Thus we can understand a third critique against the old method: the Aristotelian logic rests upon a metaphysics which believes that sensible experience gives the human mind the things as they are, with their essential qualities, and that philosophy can be satisfied with taking empirical phenomena for the true reality of nature, thanks to a mere generalization that erases the particular circumstances of existence. Nevertheless, empirically qualified existences are not to be mistaken for the things themselves.
So far, Bacon is undoubtedly a modern, since he claims that the object of knowledge is reality and that reality, if it can be inductively known from empirical data, cannot be reduced to the matter of experience.
Bacon's fourth censure of the old logic follows from this. He agrees with the sixteenth-century dialecticians that Aristotle was wrong when he thought that understanding could skip, without the hard work of induction, from what is immediately given to the senses to what is posed in the first principles of science. Aristotle wanted to know the truth, but did not explain the method of invention. On the other hand, the dialecticians, giving up the attempt to set up the first principles (and thereby the traditional Aristotelian demonstrative science), gave up any attempt to reach the truth. They only retained the deductive and systematic form of discourse to introduce order into men's opinions, and maintained that invention could be reduced to the mere search for arguments, that is, for probable reasons invented to persuade or convince.
Bacon, however, wants to promote the idea of an inductive science and argues that Aristotle's mistake affects the syllogistic form. In the fourth chapter of the fifth book of the DE AUGMENTIS, Bacon develops a remarkable critique of the syllogism and is partly responsible for the widespread disregard of formal logic in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
According to Bacon, "in all inductions, whether in good or vicious form the same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth" (III, 392). One cannot find without proving, nor prove without finding.
But this is not the case in the syllogism: "for the proof being not immediate but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judgement of the consequence is another, the one exciting only, the other examining" (III, 392). The syllogism needs the means (the middle term) so that the derived conclusion amounts to a proof. But since the syllogism is incapable of inventing the middle term, it must have been known before. In other words, syllogistic form leaves the invention of the middle term to the natural shrewdness of the mind or to good fortune. Thus, it is because of its own demonstrative form that the syllogism is unable to provide a method of truth and is useless for science.
By now it is clear why the old logic and the knowledge which is built on it are unable to produce works or why the extant works "are due to chance and experience rather than to sciences" (IV, 48). To deduce practical effects, the mind must know real causes or laws of nature. Since the old method does not supply the mind with the means of inventing causes and does not set up the scale of the intermediate propositions that are needed to reduce sensible experience and reach the real science, or to derive rightly and by degrees the consequences from the principles, it is not surprising that invented works are too few and not very useful for men's lives. Thus, from the start in sensible experience to the end in practical deduction, this old method is of no use. And an entirely new one must be proposed, which will be able to carry the human mind from empirical data to the real causes, to supply it with the means of invention, to justify the position of first truths and to manage a secure deduction of practical consequences.
And, as the critique of the old logic has to be understood as a whole, so the interpretation of nature has to be conceived as a continuous attempt, proceeding by degrees, by successive stages, to invent truth and to derive works. ("Bacon's method of science", in: THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO BACON.
ed. by Markku Peltonen [1996], 76-82).
1C.
Harvey Wheeler comments: Most historians of the philosophy of science are unfamiliar with Bacon's transformation of his innovative theory of juridical lawfinding into scientific empiricist lawfinding. Baconian law-finding is not to be confused with cause-finding in modern "classical" physics.
Bacon's quest changed as he matured. In VALERIUS TERMINUS he is writing in English, trying to lay the groundwork for the validity of the co-existence of Religion and Science.
Bacon’s early experimental treatises--like Dense and Rare--are experimental and of limited value. Historians of the philosophy of science have little trouble in disposing these early experimentalist efforts of Bacon.
His work on sound was somewhat better-- experimental-theoretical. It is a post-pythagorean theory of harmonics and still not appropriately analyzed.
Contemproary musicologists like to quote the passages on sound in NEW ATLANTIS for being compatible with today’s approach to music.
By the time of the Novum Organum Bacon was seeking a more "general theory of science." Its 'logic machine' (Hooke) was designed to be relevant to all non-theological domains.
However, most Bacon interpreters evaluate his science in contrast to the prior Aristotelian approaches and in comparison to the Ramist approaches of Bacon’s day.
He rejected them both.
Scholars then look beyond Bacon and evaluate his logic machine in contrast to the "classical mechanics" of Newtonian Optics (physics): linear time-sequence prediction.
Bacon was not seeking that type of "cause/prediction"science. He was seeking hidden, "unwritten" "laws" of nature, more on the model of Pasteur than of Newton.
Any treatment that tries to interpret Bacon's Logic Machine in the light of what classical physics called "science" will distort Bacon's meaning and achievement.
Note: if a scholar's interpretation of Bacon's Science does not square with the detailed description of the application of Bacon's science in "Salomon's House" in NEW ATLANTIS, it should be viewed with scepticism.
Bacon's science is more applicable to what we call post-modern neo-hermeutics than to Newtonian mechanics. (Patrick Heelan is good on post-modern neo-hermeneutics.)
Consider: why did Bacon conclude that his New Logic Machine would produce scientific knowledge in the form of aphorisms and apothegms--not linear time-sequence predictions?
To summarize the above:: Most contemporary interpreters of Bacon evaluate his science by comparison with Newtonian mechanics. If one interprets Bacon on the basis of classical mechanics, the result will not truly reflect Bacon's science.
A more fruitful modern model is the Watson-Crick type of "science" illustrated by their discovery of the double helix. Their process, as described carefully in Watson's book, could have been lifted from Bacon. It was not. But the point is that it tells of a highly successful, highly empiricist (in Bacon's and Kant's meaning of phenomenological empiricism) approach to the "understanding" of the "unwritten laws" of cell theory and genetics.
NOTE: It is very instructive to study why Linus Pauling failed to dsiscover the genetic code. He was an expert in the physics of biochemistry and applied quantum theory to molecular biology. His theory of the molecular bond won a Nobel Laureate.
Read Watson's explanation of why Pauling failed to crack the genetic code.
Guenther Stent, the molecular biologist of U.C. Berkeley is an avowed Kantian who narrowly missed cracking the genetic code, His philosophy of science is highly relevant to the application of neo-hermeneutics to contemporary biology.
Today's philosophy of physics, as developed by John Wheeler and David Bohm describes a "Baconian" idea of the "participant-observer universe" to account "scientifically" and empirically for the evidence produced in post-modern physics.
I hold to two points that may not persuade others. The first is the relevance of "law-finding" to the phenemonological empiricism at the heart of Bacon's Nov Org logic machine--as contrasted with his early experimentalism. The second is the standard for us to use in evaluating Bacon's science. Those who apply the model of science widespread in the social sciences and humanities during the 19th and mid upon pre-Einsteinian physics--argue that Bacon's science is not "science."
In the last half of the 20th century "science" in both the "hard" and "soft" sciences underwent the so-called "second scientific revolution." The results, in physics and biology, produced a phenomenology and an empiricism that were both quite compatible with the pre-Newtonian science of Bacon.
About 80% of the actual research in laboratories done today by scientists of all fields, (unaware) follows remarkably closely to the process explained by Bacon in Novum Organum and described in New Atlantis--except that taskforce research is not today quite as well organized as was described by Bacon in New Atlantis.
In thinking of Bacon's philosophy of science remember the three features in the Latin of Novum Organum: Schematismus, Processus, Form. These operations, which have counterparts in the "case method" of searching for the implicit unwritten law behind a series of judge rulings, cannot be understood from a reading of the Ellis translation. Nobody who works from that version can understand, nor do justice to, Bacon's science.
with the Annotations of | Hermes Stella{2} | 2. Franz Trägfer sums up the Harley MSS.6463 | discussion on "Hermes Stella" and "Valerius Terminus" "Der Titel des Fragments wurde zweimal entscheidend interpretiert. Ellis (Vorwort, 201/2): "It is impossible to ascertain the motive which determined Bacon to give the supposed author the name of Valerius Terminus, or to his commentator, of whose annotations we have no remains, that of Hermes Stella. It may be conjectured that by the name Terminus he intended to intimate that the new philosophy would put an end to the wandering of mankind in search of truth, that it would be the TERMINUS AD QAEM in which when it was once attained the mind would finally acquiesce.
Again the obscurity of the text was to be in some measure removed by the annotations of Stella; not however wholly, for Bacon in the epitome of the eighteenth chapter commends the manner of publishing knowledge 'whereby it shall not be to the capacity nor taste of all, but shall as it were single and adopt his reader.' Stella was therefore to throw a kind of starlight on the subject, enough to prevent the student's losing his way, but not much more."
Die andere klassische Interpretation gibt Anderson (op.cit.16/17): "The word 'terminus' probably indicates the 'limits and end' to which investigation may proceed. The ANNOTATIONS, of which 'none are set down in this fragments'--to quote a statement written on the manuscript by Bacon's hand, are to throw a light as by a star (STELLA). Now 'star' is the symbol used by Bacon in the GESTA GRAYORUM, the ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, and the DE AUGMENTIS to represent the sovereign. And the significance which he attaches to the word 'Hermes' is evident from his address to King James in the Introduction to the ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 'There is met in your Majesty, says Bacon, 'a rare conjunction as well of divine and sacred literature as of profane and human; so as your Majesty standeth invested of that triplicity which in great veneration was ascribed to the ancient Hermes; the power and fortune of a King, the knowledge and illumination of a Priest, and the learning and the universality of a Philosopher.' Bacon is, or pretended to be, greatly impressed by James's learning: 'To drink indeed', he says, 'of the true fountains of learning, nay to have such a fountain of learning in himself, in a king, and in a king born, is always a miracle.' And it would appear that he hopes at the beginning of James's reign--long before he suffers disillusionment respecting his sovereign's interest in the advance of 'solid' knowledge--that, whether or not he can obtain a greater position of state beyond that alloted to him by Elizabeth, he may be enabled to have the modern Hermes, king of the realm and head of the church, and a literary man of no mean fame and importance, annote a subject's work on the new science. James, when he has done this, may well be prevailed upon to make provision for the operation of the new method of knowledge either by subsidizing helpers or by placing at the author's disposal old or new foundations of learning (Works, II, 175, 401)."
Brandt (op.cit., 54) Iehnt diese Interpretation ab: "1. findet sich keine klare Bezeichnung des Königs als eines Sterns, es läßt sich den von Anderson angegebenen Texten nicht entnehmen, daß Stella als Symbol für Jakob I. zu gelten hat. 2. kann nur ein König als Hermes-Trismegistos angesprochen werden (so VIII, 335 und I, 432, nicht in der englischen Fassung III, 263), weil im Namen die Einheit von Priester, Philosoph und König liegt, aber im Titel unserer Schrift steht nur Hermes, und die Figur des Hermes hat eme vielfältige Bedeutung; Hermes ist der Grenzgott, auf ihn wird schon in dem Wort 'Terminus' des Titels angespielt; weiter ist Hermes der Götterbote, der 'hermeneus' oder Interpret-- die Hermesmythologie ist hineingesponnen in die interpretatio naturae, die sich Bacon zur Aufgabe stellt und in seine Rolle als 'keryx´ und `buccinator', als Bote des Friedens (I, 580-581). Man wird also lieber Hermes Stella eine der vielen Masken Bacons sein lassen und sich damit zugleich von der peinlichen Vorstellung befreien, Bacon künde im Titel seines Werkes an, daß der König die Fußnoten dazu verfaßt (eben das folgt aus der Annahme von Anderson)."
Dieser Auseinandersetzung urn die Bedeutung des Titels eine neue Erklärung anzufügen, halte ich, solange keine neuen Dokumente gefunden werden, für wenig sinnvoll. Allein, es sei angemerkt, wollten wir uns mit Brandt von dieser peinlichen Vorstellung bezüglich Bacons Denken und Trachten befreien, so blieben noch genug Peinlichkeiten der Hybris Bacons."
Franz Träger (Hg.), Valerius Terminus. Von der Interpretation der Natur Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1984,25-26.
in: The Works of Francis Bacon. Faksimile- | Neudruck der Ausgabe von Spedding, Ellis | und Heath, London 1857-1874, in vierzehn | Bänden (Stuttgart/Bad Cannstadt: Friedrich | Fromann, Verlag Günther Holzboog, 1963), | vol. 3.{3} | 3. Franz Träger discovered that the Spedding & Ellis as MS6462 is not correct, in fact it is MS6463. In his opinion Valerius Terminus was written before The Advancement of Learning. Anderson, Farrington and Rossi also have the opinion that it was written in 1603.
Stephens in his edition of 1734 uses the same order as the handwritten copy of Bacon's text.
Later editors, including Spedding and Ellis, choose an order which corresponds to Bacon's new order of chapters given in his index.
Franz Träger compared the translation of the 11th chapter with the translation of Guiseppe Furlani, DIE ENTSTEHUNG UND DAS WESEN DER BACONISCHEN METHODE in: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. L. Stein, 33.
Teil, 32. Bd., S. 189 ff).
Träger has also checked the following Bacon translations: ESSAYS, übers. von Elisabeth Schücking, Stuttgart, 1970; NEUES ORGANON DER WISSENSCHAFTEN, übers. von Anton Theobald Brück, Darmstadt, 1981 (Nachdruck der Ausgabe, Leipzig, 1830); NOVUM ORGANON, übers. von Rudolf Hoffmann, bearb. von Gertraud Korf, hrsg. von Manfred Buhr, Berlin (DDR), 1982.
OF THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE. | CAP. 1. | Of the limits and end of knowledge. | In the divine nature both religion and | philosophy hath acknowledged goodness in | perfection, science or providence | comprehending all things, and absolute | sovereignty or kingdom. In aspiring to the | throne of power the angels transgressed | and fell{4}, in presuming to come within | 4. Antje Peters checked the Old the oracle of knowledge man transgressed | Testament and the New Testament on the and | fall of the angels: Jesaja 14, 14 Das Judentum ist geprägt von der antithetisch parallelen Vorstellung von Dämonen und Engeln als Schädiger bzw. Helfer des Menschen. Sie wird in der Erzählung vom Engelfall entfaltet.
Das Buch Jesaja (Jes 14,12ff)14:12 Ach, du bist vom Himmel gefallen, du strahlender Sohn der Morgenröte. Zu Boden bist du geschmettert, du Bezwinger der Völker.
14:13 Du aber hattest in deinem Herzen gedacht: Ich ersteige den Himmel; dort oben stelle ich meinen Thron auf, über den Sternen Gottes; auf den Berg der (Götter)versammlung setze ich mich, im äußersten Norden.
14:14 Ich steige weit über die Wolken hinauf, um dem Höchsten zu gleichen.
14:15 Doch in die Unterwelt wirst du hinabgeworfen, in die äußerste Tiefe.
Im AT gehörte Satan zu den "Söhnen Gottes" im himmlischen Hofstaat, wie die wohl alte Vorstellung Ijob 1,6 zeigt.
Das Buch Ijob (Ijob 1,6)1:6 Nun geschah es eines Tages, da kamen die Gottessöhne, um vor den Herrn hinzutreten; unter ihnen kam auch der Satan.
Er gilt als Diener Gottes und verkörpert eine ursprünglich Gott zugeschriebene Funktion.
Der von dann von Gott abgefallene und mit seinem Diener aus dem Himmel gestürzte Engelsfürst wird zum Gegner Gottes und Verführer der Menschen.
Auch im NT findet der Teufel als ein oder der Fürst der gefallenen bösen Engel Erwähnung.
Das Evangelium nach Lukas (Lk 10,18)10:18 Da sagte er zu ihnen: Ich sah den Satan wie einen Blitz vom Himmel fallen.
Der zweite Brief an die Korinther (2 Kor 11,14)11:14 Kein Wunder, denn auch der Satan tarnt sich als Engel des Lichts.
Neben den Bibeltexten wird Bacon auch "De Civitate Dei" (Der Gottesstaat) von Aurelius Augustinus, dem größten lateinischen Kirchenlehrer des christlichen Altertums, vorgelegen haben, in der das Thema Engelfall mehrfach unter verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten erwähnt wird.
So wird im elften Buch die Situation der Engel besonders beleuchtet.
Buch XI, 11...Von dieser Erleuchtung haben sich gewisse Engel abgewendet und sich die Auszeichnung eines weisen und seligen Lebens nicht bewahrt, das zweifellos nur das ewige, seiner Ewigkeit sichere und vergewisserte Leben sein kann. Sie besitzen nur noch ein Vernunftleben, wenn auch ein einsichtsloses und derart, daß sie es, selbst wenn sie wollen, nicht verlieren können...Buch XI, 13...Die sündigen Engel, die durch ihre Schlechtigkeit jenes Lichtes verlustig gingen, haben sie (die Glückseligkeit), wie wir schlüssig folgern müssen, auch bevor sie fielen, nicht gehabt...Buch XI, 19...Denn diese Scheidung (zwischen Licht und Finsteris) konnte nur er allein treffen, der auch, bevor sie fielen, ihren künftigen Fall vorauswissen kont, und daß sie, des Lichtes der Wahrheit verlustig, im finsteren Hochmut verharren würden.
Buch XI, 33 Daß es aber Engel gibt, die gesündigt haben und in die tiefste Tiefe dieser Welt verstoßen sind, die ihnen zu einer Art von Kerker wurde, darin sie bis zur bevorstehenden letzten Verurteilung am Tage des Gerichtes zu bleiben haben: das offenbart ganz deutlich der Apostel Petrus. Er sagt, daß Gott die sündigen Engel nicht geschont, sondern sie in die finsteren Abgründe der Hölle hinabgestoßen hat, wo die bis zur Bestrafung im Gerichte gefangengehalten werden...Und da ja Gott, wie geschrieben steht, "den Stolzen widersteht, den Demütigen aber Gnade gibt" (Jak 4,6; 1 Petr 5,5), wohnt die eine (Engelsgenossenschaft) im Himmel der Himmel und ist die andre von dort hinabgestürzt in diesen untersten Lufthimmel, um hier ruhelos in und her zu schwirren.
Buch XXII,1 Gott ist es, der mit dem freiwilligen Sturz der Engel die völlig gerechte Strafe ewiger Unseligkeit verknüpft hat und den übrigen Engeln, die im höchsten Gut verblieben sind, als Lohn für ihr Verbleiben die Sicherheit gewährt hat, daß dieses Verbleiben kein Ende haben wird.
Aufgrund dieser Erkenntnisse zieht Augustin Parallelen zum Leben der Menschen, besonders im 12. Buch: Buch XII,1...Während die einen standhaft in dem allen gemeinsamen Gut, das für sie Gott selbst ist, und in seiner Ewigkeit, Wahrheit und Liebe verharren, sind die anderen, von ihrer eigenen Macht berauscht, als wären sie sich selbst ihr Gut, vom höheren, allen gemeinsamen, beseligenden Gut zum eigenen Selbst abgefallen...fell{5}: but in pursuit towards the | 5. Spedding's footnote:This clause is similitude of God's goodness or love | repeated in the margin, in the (which is one thing, for love is nothing | transcriber's hand.
else but goodness put in motion or | applied) neither man or spirit ever | hath transgressed, or shall transgress.{6} | 6. similarly in:: I.M. Praefatio Sp.
I,132, 19-22; AL Sp. III, 12 seq.
The angel of light that was, when he | (D.A. Sp. I, 742, 1 9 seq. (footnote presumed before his fall, said within | taken from the French translation of himself, I WILL ASCEND AND BE LIKE UNTO | Valerius Terminus by Francois Vert, Meridiens Klincksieck, 1986) THE HIGHEST{7}; not God, but the highest. | 7. Isaiah 14, 14: To be like to God in goodness, was no part | Authorized Version: I will ascend of his emulation; knowledge, being in | above the heights of the clouds; I creation an angel of light, was not the | will be like the most high.
want which did most solicit him; only | because he was a minister he aimed at a | supremacy; therefore his climbing or | ascension was turned into a throwing down | or precipitation. | Man on the other side, when he was tempted | before he fell, had offered unto him this | suggestion, THAT HE SHOULD BE LIKE | UNTO GOD{8}. But how? Not simply, but in | 8. Genesis 3, 5: this part, KNOWING GOOD AND EVIL. For | Authorized Version: For God does know being in his creation invested with | that in the day ye eat thereof, then sovereignty of all inferior | your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.
For Bacon's alleged use of the Geneva Bible see Henri Durel-Leon in Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society, XI:2 (1997), p. 160 and n. 74, modified in the direction of AV by, probably, Lancelot Andrewes in AL. (Thanks to Dr.
Leedham-Green) Geneva Bible: The First Boke of Moses, called Genesis, Chap 3,4+5: Then the serpent said to the woman, Ye shal not dye at all, But God doeth knowe, that when ye shall eat thereof, your eyes shalbe opened, & ye shalbe as gods knowing good and evil. [footnote c: As thogh he shulde say, God doeth not forbid you to eat of the frute, save that he knoweth that if you shulde eat thereof, you shulde be like to him] Authorized Version: And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die: For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.
Vulgata: dixit autem serpens ad mulierem nequaquam morte moriemini / scit enim Deus quod in quocumque die comederitis ex eo aperientur oculi vestri et eritis sicut dii scientes bonum et malum creatures{9}, he was not needy of power or | 9. Genesis I, 1,26 dominion; but again, being a spirit newly | Geneva Bible: Furthermore God said, inclosed in a body of earth, he was | Let us make man in our image according fittest to be allured with appetite of | to our lickeness, and let them rule light and liberty of knowledge; therefore | over the fish of the sea, and over the this approaching and intruding into God's | foule of the heaven, and over the secrets and mysteries was rewarded with a | beastes, & over all the earth, and further removing and estranging from God's | over everiething that crepeth & moveth presence. But as to the goodness of God, | on earth.
there is no danger in contending or | advancing towards a similitude thereof, as | Authorized Version: And God said, Let that which is open and propounded to our | us make man in our image, after our imagination. For that voice (whereof the | likeness: and let them have dominion heathen and all other errors of religion | over the fish of the sea, and over the have ever confessed that it sounds not | fowl of the air, and over the cattle, like man), LOVE YOUR ENEMIES; BE YOU LIKE | and over all the earth, and over every UNTO YOUR HEAVENLY FATHER, THAT SUFFERETH | creeping thing that creepeth upon the HIS RAIN TO FALL BOTH UPON | earth.
Vulgata: Et ait faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram et praesit piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli et bestiis universaeque terrae omnique reptili quod movetur in terra THE JUST AND THE UNJUST{10}, doth well | 10. Matthew 5, 44-45 declare, that we can in that point commit | Geneva Bible: Love your enemies...no excess; so again we find it often | That you may be the children of your repeated in the old law, BE YOU HOLY AS I | Father that is in heaven: for he AM | maketh his sunne to arise on the evil, and the good, and he sendeth raine on the iuste, & unjuste.
Authorized Version: Love your enemies:...That you may be the children of your father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.
Vulgata: Ego autem dico vobis diligite inimicos vestros...ut sitis filii Patris vestri qui in caelis est qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos et pluit super iustos et iniustos.
HOLY{11}; and what is holiness else but | 11. Leviticus 11,44: goodness, as we consider it separate and | Authorized Version: For I am the Lord guarded from all mixture and all access of | your God: ye shall therefore sanctify evil? | yourselves, and ye shall be holy; for I am holy: neither shall ye defile Wherefore seeing that knowledge is of the | yourself with any manner of creeping number of those things which are to be | thing that creepeth upon the earth.
accepted of with caution and | 1 Peter 1, 16: Authorized Version: For it is written, Be ye holy; for I am holy.
see also Leviticus 20,7 and 20,26 fountain, such as it is not easy to | Sp. I, 433, I. 29,30) discern where the issues and streams | thereof will take and fall; I thought it | good and necessary in the first place to | make a strong and sound head or bank to | rule and guide the course of the waters; | by setting down this position or | firmament{13}, namely, THAT ALL KNOWLEDGE | 13. Melek Hasgün comments: IS TO BE LIMITED BY RELIGION, AND TO BE | ‘Firmament’ means, apart from the arch REFERRED | or vault of heaven overhead, in which the clouds and the stars appear, in the literal etymological sense a firm support or foundation. At the beginning of his text Bacon sets the basis for his further theories.
According to Bacon it is important not to try to find out the secrets and mysteries of God or to desire to be like God, as was the case in the Fall of Man and the Fall of Angels. Thus it is forbidden to exceed these limits, but to inquire into nature and its creatures is legitimate, because God has "...let man have dominion over He maintains that all knowledge is limited by religion and by this statement he also avoids any suspicion on heresy, which could arise because of his desire for progress and knowledge.
TO USE AND ACTION{14}. | 14. "Ad meritum et usus vitae", Works, vol. I, p. 132; Italics in order to For if any man shall think by view and | stress the importance; probably not a inquiry into these sensible and material | quotation.
things, to attain to any light for the | revealing of the nature or will of God, he | shall dangerously abuse himself. It is | true that the contemplation of the | creatures of God hath for end (as to the | natures of the creatures themselves) | knowledge, but as to the nature of God, no | knowledge, but wonder; which is nothing | else but contemplation broken off, or | losing itself. Nay further, as it was | aptly said by one of Plato's school THE | SENSE OF MAN RESEMBLES THE SUN, WHICH | OPENETH AND REVEALETH THE TERRESTRIAL | GLOBE, BUT OBSCURETH AND CONCEALETH THE | CELESTIAL{15}; so doth the sense discover | 15. Philo d'Alexandrie, Des Songes, natural things, but darken and shut up | Livre I, 83-4 (footnote taken from the divine. And this appeareth sufficiently in | Vert translation) that there is no proceeding in invention | of knowledge but by similitude; and God is | only self-like, having nothing in common | with any creature, otherwise than as in | shadow and trope. Therefore attend his | will as himself openeth it, and give unto | faith that which unto faith belongeth{16}; | 16. St. Matthew 22, 21: for more worthy it is to believe than to | Authorized Version:...Then saith he think or know, considering that in | unto them, Render therefore unto knowledge (as we now are capable of it) | Caesar the things which are Caesar's; the mind suffereth from inferior natures; | and unto God the things that are but in all belief it suffereth from a | God's.
spirit which it holdeth superior and | more authorised than itself.{17} | 17. cf. A.L. Sp. III,478,1.8 sq. (D.A.
To conclude, the prejudice hath been | infinite that both divine and human | knowledge hath received by the | intermingling and tempering of the one | with the other; as that which hath filled | the one full of heresies, and the other | full of speculative fictions and | 18. similarly: A.L. Sp.III, 350,I.24 John Channing Briggs (""Bacon's But now there are again which in a | science and religion", in: THE contrary extremity to those which give to | CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO BACON, ed. by contemplation an over-large scope, do | Markku Peltonen, Cambridge 1996) offer too great a restraint to natural and | comments on Bacon's separation of lawful knowledge, being unjustly jealous | divinity and natural philosophy that every reach and depth of knowledge | (quotations in Briggs' text are from wherewith their conceits have not been | THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING): acquainted, should be too high an | elevation of man's wit, and a searching | A longstanding commonplace in Bacon and ravelling too far into God's secrets; | scholarship has been the notion that an opinion that ariseth either of envy | the Baconian advancement of learning (which is proud weakness and to be | depends upon a strict separation of censured and not confuted), or else of a | divinity and natural philosophy. In deceitful simplicity. For if they mean | a number of memorable passages Bacon that the ignorance of a second cause doth | indeed warns his readers of the dire make men more devoutly to depend upon the | consequences of confusing divinity providence of God, as supposing the | with natural science: to combine effects to come immediately from his hand, | them, he says, is to confound them.
I demand of them, as Job demanded of his | This is supposedly what Plato and the friends, WILL YOU LIE FOR GOD AS MAN WILL | scholastics did, and what Bacon FOR MAN TO | explicitly designs the new learning to overcome. Even the acceptable hybrid "divine philosophy," when it is "commixed together" with natural philosophy, leads to "an heretical religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy" (III, 350).
According to this emphatic strand of Baconian doctrine, religion that joins with the study of nature is in danger of becoming atheistic, or an enthusiastic rival of the true church. Natural philosophy that traffics unwisely with divinity collapses into idolatry or fakery.
Bacon's exemplum of these abuses in a modern proto-science is the divine philosophy of the Paracelsian school, which seeks "the truth of all natural philosophy in the Scriptures." The Paracelsians mirror and reverse the heresies of pagan pantheism by seeking what is "dead" (mortal or natural) from among the "living" (eternal) truths of divinity, when "the scope or purpose of the Spirit of God is not to express matters of nature in the Scriptures, otherwise than in passage, and for application to man's capacity and to matters moral or divine" (ut 485-6). If we take Thomas Sprat at his word, the Royal Society was founded on generally similar principles. The first corruption of knowledge, he argues, resulted from the Egyptians' concealment of wisdom "as sacred Mysteries." The current age of inquiry benefitted from "the dissolution of the ABBYES, whereby their Libraries came forth into the light, and fell into industrious Mens hands." Surrounded by the warring forces of contrary religions (the society's rooms at Gresham College, London, were occupied by soldiers in 1658), the founders of the Royal account--were "invincibly arm'd" not only against scholastic Catholicism, but against the "inchantments of ENTHUSIASM" and "spiritual Frensies" that sometimes characterized the Protestant revolutionaries.
In Bacon's project, there is an explicit, delineated role for the study of divinity, which he carefully separates from his own work. Reason is at work "in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed" and in "the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon" (III, 479). In the first instance reason stirs itself only to grasp and illustrate revelation; it does not inquire. This is the foundation of Bacon's distinction between true natural philosophy, which inquires into the world as God's manifestation of his GLORY or power, and true theology, which piously interprets the scripturally revealed meaning of God's inscrutable will. The natural world declares God's glory but not his will (III, 478). Reason's power in theology therefore "consisteth of probation and argument." lt formulates doctrine only insofar as God's revelation, largely or wholly through Scripture, makes it possible.
The Lord "doth grift [graft) his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our understanding" (III, 480). (pp. 172- 173) GRATIFY HIM?{19} But if any man without | 19. Job 13, 7-9: any sinister humour doth indeed make doubt | Authorized Version: Will ye speak