Addition — No penalty is attached to mere unpiemedi- tated or unintentional wrong, since in it I have willed nothing against right But to fraud penalties are due, since right is violated.
C Violence and Crime 90 Since in property my will is embodied in an external thing, it follows that just as far as my will is reflected in that object, I can be attacked in it and placed uudei external compulsion. Hence my will may be enforced WRONG 91 Violence is done to it, when foice is employed m order to obtain some possession oi obiect of desire Addition — In ciime, which is wrong in its proper sense, neither right in geneial noi m 3 ' peisonal light is respected Both the objective and the subjective aspects of light are set at defiance bj’ ciime 91 As a living cieature a man maj' be comjielled to do a thing, his jihysieal and othei external jiowers may be brought under the foice of anothci But the fiee will cannot be absolutely compelled f§ 5), but only 111 so far as it does not withdiaw (§ 7) out of the external, to which it IS held last, 01 out of the imaginative lepioduction of the external It can only be compelled when it allows itself to be compelled 92 Since it is onli lu so fai as the will has visible existence that it is the idea and so leally fiee, and its reali'zed existence is the embodiment of fieedom, force or violence destiovs itself foithwith in its veij' conception It 18 a manifestation of will which cancels and supersedes a manifestation or visible expression of will Ppice or violence, therefoie, is, accoiding to this abstiact tieatuient of it, devoid of 1 ight 93 Since it in its leiv conception destioi’s itself, its principle is that it must be cancelled by violence Hence it is not onlv light but necessaiy that a second exeicise of foice should annul and supeisede the fiist Note — Violation of a contiact thiough failuie to carry out the agieemeut, 01 violation of the legal duties toward the family or the state, through action or neglect, is the first violence It is an exeicise of force, if I retain another’s piopeitj', or neglect to do some duty Force exercised by a teacher upon a pnpil, or by any one against incivility and rudeness, seems to be the first act of violence, not caused by any previous disjilay of force But tlie ineieh' natuial will is of itself a ■violence to the universal idea of freedom, and against the inroads of the 92 THE PHILOSOPHY OF HlfrllJ'.
uncivilized uill the idea of fiecdoiii ought to he piotected and made good Either there must he assumed ■within the family oi state a moial and social atiuospheie, against ■which a cnide naturalness is an act of violence, or else theie is at fiist eveiywheie 2 ucsoiit a iiatuial condition or state of violence, over which the idea has the right of masteiy Acldifion — In the state theie can be heroes no inoie They ajipeai only in uncivilized communities The aim of the heio is light, nccessaiy and in Icee^img with the state, but he earned it out, as if it was his own jnivate affair The heioes, who founded states, and intioduccd niaiiiage and husbandry, did not in this icah/e a lecogni/ed light These acts issue incielyfioin then jiaiticiilai wills Yet as they iinjily the liighei light of the idea against a niciely natural state of things, then iioleute is lawful Little can be eftected against the foice of natuie meiely by goodness 94 Abstract light is a light to use foico A wioiig done to this light is a foice ei-orciscd against my libeity realized in an exteinal thing The jncseivatioii of my realized fieodom agamst foice must be itself an external act, and theiefoie a second foice, which lemoves the first and tabes its place Note — To define stiict abstract light as the light to use compulsion is to ajijirehend it as a result, which enters first of all by the roundabout way of wiong Addition — Heie may well be observed the difference between right and morality In morality or the sphere in which I turn back into myself there are also two sides, for in it goodness is for me an end, and in accordance with this idea I must direct my life Goodness is embodied in my resolution, and I realize it in myself Yet this resolu' tion IS wholly internal, and, as a consequence, is not sub- lect to coercion. The civil laws do not seek to stietch their control over the disposition. In morality I am inde- WHONG 93 pendent, and the application of external force has no meaning 95 A first Tiolenee, exercised by a free man, and doing injury to the concrete embodiment of freedom, namely right as light, is ciime Ciime is the negative-infinite judgment in its complete sense It negates not only the partitulai object of niy will, but also the universal or infinite, which is involved in the jiredicate ‘ mine,’ the very capacity foi possessing lights, nor does it even utilize my opinion, as in fiaud (§ 88) Heie we are in the realm of criminal law Note — The light, to iiijuie ■nliicli constitutes crime, has indeed so fai oulj' the features we have pointed out, and crime has a meaning deteimined in each case by these special featuies But the substance of these forms of right IS the universal which leinams the same in all its subsequent developments and modifications So also ciime lemains the same in accoidance with its conception Hence the phase, noticed in the next paiagiaph, refeis to particulai and definite contents, as, ey, perjuiy, tieason, counteifeiting, foigeiy, etc 96 The actuahzed will, which alone is subject to injury, has, of course, a conciete existence, and varies, therefore, both in quahty aud m quantity This variation gives rise to differences in the objective side of crime, which may in- jure only one side oi phase of the will, or again, its whole concrete chaiactei and range, as in muider, slaveiy, and religious persecution Note — The Stoic theory that there is but one virtue and one vice, the Draconian statutes, which punished every enme with death, and the baibarity of the formal code of hoiioui, which found in eveiy injury an unpardonable insult, all in common cling to the abstract view of the free will and peisonality, and lefuse to take them m that con- crete and defimte lealization which they must have, if they are to realize the idea — Eobbeiy and theft diffei in quality.
94 JIIi: PHILOSOPHY OF HIGIIT because in lobbery poisonal violence is done to me as an actually pieseut consciousness and as tins self-determined subject — Many quabtative phases of ci line, as, for instance, au act done af'aiust public safety, aie deterniinod by defi- nite social relations, and may be deduced fioni the concep- tion, although they aie often made in a loundabout -vray to depend upon consequences A crime against public peace IS of itself in its own diiect composition heavier or lighter according to its extent and quality The subjective moral quality retelling to the higher distinction, as to how fai the act is done consciously, will be dealt with later Addition — Thought itself lannot determine how eveiy single Clime is to be punished In many cases the positive features of the act must be consideicd By the progicss of civibzation the estimate of ciiinc becomes niildei, to-day the crimiual being punished less scveiely than he vas a hundred years ago It is not exactly that the ciiine or the iiuiiishnieiit has become difterent but the i elation between the two 97 An injuiy done to light as light is a jiositive external fact, yet it is a nullity This nullity is exposed in the actual negation of the injury and in the realization of light Eight necessaiily bungs itself to jiass by cancelling the in- jury and assuming its place Addition. — By crime something is alteicd, and exists as so altered But this existence is the opposite of itself, aud so far null Nullity consists in the usurpation of the place of right But right, as absolute, is precisely what refuses to be set aside Hence it is the manifestation of the crime which IS intrinsically nuE, and this nullity is the essential result of all crime But what is null must manifest itself as such, and make itself known as that which violates itself The criminal act is not the piimary and positive, to which punishment comes as the negative It is the nega- tive, and punishment is only the negation of a negation WRONG 95 Actual right destroys and replaces injury, thus showing its validity and verifying itself as a necessary factor in reality.
98 Injury, confined merely to external reality or posses- sion of some kind, is detriment or damage to property or wealth The cancellation of the injury or damage takes, when possible, the form of civic satisfaction or compensation Note — When damage consists in the destruction of some- thing which cannot be lestored, compensation must take the form not of a particular object but of the universal quality, namely, value 99 The injury which befalls the intiinsic or general will, the will, that is, of the injurei, the mjured and all otlieis, has just as httle jiositive existence in this general will as in the bare external lesult The general will, % e. right or law, is self-complete, has no e-xternal existence at all, and is inviolable Injury is merely negative also for the particulai wills of the injured and others It exists positively, on the other hand, only as the particular will of the ciiminal, and to injure this will m its concrete exist- ence IS to supeisedc the crime, which would otherwise be positively established, and to restore right Note — The theory of punishment is one of the matters, which in the modern positive science of right has fared worst The attempt is made to base this theory upon the understanding, and not, as should be done, upon the con- ception If crime and its removal, or, more definitely, punishment, are regarded merely as evil, it might indeed be thought unreasonable to will a second evil merely because one already existed, (Klein, “ Grunds. des pemhchen Rechts,” § 9 fol ) In the different theories of punishment, that it is preventive, deterrent, reformatoiy, etc, this superficial notion is taken to be fundamental. In the same superficial way the result of punishment is set down as a good. But here we are not deahng with an 96 mi: PHILOSOPHY of righi evil, and this oi that good, hut with wiong and justice lu these supeihual theoiies the consideration of justice is set aside, and the inoialasjiect, the sulijeetive side of crime, is made the essential Also with the moral view aie mingled trivial jisvchological notions about temptation, and the strength of sensual impulses opposing reason, about psi- chological compulsion also, and the mfliientes iiftecting tin- imagination, it being foi gotten that the subjective niaj freely abase itself to something contingent and iiuieal The tieatiiieiit of punishment in its chaiactei as a jilieno- menon, of its relation to the particular cousciousiiess, ot tin- effect of thieats upon the imagination, and of the possi- bility of lefoiin IS of gieat imiioitance in its piojiei jilace when the method of puiiishiiient is to be decided on But such treatment must assume that pnuisliiiieiit is abso- lutely just Hence eveii thing turns on the point that in crime it is not the production ot evil but the injuiv ot light as right, which must be sot aside and oM-icoino We must ask what that is in ciime, whose c-\istence has to be removed That is the only eiil to be set aside, and tin- essential thing IS to doteiiiiiue wherein that c-m1 lies So long as conceptions aie not clear on this point, coiiiusioii must leign in the tlieoiy of punishment Addition — Feuerbach, in Ins theory of punishment, considers punishment as a menace, and thinks that it am one disregards the threat aud commits a crime, the punish- ment must follow, since it was already know'ii to the criminal But is it right to make threats A threat assumes that a man is not free, and will compel him b} vividly presenting a possible evil Eight and justice, how- ever, must have their seat in freedom and in the will, and not in the restriction implied in menace. In this view of punishment it is much the same as when one raises a cane against a dog, a man is not treated in accordance with his dignity and honour, but as a dog A menace may incite a man to rebellion in order that he may demonstrate his free- WROXG 97 dom, and llieiefoie sots justice wholly aside Psychological compulsion may refer to distinctions of quality or quantity in cnnic, but not to the veiy natnre of ciinie Books of law, wiitten in accordance with the principle that punish- ment IS a till eat, lack their pi opei basis 100 The injuiy which the criminal experiences is in- heientlj' just because it expresses his own inherent will, is a visible juoof of his fieedom and is his right Bnt more than that, the injuiy is a right of the crimmal himself, and IS implied ill his lealized will or act In his act, the act of a rational being, is involved a universal element, which by the act IS set up as a law This law he has recognized m his act, and has consented to bo placed under it as under hia right Note — Beccaiia, as is well known, has denied to the state the right of exacting the death penalty, on the ground that the social oontiact cannot be supposed to contain the consent of the indindual to his own death, rather, as he thought, must the opposite be assumed To this it must be replied that the state is not a contract (§ 76), nor, more- ovei, aic the protection and secuiity of the life and pro- perty of ludniduala in their capacity as sepaiate persons, the unconditioned object of the state’s existence On the contrary, the state is the higher existence, which lays claim to the life and property of the individual, and demands the sacrifice of them Not only has the conception of crime, the reasonable essence of it, to be upheld by the state, with or without the consent of the individual, but rationality 6n its formal side, the side of the individual will, is contained in the act of the criminal The criminal is hononred as reasonable, because the punishment is regaided as containing his own right The hononr would not be shared by him, if the conception and measure of his pumshment were not de- duced fiom his very act Just as little is he honoured when he is regarded as a hurtful animal, which must be H 98 lUi: PHILOSOPHY OF lUiHir made harmless, or as one who must bo terrified or re- formed — Moreover, punishment is not the only embodi- ment of justice in the state, nor is the state merely the condition oi possibility of justice Addition — The desire of Bectaiia that men should con- sent to their own punishment is leasonable, but the criminal has already yielded consent through his act It is both iii the natuie of ciime and in the ciimmcil’s own will, that the injury caused by him should be supoi seded In spite ol this Beecana’s eftorts to abohsh capital punishment have had good results Although ncithei Joseph II nor the French have ever been able to obtain complete abolition of the death-penalty, still we have begun to see what dimes deserve death and what do not Capital punishment has thus become less fiequent, as indeed should be the lase with the exticme penalty of the law 101 The doing away with crmie is retribution, in so fai as retribution is in its conception lujuiy of an injury, im- plying that as crime has a definite qualitative and quanti- tative context, its negation should be siinilaily definite This identity, involved in the very nature of the case, is not literal equality, but equality in the inherent nature of the injury, namely, its value Note. — If we were to deduce our definition of punish- ment, as science usually does, from accepted opinions as to the psychological experiences of consciousness, we could prove that in nations and individuals there is and has been a universal feehng that crime deserves punishment, and that it should be done to the criminal according to his act Yet the sciences, which have drawn their decisions from universal opinion, the very next moment adopt conclu- sions at variance with their so-called universal facts of consciousness.
The category of equality has introduced much difBculty into the general notion of retnbution The view that it is just to mete out punishment in proportion to the special WRONG.
99 context of the ciinie, of com sc aiises later than the essen- tial iclation of punishment to crime Although, in oidei to make this essential relation specific, we must look about for other pi maples than meicly the general principle of punishment, yet this geiieial pimciple remains as it is And. more, the conception itself must contain the basis for sjiecial applications of it The conception, made thus s]iecifaL, imjilies of necessity the judgment that (nine, as the pioduct of a negative will, carries with it its own negation oi punishment This inner identity IS icpioduced by the understanding in the sphere of actual reality as equality The quantitative and quali- tative content of cimic and its icmoval belongs to the ex- ternal legion, in which no absolute rule can be laid down (conipaie § 49) In the region of the finite this rule of equahty is only a demand which, as it is important to note, the understanding must more and more hold in check However it goes on ad infinitum, and permits only of a continual approximation If we fail to observe the nature of the finite, and clmg to absolute equality in matters of detail, there arises first of all the insuperable difficulty of fixing the kind of punish- ment To do this satisfactorily psychology would have to reckon with the magnitude of the sensual motives, and also with whatever accompanies them as,e g,the greater strength of the evil will, or the weakness of the will, or its limited fieedom But that is not the sole difficulty To adhere obstinately to the equalization of pumshment and crime in every case would reduce retribution to an absurdity It would be necessary to institute a theft m return for theft, robbery for lobbery, and to demand an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, although the crimmal, as we can easily fancy, might have only one eye or be toothless. For these absurdities, however, the conception is not responsible They are due to the attempt to equate crime and punish- ment throughout their minute details Value, as the inner THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGIir identity of things siiecifically cliftcioiii, has alioady been made use of in connection with contiact, and oecuis again in the civil iirosccution of oiime (§ 95) By it the imagi- nation is tiansfeiredfioni the diiettattiihutos of the objecl to its universal natiiie Since the essential Lliaiactei oi Clime lies in its infinitude, t e, in the bioacli of it-j onn right, meie external details xanish Equality becomes only a geneial lule foi deteimining the csseiilial, nameh a man’s real desert, not foi deciding the spoci.il external penalty Only when we limit oui selves to eqiiahtx in the external details aie theft and lobbei}' unequal to fine and imprisonment But from the standpoint of then i alue and then geneial capacity to be inpiiies, tliev can be equated To approach as neailj' as possible to this 0 (]uality in value IS, as has been lemaiked, the task of the undei standing If we ignoie the lelation of cimie to its cancellation, and neglect the idea of value, and the possibilit} of (oiiijiaiiin; these two in teiins of their value, we can seo iii punishment nothing moie than the aibitraiy altachiiieiit of an evil to an act not permitted (Klein, ‘ Gi uiids des iieiiilicheu Eechts,” § 9) Addition — Eetribiition is the inner counection and iden- tity of two things whicli m outwaicl appeal aiice and in external leality are different Eequital seems to be some- thing foieign, and not ot light to belong to the ciiiiiinal But punishment is only the manifestation of ciime, the other half which is necessarily jiiesujiposod in the fiist Eetnbution looks like something immoral, like revenge, and may therefore seem to be something peisonal But it IS the conception, not the personal element, vliich cairies out retribution Eevenge is mme, says God m the Bible, and, when some find in the word re-tiibution the idea of a special pleasure for the subjective will, it must be leplied that it signifies only the turning back of ciime against itself The Euinenides sleep, but crime wakes them So it is the cnmmal's own deed which judges itself Although WROXG inreq^iiital we cannot ventuie upon equality of details, the case IS difteient with ninidei, to which death is necessarily due Life is the total contevt of one’s existence, and can- not bo nieasuiecl by value Its punishment, theiefove, I annot be measiiiod bv value, but must consist in the taking of anothei life 102 In the spheie of cliiect right the suppression ot I lime takes, iii the fiist instance, the form of revenge Tins in its content is pist, so fai as it is letribution, but in its toini it IS the ac t of <i subiective will, which may put into any in]uiy an infinite or unjiaidonable wiong Hence its lustico IS a matter of accident, and lor others means only ])iiiate satisfaction As levenge is only the positive act of a paitieulai will, it is a new in^uiy Through this contia- dictioii it becomes an iiitiuite i>iocess, the insult being mheiited without end tiom geneiation to generation yo/e — Wlieiever enuie is punished not as crnnina pvb- huf but as piiicifu, it still has attached to it a remnant of leieuge This is the state of affaiis with the Jews, with the Romans in thctt and lobbery, and with the Eughsh m some special instances Diffeimg tioin private revenge is the eceicise of leveiige by hcioes, adventurous knights, and others, all of whom apjiear when the state is in its infancy Addition — 111 tliat condition of society wheie theie aie no judges and no laws, piiiiishnieut always takes the foim of icvcuge Tins is defective, as it is the act of a subjective will, and has an inadequate content Judges are persons, it IS tiue, but they will the universal meanmg of the law, and insert into punishment nothing which is not found in the natuie of the act But the lujuied xierson, on the other hand, may view the wrong act not in its necessary limits of quality and quantity, but simply as a wrong, and may in lequital do what would lead to a new wrong Amongst unciiilized peoples icweiige is undying, as with the Arabs, amongst whom it can be suppressed only by a superior llic PHILOSOPHY Ol' RIGHT force or by uiipossibilitv lu several of oui present i emu- lations a trace of levenme survives, as when it is at the option of individuals to bimg an injuiy to trial at couit 103 That the contiadiction involved in this way ot abolibhuiE' ciime, and the couti adictious found in other cases of wrong (§§ 86, 89), should be solved, is a demand made by ajustice which is freed at once from all subioctiie interests and limits and from the arbitiaiiiiess of power Justice, therefore, does not revenge but 2 iunishcs Here we have in the first instance the demand of a will, which, while particular and subjective, wills the imivei'al as such But the conception of morality is not simply demanded, but is in the process eieated Tiansition from Bight to Moiahty 104 Clime and levengmg justice lepiesent the visible outer form of the development of the will as occuirmg first of all, in the distinction between the iiiineisal will and the individual will, which exists indei)eiiJently iii opposition to the uniiersal Next, bv using above the opposition, the universal will is turned back into itself and has become an mdependent reality Thus right, when mamtained against the mdependent piivate will, has validity, being realized through its own necessity This result is also aiiived at bv the develojniient of the conception of will on the side of its innei chaiacter The actualization of the will according to its conception pro- ceeds in this way Its first foim is the abstract and simjile phase it assumes m abstract right This first form m ust be in the next place set aside and passed be- yond (§ 21) in order that the will may become involved 111 the opposition of the abstract universal will and the independent particular will Then by the remov al of this opposition, 1 e, by the negation of a negation, it becomes an actuahzed will, free not only abstractly and potentially, WRO^(; but actually, ab is uecessaiy m a negativity which is able to refer itself to itself Wheieas in abstiaut right the will was itself mere personality, it now has its pcisonahty as its object The subjectivity which is its own object is infinite, and freedom in its infinite subjectivity constitutes the piiiieiple of moiality Note — Let us foi the sake of a closer inspection turn back to the elements, thiough which the conception of fieedoin pi ogi esses from the iiist abstiact phase of the will to that phase, in ivliich it lefeis itself to itself, the phase of the self- determining subject Thus pioperty being an citernal object, wo have in it the phase of the abstract “ mine, ” in exchange we have the common “ mine,” the ‘ mine ” hionght into cxiatenee by two wills, in wrong the will which belongs to the province of right, the will m its abstract, direct, and intrinsic existence, is made contingent bj means of the paiticulai will which is itself contingent. In moiality this whole jiliase of will is so far transcended that its eonlmgoncy is turned hack into itself and made one with itself, and thus becomes a self -lef erring, infinite ( ontingcney of the will, or in a woid subjectivity Addition. — To truth it belongs that the conception should exist, and that its loahty should correspond to the concejition In nght the will exists in an external object But as it must have its existence in itself, in au internal thing, it must become its own object, it must pass into subjectivity and have itself over against itself This rela- tion to itself 13 a&rmative, a relation brought about by the will only through the transcendence of its direct existence When its first-hand existence is transcended in crime, the way is ojien, through punishment, the nega- tion of a negation, to affirmation, that is, to morality SECOND PART.
MORALITY.
lOS. The moral standpoint is the standpoint of the irill not m its abstract or imj)hcit existence, hut in its existence for itself, an existence which is infinite (§ 104) Thi', turning back of the will upon itself, or its actual selt- identity, with its associated phases stands in contiast to its abstract implicit existence, and converts peisoii into subject 106. Subjectivity is the conception made definite, dif- fering therefore from the abstiact, general will Further, the will of the subject, though it still letains traces of self- involved simplicity, IS the will of an individual, who is an object for himself Hence subjectivity is the lealiratioii of the conception — This gives fieedom a highci gioiiiul Now at last theie appeals in the idea the side of its le.al existence, the subjectivity of the will It is onlv in the will as subjective that freedom, oi the potontiulh existing will, can be actualized Note — Morality, the second spheie, gives an outline ot the real side of the conception of freedom Obseive the process through which morality passes As the will has now withdrawn into itself, it appears at the outset as existing independently, having meiely a potential identity with the intrinsic or universal will Then this abstract self-dependence is supeiseded, and, finally, the will I's made reaUy and consciously identical with the intrinsic or MORALirY.
iimvcisal ■vvill Now in tins movement, as I have said, is illustiated the conception of fieedoni Fieedom or snh- lectivity is at fiist ahstiact and distinct from the concep- tion of it Then by moans of this movement the sonl of trecdom is so woiked up, that foi the conception, and nocessaiily also foi the idea, it icceives its true reabza- tioii The piocess ends, theiefoie, when the subjective will lias become an objective and tiuly concrete will Addition — In ii^;ht, taken stiictlj', nothing depends upon my purpose or intention The question of the self- deteiiniiiation, impulse, or puipose ol the will arises for the first time in morality Since a man is to be judged .iceoiding to the diiection he has given himself, he is in this act fieo, let the exteinal features of the act be what they may As no one can successfully assail a man’s inner conviction, and no foicc can leach it, the moral will IS inaccessible A man’s woith is estimated by his inner act Hence the moral standpoint imjilies the realization of fieedom 107 As self-cletcimination ot will is at the same time a iactor of the will's conception, subjectivity is not merely the oiitwaid leality of will, but its inner being (§ 104) This fico and independent will, hiiviiig now become the will of a subject, and assuming in the first instance the toim of the conception, has itself a visible realization, otherwise it could not attain to the idea The moral standpoint is in its lealizcd foi in the light of the subjec- tive will. In accordance with this right the will recog- nizes and IS a thing, only in so far as the thing is the will’s own, and the will in it is itself and subjective.
Note — The process of the moral standpoint (Note to precedmg paiagiaph) also appears as the development of the right of the subjective will, or of the way in which the subjective will is lealized Thus the will accounts what in its object it recognizes to be its own as its true conception, its objective or universal reality'.
llli: PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT Addition — Subjectivity of will, as a complete phase, is m its turn a whole which, by its very natuie, must also have objectivity Freedom can at first lealiiie itself oiil\ in the subject, as it is the true material foi this lealiza- tion But this concrete maiiifestatiou of will, which we have called subjectivity, is different fiom absolute will From this new one-sideduess of subjectivity iniist the will free itself, in order that it may become absolute will In morality the interest pecuhai to man is in question, and the high value of this mteicst consists in man’s knowing himself to be absolute, and determining himself Un- civilized man is controlled by the forces and occuiieucc'- of nature Children have no moral will, but are guided bv their parents Civilized man is determined trom within, and wills that ho shall be in all he does 108 The subjective will, in so far as it is dnectly its own object and distinct trom the general will C§ 106 Tiote), IS abstiact, limited, and foinial Subjectivity, how- ever, IS not formal meioly, but, since it is the infinite sell- direction of the will, IS the will itself taken formally Since this formal charactei, as it ajqieais fiist ol all in the particular will, is not as yet identical with the conception of will, the moral standpoint is the standjioiiit of relation of obligation or requirement — Since, too, subjectivitv in- volves difference, that is to sav, opjiosition to objectivity as to a mere external existence, there arises here also the standpoint of consciousness (§ 8), the standpoint of dif- ference in general, of the finite and phenomenal jihase oi the will Note — The moral is not at once opposed to the immoral, just as right is not directly opposed to wrong The geneial standpoint of both the moral and the immoral depends upon the subjectivity of the will Addition — In morahty self-determination is to be con- strued as a restless activity, which cannot be satisfied with anything that is Only m the region of estabhshed ethical MORALITY 2 iiiiici 2 )les ih the will identical nitli the concc 2 itioii of it, and has onh this conce 2 itioii for its content In morality the will is as yet lolated to what is 2 '>otential Tins is the &tand 2 ioiut of difference, and the piocess of this stand- 2 ) 0 iut IS the identification of the snb 2 ective will with the conce 2 ition ot will Th(‘ inqieiatue or ought, which, theieioie, still is in moiahty, is fulfilled only in the ethical spheie This S 2 iheie, to which the subjective will is lelated, has a twofold iiatiiie It is the substance of the ( onco 2 ition and also cxteinal leality If the good were established in the subjective ivill, it would not yet be leahzed 100 Tlie foimal will, by its own detennimng character, ( outaiiis at the outset the o 2 >i)o&itiou of subjectivity and objeclnih, and the ajijiropriate activity (§ 8) Of this will ue have these tuithei jihascs Concrete realization and detciiniuate chaiactei aie in the conception identical The conception of the subjective mil is fiist to make these two phases sepaiate and independent, and then to estab- lish them as idoutiial Deteiiniiiatc character m the self-detei milled mil (a) is bi ought about lu itself by itself, the ojijiositiou wliiili it cieates within itself being a self -best owed content This is the fiist negation, whose foiinal liiiiit consists m its being fixed as merely subjec- tive (i3) Since the will letuins into itself and is mfinite, this limit exists foi it, and it wills to tiansccnd the limita- tion Hence it stiives to coincrt its content out of sub- jectivity into objectivity, i e, some kind of directly given reality (y) The simple identity of the will with itself in this ojipositiou is the content, which maintains itself amid these oppositions, and is indiSereat to formal distinctions This content is the purjiose or end 110 As at the moral standpoint, fieedomor self -identity' of will IS for the will (§ 105), the simple identity of the content oi end receives a further chaiacteristic pecuhor to itself 'HIE PHILOSOPHY OF RIOIIl.
(a) This content becomes mine in such a, way that it m its identity IS not only my innei end, but also, so fai as it 18 externally lealized, contains foi me my subjectivity Addition — The content of the subjectno oi moral will has a special character Althoiisfh it has attained the form of objectivity, it is yet always to contain my sub- jectivity. An act shall be counted mine only so fai as it is on its inner side issued by me, and was my own piopositioii and intention I do not recognize as mine aii} thing in the outward act except what lay lu my subjective will, and m the outer act I desire to sec my subjective consciousness repeated 111 (6) The content, though it contains something particulai, from wliatevei souice it come"-, is cet the con- tent of a self-iefeiiing will, winch is also selt-iJmitK al and universal Thus it has these two teatnies (u) It aims to be m itself adequate to the univeisal will, oi to have thu objectivity of the conception, (/3) yet, since the subjectiie will exists for itself, and is tlioieloio iiidepondent and formal (§ 108), its aim is only an ought and is jiossibly not adequate to the concejition