Self-consciousness has before it another self-con- sciousness; it has come outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an other being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially real, but sees its own self in the other.
It must cancel this its other. To do so is the subla- tion of that first double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it must set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby to become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon proceeds to sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double sense is at the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For, firstly, through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with itself again through the cancelhng of its otherness; but secondly, it likewise gives otherness back again to the other self- consciousness, for it was aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the other and thus lets the other again go free.
This process of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has in this manner been represented as the action of one alone. But this action Independence of Self-Consciousness 111 on the part of the one has its'ilf the double significance of being at once its own actir-n and the action of that other as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within itself, and there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first does not have the object before it in the way that object primarily exists for desire, but as an object existing inde- pendently for itself, over which therefore it has no power to do anything for its own behoof, if that object does not per se do what the first does to it. The process then is absolutely the double process of both self- consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as itself; each itself does what it demands on the part of the other, and for that reason does what it does, only so far as the other does the same. Action from one side only would be useless, because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of both.
The action has then a double entente not only in the sense that it is an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also inasmuch as it is in its undivided entirety the act of the one as well as of the other.
In this movement we see the process repeated which came before us as the play of forces; in the present case, however, it is found in consciousness. What in the former had effect only for us [contemplating experience], holds here for the terms themselves. The middle term is self-consciousness which breaks itself up into the extremes; and each extreme is this interchange of its own determinateness, and complete transition into the opposite. While qua consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being outside itself it is at the same time restrained within itself, it exists for itself, and its self-externahsation is for consciousness.
VOL. I. — N 178 Phenomenology of Mind Consciousness finds that it immediately is and is not another consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it cancels itself as existing for itself, and has self-existence only in the self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other, through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each is to itself and to the other an immediate self- existing reahty, which, at the same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. They recognise themselves as mutually recognising one another.
This pure conception of recognition, of duplication of self- consciousness within its unity, we must now consider in the way its process appears for self-conscious- ness. It will, in the first place, present the aspect of the disparity of the two, or the break-up of the middle term into the extremes, which, qua extremes, are opposed to one another, and of which one is merely recognised, while the other only recognises.
Self-consciousness is primarily simple existence for self, self-identity by exclusion of every other from itself. It takes its essential nature and absolute object to be Ego; and in this immediacy, in this bare fact of its self- existence, it is individual. That which for it is other stands as unessential object, as object with the impress and character of negation. But the other is also a self - consciousness; an individual makes its appearance in antithesis to an individual. Appearing thus in their immediacy, they are for each other in the manner of ordinary objects. They are independent individual forms, modes of consciousness that have not risen above the bare level of life (for the existent object here has been determined as life). They are, moreover, forms of consciousness which have not yet Independence of Self-Consciousness 179 accomplished for one another the process of absolute ab- straction, of uprooting all immediate existence, and of being merely the bare, negative fact of self-identical con- sciousness; or, in other words, have not yet revealed themselves to each, other as existing purely for them- selves, i.e. as self-C)Onsciousness. Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and hence its own certainty of itself is still without truth. For its truth would be merely that its own individual existence for itself would bts shown to it to be an independent object, or, which is the same thing, that the object would be exhibited as this pure certainty of itself. By the notion of recognition^ however, this is not possible, except in the form that s^s the other is for it, so it is for the other; each in its self through its own action and again through the action of the other achieves this pure abstraction of existence for; self.
The presentjjition of itself, however, as pure abstraction of self-conscio|usness consists in showing itself as a pure negation of itsi objective form, or in showing that it is fettered to no\ determinate existence, that it is not bound at all hj\ the particularity everywhere character- istic of existence as such, and is not tied up with life. The process of bringing all this out involves a twofold action— laction on the part of the other, and action on the par*t of itself. In so far as it is the other's action, each aimsl at the destruction and death of the other. But in thri's there is imphcated also the second kind of action, «(|'lf-activity; for each imphes that it risks its own hfe.. The relation of both self-conscious- nesses is in this way so constituted that they prove themselves and each other through a hfe-and-death struggle. They ixlust enter into this struggle, for they 180 Phenomenology of Mind must bring their certainty of f,hemselves, the certainty of being for themselves, to the level of objective truth, and make this a fact both in the case of the other and in their ovm case as well. And it is solely by risking life, that freedom is obtained; only thus is it tried and proved that the essential nature of self-conscious- ness is not bare existence, is not the merely immediate form in which it at first makes its appearance, is not its mere absorption in the expanse of hfe. Rather it is thereby guaranteed that there is nothing present but what might be taken as a vanishiing moment — that self-consciousness is merely pure se^f -existence, being-for-self. The individual, who ha.s not staked his 'ife, may, no doubt, be recognised as 'a Person; but he Jias not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness. In the same way each must aim at the death of the other, as it risks its own life thereby; for that other is to it of no more worth than itself; the other's reality is presented to the former as an external other, as outside itself; it must cancel that externality. The other is a purely' existent con- sciousness and entangled in manifold \vays; it must regard its otherness as pure existence for itself or as absolute negation.
This trying and testing, however, by a struggle to the death, cancels both the truth which was to result from it, and therewith the certainty of self altogether. For just as Ufe is the natural " position " of conscious- ness, independence without absolute negativity, so death is the natural " negation " of consciousness, negation without independence, which thus remains without the requisite significance of actual recog- nition. Through death, doubtless, there has arisen Independence of Self -Consciousness 181 the certainty that both did stake their hfe, and held it hghtly both in their own case and in the case of the other; but that is not for those who underwent this struggle. They cancel their consciousness which had its place in this ahen element of natural existence; in other words, they cancel themselves and are sublated, as terms or extremes seeking to have existence on their own account. But along with this there vanishes from the play of change, the essential moment, viz. that of breaking up into extremes with opposite characteris- tics; and the middle term collapses into a hfeless unity which is broken up into hfeless extremes, merely existent and not opposed. And the two do not mutually give and receive one another back from each other through consciousness; they let one another go quite indifferently, hke things. Their act is abstract negation, not the negation characteristic of consciousness, which cancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains what is sublated, and thereby survives its being sub- lated.
In this experience self-consciousness becomes aware that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness. Tn immediate self-consciousness the simple ego is absolute object, which, however, is for us or in itself absolute mediation, and has as its essential moment substantial and sohd independence. The dissolution of that simple unity is the result of the first experience; through this there is posited a pure self-consciousness, and a consciousness which is not purely for itself, but for another, i.e. as an existent consciousness, con- sciousness in the form and shape of thinghood. Both moments are essential, since, in the first instance, they are unlike and opposed, and their reflexion into 182 Phenomenology of Mind unity has not yet come to light, they stand as two opposed forms or modes of consciousness. The one is independent whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is dependent whose essence is hfe or existence for another. The former is the Master, or Lord, the latter the Bondsman.
The master is the consciousness that exists for itself; but no longer merely the general notion of existence for self. Rather, it is consciousness which, while existing on its own account, is mediated with itself through an other consciousness, viz. bound up with an independent being or with thinghood in general. The master brings himself into relation to both these moments, to a thing as such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness whose essential character is thinghood, and since the master, qua notion of self-consciousness, is (o) an imme- diate relation of self-existence, but is now moreover at the same time (6) mediation, or a being-for-self which is for itself only through an other — he [the master] stands in relation (a) immediately to both (&) mediately to each through the other. The master relates himself to the bondsman mediately through independent existence, for that is precisely what keeps the bondsman in thrall; it is his chain, from which he could not in the struggle get away, and for that reason he proves himself dependent, shows that his independence consists in being a thing. The master, however, is the power controlling this state of existence, for he has shown in the struggle that he holds existence to be merely something negative. Since he is the power dominat- ing the negative nature of existence, while this existence again is the power controlling the other [the bondsman], the master holds, far consequence, Lordship and Bondage 183 :his other in subordination. In the same way the naster relates himself to the thing mediately through :he bondsman. The bondsman being a self-conscious- aess in the broad sense, also takes up a negative attitude to things and cancels them; but the thing is, at the same time, independent for him, and, in consequence, he cannot, with all his negating, get so far as to annihilate it outright and be done with it; that is to say, he merely works on it. To the master, on the other hand, by means of this mediatiag process, belongs the imme- diate relation, in the sense of the pure negation of it, in other words he gets the enjoyment. What mere desire did not attain, he now succeeds in attaining, viz. to have done with the thing, and find satisfaction in enjoyment. Desire alone did not get the length of this, because of the independence of the thing. The master, however, who has interposed the bondsman between it and himself, thereby relates himself merely to the dependence of the thing, and enjoys it without quahfication and without reserve. The aspect of its independence he leaves to the bondsman, who labours upon it.
In these two moments, the master gets his recognition through an other consciousness, for in them the latter aiSrms itself as unessential, both by working upon the thing, and, on the other hand, by the fact of being dependent on a determinate existence; in neither case can this other get the mastery over existence, and succeed in absolutely negating it. We have thus here this moment of recognition, viz. that the other con- sciousness cancels itself as self-existent, and, ipso facto, itself does what the first does to it. In the same way we have the other moment, that this action on the part of the second is the action proper of the first; for what 184 Phenomenology of Mind is done by the bondsman is properly an action on tlie part of the master. The latter exists only for himself, that is his essential nature; he is the negative power without quahfication, a power to which the thing is naught, and his is thus the absolutely essential action in this situation, while the bondsman's is not so, his is an unessential activity. But for recognition proper there is needed the moment that what the master does to the other he should also do to himself, and what the bonds- man does to himself, he should do to the other also. On that accomit a form of recognition has arisen that is one-sided and unequal.
In all this, the unessential consciousness is, for the master, the object which embodies the truth of his certainty of himself. But it is evident that this object does not correspond to its notion; for, just where the master has effectively achieved lordship, he really finds that something has come about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an inde- pendent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has achieved. He is thus not assured of seK-existence as his truth; he finds that his truth is rather the un- essential consciousness, and the fortuitous unessential action of that consciousness.
The truth of the independent consciousness is accord- ingly the consciousness of the bondsman. This doubt- less appears in the first instance outside it, and not as the truth of self-consciousness. But just as lordship showed its essential nature to be the reverse of what it wants to be, so, too, bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it immediately is: being a consciousness repressed within itself, it will enter into itself, and change round into real and true independence.
Lordship and Bondage 185 We have seen what bondage is only in relation to lordship. But it is a self-consciousness, and we have now to consider what it is, in this regard, in and for itself. In the first instance, the master is taken to be the essential reahty for the state of bondage; hence, for it, the truth is the independent consciousness existing for itself, although this truth is not yet taken as inherent in bondage itself. Still, it does in fact contain within itself this truth of pure negativity and self-existence, because it has experienced this reahty within it. For this self-consciousness was not in peril and fear for this element or that, nor for this or that moment of time, it was afraid for its entire being; it felt the fear of death, it was in mortal terror of its sovereign master. It has been in that experience melted to its inmost soul, has trembled throughout its every fibre, the stable foundations of its whole being have quaked within it. This complete perturbation of its entire substance, this absolute dissolution of all its stabihty into fluent continuity, is, however, the simple, ultimate nature of self-consciousness, abso- lute negativity, pure self-referrent existence, which consequently is involved in this type of consciousness. This moment of pure self-existence is moreover a fact for it; for in the master this moment is consciously his object. Further, this bondsman's consciousness is not only this total dissolution in a general way; in serving and toiling, the bondsman actually carries this out. By serving he cancels in every particular moment his dependence on and attachment to natural existence, and by his work removes this existence away. The feeling of absolute power, however, reahsed both in general and in the particular form of service, is 186 Phenomenology of Mind only dissolution implicitly, and albeit the fear of his lord is the beginning of wisdom, consciousness is not therein aware of being self-existent. Through work and labour, however, this consciousness of the bondsman comes to itself. In the moment which corresponds to desire in the case of the master's consciousness, the aspect of the non-essential relation to the thing seemed to fall to the lot of the servant, since the thing there retained its independence. Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby unalloyed feehng of self. This satisfaction, however, just for that reason is itself only a state of evanescence, for it lacks objectivity or subsistence. Labour, on the other hand, is desire restrained and checked, evanescence delayed and postponed; in other words, labour shapes and fashions the thing. The negative relation to the object passes into the form of the object, into something that is per- manent and remains; because it is just for the labourer that the object has independence. This negative mediating agency, this activity giving shape and form, is at the same time the individual existence, the pure self-existence of that consciousness, which now in the work it does is externahsed and passes into the condition of permanence. The consciousness that toils and serves accordingly comes by this means to view that independent being as its self.
But again, shaping or forming the object has not only the positive significance that the bondsman becomes thereby aware of himself as factually and objectively self-existent; this type of consciousness has also a negative import, in contrast with its first moment, the element of fear. For in shaping the thing it only becomes aware of its own proper negativity, its Lordship and Bondage 187 existence on its own account, as an object, tkrough. the fact that it cancels the actual form confronting it. But this objective negative element is precisely the alien, external reahty, before which it trembled. Now, however, it destroys this extraneous alien negative, affirms and sets itself up as a negative in the element of permanence, and thereby becomes aware of being objectively for itself. In the master, this self-existence is felt to be an other, is only external; in fear, the self- existence is present implicitly; in fashion- ing the thing, self-existence comes to be felt ex- plicitly as its own proper being, and it attains the consciousness that itself exists in its own right and on its own account {an und fur sich). By the fact that the form is objectified, it does not become some- thing other than the consciousness moulding the thing through work; for just that form is his pure self- existence, which therein becomes truly reahsed. Thus precisely in labour where there seemed to be merely some outsider's mind and ideas involved, the bondsman becomes aware, through this re-discovery of himself by himself, of having and being a " mind of his own."
For this reflexion of self into self the two moments, fear and service in general, as also that of formative activityTare necessary: and at the same time both must "exist in a universal manner. Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains formal and does not spread over the whole known reahty of existence. Without the formative activity shaping the thing, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become objective for itself. Should conscious- ness shape and form the thing without the initial state of absolute fear, then it has merely a vain and futile 188 Phenomenology of Mind " mind of its own "; for its form or negativity is not negativity perse, and hence its formative activity cannot furnish the consciousness of itself as essentially real. If it has endured not absolute fear, but merely some slight anxiety, the negative reahty has remained external to it, its substance has not been through and through infected thereby. Since the entire content of its natural consciousness has not tottered and shaken, it is still inherently a determinate mode of being; having a " mind of its own " {der eigen Sinn) is simply stubbornness (Eigensinn), a type of freedom which does not get beyond the attitude of bondage. The less the pure form can become its essential nature, the less is that form, as overspreading and controlling particulars, a universal formative activity, an absolute notion; it is rather a piece of cleverness which has mastery within a certain range, but does not wield imiversal power and dominate the entire objective reality.
B FREEDOM OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS STOICISM: SCEPTICISM: THE UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS [The previous section has established the self as ultimately a free self. But even this is abstract at first, and hence the attempt to maintain it must pass through different stages. These attempts have taken historical expression in European civilisation, but these are merely instances of an experience that is strictly found in all mankind. Hegel, however, selects the forms assumed in European history, and has these in mind through- out the succeeding analysis. The terms Stoicism and Scepticism refer primarily to the forms which these assumed in Greece and Rome. The last stage of independent and free self-hood he names, faute de mieux, the "unhappy consciousness." The background of historical material for this type of mind is found in the religious life of the Middle Ages and the mental attitude assumed under the dominion of the Roman Catholic Church and the Peudal Hierarchy. The social and political dissolution of the Roman Empire has its counterpart in the mental chaos and dissolution of Scepticism; the craving of free mind for absolute stability and constancy amid change and uncertainty found expression in an organised attempt on the part of the Church to establish permanent con- nection between man's mental insecurity and an Immutable Reality.
The two poles of the antithesis were far removed from each other, and the method or methods adopted to bring about the union reflect the profound contrast of the opposing elements. It is the inner process of free mind in this realm of abstract subjective piety which Hegel analyses in the part termed the ' unhappy consciousness ' — ' unhappy ' because craving complete consciousness of self and never at this stage attaining it.
The end of this movement, and therefore the disappearance of all the onesidedness of abstract individual freedom of self, is found when, through the above struggle, there dawns on the self the consciousness of its complete and explicit unity with reality in every shape and form. This is the beginning of the absolute sovereignty of Mind — the Consciousness of Reason as supreme. The change to this new condition found historical expression in the Reformation and the Renaissance].
190 Phenomenology of Mind