If as an example we take once more the sea-serpent, we have an idea of this but so far no judgment. And let us begin by asking, Does it exist? Let us enquire if " it exists " is really true, or only an idea. From this let us go on, and proceed to judge " The sea-serpent exists." In accomplish ing this what further have we done? And the answer is, we have qualified the real world by the adjective of the sea- serpent, and have recognized in the act that, apart from our act, it is so qualified. By the truth of a judgment we mean that its suggestion is more than an idea, that it is fact or in fact. We do not mean, of course, that as an adjective of the real the idea remains an indefinite universal. The sea- serpent, if it exists, is a determinate individual; and, if we knew the whole truth, we should be able to state exactly how it exists. Again when in the dusk I say, That is a quadruped, I qualify the reality, now appearing in perception, by this uni versal, while the actual quadruped is, of course, much besides four legs and a head. But, while asserting the universal, I do * I may remark that I am dealing at present only with affirmation; the negative judgment presents such difficulties that it can hardly be treated by way of anticipation.
CHAP. I THE GENERAL NATURE OF JUDGMENT II not mean to exclude its unknown speciality. Partial ignorance need not make my knowledge fallacious, unless by a mistake I assert that knowledge as unconditional and absolute12.
" Are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles? "13 " I doubt if this is so," " I affirm that this is so." In these examples we have got the same ideal content; the suggested idea is the relation of equality between the angles of a triangle and two right angles. And the affirmation, or judg ment, consists in saying, This idea is no mere idea, but is a quality of the real. The act attaches the floating adjective to the nature of the world, and, at the same time, tells me it was there already. The sequel, I hope, may elucidate the fore going, but there are metaphysical problems, to which it gives rise, that we must leave undiscussed.
§ ii. In this description of judgment there are two points we may at once proceed to notice. The reader will have observed that we speak of a judgment asserting one idea, or ideal content, and that we make no mention of the subject and copula. The doctrine most prevalent, on the other hand, lays down that we have always two ideas, and that one is the subject. But on both these heads I am forced to dis sent. Our second chapter will deal further with the question, but there are some remarks which may find a place here.
(i) It is not true that every judgment has two ideas. We may say on the contrary that all have but one.14 We take an ideal content, a complex totality of qualities and relations, and we then introduce divisions and distinctions, and wre call these products separate ideas with relations between them. And this is quite unobjectionable. But what is objectionable, is our then proceeding to deny that the whole before our mind is a single idea; and it involves a serious error in principle. The relations between the ideas are themselves ideal. They are not the psychical relations of mental facts. They do not exist between the symbols, but hold in the symbolized. They are part of the meaning and not of the existence. And the whole in which they subsist is ideal, and so one idea.
Take a simple instance. We have the idea of a wolf and we call that one idea. We imagine the wolf eating a lamb, and we say, There are two ideas, or three, or perhaps even more. But is this because the scene is not given as a whole?
I2 THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC BOOK I Most certainly not so. It is because in the whole there exist distinctions, and those groupings of attributes we are ac customed to make. But, if we once start on this line and deny the singleness of every idea which embraces others, we shall find the wolf himself is anything but one. He is the synthesis of a number of attributes, and, in the end, we shall find that no idea will be one which admits any sort of dis tinction in itself. Choose then which you will say, There are no single ideas, save the ideas of those qualities which are too simple to have any distinguishable aspects, and that means there are no ideas at all — or, Any content whatever which the mind takes as a whole, however large or however small, however simple or however complex, is one idea, and its manifold relations are embraced in an unity.* We shall always go wrong unless we remember that the relations within the content of any meaning, however complex, are still not relations between mental existences. There is a wolf and a lamb. Does the wolf eat the lamb? The wolf eats the lamb. We have a relation here suggested or asserted between wolf and lamb, but that relation is (if I may use the word) not a factual connection between events in my head. What is meant is no psychical conjunction of images. Just as the idea of the wolf is not the whole wolf-image, nor the idea of the lamb the imagined lamb, so the idea of their syn thesis is not the relation as it exists in my imagination. In the particular scene, which symbolizes my meaning, there are details that disappear in the universal idea, and are neither thought of nor enquired after, much less asserted.
To repeat the same thing — the imagery is a sign, and the meaning is but one part of the whole, which is divorced from the rest and from its existence. In this ideal content there are groups and joinings of qualities and relations, such as answer to nouns and verbs and prepositions. But these various ele ments, though you are right to distinguish them, have no valid ity outside the whole content. That is one idea, which contains * The psychological controversy as to the number of ideas we can entertain at once, can hardly be settled till we know beforehand what is one idea. If this is to exclude all internal complexity, what residuum will be left? But, if it admits plurality, why is it one idea? If, however, what otherwise we should call plurality, we now call single just because we have attended to it as one, the question must clearly alter its form.15 CHAP. I THE GENERAL NATURE OF JUDGMENT 13 all ideas which you are led to make in it; for, whatever is fixed by the mind as one, however simple or complex, is but one idea. But, if this is so, the old superstition that judg ment is the coupling a pair of ideas must be relinquished.
§ 12. I pass now (ii) to the other side of this error, the doctrine that in judgment one idea is the subject, and that the judgment refers another to this. In the next chapter this view will be finally disposed of, but, by way of anticipation, we may notice here two points, (a) In " wolf eating lamb " the relation is the same, whether I affirm, or deny, or doubt, or ask16. It is therefore not likely that the differentia of judgment will be found in what exists apart from all judg ment. The differentia will be found in what differences the content, as asserted, from the content as merely suggested. So that, if in all judgment it were true that one idea is the subject of the assertion, the doctrine would be wide of the essence of the matter, and perhaps quite irrelevant. But (b) the doc trine (as we shall see hereafter) is erroneous. " B follows A," " A and B coexist," " A and B are equal," " A is south of B " — in these instances it is mere disregard of facts which can hold to the doctrine. It is unnatural to take A or B as the subject and the residue as predicate. And, where exist ence is directly asserted or denied, as in, " The soul exists," or, " There is a sea-serpent," or, " There is nothing here," the difficulties of the theory will be found to culminate.
I will anticipate no further except to remark, that in every judgment there is a subject of which the ideal content is asserted. But this subject of course can not belong to the content or fall within it,17 for, in that case, it would be the idea attributed to itself. We shall see that the subject is, in the end, no idea but always reality; and, with this antici pation, we must now go forward, since we have finished the first division of this chapter. We must pass from the general notion of judgment to the criticism of certain erroneous views, a criticism, however, which is far from exhaustive, and in some points must depend for its fuller evidence upon the discussions of the following chapters.
II. § 13. Wrong theories of judgment naturally fall into two classes, those vitiated by the superstition of subject, 4 THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC BOOK I predicate and copula, and those which labour under other defects. We will take the last first.
(i) Judgment is neither the association of an idea with a sensation, nor the liveliness or strength of an idea or ideas. At the stage we have reached, we need subject these views to no detailed examination. The ideas which they speak of are psychical events, whereas judgment, we have seen, has to do with meaning, an ideal content which is universal, and which assuredly is not the mental fact. While all that we have is a relation of phenomena, a mental image, as such, in juxta position with or soldered to a sensation, we can not as yet have assertion or denial, a truth or a falsehood. We have mere reality, which is, but does not stand for anything, and which exists, but by no possibility could be true.
We will not anticipate the general discussion of " Asso ciation " (vid. Book II. Part II. Chap. I.), and will pass by those extraordinary views the school holds as to universals. We will come at once to the result. There is an idea, in the sense of a particular image, in some way conjoined with or fastened to a sensation. I have, for instance, sensations of coloured points; and images of movement and hardness and weight are " called up " by these sensations, are attracted to, and cohere with them. And this sounds very well till we raise certain difficulties. An orange presents us with visual sen sations, and we are to add to these the images just mentioned. But each of these images is a hard particular, and qualified by relations which exclude it from all others. If you simply associate this bundle of facts, who would take them as one fact? But if you blend their content, if, neglecting the exist ence, you take a part of the quality of each, and transfer that to the object, then you may call your process by what name you please, but it certainly is not association (Vid. infr. Book II.).
But let us suppose that the ideas are united somehow with the sensation, yet where is the judgment, where is truth or falsehood? The orange is now before my sense or imagi nation. For my mind it exists, and there is an end of it. Or say, " Caesar will be angry." Caesar here is the percep tion, which, when further qualified, becomes " Caesar angry." But this image again is simply what it is, it does not stand for anything, and it can mean nothing.
CHAP. I THE GENERAL NATURE OF JUDGMENT 15 Let us suppose in the first place that the " idea " main tains itself, then no doubt, as one fact, it stands in mental relation with the fact of the sensation. The two phenomena coexist as a headache may coexist with a syllogism; but such psychical coherence is far from assertion. There is no affirma tion; and what is there to affirm? Are we to assert the relation between the two facts? But that is given, and either to assert it or deny it would be senseless.* Is one fact to be made the predicate of another fact? That seems quite unintelligible. If in short both sensation and idea are facts, then not only do we fail to find any assertion, but we fail to see what there is left to assert.
But in the second place (giving up association proper) let us suppose that the " idea," as such, disappears, and that its mutilated content is merged in the sensation. In this case the whole, produced by blending, comes to my mind as a single presentation. But where is the assertion, the truth or false hood? We can hardly say that it lies in the bare presentation itself. We must find it, if anywhere, in the relation of this presentation to something else. And that relation would be the reference of judgment. But on the present view both the something else and the reference are absent. We have first an unmodified and then a modified sensation.
The only way to advance would be to suppose, in the first place, that, while the " idea " maintains itself, it is dis tinguished from its content; and to suppose, in the second place, that both of these are distinguished from the sensation. We have then two facts, a sensation and an image, and beside these a content held apart from the image. We have now reached a condition which would make judgment possible, but the advance to this condition is not explicable by Associa tion. Nor could the further steps be accounted for. You have the transference of the content from the image to the sensa tion, and the qualification of the latter as a subject; but both would be inexplicable. We may add that it is impossible for a sensation or sensations to serve as the subject in every judgment (vid. Chap. II.). And finally the consciousness that, what my act joins, is joined apart from it, is a fact not *We might say that, on this view, the denial of a falsehood must ipso facto be false.
j5 THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC BOOK I compatible with the psychology we are considering1®. To sum up the whole— to merge the content of an image in a modi fied presentation, is but one step towards judgment, and it is a very long step beyond association: while conjunction or coherence of psychical phenomena is not only not judg ment, but would not serve as its earliest basis and beginning.* §'14. But the definition, I shall be told, is a "lively idea associated with a present impression," and I shall be asked if lively makes no difference. And I answer, Not one particle; it makes no difference even if you suppose it true, and in addition it is false. The liveliness removes none of the objections we have been developing. Let it be as lively as you please, it is a mere presentation, and there is no judg ment. The liveliness of the idea not only is not judgment, but it is not always even a condition. The doctrine that an idea judged true must be stronger than one not so judged, will not bear confrontation with the actual phenomena. You may go on to increase an idea in strength till it passes into a sensa tion, and there yet may be no judgment. I will not dwell on this point, since the unadulterated facts speak loudly for themselves, but will give one illustration. We most of us have at times the images of the dead, co-inhabitants of the rooms we once shared with the living. These images, mostly faint, at times become distressing, from their strength and particularity and actual localization in those parts of the room which we do not see. In an abnormal state such images, it is well known, may become hallucinations, and take their place in the room before our eyes as actual perceptions. But with an educated man they would be recognized as illusions, and would not be judged to be outwardly real, any more than the fainter and normal images are judged to be anywhere but in our own minds. Yet lively ideas associated with present * It has been often remarked that, on Hume's theory of belief, there can be no difference between imagination and reality, truth and false hood, and that why we make this difference is incomprehensible. J. S. Mill with great openness professed on this head the total bankruptcy of the traditional doctrine. He seems somehow to have thought that a complete break-down on a cardinal point was nothing against the main doctrine of his school, nor anything more than a somewhat strange fact. It was impossible that he should see the real cause of failure. We shall deal with Professor Bain's views lower down.
CHAP. I THE GENERAL NATURE OF JUDGMENT 17 impressions — if we have not got them here, where are they?
§ 15. We turn with relief from the refutation of a doctrine, long dead and yet stubbornly cumbering the ground, to con sider a fresh error, the confusion of judgment with practical belief. I cannot enquire how far any psychical activity is consistent with the theory of Professor Bain, nor can I dis cuss the nature of a psychical activity which seems physiolog ically to consist in muscular innervation; though I am bound to add that (doubtless owing to my ignorance) Professor Bain's physiology strikes me here as being astonishingly misty. And I must pass by the doubt whether, if we accept his view, we shall find the confusion between image and meaning in any way lessened19.
We must remember that the question, Is judgment always practical, does not mean, Is the will in any way concerned in it. In that case it might be argued that all generation of psychical phenomena comes under the head Will. The ques tion means, Does the essence of judgment lie, not in the production of truth and falsehood — states which alter nothing in the things they represent — but rather in the actual produc tion of a change in real existence. Or, more simply, when an idea is judged to be true, does this mean that it moves some other phenomenon, and that its assertion or denial is nothing but this motion? The doctrine admits that an idea or ideas, when held true, differ vitally from the same when suggested; and it proceeds to assert that the differentia is the effect of the idea on our conduct, and that there is no other differentia at all.
There is a logical mistake we may point out before pro ceeding, for it is the error which has led Professor Bain astray. Assume that an asserted idea causes action, and that an idea, not believed in, does not influence conduct. From these premises can we conclude, Therefore judgment is influence? If, in other words, when A changes to B, we have an unfailing difference q, and q is not found except after A, does this war rant the assertion, that the alteration consists in q? Is it not quite possible that q follows from p, and that p is what really turns A into B? We shall do well to keep our eye on this logi cal fallacy. The assertion we are to examine is not that prac tical influence induces us to judge, or results from a judgment: What is asserted is that judgment is nothing else whatever.
l8 THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC BOOK I Against this false differentia I shall briefly maintain, (o) that the differentia may be absent from the fact, (b) that it may be present with other facts, (c) that the fact contains other characteristics, which are the true differentia, and are absent from the false one, (d) that the latter has a positive quality which. excludes the fact.
(a) If we test the theory by abstract instances such as, The angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, it collapses at once. It is impossible to find always a practical influence exerted by the ideas. We may be answered " But they might exert it, you surely would act on them." And such an answer may pass in the school of " Experience "; but a poor " transcendentalist " will perhaps be blamed if he usurps such a privilege. He at least is not allowed to take tendency and possibility and mere idea for fact. And he can hardly be prevented from pressing the question, Is the influence there or not? If it is not there, then either Professor Bain's theory disappears, or he should alter his definition, and say that an idea passes into a judgment when enriched by potentialities and eventual tendencies20. If these are not ideas we should be told what they are; but if they are only ideas that go with the first ideas, then our answer is plain. In the first place it is not true that they are always there; in the second place it is not true that, when added, they must exert a practical influence.
(b) In the second place ideas may influence me, though I never do hold them for true. The feelings and emotions associated with an idea can often prevent or produce volitions, although the idea is not affirmed as true, and even while it is recognized as false.. Though I do not believe that a slow- worm can bite, or a drone can sting, I may shrink from touching them. I may avoid a churchyard though I believe in no ghosts. An illusion no doubt, if recognized as such, does not influence volition either so much, or always in the same way; but still it may operate in spite of disbelief.* And it can hardly be a true view which forces us to say, If you judged it an illusion you would wholly disregard it, for such disregard is judgment.
* It may be said that when it operates the denial is suspended. But I confess I can find no ground for such a statement. At any rate it is certain that the idea can operate though a positive judgment is not there.
CHAP. I THE GENERAL NATURE OF JUDGMENT 1 9 I will not dwell on a point it would be easy to illustrate. In passing, however, I may remind the reader of that class of ideas which influences our actions without seeming to be true. I refer to practical ideas, the representation of a satisfied desire which is now felt to be unsatisfied. It is certain that these move us to active pursuit, and it is equally certain they are not judged to be real21; for, if they were, then for that reason they would fail to move us.* (c) But suppose that all judgment did really move to action. Would this show that judgment was nothing but such motion? Most certainly not so. We can observe what takes place in us, when a suggested idea is judged to be true; and clearly an activity (however hard to describe) does show itself there, and yet is not directed (except per accidens) towards making a change in the world and in ourselves. And if this true differentia can be verified, that should settle the question22. And again, apart from direct observation, we can argue indirectly. Assertion and denial, together with the dif ference of truth and falsehood, are real phenomena, and there is something in them which falls outside the influence of ideas on the will. It is comic if the judgment, It will rain to-morrow, is the same as buying an umbrella to-day; or, Put on your thick boots, is a truer form of, It rained hard yesterday. And when a child sees a berry and, as we say, judges, It made me sick before, it seems strange that the act of affirmation should con sist in practical abstention to-day and should be nothing else.
(d) And not only are the genuine characteristics absent from a mere practical attitude, but we find present there a qual ity which is absent from real judgment. The truth of a sug gestion is not a matter of degree, and the act which attributes an idea to reality either refers it, or does not refer it. It can hardly do either a little more or less and to a certain degree (cf. Chap. VII.). In strictness of speech all half-truths are no truths, and, " It is more or less true," really means, " It is true with a qualification," or " More or less of it is true, though as a whole it is not true." But the practical influence of ideas must have degree, and so possess a quality which judgment has not.
For these reasons, each of which can stand almost alone, it seems clear that the doctrine before us has failed. And * I may refer on this point to my Ethical Studies, Essay VII.
20 THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC BOOK I one cause of the error seems to lie in the neglect of some important distinctions we may proceed to notice. Judgment is primarily logical, and as such has no degrees; the relation of the ideal content to reality must be there or not there. Belief, on the other hand, is primarily psychological, and, whether theoretic or practical, exists in a degree, (a) Intel lectual belief or conviction is the general state which corre sponds to the particular acts of judgment. To believe that A is B may mean that, whenever the idea A — B is suggested, I go on to affirm it; or, further, that the idea fills much space in my mind, is a persistent habit and ruling principle, which dominates my thoughts and fills my imagination, so that the assertion A — B is frequently made and has wide intellectual ramifications and connections. I should believe A — B less, if it more seldom arose, by itself or by implication, and had in ferior influence. I should believe less still if, when A — B was suggested, I sometimes doubted it; and even less, if I affirmed it more seldom, and then with hesitation, against doubts, and with inability to maintain the attitude. On the other hand I should not believe at all, if I only were more or less convinced, perceiving more or less reason on both sides, inclined in one direction, but unable to cross the line and to affirm, (b) But in practical belief, beside these degrees of intellectual convic tion, there is another element of more and less. Not only is the truth of the intellectual content more or less present, but in addition it can influence my will more or less. A desire stronger or more persistent, or more dominant generally, may answer to it on the one side, or on the other a weaker and more fleeting impulse. Beside existing more or less, it can move more or less. It is, I think, not easy to keep clear of con fusion unless these ambiguities are noticed and avoided. But the main logical mistake which Professor Bain has committed is to argue from the (false) premise, " Belief must induce ac tion," to the inconsequent result " Belief is that inducement." * * In the third edition of his Emotions (1875) Prof. Bain apparently reconsiders the question, but I can neither tell if he abandons his theory, nor what it is that, if so, he puts in its place. As I am entirely unable to understand this last theory, my remarks must be taken to apply to the earlier one. Since this volume was written I have made acquaintance with Mr. Sully's criticism on Prof. Bain's doctrine (Sensa- CHAP. I THE GENERAL NATURE OF JUDGMENT 21 § 1 6. (ii) Leaving now the first group of erroneous views we may proceed to consider another collection. These may be classed as labouring under a common defect, the false notion that in judgment we have a pair of ideas. We were engaged with this fallacy in § n, and it will meet us again in the following chapter, so that here some brief remarks may suffice. In their ordinary acceptation the traditional subject, predicate, and copula are mere superstitions24. The ideal matter which is affirmed in the judgment, no doubt possesses internal relations, and in most cases (not all) the matter may be arranged as subject and attribute25. But this content, we have seen, is the same both in the assertion and out of it26. If you ask instead of judging, what is asked is precisely the same as what is judged. So that it is impossible that this internal relation can itself be the judgment; it can at best be no more than a condition of judging. We may say then, if the copula is a connection which couples a pair of ideas, it falls outside judgment; and, if on the other hand it is the sign of judgment, it does not couple. Or, if it both joined and judged, then judgment at any rate would not be mere joining. I will dwell here no more on the general error. We shall see