* The same lew hncN CNjiressicm in.a lettei of Joli v Mullei (“ Woiks,” Pait VIII, i> j(>), wlio, siienkiiig of the conchtion of Rome in the ye.ar 1803, when tlic cit\ was unclei Frencli nile, ■writes, “ A jiiofessor, asked how the piihlic ae.adeniies w’cre doing, answered, ‘ On les tol&ie coiiiiiie les liordeK ' ' Sinulaily the so- called theoiy of reason oi Icigic we niav still hear commcncled, peihaps under the belief that it is too di v ami unfiuitful a science to claim any one’s attention, «i, if it he pnisued lieie and theie, th.at its foimnhe arc willumt rontciit,.ind though not of much good, can he of no gicat lianii Hence the lecommendation, so it IS thought, if useless, can do no injnri XXVI AUmOR’S PREFACE These presumptuous utteiances, ^yhllh aie in vosue in our time, are strauye to say, in a measure lustified lay the shallonmess ot the cuiient jihilosophy Yet, on the other hand, they have spruui' from the same root as that asfainst ivhii h thev so thaiihlcsslv duett their attaclcs Smee that self-named philosoiihiziiis' has declared that to know the truth is vam, it has reduced all niattei ot thought to the same level, lesemhling in this way the despotism of the Eomaii Eiiipiie, which e(|uali/ed noble and slave, viitue and vice, liououi aud dishonoui, knowledge and ignorance In such a view the conceptions of truth aud the laws of ethical ohseivauce aie simplv' opinions and siihiective eon- victious, aud the most ciiiniiial jiiiiiciple's, piovided only that they aie convictions, aie put on a lei el with these laws Thus, too, any paltiv S2iecial oh]ect, he it never so flimsy, IS gii eii the same \ alue as an mtei est common to all thinking men and the bonds of the established social world Hence it is toi science a piece of good foituno that that kind ot jdiilosojihiziug, iihicli might, like scholasticism, have continued to spin its notions within itself, has been hioiiglit into contact with leality Indeed, such contact was, as no haie said, ineMtahle The leal woild is in earnest uitli the luiiiciples of iisrlit and duty, and in the full light of a consciousness ot these juintijdes it lives "With this woild of leality philosophic cob-web sjunning has come into oj)eu i uiitiiie How, as to genuine jihilosophy it IS precisely its attitude to reality which has been mis- aiipieheiideil Philosojiliy is, as I have alieady observed, an inriuisition into the latioual, and theiefore the appre- hension of the leal and luescnt Hence it cannot be the exposition of a world beyond, which is merely a castle in tlie an having no existence except m the terror of a one- sided and einjity foiinalism of thought In the following tiealise I have leinaiked that even Plato’s “Eepublic," now regarded as the byword for an empty ideal, has grasped author’s prefack.
xxvn the essential nature of the ethual observances of the Greeks He knew that there was hrcakinij m upon Greek life a deepei principle, which could directly manifest itself only as an unsatisfied loneiii^.viid therefore as rum Moved by the same lonjiinit Plato had to seek help agamst it, but had to concene of the help as coinimr down from above, and hoped at last to have found it in an external special form of Greek ethical ob<eivan(e He exhausted himself 111 eoutni ins' how by means of this new sociefy to stem the tide of ruin, but succeeded only m injuring more fatalh its deeper motive, the free infinite personality Yet he has piioved himself to be a great mind because the veiy principle and cential di«tmirnishiiig featuie of his idea IS the pivot upon which the world- wide levolutiou then m piocess turned What IS lational is leal And what is real is latioual Upon tins ooiiviction stand not philosophy oul\ but even evert unsophisticated consciousness Fioin it also pio- ceeds the view now undei eouteiiiplatioii that the spiiitiial umveise is the natural "When leHectiou, feeling, or whal- eiei other toim the subjectiie coiiseunisucss may assume, legarcls the jncseiit a» v.iiiilv, aud thinks itself to be bevond it and wisei, it finds ifsolf ni emjitiness, and, as it has actuality only in the piosciit it is vanity thionghout. Against the docliino th.it the kIim is a mere idea, figment or opinion, philosophy pi oseixes thc^ more piofomid view that nothing is real e\c opt the idea Hence anses the effoit to recognize in the teiiipoial and tiansieut the substance, which IS imuiaueut, and the eternal, which is present The latioiial is synouj’inous with the idea, because in realizing itself it passes into external existence. It thus ajipeais m an endless wealth of foims, figuies and phe- nomena It wiaps its kernel louiid with a robe of many colours, in which consciousness finds itself at home xxvin AUTlIOn’S PREFACE Through this vaiied husk the conception hist of all p tiates, in orclei to touch the juilse, and then feei it throbbing m its external manifestations To bung to order the endlessly -varied lelatious, which constitute the outei api)e.iiaiice of the rational essence is not the task of Xihilosophy Such luateiial is not suitable foi it. and it can well abstain tioiii giiing good advice about these things Plato ( riiild rcfiain from rccoininending to the nuises not to stand still with childion, but always to dandle them iii then aims So could Fichte foibeai to constiue, as they say, the supei vision of passports to such a point as to demand of <ill suspects that not only a desciiption of them hut also tlieii jdiotogiajili, should be inseited in the ]iasb Philosophy now exhibits no tiace of such details These supeifine couceins it mav neglect all the nioie satelv, since it shows itself of the most liberal spiiit in its attitude towards lln* endless mass of obiects and ciiiumstaiu es Bv siuli a course scieme will escape the hate w Inch is -i isited upon a multitude of cii cumstances and mstitutioiib by the vaniU of a hotter knowledge In this hate bittei ness of mind finds the greatest pleasure, as it can in no otliei ivav attain to a feeling of self-esteem This treatise, in so far as it contains a political science IS nothmg nioie than an attemjit to conceive of and present the state as in itself lational As a philosophic Tvnting it must he ou its guaid against constiuctiug a state as it ought to be Pliilosophi cannot teach the state what it should he, hut only how it, the ethical universe, is to be known I Sov Vtwot, i^oif Kat TV Tn'iOrjfia Hit lilioilus, hu, saltus To apprehend what is is the task of philosophy, because what is is reason As foi the individual, evciy one is a son of his time, so philosophy also is its time apprehended in thoughts It IS -just as foolish to fancy that any philo- sophy can transcend its present world, as that an indi- AUl hob’s prefaok ■sxix \'iii 1 could leap out of lus time or jump over Ehodes If a tliHory transgresses, its time, and builds up a ivorld as it ought to be, it has an eMsteute meiely in the unstable element of opinion, ulnth irives loom to cveiy trandeiing fancy With little change the above M\mg would read Htti'!•> the i.we, hm tl.inec The baiiiei which stand', between leasou, as self-eon- scious sj.iiit and leason a*- piesont lealitv, and does nc*t permit spnit to find aatictaction in lealily, is some abstrac- tion, which IS iiotfice to beionieived To recognize reason as the lose iii the cioss of the pieseiil,.ind to find dehglit m it. is a i.itioiial insight which implies leconoiliation with lealiti This lecom illation philosojiliv giants to tliosc who liave felt the mwaul dem.ind to conceive cleaily, to pieseive suhjeclnc fioedom while jnoseut in substantive leahtv, and let Though jiO'sO'siug this fieedom to stand not upon tile p.iitKiil.ii and contingent, hut upon what is self-origmatcd and solt-<oiiipletod This also IS the iiioie < onciete iiieanmg of what was a uiomeiit agi) luoie ab'ti.utlv tailed the umtv of foini and loutent Foiiii iii its most couticto significance is reason, as an intellectual appieheU'U.n whnli conceives its object Contcmt, again, is nMson as the substantive essence of social ordci and natuie Tlie conscious identity of form and content is the jiliilosojducal idea It 18 a self-asseition, which does honour to mam, to re- cognize nothing in sentiraonl which is not justified by thought Tins self-will is a featuie of modem times, being indeed the jieculiai piinujdo of Piotestantism What was initiated by Lutliei as faith ni feeling and the witness of the spirit, the raoio matiue imiid stiives to apprehend in conception In that wav it seeks to ft ee itself iii the picseut, and so find there itself It is a celehiated saying that a half philosophy leads away fiom God, while a true XXX AUlllOli’S PlU:FArL philosophy leads to G-od (It is tho same halfness, I may bay in passing, -wliidi legaids knowledge as an appioxima- tion to tiutli ) This saying is applicable to tho science of the state Eeasou cannot content itself with a mere ap- proximation, something which is neithei cold not hot, and must he spued out of the month As little can it be con- tented with the cold scepticism that m this woild of time things go badly, oi at best only modeiately well, and that we must keep the peace with lealitv, meiely because there 18 nothing bettei to be had Knowledge cieates a niucli moie vital peace Only one woid moie couceining the desire to teach the world what it ought to bo Foi such a pin pose philosojiliy at least always comes too late Philosopln, as tho thought of the woild, does not appeal until leality has completed its formative piocess, and made itselt leadi Histoiy thus coiioboiates the teaching of the conception that oiilv in the matuiit) ot leality does the ideal appeal as couiitei- part to tho leal, appieheuds the leal woild in its substance, and shapes it into an mlellec Inal kingdom When philo- sophy paints its giey in giey, one foiin ot life has become old, and bj means of gicv it cannot be leiuvenated, but only known The onl of Mineiva takes its flight only when the shades of night aie gatheimg But it IS time to close this pieface As a preface it is its place to sjieak only externally and subjectively of the standpoint of tho noik which it intioduces A philo- sophical account of the essential content needs a scientific and objective tieatment So, too, criticisms, othei than those which proceed from such a treatment, must be viewed by the author as unreflective convictions Such subjective critic isms must be for him a matter of indifference THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.
INTRODUCTION.
1. The philoaopliic science of ii"lit lias as its object the idea of right, i e, the conception of light and the reahzation of the conception Note — Philosophy has to do with ideas or realized thoughts, and hence not with what we have been accus- tomed to call mere conceptions It has indeed to exhibit the onesidedness and untruth of these mere conceptions, and to show that, while that which commonly bears the name “ conception,” is only an abstiact j’rodiict of the un- derstanding, the true conception alone has reality and gives this reality to itself Eveii thing, other than the realiti which 18 established by the conceiition, is tiaiisient surface existence, external accident, opinion, appearance void of essence, untiuth, delusion, and so foith Thiough the actual shape, which it takes upon itself in actuality, is the conception itself undei stood This shape is the othei essential element of the idea, and is to be distinguished from the form, which exists only as conception Addition — The conception and its existence are two sides, dis tmet yet united, like soul and body The body is the same life as the soul, and yet the two can be named inde- pendently A soul without a body would not be a living thing, and vice veiml Thus the visible existence of the eonception is its body, just as the body obeys the soul which produced it Seeds contain the tiec and its whole power, B 2 iiiu piiihosopin OP KK.iir tliougli they aie not the tiee itself, the tice coi responds accurately to the simple structuie of the seed If the body does not coi respond to the soul, it is defective The unity of visible existence and conception, of bodv and soul, is the idea It IS not a nieic haimoiiy of the two, but then com- plete interpenetiatioii Theie lives nothing, which is not m some way idea Tlie idea of light is freedom, which, if it IS to be appieheuded tiiily, must be known both in its conception and m the einliodimeiit of the conception 2 The science of light is a pait of philosophy Heme it must develop the idea, which is the icasoii of an ob]ect, out of the conception It is the same thing to say that it mustregaid the peculiai iiileinal development of the tiling itself Since it is a pait, it has a definite beginning, which is the lesult and truth of what goes befoic, and this, that goes before, constitutes its so-( ailed pi oof Hence the origin of the conception of light falls outside of the science of right The deduction ot the com option is piesup- jiosed in this tieatise, and is to be coiisidcied as alieady given Addition — Philosoph} foims a carle It has, since it must somehow make a bcgmnmg, a juimary, directly given matter, which is not pioved and is not a lesult But this startiiig-poiiit IS simply lelative, since tiom another point of view it appeals as a result Pliilosophj is a consequem e, which does not hang in the an oi foim a diiectly row be- ginning, but IS self-emlo-.ed A( cording to the formal unphilosopliic method of the sciences, definition is the fust desideratum, as regards, at least, the external scientific foim The positive siience of light, however, is little conceined with definition, sinee its special aim is to give what it is that is light, and also the paiticulai phases of the laws Poi this icason it has been said as a warning, Oinnix di’Jintlio in jiiie civili peiiculona, and in fact the iiioie disconnected and conti adictory the f phases of a right are, the less possible is a definition of it 1 HODl C'l lOX 3 A definition sliould contain only universal features, but these forthwith bring to light contiadietioiis, which in the case of law arc injustice, m all then iiaheducss Thus in Eonian law, for instance, no definition of man was possible, because it excluded tlie slaie The i oni option of man was destroyed by the fact of slaieiy In the same way to have defined propcity and owiici would have appeared to be peiilous to many iclatioiis — ^Bnt definitions may peiliaps be derived fiom etymology, for the leiismi, principally, that m this wav special cases.lie avoided,.iiid a hasis is found in the feeling and ini.igiiiative thought of men The cor- rectness of a definition would thus consist in its agi cement with existing ideas By such a inuthod everything essen- tially scientific IS cast aside A-, legaids the content thoie is east aside the necessity of the self-contained.ind self- developed obioet, and iis leg.uds the loriii there is discaided the nature of the concejitiou In philosophic knowledge the necessity of a conception is the iii.iiu thing, and the process, by winch it, as a lesult h.is umic into being, is thepioof and deduction Attei the (oiitentis seen to be necessary iiidepeiideutlv, (lie seioud jiomt is to look about tor that wliiili coiiespoudstoit in existing ideas and inodes of speech But the way in wlin h.i < oiiceptioii exists in its truth, and the xvay it pieseuts itself in iiXiidoni ideas not only aie but must be difteieut both lu foiin and stiuctnie If a not’on is not in its content fixlue, the conception can be shown to be coulaiiied lu it and to be alieady there in its essential traits A notion may thus be raised to the form of a conception But so liltle is any notion the measure and criterion of an mdepiendently necessary and true con- ception, that it must accept truth from the conception, be tustifiod by It, and know itself lliroiigli it — If the method of knowing, which proceeds by foiin.il definition, inference and pioof, lias more or less dis.iiipiMic'tl, a worse one has come to take its place Tins new method maintains that ideas, <is, e g, the idea of right in all its aspects, are to be 4 llll. rillJ.OSOlMlV OF lUOIIl directly apprehended as meie facts of consciousness, and that natural feeling, or that heightened form of it which IS known as the inspiration of one’s own bieast, is the source of right This method may be the most convenient of all, but it IS also the most un philosophic Othei fea- tures of this view, leterring not merely to knowledge but directly to action, need not detain us here While the first or foimal method went so fai as to leqiiiie m definition the form of the conception, and in pi oof the form of a necessitj of knowledge, the method of the intuitive consciousness and feeling takes for its principle the arbitraiy contingent consciousness of the subject — In this tieatise we talce foi granted the scientific jirocodiiic of jihilosophy, winch has been set forth in the iihilosophic logic 3. Right IS positiie in geneial (a) m its foim, since it has vahdity in a state, and this established authoiity is the prmciple foi the knowledge of light Hence we have the positive science ot light (b) On the side of content tins light leceives a positno element (a) through the particiilai character of a nation, the stage of its historical develoji- ment, and the intei connection ot all the relations which aie necessitated by nature (/3) thiough the necessity that a system of legalized right must contain the application ol the universal coucciition to objects and cases whose qualities are given exteinally Such an apjilication is not the specu- lative thought 01 the development of the conception, but a subsumption made by the undeistandmg (y) through the ultimate nature of a decision which has become a reality Note — Philosophy at least cannot recognize the authoritj of feeling, inclination and caprice, when they aie set in opposition to positive light and the laws — It is an acci- dent, external to the nature of positive right, when force or tyranny becomes an element ot it It will be shown latei (§§ 211-214J, at what point right must become positive The gencial phases 'nhich aie theie deduced, aie here only mentioned, in order to indicate the limit of philosophic INIRODUCIIOX 5 ri^ht, and also to forestall the idea or indeed the demand that by a systematic development of light should be pro- duced a law-book, such as would be needed by an actual state — ^To convert the difEerences between right of nature and jiositive i ight, or those between jihilosophic right and positive right, into open antagonism would be a comjilete misunderstanding Natural right or philosophic right stands to positive right as institutions to pandects — With regaid to the historical clement in positive right, referred to ill the jiaiagiaph, it may he said that the true historical view and genuine philosophic standpoint have been pre- sented by Montesquieu He legaids legislation and its specific tiaita not in an isolated and abstract way, but lather as a dependent element of one totality, connecting it with all the other elements which foim the character of a nation and an epoch In this iiiteii elation the various elements leccive then meaning and justification — The piiiely histoiieal tieatmeiit of lire phases of right, as they develop iii time, and a eomiiauson of their results with existing lelatioiis of light have their own value, but they aie out of place in a philosophic ticatise, excejit in so far as the development out of histoiic giouiids coincides witli the development out of the eouccptioii, and the historical exposition and justification can be made to cover a justifica- tion which is valid in itself and independently. This distinction IS as manifest as it is weighty A phase of right may be shown to rest upon and follow from the circum- stances and existing institutions of light, and yet may he absolutely unreasonable and void of light This is the case in Homan law with many aspects of piivate right, which were the logical results of itsinteipretation of paternal power and of marriage I’urther, if the aspects of right are really right and reasonable, it is ouc thing to point ont what with regard to them can tiuly take place thiough the concep- tion, and quite another thing to portray the manner of their appearance in histoiy, along with the circumstances.
liu; I’llII/lSOPIlT OF RTOIir cases, ■wants and crents., winch they ha^o called forth. Such a demonstiation and deduction from nearer or more remote historic causes, which is the occupation of prag- matic history, IS fiequeiitly called exposition, or piefciably conceptni.i, undei the opinion that in such an indication ot the histoi le elements is found all that is essential to a con- ception ot law and lustitnlicms of light In point of fact that ■which is truh essential the conception of the matte:, has not been so much as mentioned — So also we are ac eus- tomed to heai of Eoniau or G-eiman conceptions of light, and of conceptions of light as they aie laid down in this or that statute-book, when indeed nothing about concep- tions can he found in them hut oiil^v geueial ]diases of right, propositions deiivcd fiom the understanding, geueial maxims, and la^svs — Bv neglect of the distinction, lust alluded to, the tiue standpoint is ohsciued and the question of a valid justification is shitted into a justification based upon ciicunistamcs, lesults aie founded on jirosiqiposi- tions, ■winch HI tliemsehes aic of little laluo, and in general the rolatno is jnit in jdaco of the absolute, and external appearance m jilacc* of the natuio of the thing When the liistoiical vindication substitutes the external oiigm for the oiigm from the conception, it unconscioush does the opposite of what it intends Suppose that an institution, oiigmating under definite ciicumstancos, is shown to be necessary and to answei its puijiose, and that it accomplishes all that is required of it by the histoiical standpoint When such a proof is made to stand for a justification of the thing itself, it follows that, when the circumstances aie removed, the institution has lost its meaning and its right When, e ^, it is sought to support and defend cloisters on the grounds that thev have served to clcai and people the wilderness and by teaching and tiansciiliing to preserve scholarship, it follows that just lu BO far as the ciicumstances aic changed, cloisters have become aimless and superfluous — In so far as the histone IXIKODUCTION Significance, or the histoiical exposition and interjiietation ot the oiigin of am thing is m clitfoieiit spheres at home ivith the philoso 2 Jhie mow of the oiigiii and concejition ot the thing, one iniglit toleiate the othei But, in illustiatioii of the fact that they neithci hcic iioi in science, preserve this peaceful attitude, I quote fioin Mi Hugo’s “ Lohrbuch del Goschichte des romischon Eechts ” ' lu this work Mr Hugo saj’s (5th edition § 53) that “ Cicero jiraises the twelve tables with a side glance at philosophy,” “ but the lihilosophei Phavoiinus tieals thcni exacth as many a great philosophic since has tieated jiositive right ” Mi Hugo makes the ultimate reply to such a method as that ot Phavorinus, when ho says ot hiin that he “under- stood the twelve tables pist as little as the philosophers understood jiositive light ” — 'riie foiieetion of the philo- sopher Phavoimus by the luiist Scvtiis Ctecihiis (Gelliiis “Noct Attic” XX 1) expiesscs the lasting and tiue piinciple of the justification of that which is m its content iiieiely [jositive “Non iguoias,” as Ciecihus felicitonsly lemaiks to Phaioiinus, " leguin oppoituiiitates et medelas pro tem- poruiii nioiibus, ot jiio loiuiii jmblicai um geiieribus, ac pro utilitatum piiesentium lationibus, proque vitioium, quibus iiiedenduiu cst, feivonbus mutari ac flecti, neque uno statu consisteie, quin, ut tacies coeli et mans, ita lerum atqiie foituuae ti*mpestatibus varientur Quid salubiiiis visum est logatione ilia Stolouis, etc, quid utilius jilebiscito Voconio, etc, Cjuid tain uecessarium existimatum est, quam lex Liciuia, etc ^ Omnia tamen htec obhterata et operta sunt civitatis opuleutia,” etc — These laws are positive so far as they have meaning and appropriateness under the circumstances, and thus have only an histone value For this reason they aie in their nature transient Whether the legislator or government was wise or not in what it did for its own immediate time and circumstances IS a matter quite by itself and is for history to say ' * “ Text-book of the History of Roman haw ” 8 IHU Pllll-nsOPIlV OF RIGHT.
History ■will tlie more pi ofoundly reform ze the action of the legislator in proportion as its estimate receives support from the philosophic standpoint — From the i indu ations of the twelve tables against the judgment of Phavorinus I shall give fuither esamjiles. liecause in them Csecilius furnishes an illustiation of the fraud which is indissolubly bound up with the methods ot the understanding and its reasonings He adduces a good reason for a bad thing, and supposes that he has in that way justified the thing Take the honible law ninth jiemiitted a creditor, after the lapse of a fiied term of respite, to kill a debtor or sell him into slaveiy. Nay, fuither, if there were several creditors, they were pennitted to cut jneccs off the debtor, aud thus divide him among't them, with the jiroviso that if aui one of them should cut off too much oi too little, no action should be taken against him It was this clause, it mav be noticed which stood Shakcspcaie’s Sliylock m “The Merchant of Venice ” in sue h good stead, and was by him most thank- fully accepted Veil, for this law Cmcilius adduees the good argument that by it trust and credit wcie more firmly secured, and also that, by reason of the terj horror of the law, it nei er had to be enfoiced Not only does he in his want of thought fail to obseive that by the seventy of the law that veiv intention of seiuiiug tiust and credit was defeated, but he forthwith himself gives an illustration ot the way in which the disproportionate jinnishment caused the law to be iiiojjeiative, namely tlirough the habit ot giving false witness — But the remark of Mr. Hugo that Fbavormus had not understood the law is not to be passed over Now any school-boy can understand the law just quoted, and better than anyone else would Shylock have understood what was to him of such advantage. Hence, by “ understand ” Mr Hugo must mean that form of understanding which consists in bringing to the support of a law a good reason — Another failure to understand, asserted by Csecilius of Fhavonnus, a philosopher at any INI'HODUCIIOX 9 rate may without blushing acknowledge jumentum, which without any arcera was the only legal way to bring a sick man into court as a witness, W'as hold to mean not only a horse but also a carnage oi wagon Further on in this law Ceeeihus found moie evidence of the excellence and accuracy of the old statutes, which for the purpose of non-suitmg a sick man at couit distinguished not only between a horse and a wagon, but also, as Ciecilms cxj^lams, between a wagon coveied and cushioned and one not so comfortably equipped. Thus oue would have the choice between uttei severity on one bide, and on the othei senseless details But to exhibit fully the absurdity of these laws and the pedantic defence otteied 111 then bclialf would give rise to an invincible icpugnance to all sdiolaisliip ot that kind But in Ins manual Mi Hugo speaks also of rationality in connection with Eoman law, and I have been struck with the following loinaiks He fiist of all treats of the epoch extending iiom the oiigin of the Republic to the twelve tables (§§ 38, 39), noticing that m Rome ficoplu had many wants, and w'tuc (omjadled in their labour to use di aught annuals and beasts of burden, as w'e ourselves do, and that the giouiid was an alternation of bill and valley, and tliat the city was set upon a lull, etc These statements nnglit, jiciliaps, have answ'eied to the sense of Montesquieu’s thought, though in them it would be well- nigh impossible to find bis genius But after these pre- liinuifVry paiagia])hb, be goes on to say in § 40, that the condition of the law was still very far fiom satisfving the highest demands of leason This remark is wholly in place, as the Roman family-right, slavery, etc, give no satisfaction to the smallest demands of reason Yet when discussing the succeeding epochs, Mr Hugo forgets to tell us lu what particulais, if any, the Roman law has satis- factorily met the highest demands of reason Still of the classic juiists, w'ho flourished m the era of the greatest expansion of Roman law as a science, it is said (§ 289) 10 'iiri: PHILOSOPHY oi moiii