112 (c) Though I pie->eive my subjectivity in acioin- plishing my ends (§ 110), jet in the objectification ot these ends I jiass beyond the simjile and elemciitaiy sub- jectivity which IS ineielj' my own This new exteiiial subjectivity, which is identical with me, is the will ot others (§ 73) The splieio foi the oMsteuco of the will is subjectivity (§ 106), and the will of others is the existence, which, though other than I, I yet give to my puipose Hence the accomplishment of my puipose contains the identity of my will and that of otheis, and has to the will of others a relation which is positive Note — The objectivity of the realized end has three senses, oi rather contains in nnion the three following phases (a) It is external direct leality (§ 109) (^1) It is adequate to the conception (§ 112). (y) It is universal MOHALFli subjectivitj- The subjectivity which pieseives itself m this objectivity implies (o) that the objective end shall be iny own, so that in it I juescive myself as a jiaiticulai individual (§ 110) The two jihases (/3) and (y) of sub- jectivity coucui with the phases Q3) and (y) of objectivity At the inoial standpoint these various phases are dis- tinguished or joined iiioiely in a contradiction This is the supeifieial and finite natiiie of the iiioial spheie (§ 108) The development of the standjioiut consists m the de- velopment of these contiadictions and their solution, an achievement which at the jirescnt point of view is incomplete oi ineicly icUtiie Addiiioii — It was said that foimal light contained only jiiohibitions, and that fioui the stiict standpoint of legal light an act had only a negative lefi'rence to the will of otlieis 111 moials, on the contiaiv, the lelation of my wiU to that of otheis is posiiii e, that, which the sulijective will lealives, contains the uuiveisal will In this is piesent the juodnctioii 01 alteiation of some visible reality, and this has a beaiing upon the will of otheis The conception of nioiahty is the iiitoiiial leLxtion of the will to itself But tlicie IS hole inoie than one will, since the objectification of the will implies the tianscendencc of the onesidedness of the sejiaiate will, and the substitution of two wills havmg a positive lelatiou one to the othei In right my will is leahzed in propeity, and theie is no loom foi any leference of the will of otheis to my wiU But morality tieats of the well-being of otheis also At this point this positive relation to others first makes its appearance 113 The expression of the subjective or moral will is action Of action it may be said that (a) I know its external fulfillment to be mme, (jd) it is essentially related to the conception m its phase as the ought or imperative, and (y) it IS essentially connected with the will of others Note — Firstly, the expression of the moial will is action The embodiment achieved by the will in foimal right is a iiii: I’liiLosoniv of rk.iu mere obicct Tins loalination is iliicct, auil has m the fiist instance no tiLlual exjuess lefcieneo to the coneeptiou Not liavins; as yet come into conflict with the subjectii e will, the conception is not yet distinguished fiom it, find has no positive leliition to the will of otheis The eominands of right arc, hence, fundamentally piohibitions (§ 38) In contract and W'rong, indeed, tlicie begins to be seen a lela- tion to the will of otheis, but the agieeineiit, found at this point, IS based upon arbitral v choice, ■while the essential leference to the will of otheis is in light mciely the nega- tive proposal to keep my piopcity oi the woith of it, and to let otheis keep theirs Cnmt' does m a way issue fioin the subjective will But the content of a ciiiiie is fixed by written instructions and is not diiectly nnjnitahle to me Hence as the legal act contains only some elements of a dis- tinctively moial act, the two kinds of ai turn aie dillcient 114 The right ot the moral will has throe factors (a) The alistract or formal light The act, as dnectli realized, is to be in its essential content mine, and embody the purpose of the subjective will (&) The sjiecific side of an act oi its inner coutent (a) This IS intention, which is for me, whose general cha- racter is fixed, the value and lunci substance of the act, (/3) and well-being, or the content taken as the jiarticulai end of my particular, subjective reality (c) The good, or the content taken as univeisal and exalted to universality and absolute objectivity This is the absolute end of the will As this is the sphere ot reflection, we have the opposition of the universality, which IS subjective, and hence involves in one aspect evil, and in another conscience.
Addition — An act, to be moral, must in the first instance accord with my purpose, since the right of the moral will 18 to recognize as its realization nothing which is not found internally in the purpose. Purpose concerns the formal princnple that the externalized ■wdl must also be internal PURPOSE AND RC.SPOK.SIBIL1TT to me In the no\t place "we ash after the intention, that IS, the value of the act relatively to me The third factor is not merely the relative, but the umvei sal value of the act, the good In the fiist phase of an act there is a bleach between purpose and realization, in the second between what is given externally as universal will, aaid the l)articular internal charactei, winch I give it, the third and last phase is the claim of my intention to be the universal content The good is the intention exalted to the conception of the will FIRST SECTION Purpose and Responsibilitt 115 111 the diiect or immediate act the subjective will IS finite, since it has to do with both an external object and its varied surroundings, all piesupposed An accomphshed act makes a change in this ready-to-hand matenal, and the will IS responsible, m so far as the changed material can be said to be mine Note — An event or resultant condition is a concrete external reality, having an indefinite number of circum- stances associated Avith it Every particular element, shoAvn to be m any sense a condition, ground or cause of such an event, and, theiefore, to have contributed its por- tion, may be regarded as responsible for it, or at least as sharing in the responsibihty Hence in the case of such a iiehly varied event as the French Revolution, the formal understanding has to select from an untold multitude of cir- cumstances that one to which it wiU attribute responsibility- Addvlvon — What is contained in my purpose can be laid at my door, and this is one of the mam considerations in the case of crime But in simple responsibihty there is found only the quite external judgment as to whether I have or have not done this thing. Thus merely to be THE PIIILOSOPUy OF RIOlIl.
responsiMe does not mean tliat the whole thing is to ho imjjuted to me 116 It IS not mj’ deed, if things, -which I own, cause injuiy to otheis tliiough some of then many external con- nections, this may liapi>en even with my' hody as a mechanical oi living obicct Yet I am not wliolly' lict from lesponsihility in such a ease, since these things aio still mine, although hy then voiy natuic they aic often only imiieifectly subject to my attention and contiol 117 Wlieu the solf-diiecting w ill pi eposes to act upon a given mateiial, it has a repieseutation ot tlie ciicuin- stances Since the niateiial is supplied, tin- will is tinite and the lesults of the act aie foi it atiideiital Hence they may contain something leiy diffeient tioni the lepie- sentation But the light ot the will in acting is to lecog- nize as its own deed only those lesulis which wcie con- sciously 111 its end and weie pui posed That lespoiisiliiliti shall extend to the will onlv so fai as the lesiilts weic known, is the light ot knowledge Addition — The will has hefoie it an ontei leahty, upon which it opeiates But to he.ihle to do this, it must have a repiesentation of this leahty Tiue icsponsihility is mine only in so far as the outei leahty was within my consciousness Tlie wrill, hecause tins external inattci is supplied to it, IS finite, oi rathci hecause it is finite, the matter is supplied When I think and will lationally, I am not at this standjioint of fiiiitude, noi is the oliject 1 act upon something opposed to me The finite always has hmit and boundary There stands opposed to me that which is other than I, sojnething accidental and externally necessary, it may or may not fall into agreement with me But I am only what relates to my freedom, and the act is the purport of my will only in so far as I am awaie of it (Edipus, who unwittingly slew his father, is not to he aiTaignod as a patricide In the ancient laws, however, less value was attach«d to the subjective side of the act PURPOSE ASD RESPOXSIBIUTT.
than IS clone to-day Hence arose amongst the ancients asylums, whei e the fugiti\ e from levenge might he received and piotectod 118 An act, when it has become an external reahty, and is Lonneuted with a vaiied outei necessity, has mani- fold coiisecjiionees These consequences, being the visible shape, whoso soul is the end of action, belong to the act. But at the same time the inner act, when realized as an end 111 the external woild, is handed over to external foices, which attach to it something quite diffeient from what it Is m itself, and thus caiiy it away into stiange and distant consequences It is the light of the will to adopt only the hist consequences, since they alone lie m the pin pose Xofe — The division of consequences into necessaiy and accidental is not accmatt, beiaiise the inner necessity, miolied in the finite, is icalized as a necessity which is external, a necessity, that is to sav, implying a lelation of sepaiate things, winch aio independent, ludiffeient to one auothei, and onh cxtoiually connected The pimciple “ In acting neglect the consequences,” and the piinciple “ Judge an act bi its consequences, and make them the standard of what IS light aud good,” belong both alike to the abstract undei stiiuding. The consequences are the native form of the act, simply manifest its natuie, and aie nothing hut the act itself The act cannot scorn and disown them Tet amongst the consec|neuces is included that which is only externally attached to them and has no fellowship with the act itself The development of the contiadictioii involved in the necessaiy uatuie of the finite is in external reality the con- veision of necessity into contmgency and vice vetsd. An overt act must thoiefore confoim to this law This law it is which stands the ciiminal in such good stead, if his act has had but few consequences, bo also must the good act bo contented to have few oi no consequences But when I iiil: philosophy op bigii'i the consequences of ciime have fully (Icvelojied tlicni&clves, they add to the seventy of the 2 )unjslimeiit The self-eonsciousness of the heioiu age, jiainted in the tragedy of "CEdqius.” for instance, had not iisen out of its simpheitv, oi leflectivelv aiipiecuited the diffcience between lealized deed aud lunei act, between the outer occuiicuce and the jiuijiose and knowledge of suriouudings Noi did it distinguish between one ionsw[ueiice and anotliei, hut spread lespousihility ovei the whole aiea of the deed Addition — In the fact that I lecognizc as mine only what was in my leiiiescntation is to bo found the transition fiom jmipose to iiiteiitiou O 11 I 3 nhat I knew of the sur- roundings can be imputed to me But tlieie arc necessary results attached to even the >-imiilest act, and they are its universal element The consequences, which niaj bo jne- vented fioni taking eftect, I cannot indeed toiesee, but I ought to know the univeisal natuic of each sepaiate con- crete deed The thing which I ought to know is the essential whole, which lefeis not to bi>ecial di'lails of an act, but to its leal nature The tiausition fioni jiuipose to intention consists in my being aware not nieiely of my separate act, but of the umvcisal bound iqi with it Tins universal, when nilled by me, is nij- intention SECOND SECTION Intention and Well-being 119 The external embodiment of an act is composed of many parts, and may he regarded as capable of being divided mto an infimte number of particulars An act may be looked on as m the first instance coming into con- tact with only one of these particulais But the tiuth of the particular is the universal A definite act is not con- fined m its content to one isolated point of the varied external world, but is universal, including these varied INTENTION AND AVELL-BEING relations within itself The pm pose, which is the pioduct of thought and embraces not the particular only but also the uuivei sal side, is intention Note — Intention (in Gciman, “a loolcing away from”) implies, accoiding to its etymology, an abstraction, which has in jiart the form of universality, and partly is the exti action of a paiticulai side of the concrete thing The attempt to lustify oneself by the intention consists, in goiieial, in asseiting tliat one siietial isolated phase is the subiective essence of the act — ^To pass -judgment upon an act siinpl}' as an external deed, without qualifying it as light 01 wiong, inijiaits to it a univeisal jnedicate, it is Icilliiig, aison, etc — IVhen the paits of external leality are taken one by one, then connection must natuially be external Ecality may be, in the first instance, touched at only a single point Aison e y, may be directly con- coined with only a small piece of wood, a statement which 18 lueiely a pioposition, but not a judgment But this single point has a uiiivoisal natuie, which involves the extension ot it In life the sepaiate pait is not a mere jiait, but diiectly an oigan, in which the universal is leally present Hence in inuidei it is not a separa-te piece of flesh, but the life itself which is destioyed On one side subjective leflectiou, in its ignoiaiice of the logical nature of the paiticulai and the univoisal, permits of a dis- section into meie paiticulars and then consequences On the other side, the act in its hnite and casual character natuially bleaks up into sepaiate parts — The invention of the dolus indirectus is due to this way of thinking Addition — Manifestly nioie oi fewei circumstances may be included in an act In the case of aison, e g, the fire may not take effect, or it may spread farther than the agent intended Yet in neithei case is the result due to good oi had foitune, since man must in actmg lefuse to deal with externality An old proverb rightly enough says, “ A stone flung from, the hand is the devil’s ” In THE PHILOSOPHY of highi acting I must exjiose myself to misfoitiino, that also has a light to me, and is the manifestation of mv ottii mil 120 The light of intention is that the niiiveisal qiiahti of the act slionld not only he im|)licitlv present, but should be knoTin by the agent, and be pait and paieel of his sub- jective lYill Coiiveisely the light of objeetiMty of action, as it may be called, is to maintain that it be known and ■willed by a subject in his chaiactei iis tlmikiug Note — This light to this insight iinolves that cliiklieu, imbeciles, and lunatics aie LOiii])lctelv, oi almost com- pletely, iiiesponsible foi then actions Just as actions on the side of then external leality iiicliicle accidental lesults, so also the subjective leality contains an ludeteiminale element, winch dcjieuds ujjon the stiength of self-con- sciousuess and piudence But this unceitaiu element needs to be leckoued with only m the case of imbecilitv. lunacy, or childhood These aic the only conditions ot mind which supeisede thought and fiec ■will, and j>eimit us to take an agent otheiwiso than iii accoidance with his dignity as fiec and lational 121 The uuiveisal quality of action is in gmioial the manifold content leduced to the simplo foim of uuiiei- sality. Blit the subject turned bac k into hiiiiself is par- ticular, in opposition to the jiaiticulais of the objective woild He has m his end his own jiaiticulai content, which constitutes the essential soul of his act In the execution of this paiticulai content of the act consists his subjective fieedom in its coneiete chaiactei This is the subject’s right to find in the act his satisfaction Addition — I, as independent and self-refeiied, am pai- ticular, and opposed to the external side of the act Its content is decided by my end Minder and aisou, e g, are quite general and not the positive content of me, a subject When an j one has committed a ciime, we ask why he has done it Muidei is not done foi the sake of murder There must be besides a jjarticular positive end.
If dehi'ht 111 imudei wcie the motnc of the crime, it ■would he the pobitive content of the snh'ject as such, and the deed CMtuld he the satisfaction of his desire The motive of a deed contains the inoial element, ivliich has the two- fold sioiiification of the imiveisal in purpose and of the paiticuliii 111 intention In modem tunes we aie at pains to ask aftei the motive Foimeily the question was moiely. Is tins man just'-' Does he do Ins duty Now we scmtinize the hcait, and fix a gulf hotween the objective side of londint and the internal subjective side, oi motive No (loulit the subject’s own deteinimatiou must he con- sidcied What he wills has its gionud withm him, he wills to satisfy a jileasiiie oi giatity a passion But right and good aie also jiieciselv such a content, due, however, not to natuie but to my leason To make my own fieedom the content of mv will is a jiuic chaiacteiistic of my free- dom itselt Hence the liighei nioial phase is to find satisfaction in the act, not to haij) upon a breech between the ohjectiMty of the deed, and the self-consciousness of mail This defective mode of mteipietation has its epochs as well 111 Moild-liistoiv as m the histoiy of individuals 122 I3v iiitue of the paiticidai element the aet has loi me sulijective value oi mteiest In contrast with this end, whose content is the intention, the direct act in its w'lclei content is icdneecl to a means This end, as far as it IS finite, can again bo reduced to a means for a ■wider intention, and so on indefinitely 123 The content of these ends is only (a) formal activity, that IS, the subject’s interest or aim is to he effected by his agency Men desire to he themselves actively in- terested in whatever is or ought to be their own. (/3) I'lii’ther definite content is found foi the still abstract and formal fioodom of snbjectivit^y only m its natural sub- jective embodiment, as inclinations, passions, opinions, whims, etc The satisfaction of this content is well-hemg or happiness m its particular as also in its universal THK PUir^OSOPIIY OF niGlIT features In this satisfaction consist the ends of finitude geneially Note — This is the standpoint of lelation (§ 108) The subject at this stage emphasizes his distinctive and pai- tieular natuie Heie enteis the content of the natiiial ■wiU (§ 11) But the will IS not in its simple and duett foim, since the content belongs to a will iihith is tinned back into itselt, and laised to the level of a uiiiveisal end, namely, ii ell-being oi hapjimess Addition — In so fai as the elements of happiness aie exteinallj' jiiovided, they aie not the tine elements of freedom Fieedom truly is itself only in an end consti- tuted by itself, i e, the good Heie the question may be raised. Has man a light to set up foi hiiiiself ends iiliich are not fiee, and dejiend sinijdi on his being a hi mg thing ^ But life in man is not a mei e accident, since it accords with leasou Man has so fai a light to make his wants an end Tlieie is nothing degiadmg in one’s being alive Tlicie is open to us no iiioio spiiitiial K'gion, in which we can exist, than that of life Only tliiough the exaltation of iihat is oxteinalh jnovided to the lei el of something self-cieated do we eiitci the higliei altitude of the good But this distinction iiiijilies no intoleiaiice of either side of man’s natuie 124 Since the subjective satisfaction of the individual, the lecognition foi example of oneself as hoiiouied or famous, IS iniolved in the icaii/ation of absolutely valid ends, the demand that only subjective satisfaction should appeal as willed and attained, and also the view that m action subjective and objective ends exclude each other, are empty assertions of the abstract understandmg Nay, moie, the aigument becomes a positive evil when it is held that, because subjective satisfaction is always found in every finished woik, it must be the essential intention of the agent the objective end being only a means to the attainiiient of this satisfaction. The subject is the series INIENllON AXD WELL-BEING of his acts If these aie a senes of worthless productions, the subjectivity of the will is also woithless, if the acts are substantial and sound, so likewise is the inner will of the individual Note - — The light of the subject’s j)aiticular being to find hiinself satisfied, the light, in olhei woids, of sub- jective fieedoin, constitutes the middle oi turning-point between the ancient and the modem uoild Tins nght in its infinite natiii e is expressed in Clnistianity, and lias been made the nnneisal active piimijde of a newfoiin of the woild The moie definite nianileslations of this principle are love, lomancc, the hope of the eteiual salvation of the individual, moiahty also, and conscience It includes, 11101 eovei, vaiioiis othei foims, which will be, in a measure, iiitiodiiced 111 the sequel as the piinciple of the cmc society, and as elements of the jiolitical constitution, but jiaitlv, liowevei, appeal in liisloiy geneiallv, especially m the histoiv of ait, the sciences, and philosophy This principle of jiaiticulaiity is now, indeed, one side of the contiadiction, and, in the hist lesoit, is at least quite as much identical with the iiiineisal as distinct fiom it But abstract reflection fastens upon this clement in its difference fiom and opposition to the unneisal, and jnopounds the view that inoiahty must caiiv on a continued waifaie against the satisfaction of oneself, demanding of us — “ Mit Ahscheu /u lliuii die Plliclit gebeut ” ’ The same abstiact standpoint lies at the loot of that jisychological view of history, which seeks to disparage all great deeds and persons It emphasizes the particular side, which it has alieady decreed to be evil, considers as the chief factor in the act the hononi and glory, which may accrue to the agent, and tiansfoims and converts the in- clinations and passions, whose satisfaction was only one * “ To do with aversion what duty lequires Tllli: PIIILOSOPnY OF RIGHT.
clement of the total icMilt, into the agent’s main intention and active inmciiilo This same alistiact point of new asserts that because gieat acts, and the ical lesult biought to pass by a seiies of them, have jnodiiced a gieat elloct upon the woild, and liave natuiallj' lesulted to the agent in powei, lion oui, and lenonn, theiefoie theie lielougs to the indiiidnal not the gieatncss, but uieielv these pai- ticular and ei.teinal lesults The leasoii assigned is tliat the partiuilar coiisecjueute, suite it i\as adniitteilli an end, must bo the solo end Such abstiatt thiiihing sees oiilj the subjective side of great men, the side uliuh (onstitutes its own essence In its self-constituted vanity it oieiloolrs their leal uatuie It takes the view of the “■ jisjcliologual valet foi nhom theie are no heioes, not because tbeie aie no heroes, but because he is only a valet ” Addition — The sentence. In inacini'- tnhii^se mt csf, is right, if it means that one should will soinethuig gieat But he should also caiiy it out, ollieiwise liis vohtiou is vain. The lauiels of nieie willing aie cliy leaves, winch have never been gi oeu 125 The subjective, whose concei 11 iswitlitlic paiticulai content of well-being, is, when it becomes infinite bj being tnined back into itself, at the same tune bi ought iiitoicla- tion with iinplicit oi gcncial will. Tins new element, established, in the first instance, in paituulaiity itself, is the well-being of others, in its complete but cpiite empty chaiacter it is the well-lieing of all The well-bemg of many other paiticnlai poisons is theiefoie an essential end 01 light of subjectivitv. But since the absolute univeisal, ■which IS distinguished from this paitieulai content, is heie defined simply as right, the ends of the particulai will may or may not be in real accordance with the universal 126 My own particnlarity, and likewise the particulai ity of otheis are, however, a light, only in so far as I am fiee They cannot maintain themselves m opposition to then leal basis. An. intention to further my well-hemg or that of othois, called a moial intention, cannot justify a •wiong act Not I' — It is one of tlio most corrujit maxims of our day •winch, ouginating in the JMC-Kautian peiiod of the good heait, and iurniiihing the (jiiiutesscnce of some ■well-lcno'wn touching diainas, nndeitahcb in the case of mong acts to excite inteiost in the so-called moial intention It pictures had poisons as haiiiig heaits Idled nith good intentions and desn cs foi then own irell-heing, and perhaps foi that of othois as n ell A heightened foim of this theory has been vanijicd up in oui own tune Iiinei in spiiation and feel- ing, the leiysonl of jiailiculaiity, have been made the eiiteiiou of ivhat is light, loasouable, and excellent Crime has been pionounced light, leasonable, and excellent, as also haie the thoughts which led to it, merely on the giouudthat thej juoceeded fiom iiispiiation and feeling, though tho\ may have been in fact the most hollo'w and com 111011 place ivhiins and most foolish opinions (§ 140, mte ) — Ohseiie fuithei that heie nndei light and well- hoiiig we aie consideiiiig the foiiiial light and paiticular ■well-being of the individual The so-called general welfare, the ■well-hemg of the state, the light of the leal, concrete spiiit is quite anothei legion, in which formal light and the paiticular well-being oi hapxiiness of the individual aic siiboidinate elements It has alieadyheen remarked that it IS one of the most fiecxneut misconceptions of the abstract intellect to set uii pin ate light and pnvate wellbeing as absolutely valid in opposition to the universal pimciple of the state Addition — We may quote heie the celebrated retort given to the hbellei, who excused himself with the remark, “ II flint done rpie je vive ” " Je n'en vois pas la necessite,” was the leply Life is not necessaiy against the higher fact of fiecdom When the holy Ciispinus steals leather to make hoots foi the pool, his act, though moral, is not right, and cannot be justified Till: PHILOSOPHY OF RIOIIT 127 The imi timlai mtciests of tlie iiatuial ■will, viewed as a simple whole, constitute peisoiial leality oi the life In the final lesoit, life, when in collision with anothei’s rightful owneiship, can claim the light of necessity, not on the ground of equity hut of light Ohseive th.it on the one side is placed the infinite desti action of oui oiilei exis- tence, and thciefoio the eomjdete loss of lights, on the othei side an inpiiy to only a paiticiilai.mil liniited embodiment of one’s fiecdom A slight inpiii to a paitieulai possession does not violate the in]iiied man’s right, as such, oi his capaeiti foi light Note — From this right of need flows the beneiit oj com- petence (beneficiiiM competeninf), by virtue of whuh theieis allowed to the debtoi some of his tools, iinplemeiits, clothes, and means geiieiallv, all of iihi< h aie of couise the piopcity of the creditoi The.illowance covei s so much as is deemed sufficient foi the possible maintenauce of one in the debtoi ’s class Addition — Life, ox the totality of ends, has a light against abstiait right Foi inst.m(e, bv the theft of a loicf of bread a, pioperty is doubtless inpiied Still, if the act was the means of 2 uolouging life, it uould be uiong to consider it as oidinaiy theft If the man whose life is in dangei weie not allowed to picseive himself, he would be without lights, and, since his life is refused him, his whole freedom is denied to him also Many things, it is tiue, must go to secuie litc, esjiecially if we legaid the futuie But to live now IS all that is necessai}', the futuie is not absolute, and remains exposed to accidents Hence only the need of the immediate present can justify a wrong act Tet the act is justified, because the agent, abstain- ing from it, would commit tdie highest wrong, namely, the total negation of his realized freedom The beneficiwm competentim implies the right to ask that no man shall be wholly sacrificed to mere right 128 Heed reveals the finite and contingent character of 'iin: GOOD AXD co.vsriKxci: both iifflit and well-being, that i& to s<i\, of that abstiact embodiment of fieedom, whicli is not the existence of any particulai peisou, and also of the splicie ot the particulai will, w'liich excluded the univeihalitv of light The one- sidednoss oi idealiti’ of these phase's is found in the concep- tion itself Eight has alicady been embodied as the parti- cular will (§ 106), and subiectivitx, m the whole range of its pavticulaiity, is itself the eiubodimcnt of freedom (§ 127), and also, in its character as the infinite lefeiencc of the will to itself, is it imjduitlv the univeisal side of fieedom These two elements in then tiuth and identih, although. 111 the fiist instance, only in lelative lefeience to each other, aie on the one hand the good, as the fulfilled and absolutely definite univeisal, and, on the other hand, conscience, oi an infinite subiectnity, winch is awaie of itself, and detei mines in itself its lontent THIED SECTION The Good and Conscience 129 The good is the idea, oi umtv of the conception of the will with the particulai will Abstiact light, well-being, the suh]ectiyity of consciousness, and the con- tingency of external leality, aie in their independent and sepaiate existences superseded m this unity, although in their real essence they are contained m it and preserved This unity is realized freedom, the absolute final cause of the world Addihon — Every stage is piopeily the idea, but the earlier steps contain the idea only in moie abstract form The I, as ]ieison, is alieady the idea, although in its most abstiact guise The good is the idea moie completely de- termined, it IS the unity of the coneeiition of will with the particular will It is not something abstractly right, but THE PHILOSOPHY OF HI&Hr.
has a real rontent, whose substance constitutes bolli Uf^ht and well-being 130 111 tins idea well-being has value, not indepeiideiitly as the realization of the separate paiticular will, but only as univeisal well-being, as nnivcisal, that is, in its essence, intrinsically or in accordance with fieedoni Hence, n ell- being is not a good, if sepaiati-dfiom iinht, iioi is light a good, if sepaiatcd fiom well-beiinr Fmi jimtilui ought not to have poeat wunrhis as a consequence The good i arij - mg a necessity to be actiiab/ed by the paiticulai mil, and comprising the vital essence of such a will, has absolute right over the meie abstract right of 2 'ro])erty and the particulai ends of well-being It eithci of these eleincuts is distinguished fiom the good, it has lalidity only in so far as it accoids with the good and suboidinatcs itself to it 131 The subiective will finds lu the good the suiiioniely essential, and has woitli and inuiit oiilv as its insight and intention accoid with the good In so f.ir as the good in this place is still the abstiact idea of the good, the subjec- tive will is not yet earned iij) into it, and made one mth it It stands to the good in a i elation of the follomng hind As the good is foi it what is leal and substantial, it ought to make the good its end and icalizc it, and on the othei hand it is only thioiigli the niediiiin of the subjective will that the good can be lealized Addition — The good is the tiutli of the paiticnlai will But the will is only that to which it sets itself It is not inherently good, but becomes what it is only by its work On the other side the good apart fiom the subjective will 18 only an abstraction having no reality Beality first comes to the good through the private will Thus the development of the good contains these tliiee stages fl) Poi me, as willing, the good should be jiaiticulai mil, and I should know it (2) "We should say u hat tiling is good, and develop the particular phases of the good (3) THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE We deteimiiio the iiidepeudent good, particulaiizmg it as infinite and independent subjectivity This innei determi- nation IS conscience