Note — The peifectiiig of the state into a i onstitnfional monarchy is the woik of the moileiii woild, in is huh the substantive idea has attained the iiitiintc foim This is the descent ot the spiiit oi the ssoild lulo it'cll, the fiee peifection by s’lituc of svhich the idea sets loose tiom itsell its own elements, and nothing but its os\n elenienis, and makes thorn totalities, at the same tune it holds them within the unity of the comeiition. in nhidi is found then real rationality Tho storv ot this tiue election ot tin ethical litc IS the sul))oct luattei of uiiiveisal Moild-histoii Tile old classification of < oiisiitiitious mto uioiiaicln aiistocincv, and demoiiacvis based upon the siibstantiio unity winch has not vet been dividiMl This iiiiilv has no mternal distinctions, is not an intiiusicalli developed organization, and has not attained depth and (onciete rationality Fiom the standpoint oi the am lent woild the classification is collect, because the iiiiitv of tin* iuuient state was a substaiilivo whole, not as yet tiillj niatuie and unfolded. The distinctions predicated of it must hence be external, and lefer merely to the number of persons in whom this substantive unity should find an abode But these vaiious foims of the state, winch belong in this way to diffeient wholes, are in constitutional monarchy lowered to tin'll piopei place as elements In monarchy we have a single person, in its executive seveial, m legislation the multitude. But, as we have said, such merely quantita- THE STATE 27‘J tive distinctions aic supeificial, and do not account for the conception Similaily, it is not to the point to speak so much as we do of the demociatic or aristocratic element in the monaichy foi the phases, dcsciibed by these terms, ]ust in so fai as they occui in a monarchy, aie no longer demociatic and aii&tociatic It IS thought by some tliat the state is a mere abstrac- tion ■which oidcrs and commands, and that it may be left undecided, oi bo logaided as a tiifle, whether one or several 01 all stand in tlie chief place in the state — “ All these forms,” sai s Fichte (“ Natiiiiccht,” Pt I, p 196), “are light, and can pioduce and piesoive imiveisal light, if only tlieic be pieseut an ephoiat ” The ephoiat was invented by Fichte, and defined as a ncedlul couuteipoise to the highest 2 >owei Such a view sjniugs fiom a shallow con- ception ot the state It is tiue,indoed, that in a primitive conditioii of society these distinctions have little or no meauiug So Mo'cs, when uniiig lules to the jicople in the case of then choosing a king made no other alteration 111 the lustitulioiis than to lomiiiaiid that the king’s horses and wives should not be too iiuiiieious, or his tieasure of gold and silioi too huge (Dent xiii 16, and fol ) — Fuithci, it IS tiiie that lu one sense these thiee forms are even ioi the idea a iiiattei ol no coiicoin I mean monarchy m its limited and ex( lusue siguihcation, in accordance with which it stands b_\ the side ot cleinociacv and aiistotracv. But such a leiuaik has a meaning the oiiposite oi Fichte’s. It would mean that these foims aie a matter of indiffeience, because they collectively aie not in accordance 'with the idea in its rational development (§ 272), nor can the idea m any one of them attain its light and actuality. Hence, it IS idle to ask which of these foims is to be preferred We siieak of them now as having only an historical luteiest Heie, as m so many othci places, must he recognized the penetrating vision of Montesquieu, who discusses this HIE PHILOSOPHY OF HIGH I (iuestion m liis cclebiated description of the jmiuijiles of these foims of govemmeiit But this desciiption ive must not misunderstand, if ire aieto do it lustice He, as is ivell known, stated that Yiitue was the principle of democracy Democracy does in fact lest upon sentiment as iijion a form which is merely substantive And it is still under this form that the rationality of the absolute will e\ists iii democracy But he goes on to say that England in the seventeenth century proved bj’ a beautiful spectacle that its efforts to found a democracy weic unavailing owing to a lack of Tiitue in the loaders And he adds that, when in a republic virtue disajipears ambition seizes upon those whose minds are capable of it, and giced seizes ujion all, and the state, becoming a general picy, maintrims its strength only thiough the power of some indiiiduals and the extravagance of all Upon this Mew it must bo re- marked that when society becomes ci\ili/od, and the powers of particularity are develo2ied and freed, the virtue of the lulers IS not enough Not mere sentiment, but the form of rational law is lequired, if the whole is to bo able to keep itself together, and give to the doveloiied jiowers of liarticulaiity the right to expand positively as well as negatively Similaily should be set aside the misconception that, since in a demociatic reiiublic the sentiment of iirtue is the substantive foim, it is wanting, or at least unnccessai v, in a monaichy, and also the misconceiition that the legally constituted agencies of a s} stematized organization aie opposed to and incompatible with virtue Moderation, or the principle of aiistocracy, implies the incipient separation of public power and private interest And yet these two are here in such close contact that aiistocracy is always by its very nature on the veige of passmg into the severest foim of tyranny or anarchy, and so bunging on itself destruction "Witness Eoman history Montesquieu, by creditmg monarchy with the principle niE STAIE of honour, refeis, it is clear, not to the patruirchal oi any of the ancient monaichies, noi, on the other side, to the monarchy which has developed into an objective constitu- tion, but to a feudal monarchy, in which the relations of political light to lawful piivale pioperty and the privileges of individuals and corporations are confirmed Since in this form of constitution state-life depends upon privileged poisons, in whose liking is laid a laige part of what must be done loi the mamtenance of tlie state, the objective element of these tiansactions is giounded not on duty but on iiniiginiitive thought and opinion Thus, instead of duty it IS only honour which keeps the state together.
Hoic it IS natnial to put a second question — ^Who shall flame the constitution"'' This question seems intelligible at fiist glance, but ou closer examination turns out to be mcaniiiglc'is It piosupposcs that no constitution exists, but ineiely a colloition ot atomic individuals How a heap of ludii iduals is to obtain a constitution, whether by its own ofEoits 01 by means of ollieis, whether by goodness, thought, 01 foice, must bo left to itself to decide, for with a inoie mass the concejilion has nothing to do. If the question, howovoi, lal^es foi gianted the existence of an actual constitution, then to make a constitution means only to iiiodity it, the pieiious CMsteiice of the constitution inipliing that any change must be made constitutionally But it is stiK tly essential that the constitution, though it is begotten 111 time, should not be contemplated as made It 18 lathei to be thought of as above and beyond what is made, as self -begotten and self-centied, as divine and per- petual Addition — The piinciple of the modern world as a whole 18 freedom of subjectivity, the pimciple that all essential aspects of the sjniitual whole should attain their light by self-dei elopmeut From this standpoint one can hardly raise the idle question, as to whuh form is the better, monarchy or democracy. We venture to reply simply that IIIE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.
the forms of all constitutions of the state are one-snled, it they are not able to contain the principle of fieo snb- lectivity, and do not know how to coiiespond to completed leasoii 274 Spiiit IS leal only in what il knows itself to bo The state, which is the nation’s spud, is the lai\ which permeates all its relations, ethical obsoiiances, and the consciousness of its individuals Hence the constitution of a people du])euds inainl}' on the kind and chaiactci ot its self-consciousncss In it aic tound both its suli^ectivo fieedom and the actu.ility of the constitution Note — To think of giviusr to a jieojde a cousitntion d piioii IS a whim, ovcilookinir ]iieiisol_\ that element which rendeis a constitution something moie than a piodiict of thought Eioiy nation, thoiotoie, has the i onstitutioii which suits it and belongs to it Addition — The state must lu its (oiistitiition penetrate all its aspects Hapoleon insisted upon giving to the Spanish a constitution o piion, but the pioiect tailed A constitution is not a iiieie maniitai tine, but the woikol centuiics It is the idea and the lonsiiousuess oL what is leasonable, iii so fai as it is developed in a peojile Hence no constitution is iiieieh created That w Inch Napoleon gave to the Spanish was moie lational than what tliev had before, yet they viewed it as something foieign to them and rejected it bei ause they wcic not snihcientlv developed In a constitution a people must embodv then sense of iisrht and repioducc then conditions Otheivvise the constitu- tion may exist externally, but it has no significance or truth Often, indeed, the need of and longing foi a better constitution may arise in individuals, but that is difterent from the whole multitude’s being satuiated by such a notion This general conviction comes later The principle of morality and inner conviction advocated by Sociates came of necessity into being in Ins day, but time had to elapse before it could reach general selt-consciousness.
THE STATE.
A The Function of the Pi ince 275 The function of the pimce contains of itself the thiee elements of the totality (§ 272), (1) the univeisality of the constitution and the Ians, (2) counsel, or reference of the p.uticulav to the unneieal, and (3) the final de- cision, oi the selE-deteiiumation, into which all else letums and fiom nhich it leccives the boginniiif' of its actuality This absolute sclf-dcteiniination, constitutiug the dis- tmi'iiishiu!' piinciplc of the piintely function, as such, must 1)0 the hist to be considcied Achhtuiv — We becfiu mill the piincoly fnnclion or the factoi of indiMduality, because in it the three phases of the state aio inter-i elated as a totality The I is at onre the most ludicidual.uid the most uuiveisal The in- dnidual o(i uis also in uatuie, but thoie leality is equal to iiou-ide<ihty, and its paits exist exteiiuilly to one anolhei. Heueo it is not self-comiilete existence, in it the diffeient iiidiMdu.ilities subsist side bvside In spmt, on the other hand, all dift'ei eiiccs exist onh as ideal oi as a unity The state as spiiitual is the inteipiot.itiou of all its elements, but iiidividuaht V is at the same time the soul, the vital and soM'ieij'ii jnuuijile, xihuh cinbiaces all diffeiences 27(i (1) The basal puut ijde of the political state is the substantive umtv, n liii h is the ideality of its elements (a) In this ideahli the paiticulai functions and ofiBces of the state aie pist as iiiiu b dissohed as letained. Indeed, thej' arc retained only as baling no indcqiendent authority, but such and so cxtcnsic e an authority as is yielded them m the idea of the whole They pioeeed, theiefoie, from the power of the state, and ai e the flexible limbs of the state as of then own simplified self.
Addition — This ideality of elements is like the life of an organized body Life exists in eieiy pait There is but one life in all points, and there is no opposition to it Any part separated from it is dead. Such is also the ideahty 'IIIE rilll-OSOPHY OF RIGHT of all individual occupations, functions, and coipoiafions, great as may lie their impulse to subsist and do foi them- selves It IS as in the oigauism, wheie the stomach assumes indeiicndcnce, and vit is at the same tune sucr- seded and saciificed by becoming a member of one -whole 277 (/j) The paiticulai offices and agencies of the state, being its essential elements, aie intiniafelv connected imIIi it To the individuals, -who manage and coutiol them, the}’ are att,iched in virtue not ot llieir diri'ct jieisoiiality but ot their objectiie and univeisal cpialities With particulai personality, as.such, the\ aie -loiiii'd only ex- ternally and accidentally The business and functions of the state cannot therefore lie junate ]iro])eili Addition — The agencies of the state aie attached to in- dividuals, -who nevertheless aie not anthonzed to dischaige their offices through natuial htuess. but b>’ loason of their obiective cpuilification Capaciiv, skill, diaiacter, belong to the paiticulaiity of the indnidiial, who must, howciei, be adapted to his special business In education and tiam- mg An oflice can, tlieiefoie, be neithei sold noi be- queathed Foimeilv in Fiance seats in ])ailiament -were saleable, and this is still the case -with any position of officer in the English aiiny below a ceitain guide These tacts dejiended, oi depend, upon the inecliaival constitution of certain states, and aie now giadiiallv vanishing 278 These tno characteiistics, namely (/3) that the par- ticulai offices and functions of the state have indcqiendent and fii ill footing ueithei m themselves, nor in the pai ticular will ot individuals, but (a) ultimately in the unity of the state as in their simple self, constitute the sovereignty of the state 'Note — Tins is sovereignty on its inner side It has an outer side also, as we shall see — In the older feudal monarchy the state had an outer aspect, but on its inner side not only was the iiionaich at no tune soveieign, but neither was the state Partly were the several offices and 'HIE SlA'iH functions of the state and civic life dispeised iii independent corporations and communities (§ 273, note), wliile the whole was ratliei an aggregate than au organism Paitly, too, were these functions the jnivate pi uperty of individuals who, when it was proposed that they should act, consulted then own opinion and wish.
The idealism, winch constitutes sovereignty, is that jioint of view in aecoi dance with which the so-called ^^aits of an animal oigainsm aie not jiarts but membeis or 01 game elements Their isolation or independent subsist- ence would be disease The same pnnciple occurs in the abstiaet conceptioii of the will (see note to next §) as the negatnit}', winch by lefoiiing itself to itself reaches a univcisality, which definitely moulds itself into individuality (§ 7) Into this concietc uniiersality all particularity and dcfaniteuess aie taken uj), and icceive a new significance It is the absolute soK-detci mining ground To apprehend it wo must be at home with the com option in its tiue sub- stance and subiectivity Because soveieignty is the ideality of all particular powcis, it easily gives use to the common misconception, which takes it to be mcic foicc, empty wilfulness, and a synonc m foi despotism But despotism is a condition of lawlessness, m which the paiticular will, whether of monarch oi people (ochlociacy) counts as law, oi rather instead of law Soveieignty, on the contiaij% constitutes the element of the ideality of paiticiilai spheres and offices, in a condition w'bich is lawful and constitutional H'o par- ticular sphere is independent and self-sufficient in its aims and methods of woi king It docs not immerse itself in its own sepal ate vocation. On the conti-ary, its aims are led by and dependent upon tbo ami of the whole, an aim which has been named in geueial teims and indefinitely the well- being of the state This ideality is manifested in a twofold way. (1) In tunes of peace the particular spheres and busmesses go im: PHILOSOPHY of righi’ then wav of satisfying then pailieulai offieos and cMids Accoidiug to meie iiiiconscioiis necessity fcolf-beckint; lioic veeis lound to a contiibution in behalf of niiitual pic'-eiia- tion and the piosei'vation of the yyliole 183) But, also, thiough a diieet influent e fioin above is it that these em- ployments aie coiitiiiuallv biought batk and limited bv the aim of the Mhole (see “ Function of Cioveinment,” ^ 280), and led to make duett eftoits foi its pieseiialiou (2) In circumstaiites of disliess, iiiteiiialoi evteinal, the oiuaiiisiii consisting ot its paititiilais, comes togethei into the simple conception of soieieignti, to whiih is iiiti listed the sufety of the state, oven at the saciifa<e of vliatis at otliei times justifiable It is hcie that idealism attains its pi'tiihai lealizatiou 321) 279 (2) Soveieignty, at fiist only the iiiiiveisal thought of this ideality, exists meielv as a siibiettnity assuied of itself, and as the abstiact and so I’ai gioundless self- diiection and ultimate decision of the Mill, by -Mitue of this quality the state is mdiiidual and one But in the nest place sub]octmty exists m its tiutli oiih as a subject, and peisoualily as a peison lu the constitution, nliicli has matuied into i ational icaliti. each of the tliiee elements of the conception has itsoivn independent, leal, and sepaiate embodiment Hence, the element iihuh implies absolute decision is not individuality in geiieial but one iiidiMdual, the monaich A^ofe — The iiiteiual de\ clopiiieiit of a sticme, nhose whole content is deduced out ot the simjile conception — the only method which is deserving of the name phdosojjhic, — leveals the peculiaiity that one and the same conception, here the will, which at the beginning is abstract because it is the beginning, yet contains itself, condenses of it«elf its own characteristics, and in this way acquiies a concrete content Tlius it is fundamental iii the personality, which IS at fiist in simple right abstiact It then develops itself through the diileient foims of subjectivity, and aiK sTAii: aiK sTAii: at laijt in absolute riyht, the state or the complete, concrete objectivity of the will, attains to the personality of the state and its conscious assuiance of itself This final term gives to all particulaiities a now form by taking them up into its ])Uio self It ceases to hesitate between leasons 'in 0 and enn, and deciding by an “ I will,” initiates all action and reality Pcisoiialitv, fuilhei, oi subjectnity generally, as infinite and sel£-ieteirmg, has tiuth only as a person or inde- pendent subject This independent existence must be one, and the tiiilli wliiih it has is of tlio most dneet or imme- diate liiiid The jieisoiiality of the state is actualized only as a jieisoii, the monarch — Peisoiiality expresses the con- ception as such, M hile jiei son contains also the actuality of the coiiceplioii Heiue (he concejition becomes the idea or tiulh, only wlieii it leceiies this additional character —A so-called iiioial peison, a society, congregation, or family, be It as concicte as it may, possesses personality only as an element and abstiactly It h,ts not reached the truth of its existence But the state is this very totality, m which the moments of the conception gam reality in accordance with then peculiar truth — All these phases of the idea have been aheacly exjilaiiied, bolli in tlieii abstract and in then concieto loiins, in the couise of this treatise Here, hovsecei, they need to be lejK'ated, because we, while easily admitting them iiicccraeal in their pailiciilar forms, do not soieadilv lecogiiise and apprehend them in their true place as elements of the idea The conception of monarch offers great difficulty to abstract reasonings and to the leflective methods of the uudei standing The understanding never gets beyond isolated deteiuniuations, and ascribes merit to mere reasons, or finite points of view and what can be deiived from them. Thus the dignity of the monaieh is represented as some- thing derivative not only in its form but also m its essen- tial chaiactci. But the conception of the monarch is not 'iiii: PHILOSOPHY of right deiivative, but purely sclf-origm.itecl Akin to this mis- taken notion IS the idea that the light of the moiiarih is based upon and receives its unconditional natuio fiom divine authority The misconcoptioiis that are allied to this idea are well-known, besides, philosojiliy sets itselt the task of conceiving the divine The phiase “ sovereignty of the poojdc,” can he used iii the sense that a people is in gcneial selt-depcudciit in its foreign relations, and constitutes its own state Such are the people of Gicat Britain, foi example But tlie people of England, Scotland, Ireland, Venice, Geiio.i, oi Ceylon have ceased to be a soveieign people, since the\ no loiigei have independent princes, and the ihicT goveinmeiit is not exclusively their own Further, it m.iv be said tli.it niteuial sovereignty resides ni the people it, as was already iiointed out (§§ 277-278), we speak in geneial teims, and mean that soiereigiity acciues to the whole state But the sovereignty of the people is usually in modeiii times opposed to the sovereignty of the iiioiiaich This new of the sovereignty of the people may he traced to a contused idea of what is meant bv “the people ’’ The peoiile ajiait from their monarch, and the common meinbciship neces- sarily and directly associated with him, is a formless mass It is no longer a state In it occur none of the charac- teristic features of au equipped whole, such as sovereignty, government, law-courts, magistiatcs, piofcssions, etc, etc When these elements of an organized national life make their appearance in a people, it ceases to he that undefined abstraction, which is indicated by the mere general notion " people ” If by the phrase “sovereignty of the people” is to be undei stood a republic, or more precisely a democracy, for by a republic we understand various empirical mixtures which do not belong to a philosophic treatise, all that is necessary has already been said (§ 273, note) Theie can no longer be any defence of such a notion in coutiast with iiri: SI All; tlio devflojjetl iiloii — When a iscoiilo is not a patiidiehal tribe, having jiasseJ. fioiii the pinnitivc condition, ivhnh made the forms of.in&tociaLy and democracy possible, and IS icpiosented not as in a wiliul and uuoiganisied condition, but as a self-developed tiiily oiganic totality, in such a jioojile soveieigutv is the jteisonality of the whole, and e\ists, too, in a leality, which is proportionate to the con- ception, the pel sou ot the inunaiih The element ot tlie ultimate self-determming decision of will does not appeal as an immanent vital element of the actual state in its peciiliai reality, so long as the classifica- tion ot constitutions into denioriacy, aiistociacy, and monaicliv can lie made When this classification prevails wi‘ are as we have said, at the stage of the undeveloped suhstautive unite, wdiicli has not vet leached infinite ditteiciice and solf-immersioii But even m these incom- plete toims of the state the summit must be occupied bv an iiidiiidnal Eithui he appeals m actual fact, as in those moiiaichies, which sue of tins type Or, undei aiistoi latic, 01 iiioie esjiecialh undei demooiatic goveru- meiits, he appeals iii the peisou of statesmen or geneials, accoidiug to accident and the paiticiilar need of the time Heie all oieit action <iiul leah/atioii hare then oiigm and c oiiqiletioii 111 tlie unity of the leaclei’s decision But this snbicitmty of decision, toufaued within a primitive and unalloiecl unity of functions, must be accidental in its oiigiii mid iiiaiiifestation, and also on the whole suh- oidmate Aceuidmgl}, a puic and immixed decision was looked toi outside of and beyond this conditional summit, and was founrl m a fate which pronounced judgment from without As an element of the idea it had to enter actual CMsteiice. but yet it had its root outside of human freedom, and the compass of the state — To tins source is to be tiacecl the need of oiacles, the daiinon of Socrates, the consultation of the oiitiails of animals, the flight of birds, and then way of eatmg, etc., methods resorted to on great u IIIL PIllLO^vOPlIY OF JUCilir occasious, ■when it i\as necessaiyto have final juJt;nu‘nt upon weighty aftaiis of state As inankinJ had not vet leali/iod the profundity of self-consciousness, oi come toilli fiom the puie Migimty of the substantive unity into self-coiiS( lous evistonce, they had not yet sticugth to discoiei such a pulgmeiit within the pale ot Iniinau eMstciice — In the daimoii of Sociatcs (§ 138) we can disceiii the beginning of a change, we can see that the vill, foiintulv set upon an object whollv outside of itself, has begun to tiaiisfei itself into itself, and lecogni/e itself within itself Tins is the beginning of self-conscious and tbcietoiu tine lieedoin This leal fieedoin of the idea, since* it nice-) its own piesent self-conscious lealitv to eveiyone ot tlie elements ot lation- ality, nnjiaits to the function of c ons( lousuess the faiial sclf-detei nulling certitude, Avhich in the c out I'jitioii of the will IS the cope-stone But this final self-detei niination can fall within the spheie ot huniaii lil)(*ity oulv in so tar as it IS assigned to an independent and seji.uatc* jniinade, exalted above all that is jtailiculai and c oiubtional Only when.so placed, has it a leality lu accoi dance with the conception Addition — In the oiganization of the stale, that is to say, in constitutional inonaicln, we must hace betoie us nothing except the innei necessity of the idea Eveiy other point of view must disapjieai The state must be regarded as a gieat architectonic building, oi the hieioglyph of reason, piesentmg itself in actuality Eveiythiug le- f erring ineiely to utility, exteinality, etc, must be excluded fi om a philosophic treatment It is easy for one to grasp the notion that the state is the self-determming and com- pletely sovereign wiU, whose judgment is final It is more dilEcult to apprehend this “ I will ” as a person By this IS not meant that the monarch can be wilful in his acts Eathei is he bound to theconciete content of thead-nce of his councillors, and, when the constitution is established, he has often nothmg to do but sign his name But this 'llli: SFAIE 'llli: SFAIE name is ■weighty It is the smnniit, over “which nothing can climb It may he said that an aiticulated organiza- tion has alieady existed in the beautiful democracy of Athens. Yet -w'e sec that the Gieelcs exti acted the ulti- mate judgment tiom cjuitc c\terual phenomena, such as oiacles, eutiails of saciifacial auiiiials, and the flight of buds, and that to natuiethey held as to a po'wer, ■which m these wai s made kuowu and ijavc expression to what was good ioi inaukiud Self-coiibciousiie-<s had at that time not yet iisen to the alistiactioii ot subjectivity, or to the fact that coiiceiuing the mattei to be judged upon must be spoken a human “I will ” This “I will” constitutes the gieatcst distinction between the ancient and the modem world, and so must have its peculiar niche in the great building of state It is to be dejiloied that this character- istic should be Mewed as something merely external, to be set aside oi used at jdeasuie 280 (3) Tins ultimate self of the state’s will is in this its ahstiactiou an individu.ilitv, 11111111 is simple and direct Hence its 1 ery com ejition imjdies that it is natural Thus the motiaich as a sjiecific indiiidual is abstracted from all othei content, and is iijipoinlcd to the dignity of monarch lu adiiectly natural ivai, by natnial biith Xute — This tiansition fiom the eoiieeption of pure self- determmatiou to due<t e.xistence, and so to simple natural- ness, IS tiulv speculatiie m its nature A systematic account of it belongs to logic It is on the whole the same tiaiisitiou which is well-known lu the nature of the will It IB the piocess of translation of a content out of subjectivity, as represented end, into tangible reality (§ 8). But the peculiar form of the idea and of the transi- tion, here passed m review, is the direct conversion of the pure self-determination of the will, the simple conception itself, into a specific object, a " this,” or natural visible reality, without the intervention of any particular content, such as an end of action.
iiii: riiiLosoPUV of kk.iii In the so-called ontological proof of the cxisteiKe ol God tlieie is the same conveision of the absolute coik option into beiuo This conveision has constituted the depth ot the idea in modem times although it has been leientli liiououiiced to be incoiueiiablo On such atheon suko the uiiitv ot conception and emliodimont is the tiutli (§ 23h all knowledge of the tiuth must bo lonoiinced Although the uudei standing does not hud tins iiniti iii its consciousness, and harps upon the sop.iiation ol the tno eleiiieiits of the tiiitli, it still 2 M‘iniits a beliot in a iiiiili But since the cm lent idi-a oi the nioiiauh is logaided as issuing out of the oidm.iii coiiscioiisnoss the iiiidei stand- ing, with its astute leasoiiiiigs holds all the iiioio tenaciousli to the luiuiiple ol sipaiatioii and its lesiilts It theieuiKUi denies that the clenieiit ot ultmialo decision in the state is absoluteh, that is in the coiicejitioii ot leason, conioiued with diiect natuie It maiiitaiiis, on tin' contiary, the more accidental chai.ictei ot the coiipiiictioii of these two, and hence legaids as latioiial then absolute divoigeuce Fiiialh, tioin the iiiatioiiahtj ot the lo-iela- tioii of these two jihases pioceed othei coiisenueiii i s, uhii li destioy the idea ot the state