of the whole constitution, of legislation, and of the universal condition in geneial It exists in the form of sound human undei standing, that is, of an ethical piiinijde which in the shape of prepossessions inns thiongh everything It con- tains the tine wants and light tendencies of actuality But when this iniiei phase comes foith into conscious- ness, it appeals to imaginative thinking in the form of geneial piojiositions It claims to he of interest partly on its onn separate acioiiut, hut it also comes to the assist- ance of concrete n'asoning u]»on felt wants and ujion the events, aiiangcments, and relations of the state When this happens, there is hionght forward also the whole range of accidental opinion, with its ignorance and per- vei Sion, its false Imon ledge and incorrect -judgment Now, as to the i oust loiisness of what is 2>ecnhai in thought and knowledge, uith which the pieseut iihenomenon has to do, it may he 'aid that the worse an opinion is, the more pcculiai and unique it is The had is m its content wholly juitieulai and uunjiie the lational, on the contiary, is the absolutely uunoioiil Tot it is the unique upon which ojiimon founds its exalted self-esteem Xote — ^Hence it is not to be regarded meiely as a differ eiicc in the subjective jwmt of view when it is declared on one side ‘ Vox pojnjli, vox ilc'i, ” and on the othei side fin Aiiosto, for example), ‘ “ Clie I Volgaie igniiiante ogn’ un nprenda E paih pill di quel die iiieno intenda; ’’ hoth phases are found side by side in pubhc opinion Since truth and endless error aie so directly united in it, ' Or in tioctlie “ Znsclilagen kann die Masse, Da 1st sie respektabel, Urtlieilen gehngt ihr luiserabel.”
'iiii: PHILOSOPHY or right either the one oi the otliei is not tiuly in earnest Tt mav seem hard to deiide whith is in earnest, and it would still he hard, even if wo weie to conhne oul^elves to the diiect exjiressioii of luihlic opinion But since in its innei being jiuhlic ojnnjon is the substantive, it is tiiily in caiiiestonlv about that Yet the substantiio cannot be evtiacted from public 01)1111011, It, by its leiy natuio as substantive, can be known oulv out of itself and on its own account No matter what 2>assion is exjiended in siqipoi t of an ojnnion no mattei how seiiously it is defended oi attacked, this is no criteiion of its jnactical vahditv Yet least of all would opinion toleiate the idea that its oaiiiestiiess is not eainesl at all A great mind has iinblicly laised the tiueslion, wliethei it be peimittcd to dcceue a pcojile We must answei that a people does not allow itself to be dcceivod in legaid tC) its substantive basis, oi the essence and definite chaiactei of its spiiit, but in icgaid to the way in which it linows this, and judges ot its acts and jihases, it deceives itself Addition — Tlie jniiKiple ot the nioilein woild demands that what eveij' man is bound to lei ogni/e must seem to him justified He, nioreovei, has li.nl a voice in the discussion and decision If he has given Ins woid and indicated that he is rcsiionsible. Ins subjectniU is satisfied and he allon s manj things to go unchallenged In Nranue fieedom of speech has ahvajs jiioved lo&s daiigoious than silence One feais that if a man is silent ho mil letaiii his aveision to an object, but leasoiiing upon it fuiuishes a safety-valve and brings satisfaction, while the object, in the meautime, pursues its way unmolested 318 Public opmion deserves, therefore, to be esteemed and despised, to be despised in its conciete consciousness and cxpiession, to be esteemed in its essential basis. At best, its inner nature makes meiely an appearance in its concioto expression, and that, too, in a moic oi less tioubled shape Since it has not within itself the means ot 'llli: S'lA'lE 'llli: S'lA'lE diawmg distinctions, nor the capacity to laiae its substan- tive side into definite knowledge, independence of it is the first foimal condition of anything gieat and leasouable, whether in actuality oi in science Of any reasonable end we may he suie that jmhlic opinion will ultimately be l>leasod -nilli it, lecogmze il, and constitute it one of its pre 2 'ossessions Addition — In jiublic o 2 »iniou all is false and true, but to find out the tiutli in it is the altaii of the great man He who tells the time what it mils and means, and then bungs it to comiiletion, is the gieat man of the time. In his act the lunei signituance and essence ot the time IS ac I iiahzed Who does not leain to desjuse public, oiniuoii, nhicli is one thing m one place and anothei in anothei, mil novel piodme anything great 319 The libeih ot taking jiait in state atians, the piickmg imijulse to sai and to have s.iid one’s opinion, is diiectly sccuied by jiolice laws and regulations, which, liowevci, liiudei and jutiiish the excess of this liberty In- iliiect socuiitv Is based niioii the government’s stiength, which Ik's iiiaiiih m the laliouahtv of its constitution and the stability lit itsineasuies. but 2 >ai tly also iiithejiublicity given to the assemblies ot the classes Security is guaranteed by jmblicitv in so fai as the assemblies voice the matuie and educated insight mto the interests of the stale, and pass ovei to otheis nhat is less significant, esiiecidlly if the) aie disabused ot the idea that the utter- ances ot these otheis aie jieculiaily im^ioitant and effica- cious Besides, a bioad guaiantee is found m the general indifEeience and contempt, with which shallow and mahcious utterances aie quickly and cftectually visited Note — One means of fieely and widely participating in jiublic affaiis is the juess, which, m its more extended range, is supeiioi to siieech, although mfeiioi in vivacity — To define the libeity of the pi ess as the libeity to speak and write what one pleases is parallel to the definition of hberty UIIE PHILOSOPHY OK RI&Hl.
m general, as liberty to do ■what one pleases These views belong to the mideveloiicd ciudity and suiJcifaoiahti of tanciful theoiizing Nowheie so much as lu tins mattei does iormalisin hold its giound so obstinately, and so little jiermits itselt to be influenced by leasoiis And this n as to be ex^jected, because the object is hoie the most tiansieiit, accidental, and paiticulai in the whole range of opinion, with its infamte vanety oi (oiitent and aspect Ot conise Iheie IS no obscuiity about a diiect summons to steal niuider, or revolt. But, aside tioin that, much depends on the manner and fomi of cxjnessiou The words iiiav seem to be quite geneial and undehued, and yet may conceal a perfectly definite significance iiesidcs, they mas hat e consecjuences, which are not ai tiialh' e,\i')iessetl Indeed, it may even be debated w hethei these consequences are really in the expression and piopeily follow tioin it This mdefi- mteness in the form and in the substance does not admit of the laws attammg in this case the precision usually de- manded ot latvs Since lu tins field ciiine, wrong, and in- justice have their most particular and snbjec tn o shape, the indefiniteness ot the wrong causes the sentence also to be completelj subjective Besides, the mjuii is in this inattei sought to be done to and make itselt leal in the thought, opmioii, and will of others But it thus comes into contact ■with the fieedom ot otheis, upon whom it depends whethci the act is actually an injury oi not Hence, the laws aie open to cnticisui because of then m- definiteness By the skillul use ot tcims they may he evaded, or, on the other hand, it may be contended that the sentence is merely subjective It may be maintained further that an expression is not a deed but only an opinion, or thought, or a simple saymg Thus, from the mere sub- jectivity of content and from the insignificance of a mere opinion 01 saymg the inference is diawn that these words should pass unpunished Yet in the same breath there is demanded as great a respect and esteem for that very THE STATE.
opinion of mine as for my real mental possession, and foi the utterance of that opinion as for the deliheiateutteiance of a mental 2 iossessiou The fact lomains that injury to the honour of individuals generally, as libel, abuse, disdainful treatment of the government, its ofiicials and officcis, especially the person of the piincc, contempt foi the laurs, incitement to civd broil, etc, aie all ciiines or faults of ditteient magnitudes The greater ludefiiuteness of these acts, due to the element m which they find utterance, does not annul their real chaiactei It siinjily causes the subjective giound, on which the oftence is committed, to decide the nature and shape of the leaction It is this subjective nature of the ofEence, which m the leaction comerts subjectivity and un- certaintv into necessitj, whether this leaction be meie pre- vention of Clime by the pohee oi specific punishment Heie, as always, foimalisni relies on isolated aspects, belonging to the e\teiual appeaiam e, and seeks by these abstractions of its own creation to reason away the real and concicto nature of the thing As to the sciences, they, if thei are sciences m reality, are not found m the region of opinion and subjective thought, noi does their method of juescntation consist in the adioit use of teiiiis, oi allusions, oi half-utteied, half- concealed opinions, but in the simjile, definite, and open expression of the sense and meaning. Hence, the sciences do not come uiidei the categoiv of jiublic opinion For the rest, the element in which juibhc opmion finds utterance and becomes an overt and tangible act is, as we have already observed, the intelhgence, principles, and opinions of others It is this element which determmes the peculiar effect of these acts or the danger of them to individuals, the commumty or the state (§ 218), just as a spark, if thrown upon a heaji of gunpowder, is much more dangerous than if thrown on the ground, where 'IHi: PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT it goes out autl Icares no trace — Hence, as the riglit of science finds sccuiity m the content of its matter, so also may an ntteicd wrong find secunty, or, at least, toleration, in the contempt with which it is icceived Offences, which aie in stiictness punishable at law, may thus paitly come under a kind of nemesis Intein.il impotence, by opposing itself to the talents and viitues, by which it feels oppressed, comes m this wav to itself, and gives selt-consciousuess to its ow n nothingness A moie haimless foini of nemesis was found amongst the Ivoman soltlieis in the satiiical songs diiccted against thc‘ir eiiiperois on the tiiiiinplial maicli Haiiug gone thiongh liard sen lee, and yet failing to secuie mention in the list of honours, the\ sought to get even with the empeioi in this Testing w'a\ But eion the mnic'is which is bad and malevolent is. when tieated wntli scoin, depiivcd of its effect Like the jiublic, which to some extent forms a ( iicle for this kind ol ai liiitv, it is limited to a meaningless delight in otheis’ mi&foi tunes and to a condemnation, wlin h IS inheient in itself 320 Theie is the sub]cctnity, wliuli is the dissolution of the established state hte It has its extei iial m.uufcstatiou in the opinion oi leasoning, which, in seeking to nialce good its own landom aims, destiovs itself This suli-jei tivity has its tine leality ni its opposite, namely, in that suhiectmty, which, being identical ivith the substantive will, and i.onstituting the conceiition of the pnncelj' power, is the idealitv of the whole This higliei subiectiMly has not as j ct received la this treatise its light and visible embodi- ment Addition — We have already regarded subjectivity as existing in the monarch, and in that capacity occupying the pinnacle of the state The other side of subjectinty manifests itself arbitrarily and quite externally in public opinion The subjectivity of the monarch is in itself dbstiact, but it should be concrete, and should as concrete THE STATE.
be the ideality winch diffuses itself over the whole. In the state which ib at peace, all Inanches of the civic life have their subsistence, but this subsistence beside and out- side of one anothei the blanches have only as it issues out of the idea of the whole This process or idealization of ihe whole must also have its own manifestation II Externai, Sovcreiontt.
321 Iiitemal soveiencntv (§ 278) is this ideality in so iiU as the elements of spiiit. and of the state as the em- bodiment ot spiiit, aie unfolded in their necessity, and subsist as oigaiis of the state But spiiit, involvmg a lefoieiKc ti' itself, ubich is negative and infinitely free, becomes an independent existence, which has incorporated the bulihistent difteieiitos, and hence is exclusive So constituted, the state has an individuality, which exists essentially as an indnidiial, and in the sovereign is a real, direct individual (§ 279) 322 Individuality, as exclusive and independent exist- ence, apiieais as a i elation to otliei self-dependent states riie independent existence of the actual spirit finds an enibodiinent in this geneial self-dependence, which is, theiefoic, the fiist fiecdom and highest dignity of a peojile Note — ^Tliose who, out of a desne foi a collective whole, which will constitute a moie oi less self-dependent state, and have its own centie, are willing to abandon their own centie and self-dependence, and foiiii with others a new whole, aie ignoiaiit of the nature of a collective whole, and undeiiate the pride of a people in its mdependence — The force, which states have on then first appearance in history, 13 this self-dependence, even though it is quite abstract and has no fuithei iiiteinal development Hence, m its most primitive inamfestation, the state has at its head an individual, whethei he be patriarch, chief, or what not.
TIIH PIIILOSOPirV OF RIGH’l.
323 In actual loalitj', tins nep;ative reference of the state to itseli appeals as lefeieuce to each othei of two independent things, as though the negative weic some external thing This negative lefeience has, theiefore, in its existence tlie foini oi an event, involving acudental occuiiences coming fioni without Eut it is iii tact its own highest element, its leal intiiiitude the idealization of all its finite iiiateiials The substance, as the absolute liower, is lieie biought into conliast with all that is individual and iiaiticulai, such as lite, juojieity, the lights of propert}", oi even wider ciiclcs, and makes then lelatiie worthlessness a fact foi consciousness 324 The phase, according to winch the niteiest and light of individuals is made a vamshnig tact or, is at the same time a positive element, forming the basis of then, not accidental and fleeting, but absolute luchviduahty This lelation and the lecognitioii ot it constitute then substantial dutv PioiKut^ aud hie, not to S 2 )eak of opinions and the oidmaiy loutme ot existence, tlicv must sacrifice, if neccssaiy, in oidcr to pieseive the substantiic individuality, ludeiieiidonce, and soveieiguty of the state Note — It IS a veiy distorted account of the iiiattei when the state, in demanding saciihcos fioiii the citizens, is taken to be simiily the ciiic community, ivhosu object is merely the security of life and jiiopoity Set uiity cannot possibly be obtained by the saciihcc of what is to be seemed Herein is to be found the ethical element in wai War IS nut to be regarded as an absolute evil It is not a merely external accident, having its accidental ground m the passions of powerful individuals or nations, in acts of injustice, or in anything which ought not to be Acci- dent befalls that which is by nature accidental, and this fate is a necessity So from the standjioint of the con- ception and in philosophy the merely accidental vanishes, because m it, as it is a mere appearance, is recognized its ’IHE STATE ’IHE STATE esBeuce, namolv, necessitj. It is necessary that what is finite, such as life and piopertj, should have its contingent nature exposed, since contingency is inheient in the con- ception of the finite This necessity has in one phase of it the form of a loicc of nature, smce all that is finite is moital and tiansicnt But m the ethical life, that is to say, the state, tliia ioice and natiiie are separated. Ne- cessity becomes m this waj- exalted to the woik of fieedoin, and becomes a force nliicli is cthiciil What from the standpoint ol natuic is ti.insient, is now transient because it IS willed to be sc, and that, which is fundamentally negatiie, becomes substantive and distinctive individuality in the ethical older It IS olten said, for the sate of edification, that wai makes short Moik oi the vanity of tciupoial things. It is the elemeut by which the idealization ot what is particular receives its light and becomes an actuality Moieovei, by it, as I hare elscwheie expressed it, "finite pursuits are rendered unstable, and the ethical health ot j)eoides is pi 08011 ed Just as the inoiement of the ocean prevents the coiiuptiou 11111011 would be the result of iieipetual calm, so bj iiai jicoplc escape the corruption which would bo occasioned bv a continuous oi eternal peace ” — The new that this cpiotatioii contains merely a philosophical idea, Ol, as it is soniotimes called, a justification of pron- denco, and that actual wai needs another Inncl of justifica- tion, mil be taken up latei The idealization, which comes to the suitace in war, viewed as an accidental foreign relation, is the same as the ideahty by virtue of which the internal state functions are organic elements of the whole. This principle is found m history m such a fact as that successful wars have preiented civil broils and strengthened the internal power of the state So, too, peoples, who have been unwilling oi afraid to endure internal sove- reignty, have been subjugated by others, and in their struggles for independence have had honour and success THE PHILOSOPHY OF KI&HJ’.
small lu propoition to then failure to establish ivitbin themselves a eeiitial political iioivei, then fieedom died through then feai of its dying Moieovei, states, whi<h have no guaiautee of mdeiiendi-nce nithe stiength of then army, states, <■ (/, that aie veiv small in compaiison with then ncighbouis, hai e i ontinued to subsist because of their internal Lonstitutinn, ivliieh ineieh of itseli would seem to promise them neithci niteinal lepose noi external seciiiitv These phenomena aie ilhistiations of oiii piniuple diaiiii fiom Instoiv.
Addition — In peace the hmc hte beiomos iiioio and moie extended Eaih sepaiate •«]>heie walls itself m and becomes exdusiie, and at last Iheie is a stagnation of mankind Then paiticnlaiitv be. oine-> iiioii- and nioie fixed and ossified Unity of the bodv is i‘ssenti.il to health, and wheie the organs become haid death ensues Ever- lasting peace is fiequentlv demanded as the ideal towards which maukiiid must move Hence, Kant jiioposod an alliance of piiiiies. nhuli should settle the i niitioveisies of states, and the Holi Alli.inco was piobablj intended to be an institution of this kind But the state is iiidnidnal, and in individuality negation is essentially implied Although a uumbei of states mai make themselves into a familv, the union, hecause it is an indiiiduality, must tieate an opjiositiou, and so beget an eneniv As a lesult of wai iieoples aie stiengthened, nations mIikIi aie in- volved in civil qiiariels, winning lepose at home b\ means of war abioad It is tiiie that wai occasions lusecuiitj of possessions, but this leal insecurity is simply a necessary I ommotiou From the pulpit we hear much regarding the iinccrtainti, vanity, and instability of temjioial things At the veiy same time every one, no matter how much he is iinpi essed by these utterances, thinks that he will manage to ictam his own stock and store But if the uncertainty comes in the form of hussais with glistening sabres, and begins to woik m downright earnest, this touchmg edifica- THE SlA'l'E THE SlA'l'E tion turns about face, and bulls curses at the invader In spite of this, wars aiise, when they lie in the nature of the luattei The seeds sjuiug up afiesh, and words aie silenced befoio the earnest lepetitious of history 32o Saeiifi.ee for the sate of the individuahty of the state IS the substautiie lelation ot all the citizens, and is, thus, a uiiiieisal duly It is ideality on one of its sides, and stands in c outlast to the lealitv ot jiaiticular sub- sistence Hence it itseli becomes a specific i elation, and to it is dedicated a class ot its oiin, the class whose viitue is biavei_\ 326 Dissensions between states may arise out of anj one siiecifac side ot then lelalions to each other Thiough these dissensions the specilie i>ai L ot the state devoted to detence leccivcs its distinguishing chaiacter But if the w hole state, as such, is m daugei ot losing its independence, duti summous all the citizens to its defence If the whole becomes a single toice, and is toin fioin its internal position and goes abioad, defence becomes converted into a wai ot couej^uest Note — The i\ caponed foicc ot the state constitutes its standing aiiiiy The sjiecific function ot defending the state must be iiiti listed to a sepaiale class This pio- cecdiug IS due to the same necessity by which each of the otliei paiticulai elements, luteiests, oi affaiis, has a sepaiate place, as in inaiiiage, the industrul class, the business class, and the politn al class Theoiizing, which waudeis up and down with its leasons, goes about to con- template the greatei advantages or the gieatei disadvan- tages ot a standing aimy Meie opinion decides against an army, because the conception of the matter is harder to understand than aie sepaiate and external sides. Another reason is that the interests and aims of particularity, expenses, consequent bighei taxation, etc, aie counted of greatei concern by the civic community than is the abso- lutely necessary. On this view the necessary is valuable IHE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT only as a means to the preservation of the vaiious sjiecial cmc interests 327 Braieiy taken hv itself is a formal virtue, since in it freedom is farthest icmoied from all special aims, possessions, and en-|oymoiits, and even fiom life But it involves a negation oi leiiuiuiatioii of oiilv evteinal lealities, and does not caiivivith it a completion of the s]iiiitual natuie Thus, the senliment of coinage may ho based ujion any one of a variety of giouiids, and its aetiial result may be uot for the brave themselves, but only for others Addition — The mihtaiy class is the class of iiniveisality To it are assigned the defence of the sl.ite and the duty of bunging into existence the ideality iin])hi it in ilself In othei woids it must saciifiee itseli Biaieii is, it is tiue, of different soits The couiage of the animal, or Ihe lobber, the biaveiy due to a sciisi* of honoiii, the braveiv of chivahy, are not let the tiiie foims of it Tine biaverv in civilized peoples consists in a leadmoss to offer up one- self in the seiiiee of the state, so that the indnidiial counts only as one amongst inaiiv Not personal fearlessness, but the taking of one’s place in a iiiiiveisal cause, is the valuable featui e of it In India five hundicd men con- quered tiventv thousand, ivho ivcie bv no means cowaidlv but laclced the souse of co-opeiation 328 The content of biaverv as a sentiment is found in the tiiie absolute final end. the soveroigntv of the state Braieiv realizes this end, and in so doing gives uji personal lealitv Hence, in this feeling are found the most rigorous and direct antagomsms There is present in it a self- sacrifice, which IS yet the existence of freedom In it is found the highest self-control or independence, which yet in its existence submits to the mechanism of an external Older and a life of service. An utter obedience or oom- jilcte abnegation of one’s own opinion and leasoumgs, even an abseui e <jf one’s own spirit, is coupled with the mo't THE STATE THE STATE intense and comprehensive direct presence of the spiiit and of resolution The most hostile and hence most personal attitude towards individuals is allied with perfect indif- ference, or even, it may he, a kindly feelmi; toi\ ai ds them as individuals Noie — To lisle one’s life is indeed something more than fear of death, hut it is yet a meie negative, having no independent cliai actci and value Only the positive ele- ment, the aim and content of the act, gives significance to the feeling of feailessucss Eohheis or murderers, havmg in view a ciiiiio, advcntiiieia hont upon giatifymg merely their own faiuy iislc Iheii In cs without fear — The pnn- cijilo of the modem woild, that is, the thought and the univci sal have given Inaveiy a higher form It now seems to bo mochanical in its expiession, being the act not of a paiticulai person, hut of a member of the whole As antagonism is now diicctcd, not against sepaiate persons, hut against.i liostilo whole, personal courage appears as iinpeisonal To this change is due the invention of the gun, and this bv no moans chauec invention has trans- muted tlie ineiclv pei&onal foiin of hiaveiy into the moie abstiact 329 The state has a foicign aspect, because it is an individual suhiect Hence, its lelation to other states falls within the pimcclv function Upon this function it de- lolves solelv and diiectlv to command the armed force, to eiitortaiii i elation s nitli othei states through ambassadors, to decide ujion peace and war, and to conduct other negotiations Addition — In almost all European countries the m- dividiial summit is the pimcely function, which has charge of foreign affairs Wheiever the constitution requires the existence of classes or estates, it may he asked whether the classes, which in any case control the supplies, should not also resolve upon wai and j>6ace In England, for example, no unpopular war can be waged But if it is TIIK PHILOSOPHY OF BIGHT uieaut thcil piinces and cabmcts aic moie subject to passion than the houses, and hence that the houses should decide whethei theie should be ivai oi peace, it niiisl be replied, that often ivholo nations have been louscd to.i pitch of enthu'.iasin suipassinaf that of then juinces Frequentlj in England the whole people ha\(' insisted upon wav, and in a ueitain measuie coinjielled the niinisleis to wage it The populautv of Pitt was due to his Knowing how to meet what the nation willed Not till afteinaids did calm give use to the const ion siiess that the wai was utterly useless, and uiideitalcen without adequate means Moieovei, a state is lonneeted not only with another but with scveial otheis, and the coiujilu ations aie so dehcate that they tan be managed oulv b\ the highest power.
B Internationa.!. Lam 380 Intel national law aiiscs out of the i elation to oni' another of independent states Whatevoi is absolute in this relation receives the form of a coiiiiiiand, b(>(ause its reality depends upon a distmct soieiuign nill Addition — A state is not a piivate jieison, but ni itself a completely independent totality Heme, the i elation of states to one anotliei is not nieicly that ot moiality and piivate light It is often desiied that states should be regarded fioin the standpomt of piivate light and luoialitj But the position of pm ate iiersous is such that they have over them a law eouit, Avhidi iea]i.ics what is mtiinsicalh light A relation between states ought also to be intrinsi- cally right, and in mundane afiaiis that which is intrinsi- cally right ought to have power But as against the state there is no poiver to decide what is intnnsically right and to realize this decision Hence, we must heie lemam bv the absolute command States m then relation to one anothei aic independent and look upon the stipulations Avhich they make one with anothei as provisional.
'lUE SfATE 'lUE SfATE 331. The nation as a state is the spirit substantively realized and diiectly leal Hence, it is the absolute power on eaith As regards other states it exists in sovcieign mdependente Hence, to exist for and be recognized by another as such a state is its jnimarv absolute right But tins light is yet oiilj foiuial, and the state’s demand to be recognized, when based on these external relations is abstract Whetliei the state exists absolutely and in ooncieto fact, depends upon its content, constitution, and condition Even then the recognition, containing the identity of both iniiei and outer relations, depends upon the view aud n ill of aiiotliei Note — Just as the individual person is not real unless related to otheis (§ 71 and elsewhere), so the state is not really individual unless i elated to other states (■§ 322) The legitimate pvoviiice of a state in its foreign relations, and 11101 e especially of the ininicly function, is on one side 11 holly inteiiial, a state shall not meddle with the inter iial aftaus ot another state Yet, on the othei side, it IS essential tor its comi>leteness that it be recognized bi others But this recognition demands as a guarantee tliat it shall locoguize those who leiognize it, and will have lesjjcct loi then luJejiendence Theiefoie they cannot be indi&eiont to its iiiteinal aftaiis — In the ease ot a nomada people, 111 aui people occupy ing a Ion er grade of civihza- tion, the question arises how tai it can be considered as a state The leligious opinions foimerly held by Jews aud Mahomedaus may contain a still higher opposition, which does not permit of the universal identity imphed m recognition Addition — When Napoleon, before the peace of Oampo- formio, said, “ The French Bepuhlic needs recognition as little as the sim requires to he recognized,” he really indicated the stiength of the existence, which already carried with it a guarantee of recognition, without its having been expressed z HIE PHILOSOPHY OE RIGHT 332. Tlie diicct loality, m whitli states stand io one anotliei, sundeis itself into vaiious lelations, ivbose iiatuie proceeds from independent caprice on both sides, and hence has as a j'eneral thinf^ the formal character of a contract The subiect matter of these contiacts is, how- ever, of infinitely naiiower lanate than of those in the civic community Theie individuals aic dependent njion one another in a sfieat variety of wavs, while independent states arc wholes, which find satisfaction in the main within themselves 333 International law, or the law winch is iiniveisal, and IS meant to hold absolutely "ood between states, is to be distinguished fiom the special content of positive tieaties, and has at its basis the pioposition that tieaties, as they involve the mutual obligations of states, must be kept inviolate But because the i elation of states to one another has soveieigntv as its principle, they aic so fai ni a con- dition of nature one to the otlioi Then lights have reality not ni a genoial will, winch is constituted as a superior powoi, but lu then paiticulai wills Accoiclingly the fundamental pioposition of iiitei national law icmams a good mtention, while* in the actual situation the i elation established hy the treaty is being continuallv shifted oi abrogated