50 It IS a self-CMdeut and, indeed, almost snpeifliious remaik that an object belongs to liini who is ac c ideiitallv first m possession of it A second peison cannot take into possession what is already the property of another Addition — So fai we have been eliiefly concerned with the proposition that personahty must find an embodiment in property From what has been said, it follows that he who IS fiist in possession is likewise owner He is rightful ownci, not because he is fiist, but because lie is a free will He IS not fiist till some one comes aftei him 51. In order to fix property as the outward symbol of PROPERTT 57 mv peisonalit}', it is not enous»li that I repiesent it as mine and mteinally will it to be mine, I must also take it over into niy possession The embodiment of iiiy will tan then be reeo£rni/,ed by otheis as mine That the object, of whith I take pos«eNsioii bo unowned is a self-evident, uegative condition (§ 50) Eatliei it is moie than a bare necfatne, tmte it aiitiiijiates aielatiou to others AihhUon — A j)er3on’s jnittiiii^ his will into an object is the couecjitiou of jii ojieiti, and the iievt step is the lealizmg of it The inner act of iii_\ uill which says that something IS mine, must be made let oifiii/ablefoi others Whenlmake an object mine, I ijive it a jnedicate, which must be mani- fested in its outei toiin and not icinain merelv in my inner will Childieu often afliiin this eailier act of will against the loal possessing ot a thing hi otheis But for adults such a will IS not enough The foiin of subjectivity must be lemoved by woikiiig itsclf out into something objective 52 Active possession makes the inateiial of an object my jiropeity, sime the iiiateiial is not independently its own Note — The niatciial opposes itsell to me Indeed its veiy uatuie is to fuiuisli opposition to me It e\hibits its abstiact iiidepcndeiice to myabstiact or sentient con- sciousness The sentient imagination, it may be said in passing, puts the tiutli upside down when it regards the sentient side of mind as conciete, and the rational as abstiact In lefeieucc tlieiefoie to the will and property this absolute iudoi»endouce of the niateiial has no tiuth Active possession, viewed as an external activity, by which the universal right of appiopiiatiug natural things becomes actualized, is allied to physical stiength, cunning, skiU, all ' the means, in shoi t, by which one is able to take hold cor- Voreally of a thing Owing to the qualitative difFerences of natuial objects, the niasteiy ovci and possession of them has an infinitely dneisified meaning, and a conespondmg limitation and contingency. Moiuover, no one kmd of matter, such as an element, can be wholly possessed by any 58 'iiii: PHILOSOPHY ov Rioni THHiiliei of sepaiate persons In oidei to l)eeomc a possible object of possession, it niiist be fcilceu in sei)aiiite jiaits, as a breath ot air or draiisflit of iratei The imjx>ssibilitv of owning one kind of inattei, oi an elcnnent, depends filially, not iijiou external pliisical mtapaeitv but njion the taet that the peison, as mil, is not only individual, bill dnectlv individual, and that the oxtoinal exists foi him. theieioie, only as a colleetioii of paituiilais (§ 13, note to § 43 ) The pioii'ss, bv wli'di iie become maslei and exteiiial ownoi, is in a sense infinite, and must loniain moie oi less undetei mined and incomplete None the less, lioupiei, has the mateiial an essential foim, because- of uhnh alone il is anything The nioie I appiopiiate this toim, so much the more do I come into leal jiossessicm ot the object The consumption of food is a tliiough-and-thioiigh ch.viige of its quality The eultiiation ot skill iii mvbod\, and Ihe education of my mind, aie also moie oi Ic-ss an active possession by means ot thoiough-going modilu,ition Mmd or spiiit IS aboie all that uliicli I can make iii\ own But this possession is difteieiit fioni piojieit j Piopeitv IS completed m its lelation to the fic-e i\ill In the- i-\teiual relation of active jiossession somotliing of e\teiiialit\ ic- inains as a lesidue, but Mitli regard to the tiee mil the owned object has reseived nothing A mattei without qualities, a something which in piopeitv is sujqiosed to remain outside of mo, and to belong 11110111 to the obje-et, is an empt V abati action, which tlicmght must expose and dofe-at Addition — Fichte has raised the question, whether, if I have fashioned an object, its material is also mine Aceoid- ing to his view, if I have made a cup out of gold, any one mav take the gold, provided that he does no injurv to my handiwork Though we may imagine that form and sub- stance are separable in that way, the distinction is an empty subtlety If I take possession of a field, and plough it, not only is the furrow mine, but also tlie giound which lielongs to it It 18 my will to take possession of the mapropj:ihv 59 terial, e\eu the wliole object Hence the uiateiia.1 is not masteiless, i1 is not its own Even if the iiiciteiial remains outside ot the foini which I give the object, the form is a sign that the obji'ct is to be mine Hence the thing does not stay outside of my will oi pin pose Tlieie is con- sequently nothing in it which can be taken hold of by aiiothei 53 Pi Opel ty has its moie duet t phases in the relation of the will to the object This iclatiou is (a) diicet and active taking of possession, in so fai as the will is embodied in the object as in something jxisitive (ft) In so fai as this object IS negative ton aids the will, the will is visibly em- bodied in it as somethiiitr to he negated This is use (y) The letiuii of the will into itself out of the object, this is reluiqiiisliuienl Tlicse tliieo phases aie the positive, nega- tive, and infinite judgments of the will concerning the object A The Act of Po<>ie8non 54 Taking possession is paitly the simple bodily grasp, paitly the foimiug and paitly the luaiking or designating of the object Addition — These modes of taking possession exhibit the piogicss fioiii the categoiy of paiticularity to that of uni- vei&alif j Bodily seizuie can be made only of particulai objects, while maiking an object is done by a kind of pictuie-tlimking In iii.iikiug I keep befoie me a repre- sentation, by which I intend that the object shall he mme in its totality, and not meiely the part which I can hold in my hand 55 (a) Coiporcal possession, in which I am present di- lectly, and my will is diiectly visible, ajipeals at once to the senses, and fiom that staiidjioiut is the most complete kind of possession But it is aftoi all only subjective, temporal y and greatly limited as well by surioundings as by the qualities of the object But if I can connect an 60 'iiii: PHILOSOPHY of rioiit objetl Tvitli an5tliin!T I have already, or if the two become conncLted ac Lideiitally, the spbeic of diiect phjsical j)re- lieusioii IS to some extent enlarged Noie — Mechanical foices, weapons, instruments extend the compass of my ]iow’ei If my giound is washed by the sea 01 a iivei, oi lies adjacent to a bit ot good huutmg eountiyoi a jiastin age, if it contains stone oi olhei iniiieials, if theie IS an_\ tieasme in it oi iipcm it, m each of the'^e ways possession may be enlaiged It is the saint' if llni enlaigement occuis aftei I liaic pos-cssion and acculeiitaih, as IS the case with so-called natnial accielioiis such as allmial dejiosits, and with ob-jc'cls That aie stiaiided Ei clo- thing that IS bom is also an extension of iiij wealth, prtiDa as the} aie called, but as IhcT myohe an oiganic lelatioii, and aic not external additions to an ()b)ect alieadv m my possession, they aic cliffeient iioni the othei actessoiies All these adpuicts, some of them mutualh oxtliisiie, aie possibilities by which one ownei lathei than aiiothei may the moio easih take a piece ot land into jiosscssioii, oi woik it Tip, tlioi niai' also be iiewed as meie accidental accoin- lianimeiits ot the obicct to which thee aie added Thev aie 111 fart extcmal concomitants which do not include any conception oi liying union Hence it deiohes upon the undci standing to bung foiwaid and weigh leasoiis toi oi against then being mine, and to appl} the positiie edicts of the law, so that a decision inaj bo leachcd m accoi dance with the relatiye closeness of the connection between the object and its accessory Addition — The act of possession assumes a scpaiation of parts in the object I take no more into my possession than I can touch with my body But, secondly, external things have a wider lange than I am able to cover physi- cally Something else stands in connection with what I own Thiough the hand I exeicise the act of ownership, but the compass of the hand can be enlaiged No animal has this noble member What I grasp with it can itself PROPERTY.
61 become a moans to fuither piehension Wlien I come into possession of a thin", the undcistanrling goes at once ovei into it, and as a consoquonte not only what is diiectly laid hold upon IS mine, hnt liken isc what is connected with it At this ]mictuie jiositive law must intioduce its presenpts, because nothing more than this lan be deduced from the conception 56 (/3) Whon something that is mine is formed, it be- comes mdepeiideiit of me, ceasing to be limited to my pie- sence 111 this space oi time, oi to the presence of my con- sciousness and n ill Note — The fashioning of a thing is the kind of active possession nliidi is most adecpiate to tlie idea, because it unites the siibieUive and the obp’ctne It vanes infinitely aceoidiiig to the quality oi the ol)]ett and the purpose of the subject To tins head belongs likewise the ioimation or nuituio of luiiig things, in which my woik does not ic- main something foieigii, but is assimilated, as m the culti- vation of the soil, the caie of plants, and the taming, feed- ing, and teiicling of animals It me Intlos also any anango- mentfoi the iiioie efliciont usoof natmal products or forces, as well as the ettect of one material iijion another, etc Addition — This act oi ioiming may in practice assume the gieatest laiiety of aspects The soil, which I till, is foimed The’ foiining of the inoigamc is sometimes in- direct When I, foi instance, build a windmill, I have not foimed the an, but I foim something which will utilize the air Yet, as I have not foimed the air, I daie not call it mine Moreover the sparing of a wild animal’s life may be viewed as a foiining, since my conduct is the jireserva- tion of the object It is the same kind of act as the train- ing of animals, only that tiaimug is more duect, and pro- ceeds more laigely fioin me 57 In his dnect life, befoie it is idealized by self-eoii- sciousuess, man is merely a natural being, standing outside of his true conception Only thiough the education of his 62 iiii: PHILOSOPHY of highi'.
body and nnud, mainly by lus becoming ions* ions of him- self as free, does lie take possession of Inni&elf, become his own pioportv, and stand in opposition to otheis This active possession of himself, tonierselv, is the giving of actuality to what he is in conteptioii, lu Ins possibilities, faculties, and disposition B\ this piocess he is foi the first time secuiely established as his own, becomes a tangible leality as distinguished iioin a simple conscious- ness of himself, and is callable ot assuming the toiiii of an object (§ 43, note) Note — Wc aie now in a position to cousidei slaveiy We mav set aside the justification of slaieiv Ijased up-' the aiguuicnt that it oiiuiuates in supeiioi jdiysnal foice, the taking of prisoiieis iii wai, the saiing and pieseiving of life, uiibnuging, education, oi boston al of kindnesses These loasons all rest ultimately on the gioiiiid that man IS to be taken as a iiieiely natuial being, liiiiig or, it may even be, choosing a life which is not aderpiate to Ins conception Upon the same footing st.iiids the attempted justification of owneisliij) as meiely the status ot masteis, as also all views of the light to slaies founded on histoiy Theasseition of the absolute injustice of slaioi j on the contiaiy, clinging to the conception tliat man, as sjaiitual, IS free of himself, is also a one-sided idea, since it siijiposes man to be fiec by natuie In other woids, it takes as the truth the conception in its diiect and nnieflective form rathei than the idea This antinomy, like all othei',, lests upon the external thmking, which keeps separate and inde- pendent each of two aspects of a single complete idea In point of fact, neither aspect, if separated from the other, is able to measure the idea, and present it in its tiutli It is the mark of the fiee sjnnt (§ 21) that it does not exist meiely as conception oi natuially, but that it supersedes its own foimalisin, tianscending thereby its naked natuial cMstence, and gives to itself an existence, which, being its own, IS free.
PROPER lY.
63 Hence tlie hide ot the antinomy, which maintains the conception oi fieedom, is to ho preferred, since it contains .it least the necessary jxnnt of dcjiaitme for the tiuth The othei side, holding to the existence, which is utterly at vaiitiiice with the conception, has iii it nothing reasonable or light at all The standpoint of the free will, with which right and the science ot light begin, is already beyond the wrong view that man is simjily a natiiial being, who, as he cannot oxist toi himself, is fit only to be enslaved This untme phenomenon had its oiigiu in the circumstance that the spiiit had at that tune lUst attained the level of con- sciousness Hence tlnongh the dialectical movement of the concciitiou.iiises the fiist inkling ot the consciousness of fiecdoni Thoie is thus by th.s movement brought to pass a stmggle for lecogmtion, and,.is a necessary result, the lelation of mastci and slave But in order that the oLjectiie spirit, which giies substance to right, may not again be apprehended only on its subjective side, and that it may not again appeal as a mere unsupported command intimating that m.iu in Ins real uatuie is not apjioiuted to slaveiy, it must be seen that the idea of fieedom is in truth nothing but the state Addition — If we hold fast to the side that man is abso- lutely fiee, we condemn slaveiy Still it depends on the pel sou’s own will, whether he shall be a slave or not, j’ust as it depends upon the will of a people ivhether or not it is to be m subjection Hence slavery is a wrong not simply on the part of those who enslave or subjugate, but of the slaves and subjects themselves Slavery occuis in the passage fiom the natuial condition of man to his true moral and social condition It is found in a world where a wrong is still a right Undei such a circumstance the wrong has its value and finds a necessaiy place 58 (y) The kind of possession, which is not literal but only repiesentative of my will, is a mark or symbol, whose meaning is that it is I who have put my will into the ob- 64 'llli: PIIILO'.OPHY OF KIOIIl ject Owing to the vaiiety of objcets used as signs, this kind of jiossessioii is vei\ mdeiiuite in its meaniug Addition — Of all kinds ot possession this hv maikingis the most complete, since the otlieis have iiioie oi less the effect of a mail; "When I seize oi foim an oliicct, iii each case the losult is in the end a mail;, iiidicatiiig to otheis that I exclude them, and have set my will in the object The conception of the mail; is that the object stands not for uliat it is, but foi what it siiruifies The cock.ide, e g, means citizenship in a ceitain state, although its coloiii has no connection with the nation, and lepiesents not itself but the nation In that man acquiies possession lliioiigh the use of a sign, he exhibits liis iiiasteiv over thintjs B Use ot the Ohjpit 59 The object taken into mv possession icieives the predicate “nunc,” and the will is iclated to it jio^itiieh Yet in this identity the object is e^tabllshed as somethin!: negative, and ray mil becomes paiticiilaiizud as a uaiit or desire But the jiaiticulai ■want of one sepaiatc mil is the positive, which satis&os itself, while the object is ncgatne 111 itself, and exists only foi my uant and selves it Use is the realization of my wantthioiisrlithe change, destruction or consumption of the object, which in this way reveals that it has no self, and fulfils its natiiic Note — The view that use is the leal iiatuie and actinalitv of propel ty floats before the mind of those who consider that piopeity is dead and ownerless, if it is being put to no use This they advance as reason foi laying violent and unlawful hands upon jiropeity But the will of an owner, by vntiie of which a thing is his own, is the funda- mental piinciplo, of which use is only an external, sjiecial, and siiboidmatc manifestation Addition — In use is involved a widci relation than in jiossession by symbol, because the object, when used, is PBOPERTY.
65 not leeognized in its particular existence, but is by me negated It is reduced to a means for the satisfaction of my ■wants When the obiect and I come together, one of the tivo must lose its qualities, if we aie to become iden- tical But I am a living thing who wills and tiuly affirms himself, while the obiect is only a natural thing There- foie it must go to giouiid and I pieserve myself This constitutes the superiority and reason of the organic woi Id 60 Using an object in diicct seizure is a single separate act But nhen we have a leciuimg need, use repeatedly a product which leplaces itself, and seek to pieserve its powei to leplaco itself, a diiect and single act of seizure becomes a sign It la uniTcisabzed and denotes the pos- session of the elemental oi oiganic basis, the conditions of pioduction 61 A thing has in coutiast with me, its possessor, no end ot its own (§ 42) Its substance as an independent thing IS thus a puiely external and unsubstantial eustence As this extoinality when realized is the use, to which I put it, so the total use oi seivicc of the object is the object itself in its whole extent When I am admitted to the complete use of a thing, I am the owner of it Apart fiom the entile laugc of use, notliing is left over to be the possession of another Addition — The relation of use to property is the same as that of substance to accident, of mternal to external, of force to its manifestation But the force must be mani- fested, a faim is a faim only as it bears produce He who has the use of a farm is the possessor ot the whole, and to suppose another ownership lu addition is an empty abstraction 62 Partial or temporary use, and jiartial or temporary possession, oi possibility of use, however, are to bo dis- tinguished from actual ownership The total use of a thing cannot be mine, while the abstract property is somep 66 'IIIE PIIILOSOPIIl OF lllCilll body else’s The object would iii that lasc coutam a contradiction It would be wholly penotiated by my will and yet contain somethina; imjienetiablc, namely, the empti will of anothei Tlie iclation of niy positive will to the thing would be objectne and yet not objective Accoidingly, possession is essentially free and complete Note — The distinction between light to total use and abstiact jiosscssion is due to the eiiiptv and formal iiiidei- standing To it the idea, which in this case is the unity of possession or the peiaonal mil with the realization of this will, IS not tiue On the central j', it holds as tine these two elements in their sep,uation This distinction of the understanding impbes that an empty masteiship of things IS an actual lelation If lie could extend the teim " abeiiation ” bejond the meie imagination of the subject, and the leality, with which he is diiectly at vaiiance, we might call such a view of piopcity an abeiiation of per- sonahty How can what is mine in one single object be without qualification my indiiidual exclusive will, and also the individual exclusive will of someone else P In the “ Institut ” hbr ii tit iv it is said “ Ubttfi uctus eatjvs alienis lehiis viendi,fiiie‘)idi. saha lerum, substantia, " and again “ Ne tamen %n uniiersvm inuhles essent pro- prietates, semper abscendente usvjructn placuit teitis modis extvngui usumfructinn et ad p opt letatemt eierh ” "Placmt " — as though it wei e optional, whether or not to give sense to the foimal distinction of the undeistanding A pro- ptietas semper abscendente usufructu would not only be inutiles, but no longer a proprietas Many distinctions regarding property, such as that into t es mancipt and nec mancipi, and that into domtmum Quiritarium and Boni- tarium, aie merely historical dainties and do not belong to this place, because they have no relation to the conception of jiioperty But the i elation of the dominium directum to the dominium utile, and that of the contiact which gives hciitable right in another’s land, and also the various ways PHOPJiRI V 67 PHOPJiRI V 67 of dealing Avilli estates, in fee, with their ground lents and othei icnts and impositions, have a cleai healing upon the distinction now under discussion When these chaiges aie iiiedeeniahly iinjiosed, tins foimal distinction IS indeed jiiesent, hut it is again transcended when by the association of ceitam chaiges with the dominium utile, the dominium utile and the dominium directum be- come tlic same If these lelatioiis contained no more that the foiinal distinction of the nndci standing, there would be opposed to each othei not two masters (domini), but an ownei and an empty niastoi But by virtue of the charges 01 taxes it IS two owueis, who stand in relation to each othei, though they aic not lelated by a common pos- session In this 1 elation is to be found the tiansition tioin propel ty to use, a tiansition already operating when owneiship, which was foimeily reckoned as the moie honoiuablc, is gnon a setondaay jilace, while the utile or piodiiee of a Jomuiiinii dii ectum is regarded as the essential and rational It IS fully fittceu bundled vcais since through the influence of Chiistiauity the fieedora of the pel son began to flourisb, and at least in a small section of the human race take rank as a null ei sal pimciple But the lecognition here and there of the princijile of the fieedom of pioperty is, as it were, a thing of yesterday This is a good illustration from world-histoiy, of the length of time needed by the sjniit to reach self-consciousness, and is a rebuke also to the impatience of opinion 63 In use the object is a single one, definite in quality and quantity, and answers to a special need But its special usefulness, when fixed quantitatively, can be com- pared with othei objects capable of being put to the same use, and a special want, served by the object, and indeed any want mav be compaied with other wants, and their coi responding objects may be also compared This uni- versal charactciistic, which proceeds fiom the paiticuLii 68 THE PHILOSOPHY OF KIGHl object and jet absti'acts fiom its sperial qualities is tbo laluc Value is the tiuo essouce oi siibstaiue of tbe object, and the object bv jiOBSCsfeiiit; value becomes an object foi consciousness. As complete ou'uei of the object, I am oivnei of its value as well as oi its use Note — Tlio feudal tenant is the owuei of use only, not of the 1 alue Addition — Quality heic boiomes quanti(\ Want is a teim common to the fficatest vaiietv ot thiuos and enables me to compaie them Thought in its jnogicss staits fioiii the special quality of an object, jusscs through indiftcrencc with legaid to the qualitj, and fiiialh leaches quantiti So m iiiathomatics the ciicle, ellijiso and jiaiabola aie specificallv difloiout, and jet the disluulioii of one cune irom auothei is meielj' quaiititatu e, henig leduced to a mere quantitative clifteieiue iii the hugeness of then co- efficients In piopeity the (|uantitati\e aspect, tihicli issues fiom the quahtatnc, is lalue The qualitatne deteimines the quantum, howeiei, and is theudoK' quite as much lotamed as supeisoded When we (ousidei the concejitiou of value, the object is legaided oulj as a sign, counting not foi what it is but toi what it is woith A letter ot ciedit, e 3, is not a kind of jiapei, but a sign ot anothci uuiveisal, namely, its lace lalue The sjn’cifie value of an object vanes.iccoidiiig to the want, but 111 ordei to evpicss abstiact woitli, wo use inonoj' Money lepresents things, but since it does not lepiesent want itself, but is only a sign ot it, it is again governed by the specific value, which it meiely stands for One can be owner of an object without being master of its value A familj, which can neithei sell noi pawn its goods, is not mastei of then value But since the restiictions characteiizing this foim of property, such as fiefs, jnopeitj’^ conveyed in tiust, etc, are not adequate to the coucejdion of it, they aie laigclj disappeaimg 64. The form of the object and the mark are themselves puopmtii.
69 e\teiual ciiciimstdnees, rtcpiivcd of meaning and worth if taken apait from nse, employment, or some sncli manifes- tation of the subiective will The picscnce of the will, howevei, is iii time, and its obiective leality is continuance ot the siib]ecti\e inaiiifestation If the manifestation lapses, the object, aliaiidoiied by the leal essence of the will and of iiossession, becomes owiieilcss Hence I may lose 01 acqniie inopeiU thiongli jncsciijition Note — Piesciiption does not luu couutei to stiict, light and IS not intiodmed into law meiely to cut shoit the stiifc and confusion, which would natinally arise out of old claims It is lounded on tlie leality of piopeity, in othei wolds ujiou the net essitv that the will, in older to keep a thing, must manifest itself in it — Public monuments aie piopeiti of the nation, oi lathor they, like all woiks of art intended foi use, tiio hung and self-siifhcient ends because of then mdwelliiig soul of lememhiance and lioiiom Depiived ot this soul they aie, so fai as the nation is eonceiiied, without a uiastei, and become casually a pill ate possession, as has happened with the Grieck and Egyptian ivoiks of ait in Tiiikei — The jniiate light of an autlioi’s fainily to his woiks is jnesciibed foi similar leasoiis Those woiks become in a sense inasteiless, since they, like theiuoiiuiiients, though in an opposite way, become first eoininon piopeity, and then tliiongh various channels, private piopeitv To set apait land foi a cemeteiy and then not use it, oi to set apait land nevci to be used, con- tams an empty unreal caprice As to traverse this action does no injury, resjiect foi it cannot be guaranteed Addition — Presciiption lests upon the supposition that I have ceased to look upon the object as mine If a thing IS to lemain mine, thcie must be a continuous act of will, and tins act reveals itself through use oi pi esei ration — The decline in the value of public monuments was fre- quently illustiated diuiiig the Eefoiination in institutions founded for the saying of masses The spirit of the old 70 'jiii: PHILOSOPHY oi moni confession and theiefoie of these buildings had fled, and the buildings could be taten as piivate properlv C Relinquishment of Propeity 65 I may lelinqui&h pioperti, since it is mine onlv bi virtue of iny Lai mg put my mil mlo it I mav let a thing go uuoivned b) me oi jiass it oi ei to the ivill and possession of anothei, but this is possible oiilv so fai as the obieit is in its natiiio something external Addition — Piesciiptiou is lelincpiishmont without duett deelaiation of will Tiuc lelinquishmcnt is a cledaiation that I mil no longei legaid the objert as mine The process m all its jihases niai be tahen to be a tine talcing of possession Fust thoie is the duett pieheusion, then hv use propel ty is thoioughlr atqiiiied, and the thud steji is the unit\ of both these elenieuts, possession thiough le- linquishment 66 Some goods, oi latliei substiuilivc phases of life are inalienable, and the light to them does not peiish thiough lapse of tune These tompiise in\ inuei peisoualiti and the univeisal essence of nil const lousuess of mi self, and are peisonality m geneial, fieedoin of mil in the broadest sense, social life and lehgioii Note — What the spiiit is in conception, or implicitly, it should also be in actuality, it slioiilil bo a peison, that is to sa}, be able to 2 iossess jirojieiti, haie sociably and reli- gion This idea is itselt the conception of sjiuit As causn sui, or free cause, it is that, ciijiis natura non potest connpi nisi existens (Spinoza, “ Etli ” Def 1) In this very conception, nainelv, that spiiit shall be what it is only through itself and by the infinite letum into itself out of its natural and direct reality, lies the possibility of opposi- tion between what it is onlv imjilicitlv (§ 57), and what it IS only exphcitly In the wiU this ojqiosition is the jiossi- bility of evil, but in general it is the possibility of the PROPER I Y.
71 PROPER I Y.
71 alienation of personality and substantive being, and this alienation may occui eitlioi unconsciously or intentionally — Examples of the disposal of pei sonality are slaveiy, vas- salage, inability to own piopeity oi lack of complete control ovei it Relinquishment of leason, sociality, morality or religion occui s in supeistition, it occurs also if I delegate to otheis the authority to piesciibe for me what kind of acts I shall commit, as when one sells himself for robbery, murdei, oi the possibility of auv othei crime, it occurs when I permit otheis to deteimme what foi me shall be dut}"- 01 religious ti uth The light to nothing that is inalienable can be foifeited thiough lapse of time The ait by which I take possession of my peisoiiality and leal being, and establish myself as having lights, responsibilities and moial and lehgious obli- gations, depiives these attiibutcs of that externality, which alone gii es them the capacity of being possessed by another Along with thedupaituie of this oxteinality goes the lefer- ence to time oi to anv pievious consent oi complaisance This rotuin of myself into mjsclf, being the piocess by which I establish myself as idea or complete legal and moral poison, docs away with the old i elation It lemoves the violence which I and otheis had done to my own con- ception and leasou, the wiong of haiingtieated the infinite existence of solf-consciousness as something meiely ex- traneous, and of having suffcied otheis to do the same This retuiii into myself levc.ils the contiadiction implied in my having given into the keeping of others my light, morality oi religion I gave them what I did not myself 2>ossess, what, so soon as I do possess it, exists in essence only as mine, and not as something external Addition — It lies in thenature of the matter that the slave has an absolute right to make himself free, or that, when anyone has lined out his moiahtv for robbery and muider, the transaction is absolutely void. Anyone possesses the competency to annul such an agreement It is the same 72 UIIE PHILOSOPHY OF RIOIII