Society as a Herd of Individuals 407 result with the mark of its approval and praise, this is meant to imply that in the case of work it does not merely praise the work itself, but at the same time its own generosity and moderation in not having de- stroyed the work as work nor spoiled it by finding fault. Since it shows an interest in the work, it enjoys its own self therein; and in the same way the work which it found fault with, is welcomed for just this enjoyment of its own action which is thereby procured. Those, however, who regard themselves as, or profess to be, deceived by this interference with others wanted really themselves to deceive in the same way. They give out their efforts and doings as something only for themselves, in which they merely have themselves and their own nature in view. But since they do some- thing, and thus express their nature, bring themselves to the light of day, they directly contradict by their deed the pretext of wanting to exclude the daylight, i.e. to exclude the publicity of universal consciousness, and participation by every one. Actuahsation is, on the contrary, an exposing of what is one's own in a universal element, where it comes to be and has to be " fact " for every one.
Consciousness, then, is as much deception of itself as of others, if it is pretended that the " bare fact " is its sole concern. A consciousness that lays open a " fact " soon learns that others want to hurry to the spot and make themselves busy there, like flies to new milk; and they in their turn find out in its case that it is not dealing with "fact" qua object, but with its "own" fact. On the other hand, if only action itself, the use of powers and capacities, or the expression of a given individuahty, is to be the essential thing, they recipro- 408 Phenomenology of Mind cally learn that all are affected, and consider them- selves invited to deal with the matter, and that instead of a mere abstract action, or a particular peculiar action, something has been ehcited and exposed which was like- wise for others or is a " fact itself." In both cases the same thing happens; and only appears to be different by contrast with that which was accepted and assumed to hold on the matter. Consciousness finds both sides to be equally essential moments, and there- by learns what the nature of the "fact itself" is, viz. that it is neither merely " fact " which is opposed to action in general and to the particular action, nor action which is opposed to permanence, and which might be the genus independent of these moments as its species: but rather that " fact itself " is an essential reaUty whose existence means the action of the particular indi- vidual, and of all individuals, and whose action is immediately for others, or is a " fact," and is only "fact" in the sense of an action of each and all — the essential reality which is the essence of all beings, (Wesen), which is spiritual essence. Consciousness learns that no one of these moments is subject, but rather gets dissolved in the universal " fact itself." The moments of individuality, which were taken as subject one after another by this unreflective incoherent stage of consciousness, coalesce and con- centrate into simple individuality, which while a this, a particular, is likewise directly universal. " Fact itself " thereby ceases to stand in the relation of a predicate, loses the characteristic of hfeless abstract universahty: it is substance permeated by individu- ality: subject, wherein individuality is just as much individual, or this particular individuality, as all in- Society as a Herd of Individuals 409 dividuals: and the universal, which, has an existence only as being this action of each and all, gets an actual reality in that this particular consciousness knows it to be its own individual reality, and the reahty of all. " Pure fact itself " is what was characterised above as the "category," — being which is the ego, or ego which is being, but in the sense of thought, which is still dis- tinguished from actual self-consciousness. Here, how- ever, the moments of actual self-consciousness, being- for-self and being-for-another — so far as we call them its content, purpose, action, and reality, and also in so far as we call them its form — are made identical with the bare and simple category itself, and the category is thereby at the same time the entire content.
Reason as Lawgiver Reason as Lawgiver [The nest step in the development of individuality is to bring out the universal conditions of its co-existence with other individualities. This it can do because it is complete in itself, and is essentially self-conscious reason. These conditions are many, because of the diversity of its own content and of the relations in which it stands; and are yet the condi- tions of individuality which is one and single. Hence their plurality never implies a separation; the conditions limit each other's operation and their precise operation must be determined.
These then are the two stages in determining the general conditions or laws of co-existence of individuality: (1) the enunciation of different laws by and for rational individuality, (2) the relation of these laws inter se, and to the single principle from which they all proceed. Both stages owe their existence to the activitj' of reason. Reason promulgates laws, and criticises, tests the validity of, the laws.
Hence the two following sections.]
410 Reason as Lawgiver Spiritual essential reality is, in its bare existence, pure consciousness, and also a particular self-con- sciousness. The originally determinate nature of the individual has lost its positive significance of being inherently the element and purpose of his activity; it is merely a superseded moment, while the individual is a self in the sense of a universal self. Conversely, the formal "fact itself" gets its content and filling in active individuality with the distinctions it draws within it- self; for these distinctions compose the content of that universal. The category is implicit {an sicli) as the universal of pure consciousness; it is also explicit {fiir sich), for the self of consciousness is likewise its moment. It is absolute being, for that universality is the bare self-identity of being.
Thus the significance of what is object for conscious- ness lies in its being the truth; it is and it holds good, in the sense of being and holding good by itself as an independent entity {an und fiir sich selbst). It is the " absolute fact," which no longer suffers from the oppo- sition between what is certain and what is true, between universal and particular, between purpose and its reahty, but whose existence is the reality and action of self-consciousness. This " fact " is therefore the ethical substance; and consciousness of it is ethical consciousness. Its object is likewise taken to be the truth, for it combines self-consciousness and being in 411 412 Phenomenology of Mind a single unity. It stands for what is absolute, for self-consciousness cannot and will not again go beyond this object because it is there at home with itself: it cannot, for the object is all its power, and all its being: it will not, because the object is its self, or the will of this particular self. It is the real object inherently as object, for it contains and in- volves the distinction which consciousness implies. It divides itself into areas or spheres (Massen) which are the determinate laws of the absolute reahty [viz. the ethical substance]. These spheres, however, do not obscure the notion, for the moments, (being, bare con- sciousness and self), are kept contained within it — a unity which constitutes the inner nature of these spheres, and no longer lets these moments in this distinction fall a^part from one another.
These laws or groups (Massen) of the substance of ethical Hfe are directly recognised and acknowledged. We cannot ask for their origin and justification, nor is there something else to search for as their warrant; for something other than this independent self-subsistent reality (an und fiir sich seyendes Wesen) could only be self-consciousness itself. But self-consciousness is nothing else than this reality, for itself is the self-exist- ence of this reality, which is the truth just because it is as much the self of consciousness as its inherent nature (sein Ansicli), or pure consciousness.
Since self-consciousness knows itself to be a moment of this substance, the moment of self-existence, of inde- pendence and self-determination, it expresses the exis- tence of the law within itself, in the form: " the healthy natural reason knows immediately what is right and good." As healthy reason knows the law immedi- Reason as Laivgiver 413 ately, so the law is valid for it also immediately, and it says directly: " this is right and good ": " this," a particular, for there are determinate specific laws, the "this" is "fact itself" with a concrete filling and content.
What is thus given immediately must likewise be accepted and regarded as immediate. As in the case of the immediacy of sense-experience, so here we have also to consider the nature of the existence to which this immediate certainty in ethical experience gives expression — to analyse the constitution of the imme- diately existing areas (Massen) of ethical reality. Examples of some such laws will show what we want to know, and since we take them in the form of de- clarations of the healthy reason knowing them, we have not, in this comiection, first to bring to notice the moment which has to be made good in their case when looked at as immediate ethical laws.
" Every one ought to speak the truth." In this duty, as expressed unconditionally, the condition will at once be granted, viz. if he knows the truth. The command will therefore now rim: every one should speak the truth, at all times according to his knowledge and con- viction about it. The healthy reason, this very ethical consciousness which knows immediately what is right and good, will explain that this condition had all the while been so bound up with that universal maxim that it meant the command to be taken in that sense. It thereby admits, however, in point of fact, that in the very expression of the maxim it eo ifso really violated it. The healthy reason said: "each should speak the truth"; it intended, however: "he must speak the truth according to his knowledge and con- 414 Phenomenology of Mind viction." That is to say, it spoke otherwise than it intended, and to speak otherwise than one intends means not speaking the truth. The improved untruth, or inaptitude now takes the form: " each must speak the truth according to his knowledge and conviction about it on each occasion." Thereby, however, what was universally necessary and absolutely vahd (and this the proposition wanted to express) has turned round into what is really a complete contingency. For speaking the truth is left to the chance whether I know it and can convince myself of it; and there is nothing more in the statement than that truth and falsehood are to be spoken as they come, just as any one happens to know, intend, and understand. This contingency in the content has universality merely in the prepositional form of the expression; but as an ethical maxim, the proposition promises a universal and necessary content, and thus contradicts itself by the content being contingent. Finally, if the maxim were to be improved by saying that the contingency of the knowledge and the conviction as to the truth should be dropped, and that the truth, too, " ought " to be known, then this would be a command which con- tradicts straightway what we started from. Healthy reason was at first assumed to have the immediate capacity of expressing the truth; now, however, we are saying that it " ought " to know the truth, i.e. that it does not immediately know how to express the truth. Looking at the content, this has dropped out in the demand that we " should " know the truth; for this demand refers to knowing in general — " we ought to know." What is demanded is, therefore, strictly speak- ing, something independent of every specific content, Reason as Lawgiver 415 But, here, the whole point of the statement concerned a definite content, a distinction involved in the substance of the ethical life. Yet this inherent determination of that substance is a content of such a kind as turned out really to be a complete contingency, and when we try to get the required universality and necessity by making the law refer to the knowledge [instead of to the content], then the content really disappears altogether.
Another celebrated command runs: " Love thy neighbour as thyself." It is directed to an individual standing in relation to another individual, and asserts this law as a relation of a particular individual to a particular individual, i.e. a relation of sentiment or feeling (Empfindung). Active love — for an inactive love has of course no existence, and is therefore doubtless not intended here — aims at removing evil from some one and bringing him good. To do this we have to distinguish what the evil is, what is the appropriate good to meet this evil, and what in general his well-being consists in; i.e. we have to love him intelligently. Unintelligent love will do him harm perhaps more than hatred. Intelligent, veritable {wesent- lich) well-doing is, however, in its richest and most important form, the intelligent universal action of the state — an action compared with which the action of a particular individual as such is something altogether so trifling that it is hardly worth talking about. The action of the state is in this connection of such great weight and strength, that if the action of the individual were to oppose it, and either sought to be straightway and deliberately {fur sich) criminal, or out of love for another wanted to cheat the universal out of the right 416 Phenomenology of Mind and claim which it has upon him, such action would be useless and would inevitably be annihilated. Hence all that well-doing, which lies in sentiment and feeling, can mean, is something wholly and solely particular; it amounts to merely a temporary relief, which is as contingent as it is momentary. Chance determines not merely its occasion, but also whether it is a "work" at all, whether it is not at once dissipated again, and whether it does not itself really turn to evil. Thus, this sort of action for the good of others, which is given out as necessary, is so constituted that it may just as likely not exist as exist; is such that, if the occasion by chance arises, it may possibly turn out a " work," may possibly be good, but just as likely may not. This law, there- fore, has as little of a universal content as the first above considered, and fails to express anj^thing sub- stantial, something objectively real per se {an und fur sich), which it should do if it is to be an absolute ethical law. In other words, such laws never get further than the "ought to be," they have no actual reality; they are not laws, but merely commands.
It is, however, in point of fact, clear from the very nature of the case that we must renounce all claim to an absolute universal content. For every specific de- termination which the bare and simple substance (and its very nature consists in being simple) might get, is inadequate to its nature. The command itself in its simple absoluteness expresses immediate ethical exist- ence; the distinction appearing in it is. a specific determinate element, and thus a content standing under the absolute universality of this simple existence. Since, then, an absolute content must thus be re- nounced, formal universality is the only kind that is Reason as Lawgiver 417 possible and suitable, and this means merely that it is not to contradict itself. For universality devoid of content is formal; and an absolute content amounts to a distinction which is no distinction, i.e. means absence of content.* In default of all content, there is thus nothing left with which to make a law but the bare form of universality, in fact, the mere tautology of consciousness, a tautology which stands over against the content, and consists in a knowledge, not of the content actually existing, the content proper, but of its ultimate essence only, a knowledge of its self-consistency. The ethical being is consequently not itself if so facto a content, but only a standard for deciding whether a content is capable of being a law or not, when the content does not contradict itself. Reason as lawgiver is reduced to being reason as criterion; instead of laying down laws reason now only tests what is laid down.
* Tie above criticism applies to Kant's " categorical imperative."
VOL I.— 2 E Keason as Testing Laws A difference within the bare and simple ethical sub- stance is for it an accident, which, in the case of determinate commands, as we saw, appeared as contingency in the knowledge of the circumstances and contingency in action. The comparison of that simple existence with the determinateness which was inadequate to its nature, took place in us; and the simple substance was then seen to be formal universality or pure consciousness, which holds itself free from and in opposition to content, and is a knowledge of that con- tent as something that is specific and determinate. The universality in this way remains the same as what "fact itself" was. But in consciousness this universaUty is an " other "; it is no longer the genus, inert and void of thought, but is related to the particular and valid as its force and truth.
This consciousness at first seems the same process of testing which formerly we carried on, and its action seems unable to be anything else than has already taken place — a comparison of the universal with the determinate particular which would yield as formerly their mutual incongruity. But the relation of content to universal is different here, since this universal has got another significance. It is jornml universality of which the specific consent' "is capable; for in that 418 Reason as Testing Laivs 419 universality the content is considered merely in rela- tion to itself. When we were applying the test, the universal solid substance stood over against that specificity, which proved to be a contingent element of the consciousness into which the substance entered. Here one term of the comparison has vanished; the universal is no longer the existing substance with a value all its own, is no longer substantive right per se, but simple knowledge or form, which compares a content merely with itself, and looks at it to see if it is a tautology. Laws are no longer given, but ex- amined and tested; and the laws, for that conscious- ness which apphes the test, are already given. It picks up and accepts their content as simply there, without going into the consideration (as was done before) of the particularity and contingency attaching to its reality; instead of this it takes its stand by the command as command, and takes up an attitude to- wards this command just as direct and simple as [the fact of] its being a standard and criterion for criticiz- ing it.
For that reason, however, this process of testing does not get very far. Just because the standard is a tau- tology and indifferent to the content, it accepts one content just as readily as the opposite. Suppose the question is: — ought it to be a law without quahfication {an und fur sick) that there should be property: — without quahfication, and not because of utiHty for other ends. The essential ethical truth there consists just in the fact that the law should be merely a self- consistent whole [sicli selhst gleiche), and through being identical with itself, have its ground in its own essen- tial nature, and not be something conditioned. Pro- 420 Phenomenology of Mind perty fer se does not contradict itself. It is a specifically determinate isolated element, or merely self-consistent and self-identical {sick selhst gleicli). Absence of pro- perty, absence of ownership of things or, again, com- munity of goods, contradicts itself just as little. That something belong to nobody at all, or to the first best man who puts himself in possession, or, again, to all together, and to each according to his need or in equal portions — that is a simple characteristic, a formal thought, like its opposite, property.
If no one is master of a thing and it is looked at as a necessary object for human requirement, then it necessarily becomes the possession of some particular individual; and the contradiction would rather lie in mak- ing a law out of the freedom of the thing. By the thing being without an owner is meant, however, not absolute freedom from ownership, l3ut that it shall come into some one's possession according to the need of the individual, and, moreover, not in order to be kept but directly to be used. But to make provision for need in such an entirely casual haphazard manner is contra- dictory to the nature of the conscious being, with whom alone we have here to do. For such a being has to think of his need in a universal way, to look to his exist- ence in its entirety, and procure himself a permanent lasting good. This being so, the idea that a thing is to become by chance the possession of the first self- conscious individual (Lehen) who happens to need it, is inconsistent with itself.
In a communistic society, where provision would be made in a way which is universal and permanent, either each comes to have as much as he requires — in which case there is a contradiction between this inequality Reason as Testing Laws 421 and the essential nature of consciousness, whose prin- ciple is the equality of individuals — or, acting on this last principle, there is an equal division of goods, and in this case the share each gets has no relation to his needs, and yet this is solely what "share," i.e. fair share, really means.
But if when taken in this way absence of property seems contradictory, this is only because it has not been left in the form of a simple determinate characteristic. The same result is found in the case of property if this is resolved into separate moments. The particular thing which is my property has by being so the value of some- thing universal, estabhshed, and permanent. This, how- ever, contradicts its nature, which consists in its being used and passing away. At the same time its value lies in being mine, which all others acknowledge and keep themselves away from. But just in my being acknow- ledged lies rather my equality, my identity, with every one — the opposite of exclusion. Again, what I possess is a thing, i.e. an existence, which is there for others in general, quite universally and without any condition that it is for me alone. That I possess it contradicts the general nature of its thinghood. Property therefore contradicts itself on all hands just as much as absence of property; each has within it both these opposite and self-contra- dictory moments, universahty and particularity.
But each of these determinate characteristics, pre- sented simply as property or absence of property without further developing its imphcations, is as simple in the one case as the other, i.e. is not self-contradictory. The standard of law which reason has within itself there- fore fits every case in the same way, and is in point of fact on standard at all. It would, too, tutur on 422 Phenomenology of Mind rather strange, if tautology, the principle of contra- diction, which is allowed to be merely a formal criterion for knowledge of theoretical truth, i.e. something which is quite indifferent to truth and untruth alike, were to be more than this for knowledge of practical truth.
In both the above moments of what fills up the previous emptiness of spiritual reahty {geistigen Wesens), the attempt to establish immediate determinate char- acteristics within the substance of the ethical life, and then to know whether these determinations are laws, has cancelled itself. The outcome, then, seems to be that neither determinate laws nor a knowledge of these can be effectively obtained. But the substance in question is the consciousness of itself as absolute essentiality {Wesenheit), a consciousness therefore which can give up neither the difference falling within that substance, nor the knowledge of this difference. That giving laws and testing laws have turned out futile indicates that both, taken individually and in isola- tign, are merely unstable moments of the ethical con- sciousness; and the process in which they appear has the formal significance, that the substance of ethical life is thereby shown to be consciousness.
So far as both these moments are more precise deter- minations of the consciousness of "fact as such" {Sache selhst) they can be looked on as forms of that honesty of nature {Ehrlichkeit) which now, as was the case with its formal moments, is much occupied with a content which " ought to be " good and right, and with testing definite fixed truth of this sort, and supposes itself to possess in healthy reason and intelligent insight the force and vahdity of ethical commands.
Without this honesty of nature, however, laws do not Reason as Testing Laws 423