notes 494-501 CHAPTER VII THE BEGINNINGS OF INFERENCE Gulf between explicit inference and the beginnings of soul-life (1-2). Yet from the first an intellectual activity is present, which slowly developes (3-8). Prevalent errors as to early intelligence (o-n). Obstacles to the right study of it (12-15).. Pages 502-514 Additional Notes SiS-Si8 CONTENTS XXI BOOK III.— PART II INFERENCE— CONTINUED CHAPTER I FORMAL AND MATERIAL REASONING No reasoning with a bare form (2); nor need we even have a relative form if that means a mere formula (3). No material reasoning if that means an argument from the particular (4). There is a form or principle in every inference, and there is an irrelevant detail (5-6). We can extract this form (7); but it is not a major premise (8-13). The form is the principle which neither proves, nor is proved by, the instances (14-16); and this can be stated in a syl logism (17). Other meanings of "formal" (18). Pages 519-532 Additional Notes 533-534 CHAPTER II THE CAUSE AND THE BECAUSE Is the middle the cause (i)? Meaning of this term must be limited (2). The cause is known by reasoning, since it implies ideal reconstruc tion of the case (3-5). Futile to ask if cause comes from mere habit (6). Explanation not perception of intermediate detail (7-10).
But the reason need not be the cause (n). Ambiguity of "because" (12). The psychical cause and the logical ground distinguished (13-14). The consequence not more complex than the cause or ground (15). Result (16) Pages 535-548 Additional Notes 548-550 CHAPTER III THE VALIDITY OF INFERENCE The question has two main senses, but can here receive no final answer (1-2). Is reasoning formally valid? Not if we have interfered to make the conclusion (3). Do we interfere in Synthetical Construc tion without elision (4-6), or with elision (7)? Is the process capricious in Comparison, etc. (8-10), and again in Abstraction (n- 15)? The Disjunctive Argument (16-20). Sceptical doubts (21-22). Result (23).
Is a conclusive inference practicable? Question explained but not answered (24-25) Pages 55^-572 XX11 CONTENTS CHAPTER IV THE VALIDITY OF INFERENCE (Continued) Is inference valid really as well as formally? Question stated (1-2). Inference seems not always true of things. Instance of Comparison. Three alternatives (3). Does reality change through our caprice, or in harmony, or does it merely somehow correspond? Unless we utterly revolutionize our beliefs, we must give up complete identity of logic and fact (4-7).
Reasoning is never quite true of presented fact, since it must be dis cursive (7-11). Even Dialectic, because discursive, seems unreal (12). Nor, if logic answered to the known series of phenomena, need it even thus be true; for that series is not given but inferred. To be true of the presented logic must be true to sense, v/hich is impossible (13-15).
Can we then, denying the truth of sense-presentation, take reality itself as logical truth? Another alternative opposes us, and our logic still may prove untrue (16). Yet why should truth and reality have exactly the same nature (17)? Anyhow logic can not copy phe nomena Pages S79-5QI Additional Notes 591-595 TERMINAL ESSAYS ESSAY I ON INFERENCE (pp. 597~62l) Logic, order in (597). Conclusion to be reached as to Inference I. Inference defined (598-600). What Logic must assume (600). Can the claim of Logic be in any case made good (601)?
II. Specimens of Inference examined (601-11). Dialectical Method (601-2). Disjunctive reasoning (602-3). Syllogism (603). Arith metic (603-5). Construction, spatial and temporal (605-7). Anal ysis and Abstraction (607-9). Comparison (609-11).
III. Defects of the above as inferences (611). A further failure in all Logic is its abstraction from the psychical process. Different scopes of Logic and Psychology. Each of these sciences alike is independent but defective (611-13).
IV. Is Inference arbitrary and unreal? Objections as to triviality and irrelevancy answered (614-16). But in what sense is Inference CONTENTS XX111 V. Fallibility of all inference. Intrusion of what is merely psycho logical (617). And the logical types themselves are imperfect (617- 18). Nor is any complete code possible, nor any " formal" criterion. Individuality of inference (618-20).
VI. The Criterion — what. Use and object of Logic (619-21).
ESSAY II Inference appears always as one kind of judgment, but not all judg ment seems essentially to be inference (622-3). But this is never theless to be maintained as true (623).
All judgment implies and is inference, and a mere judgment is merely an abstraction (623-4). An objection answered (625-6).
The meaning of "judgment" and "idea," like that of "inference," varies according to the level at which it is used. Hence "judg ment" has both a wider and a more restricted sense. But its essence remains always the same and is confined to logical truth An object, so far as aesthetic, is not in this sense true (627-8).
All judgment is selective, and yet the subject of every judgment is the real Universe. An error here noted (628).
This duplicity of the subject in every judgment makes every judgment an inference already in principle (629-30).
All judgment depends on abstraction from certain conditions of its own being. Even as having an object it already abstracts, and, again, its "real world" is a further abstraction (630-1). And judgment abstracts always from its own psychical existence (631-2). It thus depends throughout upon conditions — upon a " because " which in form it ignores. And hence, except in form, every judgment is already an inference (632).
Further all judgment is not only condition^ but is also conditiona/ (633). On Ground and Conditions. On the difference between "because" and "if." An objection answered (633-5).
The meaning of "if" further explained. Meaning of "uncondition ally." How far does "conditionally" imply doubt (636-7)? On "supposal" and on "hypothetical" (637-8).
Every judgment is conditional Ideal of knowledge, what No such fact as a mere judgment, though in practice, here as everywhere, the relative must more or less be taken as absolute (639-40).
And, as no "mere judgment," so also no "mere idea." The reality is the concrete whole from which such things are abstractions. But in Logic the order of treatment is to some extent artificial and so optional (640-1).
XXIV CONTENTS ESSAY III ON THE EXTENSIONAL READING OF JUDGMENTS Every judgment can be read in intension, but no judgment can be read merely so. And the same thing holds (mutat. mutand.) as to extensional reading (642-3). Can, again, all judgment be taken as asserting or denying about some "individual" or "individuals"? Certainly not so, if "individual" is taken in its more ordinary sense (643). And the attempt to read thus all judgments involves torture (643-4). The possibility of taking any idea as one particular psychical event makes applicable a mode of torture which still remains in principle irrational (644-6).
ESSAY IV UNIQUENESS (pp. 647-658) Uniqueness — two aspects of, one (a) positive and the other (b) nega tive. But the second, even if perhaps always present, rests in any case on the first. An objection answered (647-8).
Uniqueness is absolute or relative, and holds again either in principle or merely de facto (648-9). Positive uniqueness as absolute. Claims to its possession considered, (i) The Universe. (2) One single quality (650). (3) Qualities as many. A distinction is to be made here. The Many as mere particulars; but this is a false abstraction and not a given fact (650-2). Attempts to defend its claim (a) by external relations, and (b) by an appeal to Designation (652-3). (4) The "This." Certainly it offers itself as unique, but this claim holds only so long as we remain at the stage of Feel ing (653-4). And even there the character of the "This" is incon sistent and not self-contained, and hence the claim of the " This " fails (654-5). (5) Finite Individuals. Their claim to uniqueness must be allowed if you take them as members in and of a perfect System (655-6). On the other hand this claim cannot be verified completely in detail (656-7). Recapitulation (657-8).
ESSAY V ESSAY V " This " is not specially a mark of external perception. Like " mine " and "now" it belongs to all Immediate Experience or Feeling generally (659).
Can it as an idea be predicated beyond its actual self? Certainly it CONTENTS XXV can be so used, but it cannot be used beyond the Universe that is indivisibly one with itself (659-61).
ESSAY VI THE NEGATIVE JUDGMENT (pp. 662-667) Every judgment is selective, and hence in consequence is in essence both negative and disjunctive (662). But explicitly it need not be so, since Judgment (like Inference) exists at diverse stages (662-3).
All Judgment involves the principle of Alternative; and the negation which it contains implies a positive ground on both sides, and a whole which is disjunctive and systematic (663-5).
Negation is not "unreal" and "subjective." It is "real" always, though we may be unable to see how in detail it is so. And it never in truth can be merely "subjective" (665-6). The negative is more real than what is taken as barely positive, since mere posi tion and bare exclusion alike are unreal abstractions (666).
All negation must qualify, though we may be unable to see in detail how precisely it does so. And no judgment anywhere, whether negative or positive, can really be bare and purposeless (666-7).
ESSAY VII ON THE IMPOSSIBLE, THE UNREAL, THE SELF-CONTRADICTORY, AND THE UNMEANING (pp. 668-673) The Possible — what. Its dangerous ambiguities. Its negative aspect. The Real— in what sense "possible" (668-9).
The Impossible — what. Its difference from the Unreal. " Nothing " — • what (669-71). The Meaningless— what (671). The Self -contra dictory— what. How it is thinkable, and in what sense it can How far can the above ideas be used in practice indiscriminately? Their ultimate reality — what. They all consist in one-sided Ab straction, which for finite experience is necessary, but which in the ultimate concrete Reality is throughout made good (672-3).
ESSAY VIII SOME REMARKS ON ABSOLUTE TRUTH AND ON PROBABILITY No knowledge can rest on, or be affected by, the Unknown and by ignorance taken as mere Privation (674). Absolute and Relative Truth — what. How a truth can be imperfect and yet absolute Any objection to absolute truth on the ground of Probability is un- XXvi CONTENTS