SigPhi · Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Arts

Page 7 of 12

consciousness. Just so these three chief modifications present themselves in the world of art in independent development.

([Greek: a]) The _first_ of the particular arts with which, according to their fundamental principle, we have to begin, is architecture considered as a fine art.[164] Its task lies in so manipulating external inorganic nature that it becomes cognate to mind, as an artistic outer world. The material of architecture is matter itself in its immediate externality as a heavy mass subject to mechanical laws, and its forms do not depart from the forms of inorganic nature, but are merely set in order in conformity with relations of the abstract understanding, _i.e._ with relations of symmetry. In this material and in such forms, the ideal as concrete spirituality does not admit of being realized. Hence the reality which is represented in them remains contrasted with the Idea, as something external which it has not penetrated, or has penetrated only to establish an abstract relation.

For these reasons, the fundamental type of the fine art of building is the _symbolical_ form of art. It is architecture that pioneers the way for the adequate realization of the God, and in this its service bestows hard toil upon existing nature, in order to disentangle it from the jungle of finitude and the abortiveness of chance. By this means it levels a space for the God, gives form to his external surroundings, and builds him his temple as a fit place for concentration of spirit, and for its direction to the mind's absolute objects. It raises an enclosure round the assembly of those gathered together, as a defence against the threatening of the storm, against rain, the hurricane, and wild beasts, and reveals the will to assemble, although externally, yet in conformity with principles of art. With such import as this it has power to inspire its material and its forms more or less effectively, as the determinate character of the content on behalf of which it sets to work is more or less significant, more concrete or more abstract, more profound in sounding its own depths, or more dim and more superficial. So much, indeed, may architecture attempt in this respect as even to create an adequate artistic existence for such an import in its shapes and in its material. But in such a case it has already overstepped its own boundary, and is leaning to sculpture, the phase above it. For the limit of architecture lies precisely in this point, that it retains the spiritual as an inward existence over against the external forms of the art, and consequently must refer to what has soul only as to something other than its own creations.

[Greek: b] Architecture, however, as we have seen, has purified the external world, and endowed it with symmetrical order and with affinity to mind; and the temple of the God, the house of his community, stands ready. Into this temple, then, in the _second_ place, the God enters in the lightning-flash of individuality, which strikes and permeates the inert mass, while the infinite[165] and no longer merely symmetrical form belonging to mind itself concentrates and gives shape to the corresponding bodily existence. This is the task of _Sculpture_. In as far as in this art the spiritual inward being which architecture can but indicate makes itself at home in the sensuous shape and its external matter, and in as far as these two sides are so adapted to one another that neither is predominant, sculpture must be assigned the _classical form of art_ as its fundamental type. For this reason the sensuous element itself has here no expression which could not be that of the spiritual element, just as, conversely, sculpture can represent no spiritual content which does not admit throughout of being adequately presented to perception in bodily form. Sculpture should place the spirit before us in its bodily form and in immediate unity therewith at rest and in peace; and the form should be animated by the content of spiritual individuality. And so the external sensuous matter is here no longer manipulated, either in conformity with its mechanical quality alone, as a mass possessing weight, nor in shapes belonging to the inorganic world, nor as indifferent to colour, etc.; but it is wrought in ideal forms of the human figure, and, it must be remarked, in all three spatial dimensions.

In this last respect we must claim for sculpture, that it is in it that the inward and spiritual are first revealed in their eternal repose and essential self-completeness. To such repose and unity with itself there can correspond only that external shape which itself maintains its unity and repose. And this is fulfilled by shape in its abstract spatiality.[166] The spirit which sculpture represents is that which is solid in itself, not broken up in the play of trivialities and of passions; and hence its external form too is not abandoned to any manifold phases of appearance, but appears under this one aspect only, as the abstraction of space in the whole of its dimensions.

([Greek: g]) Now, after architecture has erected the temple, and the hand of sculpture has supplied it with the statue of the God, then, in the third place, this god present to sense is confronted in the spacious halls of his house by the _community_. The community is the spiritual reflection into itself of such sensuous existence, and is the animating subjectivity and inner life which brings about the result that the determining principle for the content of art, as well as for the medium which represents it in outward form, comes to be particularization [dispersion into various shapes, attributes, incidents, etc.], individualization, and the subjectivity which they require.[167] The solid unity which the God has in sculpture breaks up into the multitudinous inner lives of individuals, whose unity is not sensuous, but purely ideal.[168] It is only in this stage that God Himself comes to be really and truly spirit--the spirit in His (God's) community; for He here begins to be a to-and-fro, an alternation between His unity within himself and his realization in the individual's knowledge and in its separate being, as also in the common nature and union of the multitude. In the community, God is released from the abstractness of unexpanded self-identity, as well as from the simple absorption in a bodily medium, by which sculpture represents Him. And He is thus exalted into spiritual existence and into knowledge, into the reflected[169] appearance which essentially displays itself as inward and as subjectivity. Therefore the higher content is now the spiritual nature, and that in its absolute shape. But the dispersion of which we have spoken reveals this at the same time as particular spiritual being, and as individual character. Now, what manifests itself in this phase as the main thing is not the serene quiescence of the God in Himself, but appearance as such, being which is _for_ another, self-manifestation. And hence, in the phase we have reached, all the most manifold subjectivity in its living movement and operation--as human passion, action, and incident, and, in general, the wide realm of human feeling, will, and its negation,--is for its own sake the object of artistic representation. In conformity with this content, the sensuous element of art has at once to show itself as made particular in itself and as adapted to subjective inwardness. Media that fulfil this requirement we have in colour, in musical sound, and finally in sound as the mere indication of inward perceptions and ideas; and as modes of realizing the import in question by help of these media we obtain painting, music, and poetry. In this region the sensuous medium displays itself as subdivided in its own being and universally set down as ideal.[170] Thus it has the highest degree of conformity with the content of art, which, as such, is spiritual, and the connection of intelligible import and sensuous medium develops into closer intimacy than was possible in the case of architecture and sculpture. The unity attained, however, is a more inward unity, the weight of which is thrown wholly on the subjective side, and which, in as far as form and content are compelled to particularize themselves and give themselves merely ideal existence, can only come to pass at the expense of the objective universality of the content and also of its amalgamation with the immediately sensuous element.[171] The arts, then, of which form and content exalt themselves to ideality, abandon the character of symbolic architecture and the classical ideal of sculpture, and therefore borrow their type from the romantic form of art, whose mode of plasticity they are most adequately adapted to express. And they constitute a _totality_ of arts, because the romantic type is the most concrete in itself.[172] i. The articulation of this _third sphere_ of the individual arts may be determined as follows. The _first_ art in it, which comes next to sculpture, is painting. It employs as a medium for its content and for the plastic embodiment of that content visibility as such in as far as it is specialized in its own nature, _i.e._ as developed into colour.

It is true that the material employed in architecture and sculpture is also visible and coloured; but it is not, as in painting, visibility as such, not the simple light which, differentiating itself in virtue of its contrast with darkness, and in combination with the latter, gives rise to colour.[173] This quality of visibility, made subjective in itself and treated as ideal, needs neither, like architecture, the abstractly mechanical attribute of mass as operative in the properties of heavy matter, nor, like sculpture, the complete sensuous attributes of space, even though concentrated into organic shapes.

The visibility and the rendering visible which belong to painting have their differences in a more ideal form, in the several kinds of colour, and they liberate art from the sensuous completeness in space which attaches to material things, by restricting themselves to a plane surface.

On the other hand, the content also attains the most comprehensive specification. Whatever can find room in the human heart, as feeling, idea, and purpose; whatever it is capable of shaping into act--all this diversity of material is capable of entering into the varied content of painting. The whole realm of particular existence, from the highest embodiment of mind down to the most isolated object of nature, finds a place here. For it is possible even for finite nature,[174] in its particular scenes and phenomena, to make its appearance in the realm of art, if only some allusion to an element of mind endows it with affinity to thought and feeling.

ii. The _second_ art in which the romantic type realizes itself is contrasted with painting, and is music. Its medium, though still sensuous, yet develops into still more thorough subjectivity and particularization. Music, too, treats the sensuous as ideal, and does so by negating,[175] and idealizing into the individual isolation of a single point, the indifferent externality[176] of space, whose complete semblance is accepted and imitated by painting. The single point, _qua_ such a negativity (excluding space) is in itself a concrete and active process of positive negation[177] within the attributes of matter, in the shape of a motion and tremor of the material body within itself and in its relation to itself. Such an inchoate ideality of matter,[178] which appears no longer as under the form of space, but as temporal ideality,[179] is sound, the sensuous set down as negated, with its abstract visibility converted into audibility, inasmuch as sound, so to speak, liberates the ideal content from its immersion in matter. This earliest inwardness of matter and inspiration of soul into it furnishes the medium for the mental inwardness--itself as yet indefinite,--and for the soul[180] into which mind concentrates itself; and finds utterance in its tones for the heart with its whole gamut of feelings and passions. Thus music forms the centre of the romantic arts, just as sculpture represents the central point between architecture and the arts of romantic subjectivity. Thus, too, it forms the point of transition between abstract spatial sensuousness, such as painting employs, and the abstract spirituality of poetry. Music has within itself, like architecture, a relation of quantity conformable to the understanding, as the antithesis to emotion and inwardness; and has also as its basis a solid conformity to law on the part of the tones, of their conjunction, and of their succession.

iii. most spiritual mode of representation of the romantic art-type, we must look for it in _poetry_. Its characteristic peculiarity lies in the power with which it subjects to the mind and to its ideas the sensuous element from which music and painting in their degree began to liberate art. For sound, the only external matter which poetry retains, is in it no longer the feeling of the sonorous itself, but is a _sign_, which by itself is void of import. And it is a sign of the idea which has become concrete in itself and not merely of indefinite feeling and of its _nuances_ and grades. This is how sound develops into the _Word_, as voice articulate in itself, whose import it is to indicate ideas and notions. The merely negative point up to which music had developed now makes its appearance as the completely concrete point, the point which is mind, the self-conscious individual, which, producing out of itself the infinite space of its ideas, unites it with the temporal character of sound. Yet this sensuous element, which in music was still immediately one with inward feeling, is in poetry separated from the content of consciousness. In poetry the mind determines this content for its own sake, and apart from all else, into the shape of ideas, and though it employs sound to express them, yet treats it solely as a symbol without value or import. Thus considered, sound may just as well be reduced to a mere letter, for the audible, like the visible, is thus depressed into a mere indication of mind.[181] For this reason the proper medium of poetical representation is the poetical imagination and intellectual portrayal itself. And as this element is common to all types of art, it follows that poetry runs through them all and develops itself independently in each. Poetry is the universal art of the mind which has become free in its own nature, and which is not tied to find its realization in external sensuous matter, but expatiates exclusively in the inner space and inner time of the ideas and feelings. Yet just in this its highest phase art ends by transcending itself, inasmuch as it abandons the medium of a harmonious embodiment of mind in sensuous form, and passes from the poetry of imagination into the prose of thought.

5. Such we may take to be the articulated totality of the particular arts, viz. the external art of architecture, the objective art of sculpture, and the subjective art of painting music and poetry.

Many other classifications have been attempted, for a work of art presents so many aspects, that, as has often been the case, first one and then another is made the basis of classification. For instance, one might take the sensuous medium. Thus architecture is treated as crystallization; sculpture, as the organic modelling of the material in its sensuous and spatial totality; painting, as the coloured surface and line; while in music, space, as such, passes into the point of time possessed of content within itself, until finally the external medium is in poetry depressed into complete insignificance. Or, again, these differences have been considered with reference to their purely abstract attributes of space and time. Such abstract peculiarities of works of art may, like their material medium, be consistently explored in their characteristic traits; but they cannot be worked out as the ultimate and fundamental law, because any such aspect itself derives its origin from a higher principle, and must therefore be subordinate thereto.

This higher principle we have found in the types of art--symbolic, classical, and romantic--which are the universal stages or elements[182] of the Idea of beauty itself. For _symbolic art_ attains its most adequate reality and most complete application in _architecture_, in which it holds sway in the full import of its notion, and is not yet degraded to be, as it were, the inorganic nature dealt with by another art. The _classical_ type of art, on the other hand, finds adequate realization in sculpture, while it treats architecture only as furnishing an enclosure in which it is to operate, and has not acquired the power of developing painting and music as absolute[183] forms for its content. The _romantic_ type of art, finally, takes possession of painting and music, and in like manner of poetic representation, as substantive and unconditionally adequate modes of utterance. Poetry, however, is conformable to all types of the beautiful, and extends over them all, because the artistic imagination is its proper medium, and imagination is essential to every product that belongs to the beautiful, whatever its type may be.

And, therefore, what the particular arts realize in individual works of art, are according to their abstract conception simply the universal types which constitute the self-unfolding Idea of beauty. It is as the external realization of this Idea that the wide Pantheon of art is being erected, whose architect and builder is the spirit of beauty as it awakens to self-knowledge, and to complete which the history of the world will need its evolution of ages.

FOOTNOTES: [1] New York, Appleton and Co.

[2] Chicago, Griggs and Co., 1885.

[3] Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1886.

[4] Of these, Chapter III. is subdivided into two Parts, because of the disproportionate length of the division in the original to which it corresponds.

[5] Preface to "Sordello."

[6] "Endless duration makes good no better, nor white any whiter," is one of Aristotle's comments on Plato's "eternal" ideas, and is just, unless "eternal" conveys a difference of kind.

[7] Whewell, I think, misinterprets Plato's language about astronomy in this sense. Plato is not decrying observation, but demanding a theoretical treatment of the laws of motion,--a remarkable anticipation of modern ideas.

[8] "A Year with the Birds," by an Oxford Tutor.

[9] See note above, p. xii.

[10] The fusion of these meanings in the German "Geist" gives a force to his pleading which English cannot render. He appeals, _e.g._, triumphantly to "God is a Spirit," _i.e._ not "a ghost" but "mind."

[11] See Tennyson's "Higher Pantheism," especially the fine lines-- "Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet, Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet."

[12] In Baumgarten's "Æsthetica," 1750. See Lotze's "Æsthetik in Deutschland," p. 4, and Scherer's "Hist. of German Literature," Engl.

Transl., ii. 25.

[13] _Aus dem Geiste_--allusion to "born of water and of the Spirit."

[14] Not in the sense of fancying what you please, but in the technical sense of having separate existence; detached, so to speak, from the general background of things, not a mere concurrence of other elements.

[15] Has no power of distinguishing itself from other things.

[18] "_Raisonnement_"--a disparaging term in Hegel.

[19] "Particular"--different unconnected matters, considered as merely thrown together in an aggregate, or occurring in a series; opposed to parts or cases united by an essential principle.

[22] The life in which we treat common circumstances and sensations as, in their degree, realities.

[25] "_Material_," _e.g._ colour, sound, heavy matter, etc.

[26] "_Element_:" perhaps more especially any mental function entering into art--sense, imagination, understanding, etc.

[28] "_Haltpunkte_:" ultimate points that the matter of art must not leave hold of, leading ideas that must somehow dominate it.

[29] "_Gestaltung_:" shaping, as if arrangement of shapes.

[33] "_Bildenden Künste._" I am not sure if I have given the best rendering. It is wider than _Plastik_, because it includes painting and architecture.

[34] _Die Horen_--the monthly magazine whose establishment by Schiller, in 1795, first brought Schiller and Goethe into contact. It only existed for three years. See Scherer, Eng. Trans., ii. 173.

[35] That is, not a caprice of nature or art, but the perfection of the object _after its kind_.

[38] "_Drama_," Gr. [Greek: drama] = _Handlung_, "action."

[43] I have no doubt he means Shakespeare, who was unpopular in Germany before Goethe's time. _Vide_ "Wilhelm Meister."

[44] "_Das Wahre sehen nicht die einzelnen_," etc.

[45] The exhibition of particulars as contained in the principle, and of the principle as contained in particulars.

[46] "_Machen._" [48] See Appendix to Eng. Trans. of Scherer, ii. 347. Goethe's "Götz von Berlichingen" appeared in 1773; Schiller's "Raüber" in 1781.

[49] The "Iphigenie" was completed in Goethe's thirty-eighth year, fourteen years later than "Götz." The bulk of his great works are of the same date as the "Iphigenie," or later. See Scherer, ii. 152, and Appendix, 1. c. Schiller's "Wallenstein" was completed after his thirty-fifth year.

[50] Free from irrelevancies.

[51] _i.e._ it requires a definite or determinate answer, depending on a number of ideas which cannot be explained in an introduction.

[52] _i.e._ considered generally, apart from the wishes and, perhaps, selfish aims of individual artists.

[54] Reality derivative from his own reality.

[55] He means as in attitude, bearing, gentle movement, etc.

[56] "_Bildung._" [58] _i.e._ you cannot describe it or picture it definitely, like a thing with attributes, although you feel it in yourself.

[59] _i.e._ you may be afraid of anything; the fact that you are afraid does not in itself indicate what you are afraid of.

[60] My private feeling is compared to a small circle, in which morality, justice, etc., may _be_, but have not room to show their nature. Feeling allows of no definition.

[61] _All_ its positive aspects or relations, age, phase, artist's history, etc.

[62] Its sensuous aspect has no independent warrant or justification, as that, for example, of an animal has in its own separate life. So it must simply be such as is enough to appeal to man's mind, _e.g._ mere surface painting.

[63] _i.e._ person.

[64] Nothing can be tasted which is not dissolved in a liquid.

[66] Abstract forms, which are to reality as a diagram to a picture.

[67] Lit. "figure," _Gestalt_.

[70] General, abstract, as much applicable to one thing as to another.

[71] "_Heuchelei_," lit. "hypocrisy."

purpose of making a thing over again, without putting any life or meaning into it.

[74] Which says that the business of art is to imitate.

[75] Of imitation.

[76] "_Phantastischen._" "Fantastic" means "odd or wild." Hegel only means "original," "creative."

[77] Mechanical, without origination.

[78] "_Nüancen._" Context seems to forbid referring it to colour. I suspect it of meaning character of outline.

[80] "_Raisonnirende_;" a term of disparagement in Hegel, applied to proofs, _pro_ and _con_, which do not rest on a thorough conception of the fundamental nature of what is being discussed.

[82] "Formal" means here as usual, empty, or general; _i.e._ not taking account of varieties in the matter to which it is applied.

[84] "_Theoretisch._" I have no doubt that it has here the meaning of [Greek: Theôrein] without a trace of allusion to "theory." It is opposed to "destructive," or "appetitive."

[85] The moral.

[86] Person, _i.e._, here, audience or spectator.

[88] "Contingent" means, not so much "what may or may not exist," as the trivial, which makes no difference whether it exists or not.

[89] "_In ihm selbst gebrochenes._" I do not suppose there is an allusion to the words I use.

[90] "_Sittlichkeit_" almost = morality in the English sense. It means the habit of virtue, without the reflective aspiration after goodness as an ideal.

[91] "_Moralität_" almost = conscientiousness or scrupulosity. The above sentence is hardly true with the English word "moral."

[92] "_Für sich_," is often used where there is no notion of development, and seems very like "an sich."

[93] "_Gemüth._" [94] As _e.g._ if we suppose that an act done at the bidding of natural affection cannot also be a fulfilment of the command of duty. The "reconciliation" would be in supposing the natural affection, _e.g._ for parents, to operate as a moral motive, being transformed by a recognition of its sacred or spiritual character.

[96] "_An und für sich Wahre._" [99] See Pref. Essay, p. xix.

[100] Or conscientiousness--what was above described as the moralistic view.

[101] "_An sich._" [102] "_An und für sich wahrem und wirklichem._" [104] "_Der mensch wie er geht und steht._" [107] _i.e._ in any means which we adopt in order to effect an end which we have distinctly before us as an idea. A knife does not include cutting, nor a spade digging, although their construction is relative to these ends. But a man does include living, _i.e._ he is not a man if he ceases to live.

[112] On Goethe's discoveries in morphology and errors in optics, see Helmholtz's "Popular Lectures," series i., lecture ii.; but compare Schopenhauer, "Werke," vol. i., "_Ueber das Sehn und die Farben_."

"A people is but the attempt of many To rise to the completer life of one."

[114] Or "Of the moral, etc., man."

[115] "_Ueber Anmuth und Würde_," "Of Grace and Dignity," a work of Schiller that appeared in 1793.

[117] The Baccalaureus' speech in Faust (Part 2) "Die Welt, sie war nicht, eh' ich sie erschuf," etc., appears to be a parody of Fichte's ideas in this aspect.

[118] I think the order of the German must be a misprint. "_So ist nichts an und für sich und in sich selbst werthvoll betrachtet._" [119] "_An und für sich seyende._" [120] The three points are, (i.) The I is abstract. (ii.) Everything is a semblance for it. (iii.) Its own acts, even, are a semblance.

[121] Not literal. "_Das alles an sich setzende und auflösende Ich._" [122] _Formal_ freedom is detachment from everything, or the (apparent) capacity of alternatives; it is opposed to _real_ freedom, which is identification of one's-self with something that is capable of satisfying one.

[123] "_Genialität_:" the character or state of mind in which genius is dominant--here, the mere self-enjoyment of genius.

[124] "_Selbstgenuss._" I do not think it means self-indulgence, but the above-described enjoyment of reposing in the superiority of the ego.

[125] "_Eitelkeit_," also = "conceit;" which is the other side of this attitude. Hegel uses it on purpose.

[126] "_Eitle._" really a word formed like _Redselig_, etc., but to be given an equivocating reference to "_Schöne Seele_," which I have rendered in the next sentence by "saintly soul."

[130] This recurring phrase may be used etymologically, as a reminiscence of the Platonic [Greek: plêrousthai].

[131] _Haltung_: "bearing" in general, and more especially _the_ bearing of one who bears himself nobly by reason of a principle.

[132] See Scherer, Eng. Transl., ii. 248.

[133] It is natural for a reader to ask in _what_ person or subject God is conceived to have reality. On this see below, p. 165. It appears certain to me that Hegel, when he writes thus, is referring to the self-consciousness of individual human beings as constituting, and reflecting on, an ideal unity between them. This may seem to put a non-natural meaning on the term "person" or "subject," as if the common element of a number of intelligences could be a single person. It is obvious that the question hinges on the degree in which a unity that is not sensuous but ideal can be effective and actual. I can only say here, that the more we consider the nature of ideal unity the higher we shall rate its capabilities. See Prefatory Essay, p. xiv.

[134] _Fackeldistel_ = "Torch thistle," a plant of the genus _Cereus_, Nat. Order _Cactaceæ_.

[135] Or "as spirit and in spirit."

[136] The idea of art.

[137] The two evolutions are, speaking roughly, (i.) that of the subject-matter; (ii.) that of the particular mode of art: (i.)

_e.g._ you have Egyptian, Greek, Christian religion, etc., with the corresponding views and sentiments, each in its own relation to art; (ii.) you have, as a cross division to the former, the several arts--sculpture, music, poetry, etc., each having its special ground and warrant.

[138] He is asking himself why sound or paint, etc., should correspond to one type of art as theoretically defined--this being intellectual, not sensuous, at root--and answers that these media _qua_ natural objects have, though more latent than in works of art, an import and purpose of their own, which reveals itself in their suitability to particular forms of art.

[139] "_Gestaltungsformen._" I use "plastic" all through in a pregnant sense, as one speaks of plastic fancy, etc.; meaning ideally determinate, and fit for translating into pictures, poetry, etc. These "plastic forms" are the various modifications of the subject-matter of art. See note, p. 139, above.

[140] See note, p. 139, above.

[142] "_Gestaltung._" I do not think this means the process of shaping, but the shapes taken collectively.

[143] _i.e._ not in a separate ideal shape devoted to it. He means that man takes a stock or stone as representation or symbol of the divine, and as there is no real connection between divinity and the stone, it may either be left untouched and unshaped, or be hewn into any bizarre or arbitrary shape that comes to hand: see next paragraph.

[144] This description is probably directed, in the first place, to the Indian representation of deities, and would apply to those of many barbaric religions. But its truth may be very simply verified in daily observation of the first attempts of the uneducated at plastic presentation of their ideas, where costliness, ingenuity, labour, or size take the place of beauty.

[146] _i.e._ an idea or purpose which gives these partial and defective representations all the meaning they have, although they are incapable of really expressing it.

[147] "_Gährung_," lit. "fermentation."

[148] "_Der ursprüngliche Begriff_," lit. "the original notion."

[149] _i.e._ God or the Universe _invented_ man to be the expression of mind; art _finds_ him, and adapts his shape to the artistic embodiment of mind as concentrated in individual instances.

[150] Because it represents the soul as independent of an appropriate body--the human soul as capable of existing in a beast's body.

[151] "_Geistigkeit._" "The nature of thought, mind, or spirit." It cannot be here rendered by mind or spirit, because these words make us think of an isolated individual, a mind or soul, and neglect the common spiritual or intellectual nature, which is referred to by the author.

[152] It is the essence of mind or thought not to have its parts outside one another. The so-called terms of a judgment are a good instance of parts in thought which are inward to each other.

[153] Compare Browning's "Old Pictures in Florence."

[154] _i.e._ in the form of feeling and imagination--not reflected upon.

[155] Subject, _i.e._ conscious individual person.

[156] "_Innerlichkeit_," lit. "inwardness."

[157] Taken, considered as or determined to be negative.

[158] "Inward," again, does not mean merely inside our heads, but having the character of spirit in that its parts are not external to one another. A judgment is thus "inward."

[159] _i.e._ does not keep up a distinction between percipient and object, as between things in space. Goodness, nobleness, etc., are not felt to be other than or outside the mind.

[160] The romantic.

[161] _i.e._ species, modifications naturally arising out of a principle.

[162] Thus _e.g._ Sculpture is _the_ art which corresponds _par excellence_ to the general type called Classical Art; but there is _a_ Symbolic kind of sculpture, and I suppose _a_ Romantic or modern kind of sculpture, although neither of these types are exactly fitted to the capabilities of Sculpture.

[163] Architecture as relative to the purposes of life and of religion.

See below, p. 162.

[165] In the sense "self-complete," "not primarily regarded as explained by anything outside," like a machine or an animal contrasted with a wheel or a limb, which latter are finite, because they demand explanation and supplementation from without, _i.e._ necessarily draw attention to their own limit.

[166] _i.e._ shape taken simply as an object filling space.

[167] The terms used in the text explain themselves if we compare, _e.g._, a Teniers with a Greek statue, or again, say, a Turner with the same. "Subjectivity" means that the work of art appeals to our ordinary feelings, experiences, etc. Music and poetry are still stronger cases than painting, according to the theory. Poetry especially can deal with _everything_.

[168] The unity of the individuals forming a church or nation is not visible, but exists in common sentiments, purposes, etc., and in the recognition of their community.

[169] An expression constantly applied to consciousness, because it can look at itself. _Cf._:-- "'Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?'

'No, Cassius; for the eye sees not itself But by reflection, by some other things.'"

_Julius Cæsar._ [170] Posited or laid down to be ideal; almost = pronounced or made _to be_ in the sense of _not being_; e.g. musical sound is "ideal" as existing, _qua_ work of art, in memory only, the moment in which it is actually heard being fugitive; a picture, in respect of the third dimension, which has to be read into it; and poetry is almost wholly ideal, _i.e._ uses hardly any sensuous element, but appeals almost