These moments taken together exhaust the nature of the Thing, the truth of perception, so far as it is neces- sary to develop it here. It is (1) a universahty, passive and indifferent, the " also " which forms the sole bond of connection between the quahties, or rather con- stituent elements, " matters," existing together; (2) negation, hkewise in a simple form, or the " one," which consists in excluding properties of an opposite character; and (3) the many properties themselves, the relation of the two first moments — the negation, as it is related to that indifferent element, and in being so expands into a manifold of differences, the focal point of par- ticularity radiating forth into plurality within the " medium " of subsistence. Taking the aspect that these differences belong to a "medium" indifferent to what is within it, they are themselves imiversal, they are related merely to themselves and do not affect each other. Taking, however, the other aspect, that they belong to the negative unity, they at the same time mutually exclude one another; but do so necessarily in the shape of properties that have a separate existence apart from the " also " connecting them. The sensuous universahty, the immediate unity of positive being and negative exclusion, is only then a property, when oneness and pure universahty are evolved from it and distinguished from one another, and when that sensuous universality combines these with one another. Only after this relation of tlie unity to those pure essential moments is eiiccted, is the " Thing " complete.
This, then, is the way the " Thing " in perception is constituted, and consciousness is perceptual in character so far as this " Thing '"' is its object: it has merely to " take " the object [ccvpio — ^QT-eeption'] and assume the attitude of pure apprehension, and what comes its way in so doing is truth {das Wahre). If it did something when taking the given, it would by such supplementa- tion or elimination alter the truth. Since the object is the true and universal, the self-same, while con- sciousness is the variable and non-essential, it may happen that consciousness apprehends the object wrongly and deceives itself. The percipient is aware of the possibihty of deception; for, in the universaHty forming the principle here, the percipient is directly aware of otherness, but aware of it as null and naught, as what is superseded. His criterion of truth is therefore scl/'-sameness, and his procedure is that of apprehending what comes before him as self-same. Since, at the same time, diversity is a fact for him, his procedure is a way of relating the diverse moments of his apprehension to one another. If, however, in this comparison a want of sameness comes out, this is not an untruth on the part of the object (for the object is the self-same), but on the part of perception.
Let us now see what sort of experience consciousness forms in the course of its actual perception. We, who are analysing the process, find this experience already contained in the development (just given) of the object and of the attitude of consciousness towards it. The experience will be merely the development of the con- tradictions that appear there.
Perception 111 The object which I apprehend, presents itself as purely " one " and single: also, I am aware of the " pro- perty " (Eigenschaft) in it, a property which is universal, thereby transcending the particularity of the object. The first form of being, in which the objective reahty has the sense of a " one," was thus not its true being; and since the object is the true fact here, the untruth falls on my side, and the apprehension was not correct. On account of the universality of the property {Eigenschaft) I must rather take the objective entity as a commu7iity {Gemeinschaft) in general. I further perceive now the property to be determinate, opposed to another and excluding this other. Thus, in point of fact, I did not apprehend the object rightly when I defined it as a " commonness " or commimity with others, or as con- tinuity; and must rather, taking account of the deter- minateness of the proj^erty, divide the continuity and set down the object as a " one " that excludes. In the divided " one " I find many such properties, which are not attached to one another, but indifferent to one another. Thus I did not apprehend the object correctly when I took it for something that excludes. The object, instead, just as formerly it was merely continuity in general, is now a universal common medium where many properties in the form of sense universals subsist, each for itself and on its own account, and, qua determinate, excluding the others. The simple and true fact, which I perceive, is, however, in virtue of this result, not a universal medium either, but the particular property by itself, which, again, in this form, is neither a pro- perty nor a determinate being, for it is now neither attached to a distinct "one" nor in relation to others. But the particular quahty is a property only when 112 Phenomenology of Mind attached to a " one,'' and determinate only by relation to others. By being this bare relation of self to self, it remains merely sensuous existence in general, smce it no longer contains the character of negativity; and the mode of consciousness, which is now aware of a bemg of sense, is merely a way of " meaning " (Meinen) or " intending," i.e. it has left the attitude of perception entirely and gone back into itself. But sense existence and " meaning " themselves pass over into perception: I am thrown back on the beginning, and once more dragged into the same circuit, that supersedes itself in every moment and as a whole.
Consciousness, then, has to go over this cycle again, but not in the same way as on the first occasion. For it has found out, regarding perception, that the truth and outcome of perception is its dissolution, is reflection out of and away from the truth into itself. In this way consciousness becomes definitely aware of how its perceptual process is essentially constituted, viz. that this is not a simple bare apprehension, but in its apprehension is at the same time reflected out of the true content back into itself. This return of consciousness into itself, which is immediately involved and implicated in that pure apprehension — for this return to self has proved to be essential to perception — alters the true content. Consciousness is aware that this aspect is at the same time its own, and takes it upon itself; and by so doing consciousness will thus get the true object bare and naked.
In this way we have, now, in the case of perception, as happened in the case of sensuous certainty, the aspect of consciousness being forced back upon itself; but, in the first instance, not in the sense in which Perception.113 this took place in the former case — i.e. not as if the truth of perception fell within it. Rather consciousness is aware that the untruth, that comes out there, falls within it. By knowing this, however, consciousness is able to cancel and supersede this untruth. It distin- guishes its apprehension of the truth from the untruth of its perception, corrects this untruth, and, so far as itself takes in hand to make this correction, the truth, qua truth of perception, certainly falls within its own consciousness. The procedure of consciousness, which we have now to consider, is thus so constituted that it no longer merely perceives, but is also conscious. of its reflection into self, and keeps this apart from the simple apprehension proper.
To begin with, then, I am aware of the " thing " as a " one," and have to keep it fixed in this true character as " one." If in the course of perceiving something crops up contradicting that, then I must take it to be due to my reflection. Now, in perception various different properties also turn up, which seem to be properties of the thing. But the thing is a " one "; and we are aware in ourselves that this diversity, by which the thing ceases to be a unity, falls in us. This thing, then, is, in point of fact, merely white to our eyes, also sharp to our tongue, and also cubical to our feehng, and so on. The entire diversity of these aspects comes not from the thing, but from us; and we find them falling apart thus from one another, because the organs they affect are quite distinct inter se, the eye is entirely dis- tinct from the tongue, and so on. We are, consequently, the imiversal medium where such elements get dis- sociated, and exist each by itself. By the fact, then, that we regard the characteristic of being a universal VOL, I,— I 114 Phenomenology of Mind medium as our reflection, we preserve and maintain the self-sameness and truth of the thing, its being a " one." These diverse aspects, which consciousness puts to its side of the account, are, however, each by itself just as it appears in the universal medium, specifically determined. White is only in opposition to black, and so on, and the thing is a " one " just by the fact that it is opposed to other things. It does not, however, exclude others from itself, so far as it is " one "; for to be " one " is to be in a universal relation of self to self, and hence by the fact of its being " one " it is rather like all. It is through the determinate character- istic that the thing excludes other things. Things themselves are thus determinate in and for them- selves; they have properties by which they distin- guish themselves from one another. Since the pro- perty is the special and peculiar property [the proper property] of, the thing, or a specific characteristic in the thing itself, the thing has several properties. For, in the first place, the thing is true being, is a being in- herently in itself; and what is in it is so as its own essential nature, and not on account of other things. Hence, in the second place, the determmate properties are not on account of other things and for other things, but inherent in that thing itself. They are, however, determinate properties in it only by the fact that they are several, and maintain their distinction from one another. And, in the third place, since they are thus within " thinghood," they are self-contained, each in and for itself, and are indifferent to one another. It is, then, in truth the thing itself which is white, and also cubical, and also sharp, and so on; in other words, the thing is the " also," the general medium, wherein Perception 115 the many properties subsist externally to one another, without touching or aSecting one another, and without cancelhng one another; and, so taken, the " also " is accepted as the true being of the thing.
Now, on this mode of perception arising, con- sciousness is at the same time aware that it reflects itself also into itself, and that, in perceiving, the opposite moment to the " also " crops up. This moment, however, is the unity of the thing with itself, an unity which excludes distinction from itself. It is conse- quently this unity which consciousness has to take upon itself; for the thing as such is the subsistence of many different and independent properties. Thus we say of the thing, " it is white, and also cubical, and also sharp," and so on. But so far as it is white it is 7wt cubical, and so far as it is cubical and also white, it is not sharp, and so on. Putting these proper- ties into a " one " belongs solely to consciousness, which, therefore, has to avoid letting them coincide and be one (i.e. one and the same property) in the thing. In the long run it introduces the idea of " in-so-far " to meet the difficulty; and by this means it keeps the quahties apart, and preserves the thing in the sense of the " also." Quite properly consciousness at first makes itself responsible for the " oneness " in such a way that what was called a property is repre- sented as being " free matter " {materia libera).* In this way the thing is raised to the level of a true " also," since it thus becomes a collection of component elements (materials or matters), and instead of being a " one " becomes a mere enclosure, a circumscribing surface.
* All expression dreiwu from the physics of Hegel's day.
116 Phenomenology of Mind If we look back on what consciousness formerly took upon itself, and now takes upon itself, what it previously ascribed to the thing, and now ascribes to it, we see that consciousness alternately makes itself, as well as the thing, into both a pure atomic many-less " one," and an " also " resolved into independent con- stituent elements (materials or matters). Consciousness thus finds through this comparison that not only its way of taking the truth contains the diverse moments of apprehension and return upon itself, but that the truth itself, the thing, manifests itself in this two- fold manner. Here we find, as a result of experience, that the thing exhibits itself, in a determinate and specific manner, to the consciousness apprehending it, but at the same time is reflected back into itself out of that manner of presenting itself to consciousness; in other words, the thing contains within it opposite aspects of truth, a truth whose elements are in antithesis to one another.
Consciousness, then, gets away also from this second form of perceptual procedure, that, namely, which takes the thing as the true selfsame, and itself as the reverse, as the factor that leaves sameness behind and goes back into self. Its object is now the entire process which was previously shared between the object and consciousness. The thing is a "one," reflected into self; it is for itself; but it is also for an other; and, further, it is an other for itself as it is for another. The thing is, hence, for itself and also for another, a being that has difference of a twofold kind. But it is also "one." Its being "one," however, contradicts the diversity it has. Consciousness would, consequently, have again to make itself answerable for Perception' 117 Perception' 117 putting the diversity into the "one," and would have to keep this apart from the thing. It would thus be compelled to say that the thing " in-so-far as " it is for itself is not for another. But the oneness belongs to the thing itself, too, as consciousness has found out; the thing is essentially reflected into self. The " also," the distinction of elements indifferent to one another, falls doubtless within the thing, too, qua oneness, but since both are different, they do not fall within the same thing, but in different things. The con- tradiction which is found in the case of the objective content as a whole is assigned to and shared by two objects. The thing is, thus, doubtless as it stands {an und fur sich) selfsame, but this unity with itself is disturbed by other things. In this way the unity of the thing is preserved, and, at the same time, the otherness that is external to the thing, and also out- side consciousness.
Now, although the contradiction in the object is in this way allotted to difierent things, yet the isolated individual thing will still be affected with distinction. The different things have a subsistence on their own account {fur sich); and the conflict between them takes place on both sides in such a way that each is not different from itself, but only from the other. Each, however, is thereby characterised as a something dis- tinctive, and contains in it essential distinction from the others; but at the same time not in such a way that this is an opposition within its being; on the con- trary, it is by itself a simple determinate characteristic which constitutes its essential character, distinguishing it from others. As a matter of fact, since the diversity lies in it, this diversity does indeed necessarily assume 118 Phenomenology of Mind the form of a real distinction of manifold quaUties within it. But because the determinate characteristic gives the essence of the thing, by which it is distinguished from others, and has a being all its own, this further manifold constitution is something indifferent. The thing thus no doubt contains in its unity the quaHfying " in-so-far " in two ways, which have, however, un- equal significance; and by that quahfication this oppositeness becomes not a real opposition on the part of the thing itself, but — so far as the thing comes into a condition of opposition through its absolute distinction — this opposition belongs to the thing with reference to an other thing lying outside it. The further mani- foldness is doubtless necessarily in the thing too, and cannot be left out; but it is unessential to the thing.
This determinate characteristic, which constitutes the essential character of the thing and distinguishes it from all others, is now so defined that thereby the thing stands in opposition to others, but must therein preserve itself for itself {filr sicli). It is, however, a thing, a self-existent "one," only so far as it does not stand in relation to others. For in this relation, the connection with another is rather the point emphasised, and connection with another means giving up self- existence, means ceasing to have a being on its own account. It is precisely through the absolute character and its opposition that the thing relates itself to others, and is essentially this process of relation, and only this. The relation, however, is the negation of its independence, and the thing collapses through its own essential property.
The necessity of the experience which consciousness has to go through in finding that the thing is destroyed Perception 119 just by the very characteristic which constitutes its essential nature and its distinctive existence on its own account, may, as regards the bare principle it imphes, be shortly stated thus. The thing is set up as having a being of its own, as existing for itself, or as an absolute negation of all otherness; hence it is absolute negation merely relating itself to itself. But this kind of negation is the cancelling and superseding of itself, or means that it has its essential reality in an other.
In point of fact the determination of the object^ as it (the object) has turned out, contains nothing else. It aims at having an essential property, con- stituting its bare existence for itself, but with this bare self-existence it means also to embrace and contain diversity, which is to be necessary, but is at the same time not to constitute its essential characteristic. But this is a distinction that only exists in words; the TCOM-essential, which has all the same to be necessary, cancels its own meaning, or is what we have just called the negation of itself.
With this the last qualifying " in-so-far," which separated self-existence and existence for another, drops away altogether. The object is really in one and the same respect the opposite of itself — for itself " so far as " it is for another, and for another " so far as " it is for itself. It is for itself, reflected into self, one; but all this is asserted along with its opposite, with its being for another, and for that reason is asserted merely to be superseded. In other words, this existence for itself is as much unessential as that which alone was meant to be unessential, viz. the relation to another.
By this process the object in its pure characteristics, in those features which were to constitute its essential 120 Phenomenology of Mind nature, is superseded, just as the object in its sensible mode of existence became transcended. From being sensible it passed into being a universal; but this universal, because derived from sense, is essentially conditioned by it, and hence is, in general, not a genuine self-identical universaHty, but one affected with an opposition. For that reason this universality breaks up into the extremes of singleness and universality, of the " one " of the properties and the " also " of the free constituents or "matters." These pure deter- minations appear to express the essential nature itself; but they are merely a self-existence which is fettered at the same time with existence for an other. Since, however, both essentially exist in a single unity, we have before us now unconditioned absolute universality; and it is here that consciousness first truly passes into the sphere of Understanding, of Intelligence.
Sensible singleness thus disappears in the dialectic process of immediate certainty, and becomes uni- versality, but merely sensuous universality. The stage of " meaning " has vanished, and perceiving takes the object as it inherently is in itself, or, put generally, as a universal. Singleness, therefore, makes its appear- ance there as true singleness, as the inherent nature of the " one," or as reflectedness into self. This is still, however, a conditioned self-existence alongside which appears another self-existence, the universality opposed to singleness and conditioned by it. But these two contradictory extremes are not merely along- side one another, but within one unity; or, what is the same thing, the common element of both, self- existence, is entirely fettered to its opposite, i.e. is, at the same time, not an existence-for-self. The Perception 121 Perception 121 Sophistry of perception seeks to save these moments from their contradiction, tries to keep them fixed by distinguishing between " aspects," by using terms hke " also " and " so far as," and seeks in hke manner to lay hold on the truth by distinguishing the unessential element from an essential nature opposed thereto. But these expedients, instead of keeping away deception from the process of apprehension, prove rather to be of no avail at all; and the real truth, which should be got at through the logic of the perceptual process, proves to be in one and the same "aspect" the oppo- site (of what those expedients imply), and consequently to have as its essential content undifferentiated and in- determinate universality.
These empty abstractions of " singleness " and its antithetic " universahty," as also of " essence," that is attended with a " non-essential " element, an element which is all the same " necessary," are powers the interplay of which constitutes perceptual understanding, often called " sound common sense " {Menschenver stand). This "healthy common sense," which takes itself for the sohd substantial type of conscious life, is, in the sphere of perception, merely the interplay of these abstractions; it is always poorest where it pretends to be richest. In that it is tossed about by these unreal entities, bandied from one to the other, and by its sophistry endeavours to affirm and hold fast alternately now one, then the exact opposite, it sets itself against the truth, and imagines philosophy has merely to do with " things of the intellect," (GedanJcendinge) merely manipulates " ideas." As a matter of fact, philosophy does have to do with them, too, and knows them to be the pure essential entities, the absolute powers and 122 Phenomenology of Mind ultimate elements. But, in doing so, pliilosophy knows them at the same time in their determinate and specific constitution, and is, therefore, master over them; while that perceptual understanding takes them for the real truth, and is led by them from one mistake to another. It does not get the length of being aware that there are such simple essentiahties operating within it and dominating its activity; it thinks it has always to do with quite sohd material and content, just as sense-certainty is unaware that its essence is the empty abstraction of pure being. But in point of fact it is these essential elements in virtue of which perceptual understanding makes its way hither and thither through every kind of material and content; they are its principle of coherence and control over its varied material; they alone are what constitutes for consciousness the essence of sensuous things, what determines their relation to consciousness, and they are that in the medium of which the process of perceiving, with the truth it contains, runs its course. The course of this process, a perpetual alternate deter- mining of the truth and superseding of this determina- tion, constitutes, properly speaking, the constant every- day life and activity of perceptual intelligence, of the