Addition — A mil which resolves nothing, is not an actual will, that winch is dovoid of definite character never reaches a volition The reason for hesitation may he in a sensitiveness, which is aware that in determining 24 'lllli PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.
itself it IS engaged i\-itli -what is fimte, is assigning itself a limit, and abandoning its infinity, it may tlius bold to its decision not to i enounce tlio totality wliicli it intends Sucli a feeling is dead, even -when it amis to be something beautiful “ "Who will be gieat,” savs Goethe, “ must be able to limit himself” Bv Tolition alone man enteis actuality, howeyei distasteful it mai^ be to him, for indo- lence will not deseit its own self-bioodmg, m which it chngs to a univeisal possibility But possibility is not yet actuality Hence the will, which is secuie simply of itself, does not as yet lose itself in any definite reality 14 The fimte nill, which has meiely fiom the stand- point of foim doubled itself back upon itself, and has become the infinite and seK-secludcd I (§ 5), stands above its content ot ditteieut impulses and also above the several ways by which thev aie lealizcd and satisfied At the same time, as it is only foimally infinite, it is confined to this very content as the decisive featuie of its natuie and external actuality, although it is imdetcimined and not confined to one content lathei than anothei (§§ 6, 11) As to the letuin of the I into itself such a will is oulv a possible mil, which may oi may not be mine, and the I is only the possibility of deputing itself to this or that object Hence amongst these definite phases, which m this light are foi the I exteinal, the will chooses 15. Freedom of the wdl is in this view of it cajirice, in which aie contained both a leflection, which is fice and abstracted from everything, and a dependence upon a con- tent or matter either internally or externally provided Since the content is in itself or implicitly necessary as an end, and m opposition to this reflection is a deflmte possibility, caprice, when it is will, is in its nature con- tingent Note — The usual idea of freedom is that of eajnice It IS a midway stage of leflection between the will as meiely natural impulse and the will as free absolutely When it IXTRODCCnON.
25 IS said that freedom as a general thing consists in doing ■what one likes, such an idea must be taken to imply an utter lack of developed thought, containing as yet not even a susjiicion of ■ivhat is meant by the absolutely fiee will, light, the ethie.il system, etc Eeflection, bemg the foimal univeisality aud unity of self consciousness, is the will’s abstiact certitude of its fiecdom, but it is not yet the truth of it, because it has not as yet itself for content and cud, the subjective side is still diiteient from the objective Thus the content in such a case lemains puiely and com- pletely finite Capiiro, instead of being will in its truth, is lathei will in its contiadiction In the contioveisy caiiiod on, especially at the time of the metaphjsic of Wolf, as to whether the will is really free, or our consciousness of its fieedom is a delusion, it was this cajiiicc which -was in the minds of both parties Against the ceititudo of abstiact self-diiection, deteiminism lightly opposed a content, which was externally presented, and not being contained in this ceititude came from without. It did not mattei whethci this “\Mthout” weie imjiulse, imagination, or in geucial a consciousness so filled that the content was not the peculiai possession of the self- detei mining activity as such Since only the foimal eleineut of fiee self-cliioction is immanent in cajirice, while the othei element is something given to it fiom without, to take cajnice as fieedom may taiily be named a delusion Freedom in eveiy philosophy of icflection, whether it be the Eantian or the Fiiesian, which is the Kantian super- ficialized, is nothing more than this formal self-activity Addition — Since I have the possibdity of determming myself in this or that way, since I have the power of choice, I possess caprice, oi what is commonly called freedom This choice is due to the univeisality of the ■will, enabhng me to make my own this thing or another. This possession IS a particulai content, which is theiefore not adequate to me, but separated from me, and is mme only m possibility; 26 'iiii: piiiLosopnY OF bight just as I am tlie possibility of biin£;mtj myself into coinci- dence ■with it Hence choice is due to the iiidetennmate- ness of the I, and to the deteimiiiateness of a content But as to this, content the will is not fiee, althou<rh it has in itself foiniiillv the side of inhmtudc No such content coriesponds to will, m no content can it truly hud itself In capiice it is mvohed that the content is not foiined by the natuie oi my will, but by contimrencv' I am de- pendent upon this content This is the contiadictiou con- tained in ca 2 nico Oidinaiy man believes that he is fiee, when he is allowed to act capiieioiisly, but precisely lu eapiice is it mheieiit tliat he is not fiee ^Vlien I will the rational, I do not act as aiiaiticulai individual but accoid- ing to the couceiitiou of ethical obseiiame in ^'encial In an ethical act I establish not myselt but the tliinj' A man, who acts peiveisely, exhibits iiaiticulaiity The latioiialis the highway on which evei}'' one tiavels, and no one is specially maiked ‘When a gieat aitist finishes a woik we say “ It must bo So ” The i>aiticulaiity of the.iitist has wholly disajipeai ed and the woik shows no manneiism Phidias has no manneiism, the statue itself lives and moves But the pooici is the aitist, the inoie easily we discern himself, his jiaiticnlaiilv and capiice If we adlici e to the considei ation that in cajnice a man can will what he pleases, w'c have ceitamly fieedom of a kind, but again, if we hold to the i icw that the content is given, then man must be detei mined by it, and in this light is no longci free 16 What is resolved upon and chosen (§ 14) the will may again give up (§ 5) Tet, even with the possibility of tiansceudmg any other content which it may substitute, and of jiroceedmg in this way ad infinitum, the will does not advance beyond finitude, because every content in turn is diffeientfiom the foiin and is finite The ojujositc aspect, namely mdeterminateuess, irresolution or abstraction, is also one-sided INillODUCllOX 27 17 Since tLe conti iidiction mvolved in capiico (§ 16) is the ditileclic of the iinjiulses and intimations, it is mani- fested in their mutual autaffonism The satisfaction of on(‘ demands the subjection and saciifite of the satisfaction of anothei Since an nnjmlse is ineiely the simple tendency of its own essential natuie, and has no measuie in itself, to subject 01 sacrifice the satisfaction of any impulse is a contmy;ent decision of capiite In snch a case caprice may act upon the calcuhition as to which impulse will bung the gieatei satisfaction, oi may have some othei Bimilai puipose Addition — Impulses and inclinations aie in the first instance the content of will, and onlv leflection tianscends them But these impulses aie solf-diiectmg, ciowding upon and jostling one anothei, and all seeking to be satisfied To set all but one m the backgiound, and put myself into this one, is to limit and distoit myself, since I, in so doing, i enounce my univeisalitj, which is a system of all the impulses Just as little help is found in a mere suboidination of them, a couisc usually followed by the undei standing Theie is atailablc no ciiteiion by which to make such an aiiangement, and hence the demand foi a suboidination is usually sustained by tedious and iirelevant allusions to geueial satings 18 With legaid to the moial estimate of impulses, dialectic ajipeais in this foim The phases of the diiect or natiual uill aie luiniaueut and jiositive, and thus good Hence man is by nature good But natural characteristics, since they are opposed to ticedom and the conception of the spirit, and aie, hence, negative, must be eradicated Thus man is by uatuie evil To decide for either view is a mattei of subjective capiice Addition — The Chnstian doctrine that man is by nature evil IS loftiei than the ojiposite that he is natuially good, and IS to be inteipicted philosophically in this way Man as spmt is a free being, who need not give way to impulse 28 'JIIi: PHILOSOPHY OF BIGIIP Hence in liis duect and iinfoimed condition, man i 3 m a situation in 11111011 lie ought not to he, and he must free himself This is the meaning of the doctime of original sin, mtliout which Chiistianity would not he the leligion of fieedom 19 In the demand that impulses must he purified is found the geneial idea that they must he freed tiom the foim of diiect subjection to natiiie, and fiom a content that 13 subjective and contmgent, and iiiiist he lesloied to then suhstantiie essence The tiiith contained in this in- definite demand is that impulses should he phases of will in a lational sj stein To ajiprehend them in tins way as pio- ceeding from the conception is the content of the science of right Note — The content of this science may, 111 all its seveial elements, light, propeity, moiahty, family, state, ho lepie- sented in this way, that man has In iiatine the impulse to right, the impulse to piopcitj', to moiahty, to seviial love, and to social life If instead of this foiin, nhich belongs to empnical psychology, a philosophic f 01 in be piefeiied, it may he obtained cheap fioin what in modem tunes was le- puted and still is leputed to he philosophy He will then say that man finds 111 himself as a fact of consciousness that he wills light, piopeity, the state, etc Later will he given still anothei foim of the content which apjieaisheio in the shape of impulses, that, namely, of duties 20 The lefiection which is brought to hear upon im- pulses, placing them before itself, estimating them, com- paring them with one another, and contrasting them with their means and consequences, and also with a whole of satisfaction, namely happiness, brings the formal uni- versal to this mateiial, and in an external way jiunfies it of its ciudity and barbarism. This propulsion by the imi- \cisality of thought is the absolute woith of civilization Addition — ^lu happiness thought has already the upper INl’RODUC'lIOX hand with the foice of natuial impulse, since it is not satisfied with what is inomentaiy, but leqniies happiness as a whole This happiness is dependent upon civilization to the extent to which civilization confiims the nmveisal Bnt in the ideal of happiness theic aie two elements Theie is (1) a nmveisal that is higher than all particulars, yet, as the content of this nmveisal is in turn only nni- veisal jileasuie, theic aiisea once inoie the individual, liaiticulai and finite, and icticat must be made to impulse, (2) Since the content of happiness lies in the subjective peicejition of each individual, tins universal end is again paiticulai, noi is theie jiiesent in it any tiue nmty oi content and foim 21 But the tiutli of this foimal universality, which taken by itself is uudotci mined and finds definite cha- lacter in externally given niateiial, is the self-diiecting uniieisality which is will oi tieedom Since the will has as its object, content and end, univcisality itself, and thus assumes the foim of the infimte, it is free not only in itself 01 implicitly, but ioi itself oi exphcitly It is the tiue idea Note — The self-consciousness of the will in the form of appetite or impulse is sensible, the sensible in geneial indicating the externality of self-consciousness, or that condition in which self-consciousness is outside of itself Now this sensible side is one of the two elements of the loflectmg will, and the other is the abstract universahty of thought But the absolute will has as its object the will itself as such in its pure nniveisality In this universahty the du'ectness of the natural will is superseded, and so also IS the private individuahty which is produced by reflection and mfects the natuial condition But to supersede these and hft them into the universal, constitutes the activity of thought Thus the self-consciousness, which purifies its object, content oi end, and exalts it to universality, is thought carrymg itself through mto wiU. It is at this 30 ■HIE PHILOSOPHY OF KlCilir point tliat it becomes elcai tbat tlie ivill is tine ‘Oind free only as thinking intelligence The slave knows not his essence, his infinitude, his freedom, he does not know himself in his essence, and not to know himself is not to think himself The self-consciousness, which by thought appiehends that itself is essence, and thus puts away from itself the accidental and untiiie, constitutes the piiiicijilc of light, iiioiality, and all foims of ethical ohsciiance They who, in speaking philosophically of light, luoiality, and ethical obseivauce, would exclude thought and turn to feeling, the heait, the hi east, and luspiiation, expiess the deepest contempt for thought and science And science itself, oveiwheluicd with desiiair and uttei iiisiindity, makes barbai isiii and absence of thought a jii iiicijile, and so far as in it lay lobbed men of all tiiith, dignity, and woith Addition — In philosophy tiutli is had when the concep- tion coiresponds to leahty A body is the leality, and soul IS the conception Soul and body should be adequate to each other A dead man is still an existence, but no longoi a true existence, it is a leality void of conception Tor that reason the dead body decays So with the tiue will, that which it wills, namely, its content, is identical with it, and so fieedoni wills fieedom 22 The will which exists absolutely is tiuly infinite, because its object being the will itself, is for it not another or a limitation In the object the will has simply leveited into itself. Moieover, it is not mere possibihty, capacity, potentiality {potentia), but infinitely actual {infinitum actu), because the reality of the conception or its visible externality is internal to itself Note — ^Hence when the free will is spoken of without the qualification of absolute freedom, only the capacity of freedom is meant, or the natuial and finite will (§ 11), and, notwithstanding all words and opinions to the con- trary, not the free will. Since the understanding com- INfRODUClIOX 31 pieheiids tlic infinite only in its negative aspect, and lienee as a Levond, it tliinks to do the infinite all the more honour the faithei it icmoves it into the vague distance, and the moie it takes it as a foipigu thing In fiee will the tine infinite is piesent and leal, it is itself the actually piesent self-contained idea Addition — The infinite has lightly heen lepiesented as a cii cle The straight line goes out lai tliei and farther, and symbolizes the mcicl}'' negative and bad infinite, which, unlike the tiue, does not leturii into itself. The fiee will IS tiuly infinite, foi it is not a meie jiossibility or disposi- tion Its external leabty is its own mnci nature, itself 23 Only m this lieedom is the will wholly by itself, because it icfeis to nothing but itsell, and all dependence upon any othei thing falls away — The will is true, or rather truth itself, because its chaiacter consists in its being in its manifested leality, oi coirelative opposite, what it is in its conception. In othei woids, the pure conception has the iieicoiition oi intuition of itself as its end and reality 24 The will is univeisal, because in it all limitation and paiticular individuality aie supcisedod These one-sided phases are found only in the diffeiencc between the con- ception and its obiect or content, oi, fiom another stand- point, in the diffei ence between the conscious inde^iendent existence of the subject, and the will’s imjihcit, or self- involved existence, or between its excluding and concluding individuality, and its universality Note. — The different phases of universality are tabulated in the logic (“Encyclop of the Phil Sciences,” §§ 118-126). Imaginative thinking always takes universality in an abstract and external way But absolute nniversabty is not to be thought of either as the umversabty of leflec- tion, which IS a kind of concensus oi generality, or, as the abstract universality and self-identity, which is fashioned by the understanding ( § 6, note"), and keeps aloof from the 32 'HIE PHILOSOPHY of rigii'i.
individual It is latlior the concictc, self-contained, and self-ieferrmg nuivcisalitv, which is the substance, lutiinsic genus, or luimaueut idea of self-conseiousiiess It is a conceiition of fiee Mill as the umveisal, tianseendmg its object, passing tliiough and hejoiid its own specihe cha- ractei, and then beeonimg identical •with itself — Tins abso- lute universal is ivhat is in goucial called the latiunal, and IS to be apjiielieiided only m this speculative ivay 25 The sub-jeetivo side of the will is the side of its self- consciousness and indiiiduahty (§ 7), as distiiiguisbed from its implicit conception This subjectivitj' is (a) puie form 01 absolute unity of self-consciousness -with itself This unity is the ecjuation “I = T,” conscioU'ness being characteiized bj' a thoiougbly intvaid and abstiact self- dependence It is puie ceititudc of itselt in contiast with the truth, (/3) paitieulanty of will, as capiiee ivith its accidental content of pleasuiablc ends, (y) in geneial a one-sided foiui (§ 8), in so fai as that ivhicli is willed is at first an unfulfilled end, oi a conteut which siinjily belongs to self-consciousness 26 (a) 111 so far as the will is dctci mined by itself, and IS in accord with its conception and tiuc, it is whollv objective will (/3) But objective self-consciousness, whicli has not the form of the infinite, is a will sunk iii its object or condition, whatovei the content of that may be It is the will of the child, or the will present in slavery oi superstition (y) Objectivity is finally a one-sided form in opposition to the subjective phase of will, it is direct reahty, oi external existence In this sense the will becomes objective only by the execution of its ends.
Note — These logical phases of subjectivity and objec- tivity, since they are often made use of in the sequel, are here exjKised, with the express purpose of noting that it happens with them as with other distinctions and opjiosed aspects of leflcction, they by vutue of their finite and dialectic character pass over into their opposites. For IJSTRODUCIIOX 33 IJSTRODUCIIOX 33 imagination and underatandmg tlie meanings of antithetic phases are not convertible, because their identity is still internal But in will, on the eontiaiy, these phases, which ought to be at once abstiact and yet also sides of that which can be known only as conciete, lead of them- selves to identity, and to an exdiani'e of meanings To the nnderstandmg this is umntelligible — Thus, e g, the will, as a fieedom which exists in itself, is subjectivity itself, thus subjectivity is the conception of the will, and therefore its objectivity But subjectivity is finite m opposition to objectivity, yet in this opposition the will is not isolated, but in intiicate union with the object, and thus its finitude consists quite as much in its not being subjective, etc — What in the sequel is to be meant by the subjective oi the objective side of the will, has each time to be made clear fioni the context, which wdl supply then positions in i elation to the totality Addition — It IS oidinaiily supposed that subjective and objectne are blank opposites, but this is not the case Eathei do they pass into one another, for they are not abstract aspects like jiositive and iiegatn e, but have already a conciete significance To cousidci in the fiist instance the expiession “ subjective, ” this may mean an end which IS merely the end of a ceitaiu subject In this sense a poor woik of art, that is not adequate to the thing, is meiely subjective But, fuithei, this expression may point to the content of the will, and is then of about the same meaning as capricious, the subjective content then is that which belongs merely to the subject. In this sense bad acts are merely subjective. Further, the pure, empty I may be called subjective, as it has only itself as an obj'ect, and possesses the power of abstraction from all further content Subjectivity has, moreover, a wholly particular and correct meaning in accoi dance with which anythmg, in order to win recognition from me, has to become mine and seek validity in me This is the infinite avarice of D 34 'JHK PIIILOSOPUY OF RlGII’l subjectivity, eager to compieliend and consiiinc eveiything ■within the simple and puie I Similaily we mav take the ob]ectivc in difEeient ways By it we iiiav uiidoistaiid anything to winch we give existence in contiast to ouiselves, vhctlicr it be an actual thing or a mere thought, which we place over against oui- selves By it also we understand the direct reality, in which the cud is to be lealized Although the end itself IS quite paiticulai and subjective, vie jet name it objective after it has made its apjicaiauce Furthei, the objective ■will IS also that in which tiuth is, thus, God’s will, the ethical will also, aie objective Lastly, we may call tlie will objective, uhcn it is wholly subinciged in its object, as, eg, the child’s will, which is coutidmg and without subjective fieedom, and the slave’s will, which does not know itself as fiee, and is thus a will-lcss will In this sense any will is objective, if it is guided m its action by a foreign authority, and has not yet completed the infinite return into itself 27 The absolute charactei oi, if you like, the absolute impulse of the fiee spiiit (§ 21) is, as has been obseivcd, that its freedom shall be foi it an object It is to be objective in a two-fold sense it is the rational system of itself, and this system is to be diiectly leal (§ 26) Theie IS thus actualized as idea what the will is implicitly Hence, the abstract conception of the idea of the wull is in general the tiee will which wills the fice will 28 The activity of the wiU, directed to the task of transcending the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity, of transferring its end from subjectivity into objectivity, and yet while in objectivity of remaining with itself, IS bej'ond the formal method of consciousness (§ 8), in which objectivity is only direct actuality This activity IS the essential development of the substantive content of the idea (§ 21). In this development the conception moulds 'the idea, which is in the first mstance abstract, into ISiKODUCriON.
35 the totality of a system This totality as substantive is independent of the opposition between mere subiectiVe end and its lealizatioii, and m both of these forms is the •same 29 That a leality is the lealization of the free will, this IS what IS meant by a light Eight, therefore, is, in geiieial, fieedom as idea Note — In the Kantian doctiine (Inti eduction to Kant’s ‘ Theoiy ot Eight”), now gcncially accepted, "the highest factor is a limitation of my fioedom or capiice, in ordei that it may bo able to subsist alongside of eveiy othei individual’s capiicc in accordance with a universal law” This doctiine contains only a negative phase, that of limitation And besides, the j'ositive phase, the universal law 01 so-called law of icasou, consisting in the agreement of the ( apiici' of one nitli that of another, goes heyond the well-known foinial identity and the iiioposition of con- tiadiction The definition of light, lust quoted, contains the view which has especially smee Eousseau spread widely Accoidiiig to this 1 lew neither the ahsoliite and rational will, 1101 the tiue spiiit, but the will and spiiit of the paiticulai individual m then peciiliai tapiice, aie the substantive and piimaiy basis Wlicn once tins pimciple is accejited, the latioual can announce itself only as limiting this fieedom Hence it is not an inlicient lationality, but only a meie cxteiiial and foimal nniveisal This view is aceoidingly devoid of speculative thought, and is i ejected by the philosophic conception In the mmds of men and in the actual world it has assumed a shape, whose horror IS without a paiallel, except m the shallowness of the thoughts upon which it was founded 30 Eight in geneial is something holy, because it is the embodiment of the absolute conception and self-conscious fieedom But the foimalism of right, and after a while of duty also, is due to distinctions arismg out of the development of the conception of freedom In contrast 36 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.
With the moie formal, ahstiact and limited light, there is that spheie oi stage of the sjiint, m ivhicJi spirit has brought to definite actuality the furthci elements contained in the idea This stage is the iiclier and inoie concrete, it IS truly universal and has thciefoie a highci light Note — Eicij step in the development of the idea of freedom has its peciiliai light, l>etauso it is the embodi- ment of a phase of ficedom Wlien moiality and ethical observance aie spoken of in ojiposition to light, only the first or formal light of the abstract jiei sonality is meant Morahty, ethical observance, a state-inteiest, aie every one a sxjecial right, because each of these is a definite realiza- tion of fieedoiii They can come into collision only in so far as they occupy the same plane It the luoial stand- pomt of spirit weic not also a light and one of the forms of freedom, it could not collide with the right ot peisonalitv or any other light A light contains the conception of freedom which is the highest phase of spirit, and m opposi- tion to it any otliei kind of thing is lacking in real sub- stance Yet collision also implies a limit and a suboi dura- tion of one phase to anothci Only the right of the world-spirit is the unlimited absolute 31 The scientific method by which the conception is self-evolved, and its phases seH-developecl and self-pro- duced, IS not first of all an assurance that certain relations are given fioiii somewhere or other, and then the applica- tion to this foieign mateiial of the uiiiveisal The true process is found in the logic, and here is presupposed Note — The efficient or motive principle, which is not merely the analysis but the production of the several elements of the universal, I call dialectic Dialectic is not that process m which an object or proposition, presented to feeling or the direct consciousness, is analyzed, en- tangled, taken hither and thither, until at last its contrary is derived Such a merely negative method appears frequently in Plato. It may fix the opposite of any INTRODUCIIOX 37 INTRODUCIIOX 37 notion, or reveal the conti-adiction contained m it, as did the ancient scepticism, oi it may in a feehle way consider an approximation to tiutli, oi modern half-and-half attain- ment of it, as its goal But the higher dialectic of the con- ception does not merely apprehend any phase as a limit and opposite, but pioduces out of this negative a positive con- tent and result Only by such a couise is there develop- ment and inherent progicss Hence tins dialectic is not the external agency ot sub 3 ective thinking, but the private soul of the content, which unfolds its blanches and fruit oiganieally Thought legaids this development of the idea and of the iieculiai activity of the reason of the idea as only subjective, but is on its side unable to make any addition To cousidci anything rationally is not to bring reason to it from the outside, and work it up in this way, but to count it as itself loasonable Here it is spirit in its fieedoin, the bunimit of self-conscious leason, which gives itself actuality, and pioduces itself as the existing world The business of science is simply to bung the specific work of the reason, winch is in the thing, to consciousness 32 The phases of the development of the conception aie themselves conceptions And yet, because the concep- tion IS essentially the idea, they have the form of manifes- tations Hence the sequence of the concej)tionB, which arise in this way, is at the same time a sequence of realiza- tions, aud are to be by science so considered.
Mote — In a speculative sense the way, in which a con- ception is manifested in leahty, is identical with a definite phase of the conception But it is noteworthy that, m the scientific development of the idea, the elements, which result in a further definite form, although precedmg this result as phases of the conception, do not m the tem- lioral development go before it as concrete reahzations Thus, as will be seen later, that stage of the idea which is the family piesujiposcs phases of the conception, whose result it IS But that these internal presuppositions should 38 iiii: I’liir osopiiY or riohi be piesent in such visible lealizations as rin;lit of iiropeitj, contract, moiahty, etc, this is the other side of the ^^loeess, which only in a highly developed civilization has attained to a specihc lealization of its elements Addition — The idea must always p:o on deteimininfr itself within itself, since at the be<?iiming it is only absti act conception However, this initial abstiact conception is never given up, but only becomes inwaidly iichei, tlie last phase being the richest The eailiei and meiely iiniihcit phases reach in this wa\' fiee self-dependence but iii such a mauuei that the conception remains the soul hu li holds eveiythmg togethei, and only tliiongh a pioccilmc im- manent within itself airnes at its own distiiu turns Heiici' the last phase falls again into a unity with the fiist, and it cannot be said that the conception evei comes to soinetliiin: new Although the elements of the conceiitioii appeal to have fallen apart when they entei lealitv, this is only a mere appearance Its supeificial chaiaiter is loiealed in the process, since all the pailiculais finally tuin back again into the conception of the unneisal The cmpiiical si leiices usually analyze what they find in pictmial ideas, and if the individual is successfully biouglit back to the geiieial, the general property is then called the conception But this is not our procedure We desiie only to obsciye how the conception detci mines itself, and compels us to keep at a distance eveij thing of oui own spinning and thinking But what we get in this way is one sciies of thoughts and another senes of realized foiras As to these two senes, it may happen that the order of time of the actual manifestations IS paitly different from the order of the conception Thus it cannot, e g,he said that propel ty existed before the familc, and yet, in spite of that it is discussed before the family is discussed The question might also be raised heie, Why do we not begin with the highest, i e, with concrete truth The answer is, because we desire to see truth in the form of a lesult, and it is an essential part IXlRODUCriOX 39 of the process to conceive the conception first of all as ab- stract The actual senes of realizations of the conception IB thus for us 111 due couise as follows, even although in actuahtj' the order should be the same Our 2 }rocess is this, that the abstiact foims reveal themselves not as self-sub- sistent but as untrue Division of the WoiJc 33 Accoiding to the stages in the development of the idea of the absolutely free will, A The will IS diiect oi immediate, its conception is theietore abstiact, i e, personality, and its embodied leality is a diiect external thing This is the sphere of abstiact oi formal light.
B The will, passing out of external reality, turns back into itself Its jihase is subiective individuality, and it is contrasted with the univeisal This universal is on its m- teinal side the good, and on its external side a presented world, and these two sides aie occasioned only by means of each othoi In this sphere the idea is divided, and exists in sepaiate elements The right of the subjective will IS in a lelatioii of contiast to the right of the woild, or the right of the idea Heie, honevei, the idea exists only implicitly This is the sphere of moiality