ever the children of men dwell, He hath given thee ali.” It is, however, Jglin^anTei certain that Nebuchadnezzar received his sovereignty from God by no iS to be taken. special grant, but in the same way as other princes {Romans, ch. 13): “There is no power but of God”; and ( Proverbs, ch. 8): “By me kings reign and princes decree justice.” Further, Nebuchadnezzar had not a legal rule over the whole earth, as Bartoius thinks, for the Jews were not legal subjects of his.
Another proof that there was by divine law no ruler over the whole Proof 2 world lies in the fact that the Jewish nation was free from the foreigner; nay, the Jews were forbidden by their law to have any foreigner as their lord {Deuteronomy, ch. 17): “Thou mayest not set a stranger to be king over thee.” And, although St. Thomas {De regimine principum, bk. 3, ch. 4 jjj? to ht« and 5) says that the Romans were entrusted with empire by God because given empire of their justice and their patriotism and the excellence of their laws, yet ^0^®ns this is not to be taken to mean that they had their empire by divine grant or institution, as St. Augustine also says {De civitate Dei, ch. 18), but that in the divine providence it befell that they should obtain the sovereignty 344 0f the world. This, however, was not in the way in which Saul or David had his kingdom from God, but in some other way, such as by just war or other title.
Franciscus de Victoria Proof 3.
Reason for saying that after Chrisfs coming, the Emperor is lord of the whole earth.
The author demolishes this reason- ing.
This will be plain to any one who considers the tities and modes of succession whereby sovereignty and lordship in the world have come down to our own day. For, to omit everything that happened before the flood, the world was certainly divided after Noah into different provinces and kingdoms, whether this were by ordinance of Noah himself — for he survived the flood three hundred and fifty years ( Genesis, ch. 9), and sent colonies into different regions, as appears in Berosus of Babylon — or whether, as is more likely, different family-groups by the common agreement of man- kind occupied different provinces, as ( Genesis, ch. 13) “Abram said unto Lot: ‘ Is not the whole land before thee?...If thou wilt take the left hand, then I will go to the right, or if thou depart to the right hand, then I will go to the left.” We are, accordingly, told ( Genesis, ch. 10) that through the descendants of Noah came diversities of peoples and countries, whether in some regions they first assumed lordship by usurpation, as Nimrod seems to have done, of whom Genesis, ch. 10, v. 8, says that he was the first to be a mighty one in the earth, or whether by accord of sev- eral to unite in one State they appointed a prince over themselves by common agreement. For it is sure that either in these or in other like modes sovereignty and lordship began in the world and that afterwards, either by right of inheritance or of war or by some other such title, they 345 were continued unto our own day, or at any rate up to the time of the Saviour’s coming. Herein it is manifest that before the coming of Christ no one was vested with world-wide sway by divine law and that the Emperor can not at the present day derive therefrom a title to arrogate to himself lordship over the whole earth, and consequently not over the barbarians.
It might, however, be alleged that after our Lord’s coming there was one Emperor over the world by express grant of Christ, in that He, as regards His manhood, was Lord of the world, according to St. Matthezv, ch. 28: “All power is given unto me,” etc.,which, according to St. Augustine and St. Jerome, is to be understood as regards His manhood. Also, as the Apostle declares (I Corinthians, ch. 15), “He hatn put all things under his feet.” Therefore, just as He left on earth one vicar in matters spiritual, so also in matters temporal, and in the latter case it is the Emperor. St. Thomas, too, says (De regimine principum, bk. 3, ch. 13) that Christ was from His nativity the true Lord and monarch of the world and that Augustus though unwitting thereof, was acting as His deputy. Now, it is ciear that this deputyship was not in matters spiritual, but in matters temporal. Seeing, then, that Christ’s Kingdom, if it were temporal, was over the whole world, Augustus was, on that showing, lord of the world and so on the same principle his successors were.
This reasoning is, however, quite inadmissible: In the first place, 346 because of the doubt attaching to the statement that Christ as regards His manhood was temporal Lord of the world. The probability indeed is that He was not, and our Lord seems to have asserted as much in the passage: “My Kingdom is not of this world.”1 Accordingly, St. Thomas remarks in this On the Indians, Sect. II.
connection that ChrisCs dominion is directly appointed for the soul’s salva- tion and for spiritual profit, although it is not excluded in matters temporal in the same fashion as it is appointed in matters spiritual. This shows that in St. Thomas’s view His Kingdom was not of the same sort as a civil and temporal kingdom, but that,while He had ali kinds of power, even in matters temporal, which would subserve the aim of redemption, yet apart from that aim He had none. Further, even if we grant that He was temporal Lord, it is guess-work to say that He bequeathed that power to the Emperor, there being no mention of any such thing in the whole Bible. And as regards St. Thomas’s statement that the Emperor Augustus was Christ’s vicegerent, firstly, he does indeed make it in the passage referred to, but in his Tertia Pars, where he is professedly discussing the power of Christ, he makes no mention of this temporal power.
Secondly, St. Thomas’s meaning is that the Emperor was Christ’s vicegerent to the extent that temporal power is subordinate and subservient 347 to spiritual power. In this sense, of a truth, kings are the servants of bishops, just as the smith’s art is subject to the knight’s and the soldier’s, while all the time neither the soldier nor his superior officer is a smith, but is only concerned to give the smith orders about the making of armor. Again, St. Thomas, writing on that passage in St. John, ch. 18, expressly says that Christ’s Kingdom is not temporal or such a kingdom as Pilate conceived, but a spiritual kingdom, inasmuch as our Lord declares in that passage: “Thou sayest that I am a King. To this end was I born and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth.” This shows it to be a mere fiction to say that by express grant of Christ there is one Emperor and lord of the world.
A consideration which palpably confirms this is the following: If there had been any such institution by divine law, how comes it that the Empire was divided into Eastern and Western, first among the sons of Constantine the Great and then, later, by Pope Stephen, who conferred the Empire of the West on the Germans, as is held in X, 1, 6, 34? For the assertion that the Greeks thereafter were not Emperors is inept and ignorant, as the glossator hereon points out, seeing that the German Emperors never claimed in virtue of this grant to be Lords of Greece, and John Palaeologus, Emperor of Constantinople, was held to be lawful Emperor at the Council of Florence.
348 Moreover, the patrimony of the Church (as the jurists themselves, and even Bartolus, confess) is not subject to the Emperor. Now, if all things were subject to the Emperor by divine law, no imperial gift or any other title could divest the Emperors of them, any more than the Pope can release any one from the power of the Popes. Also, the Kingdom of Spain is not subject to the Emperor, nor is France, as is also held in X, I, 6, 34 above- mentioned, although the glossator adds out of his own head that this is not so much a matter of law as of fact. Also, the doctors agree that States, which have in times past been subject to the Empire, might be freed from that subjection by prescription; which would not be the case, if this subjection were in virtue of a divine law.
The author returas to the confirmation of his proposi¬ tiori.
The Pope, who granted the Empire, is said to have been Leo III.
Franciscus de Victoria The author proves that the Emperor is not lord of the world by human law either.
Secondpropo- sition. As the gloss on the preface to the Digest.
Discussion of the second title whereby the Spaniards could obtain possession of the barba- rians.
The opinion of some juris- consults.
Now, in point of human law, it is manifest that the Emperor is not lord of the world, because either this would be by the sole authority of some law, and there is none such; or, if there were, it would be void of effect, inasmuch as law presupposes jurisdiction. If, then, the Emperor had no jurisdiction over the world before the law, the law could not bind one who was not previously subject to it. Nor, on the other hand, had the Emperor this position by lawful succession or by gift or by exchange or by purchase or by just war or by election or by any other legal title, as is admitted. Therefore the Emperor never was the lord of the whole world.
2. Second conclusion: Granted that the Emperor were the lord of the 349 world, stili that would not entitle him to seize the provinces of the Indian aborigines and erect new lords there and put down the former ones or take taxes. The proof is herein, namely, that even those who attribute lordship over the world to the Emperor do not claim that he is lord in ownership, but onlyin jurisdiction, and this latter right does not goso far as towarrant him in converting provinces to his own use or in giving towns or even estates away at his pleasure. This, then, shows that the Spaniards can not justify on this ground their seizure of the provinces in question.
A second alleged title to the lawful possession of these lands, and one which is vehemently asserted, is traced through the Supreme Pontiff. For it is claimed that the Pope is temporal monarch, too, over ali the world and that he could consequently make the Kings of Spain sovereign over the aborigines in question, and that so it has been done.
In this matter there are some jurists, who hold that the Pope has full jurisdiction in temporal matters over the whole earth, and they even add that the power of ali secular princes comes to them from the Pope. This is the tenet of Hostiensis on X, 3, 34, 8; also of the Archbishop (pt. 3, tit. 22, ch. 5, § 8); and also of Augustinus Anconitanus. Sylvester holds the same 350 doctrine, making a much more ample and liberal concession of this power to the Pope, under the word infidelitas (§ 7) and under the word Papa (§§ 7j io, ii and 14), and under the word legitimus (§ 4). He has some singular remarks on this topic in the passages mentioned, as, for example, that “the power of the Emperor and ali other princes is sub-delegated as regards the Pope, being derived from God through the medium of the Pope,” and that “all their power is dependent on the Pope,” and that “Constantine gave lands to the Pope in recognition of his temporal power,” and on the other hand that “the Pope gave the Empire to Constantine to his use and profit,” nay, that “Constantine’s act was really not a gift, but merely the retura of what had previously been taken away,” and that, “if the Pope does not exercise jurisdiction in temporal matters outside the patrimony of the Church, this is not for want of authority, but in order to avoid the scandal of the Jews and in order to promote peace”; and many other things even more empty and absurd than these. The sole proof that he gives herefor is in the passages “The earth is the Lord’s and the fulness thereof,”1 and “All power is given unto me, both in heaven and in earth,”2 and the Pope On the Indians, Sect. II.
is the vicar of God and of Christ, and ( Philippians, ch. 2) Christ “for our sake became obedient even unto death,” etc. Bartolus, too, seems to be of this opinion in his comment onthe Extravagans, Ad reprimendum, and 351 St. Thomas seems to favor it at the end of the second book of the Sententiae, the closing words of which are by way of solution of the fourth argument, which is the last of the whole book, namely, that the Pope holds the summit of both kinds of power, both secular and spiritual, and Herveus is of the same opinion in his De potestate Ecclesiae.
This, then, being laid as a basis, the authors of this opinion say as follows: In the first place, that the Pope has free power, on the footing of supreme temporal lord, to make the Kings of Spain rulers over the Indian aborigines. Secondly, they say that, even if it be assumed that he could not do this, at any rate if these aborigines refused to recognize the temporal power of the Pope over them, this would warrant him in making war on them and in putting rulers over them. Now, each of these things has been done. For, first, the Supreme Pontiff granted the provinces in question to the Kings of Spain. Secondly, the aborigines were notified that the Pope is the vicar of God and His vicegerent on earth and it was claimed that they should, therefore, recognize him as their superior, and their refusal furnishes a good ground for making war on them and seizing their lands, etc. Hos- tiensis, place cited, expressly makes this point, so does Angelus in his Summa.
Now, inasmuch as I have fully discussed the temporal power of the Pope in my Relectio de Potestate Ecclesiastica, I will put my answer to the 352 above into a few brief propositions: 3. First: The Pope is not civil or temporal lord of the whole world in the proper sense of the words “lordship” and “civil power.” This is the conclusion arrived at by Torquemada (bk. 2, ch. 1 1 3), and by Joannes Andreae and by Hugo, on can. 6, Dist. 96. And the most learned Innocent admits, in the above cited X, 1, 6, 34, that he has not temporal power over the Kingdom of France. And it seems the definite opinion of St. Bernard in the second book of his De consideratione, addressed to Pope Eugenius III. The opposite opinion seems contrary to the precept of our Lord who, {St. Matthew, ch. 20, and St. Luke, ch, 22), says, “ Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them,” etc. “But it shall not be so among you.” And contrary also to the precept of the Apostle Peter, “neither as being lords over [God’s] heritage but being ensamples to the flock.”1 And if Christ the Lord had not temporal power, as has been shown in the foregoing discussion to be more probable and as is also the opinion of St. Thomas, much less has the Pope it, he being Christ’s vicar. The above-mentioned thinkers attribute to the Pope that which he has never claimed for himself; nay, he admits the contrary in many passages, as I have shown in the Relectio referred to. And the proof is sufficient, like that given above concerning the Emperor, for no lordship can come to him save either by natural law or by divine law or by human law. Now, it is certain that none comes to him by natural or by human law, and none is Summary of the opinion of the afore- mentioned.
The author replies in a few proposi¬ tions.
Proposition I.
Franciscus de Victoria The author refutes the arguments of the opposite side.
Proposi- tion II.
Proposi- sition III.
shown to come to him by divine law. Therefore the assertion is ungrounded and arbitrary.
Further, our Lord’s injunction to Peter, “Feed my sheep,”1 clearly 353 shows that power in spiritual and not in temporal matters is meant. It is, moreover, demonstrable that the Pope has not the whole world for his sphere. For our Lord said (St. John, ch. 10) that there should be “one flock and one shepherd ” at the end of the age. This is sufficient proof that at the present day all are not sheep of this flock. Again, assuming that Christ had this power, it is manifest that it has not been entrusted to the Pope. This appears from the fact that the Pope is no less vicar of Christ in spiritual than in temporal matters. But the Pope has no spiritual jurisdiction over unbelievers, as even our opponents admit, and, as seems (I Corinthians, ch. 5) to have been the express teaching of the Apostle: “For what have I to do to judge them also that are without?” Therefore he has it not also in temporal matters. And of a truth there is nothing in the argument that, as Christ had temporal power over the world, therefore the Pope also has it. For Christ undoubtedly had spiritual power over the whole world, not less over believers than over unbelievers and could make laws which bound the whole world, as he did with regard to baptism and the articles of faith. And yet the Pope has not that power over unbelievers and may not excommunicate them or forbid their marriage within the degrees per- mitted by the divine law. Therefore. Also, the fact that, according to the doctors, Christ did not entrust supremacy in power even to the Apostles 354 shows that there is no force in the consequence: Christ had temporal power over the world; therefore the Pope has it too.
4. Second proposition: Even assuming that the Supreme Pontiff had this secular power over the whole world, he could not give it to secular princes. This is obvious, because it would be annexed to the Papacy. Nor can any Pope sever it from the office of Supreme PontifF or deprive his successor of that power, for the succeeding Supreme Pontiff can not be less than his predecessor; and, if some one Pontiff had made a gift of this power, either the grant would be null or the succeeding Pontiff could cancel it.
5. Third proposition: The Pope has temporal power only so far as it is in subservience to matters spiritual, that is, as far as is necessary for the administration of spiritual affairs. This is also the view of Torquemada (as above, ch. 114), and of all the doctors. And the proof of it lies in the fact that an art to which a higher end pertains is imperative and preceptive as regards the arts to which lower ends pertain (Ethics, bk. 1). But the end of spiritual power is ultimate felicity, while the end of civil power is political felicity. Therefore, temporal power is subject to spiritual power. This is the reasoning adopted by Innocent in X, 1, 33, 6; and it receives 355 confirmation from the consideration that, whenever anybody is entrusted with the charge of any office, he is impliedly granted everything without which the duties of the office can not rightly be discharged (X, 1, 29, 1). Inasmuch, then, as the Pope is a spiritual pastor by Christ’s commission On the Indians, Sect. II.
and the discharge of the duties of this office can not be hindered by the civil power (there being no lack in the provision of things necessary either by God or by Nature), it is beyond doubt that power over things temporal has also been left to him so far as is necessary for the government of things spiritual. And on this principle the Pope can infringe civil laws which tend to breed sinners, just as he has infringed the laws with regard to prescription by a party acting in bad faith, as is ciear from X, 2, 26, 20. And on this principle also, when princes are at variance with one another about some right of sovereignty and are rushing into war, he can act as judge and inquire into the claims of the parties and deliver judgment, a judgment which the princes are bound to respect, lest those numerous spiritual evils should befall which are the inevitable results of a war between Christian princes. And although the Pope does not do this or does not do it often, it is not because he can not, as Master Durandus says, but because, for fear of scandal, he wishes to prevent the princes from thinking his motive is ambi- tion or because he is afraid of a revolt from the Apostohc See on the part of 356 the princes. And on this principle the Pope can sometimes depose kings and even set up new kings, as at times has been done. And certainly no one rightly calling himself Christian should deny this power to the Pope. This is the viewheld by Paludanus and Durandus {De jurisdictione ecclesiastica ), and by Henricus Gandavensis (1 Quodlibeta, 6, art. 23). It is in this sense, also, that those numerous rules are to be interpreted which say that the Pope has both swords. The earlier doctors make the same assertion, as also does St. Thomas in the second book of the Sententiae, as above quoted.
Aye, and there is no doubt that in this way bishops have temporal authority within their bishoprics on the same principle that the Pope has iay princes authority in the world. And so they err in speech and in deed, whether note th,s- princes or magistrates, who stnve to prevent bishops from deternng lay- men from sin by fines or exile or other temporal punishments. For this is not in excess of their power, provided they do not do it from greed or for gain, but of necessity and for profit in things spiritual. And herein we find a further argument in support of our first conclusion; for if the Pope were lord of the world, a bishop would also be temporal lord in his bishopric, seeing that within his bishopric he also is a vicar of Chnst, but this oui opponents deny.
357 6. Fourth conclusion: The Pope has no temporal power over the Propoji- Indian aborigines or over other unbehevers. This is cleai from proposi- proof 1# tions I and III. For he has no temporal power save such as subserves spiritual matters. But he has no spiritual power over them (I Corinth., ch. c v. 12). Therefore he has no temporal power either.
7. The corollary follows that even if the barbarians refuse to recogmze Coroiiary. any lordship of the Pope, that furnishes no ground for making war on them and seizing their property. This is ciear, because he has no such lordship.
And it receives manifest confirmation from the fact (as will be asserted below and as our opponents admit) that, even if the barbarians refuse to accept Christ as their lord, this does not justify making war on them or Absurdity of the opposite opinion.
Confirma- tion 2.
Proof 2, and with author- ity.
Proof 3. Proof 4.
Third Title.
138 Franciscus de Victoria doing them any hurt. Now, it is utterly absurd for our opponents to say that, while the barbarians go scatheless for rejecting Christ, they should be bound to accept His vicar under penalty of war and confiscation of their property, aye, and penal chastisement. And a second confirmation is furnished by the fact that the ground, according to the persons in question, for disallowing compulsion, even if they refuse to accept Christ or His faith, is that it can not be evidently proved to them by natural reasoning. But the lordship of the Pope admits of this proof stili less. Therefore they can not be compelled to recognize this lordship.
Again, although Sylvester discourses at great length on the power of the Pope, yet, under the word infideles (§ 7), he expressly maintains against 358 Hostiensis that unbelievers can not be compelled by arms to recognize this lordship and can not be deprived of their property on this pretext. And Innocent maintains the same in X, 3, 34, 8. There is also no doubt that this was the opinion of St. Thomas too ( Secunda Secundae, qu. 66, art. 8, on obj. 2); Cajetan is express thereon, in his comment on the passage where St. Thomas says that unbelievers cannot be deprived of their property, save only that the subjects of temporal princes can be deprived for reasons known to the law and rendering their subjects in general liable to depriva- tion. Of a truth, Saracens dwelling among Christians have never been deprived of their property on any such pretext or made to suffer any harm. Why, if this pretext be enough to justify making war on them, it is as much as to say that they can be deprived by reason of their unbelief. For it is certain that none of the unbelievers recognize this lordship. But there is no doctor even among our opponents who would allow that they can be deprived on the mere ground of unbelief. Therefore the allegation of the doctors in question is utterly sophistical, namely, that if the unbelievers recognize the lordship of the Roman Pontiff, war can not be made on them, but that it may if they do not recognize it; for none of them does recognize it.