Such we may accept as the articulate totality of the particular arts; they are the external art of architecture, the objective art of sculpture and the subjective arts of painting, music, and poetry.
Many other classifications than these have been attempted, for a work of art presents such a wealth of aspects, that it is quite possible, as has frequently been the case, to make first one and then another the basis of division. For instance, you may take the sensuous medium simply. Architecture may then be viewed as a kind of crystallization; sculpture, as the organic configuration of material in its sensuous and spatial totality; painting as the coloured surface and line, while in music, space, as such, passes over into the point or moment of time replete with content in itself, until we come finally to poetry, where the external medium is wholly suppressed into insignificance.
Or, again, these differences have been viewed with reference to their purely abstract conditions of space and time. Such abstract divisions of works of art may, as their medium also may be consequentially traced in their characteristic features. They cannot, however, be worked out as the final and fundamental principle, because such aspects themselves derive their origins from a higher principle, and must therefore fall into subordination thereto.
This higher principle we have discovered in the types of art--symbolic, classical, and romantic--which are the universal stages or phases of the Idea of beauty itself.
Their relation to the individual arts in their concrete manifestation as embodiment is of a kind that these arts constitute the real and positive existence of these general art-types. For _symbolic_ art attains its most adequate realization and most pertinent application in _architecture_, in which it expatiates in the full import of its notion, and is not as yet depreciated, as it were, into the merely inorganic nature dealt with by some other art. The _classical_ type of art finds its unfettered realization, on the other hand, in sculpture, treating architecture merely as the enclosure which surrounds it, and being unable to elaborate painting and music into the wholly adequate[174] forms of its content. Finally, the _romantic_ art-type is supreme in the products of painting and music, and likewise in poetical composition, as their preeminent and unconditionally adequate modes of expression. Poetry is, however, conformable to all types of the beautiful, and its embrace reaches them all for the reason that the poetic imagination is its own proper medium, and imagination is essential to every creation of beauty, whatever its type may be.
To sum up, then, what the particular arts realize in particular works of art, are according to their fundamental conception, simply the universal types which constitute the self-unfolding Idea of beauty.
It is as the external realization of this Idea that the wide Pantheon of art is being raised; and the architect and builder thereof is the spirit of beauty as it gradually comes to self-cognition, and to complete which the history of the world will require its evolution of centuries.
[Footnote 1: The introduction begins as an introduction of lectures.
But as the work is merely based to a large extent on notes for lectures, or on a manuscript which did not preserve the lectures as they were delivered, it will be found most convenient to ignore this fact, and in references to regard it simply as a written treatise.]
[Footnote 2: Hegel, alluding no doubt to the words of the Gospel, puts it "born and born again from mind (spirit)."]
[Footnote 3: It is assumed that such a fancy is seized and defined as such in separation from other experience.]
[Footnote 4: The sentence is slightly ironical.]
[Footnote 6: _Raisonnements_: a disparaging expression.]
[Footnote 7: Hegel here means the formal character, not the material on which it is imposed in the several arts.]
[Footnote 8: Hegel says, "as that which has no right to be," _das Nichtseyn sollende._] [Footnote 9: _Erscheine_ as contrasted with _scheine._] [Footnote 10: _Das An-und-Fürsichseyende._ That which is explicitly to itself self-determinate being, no less than essentially such in its substantive right.]
[Footnote 11: _Besonnener Art._ Possibly Hegel means "one more compatible with common sense."]
[Footnote 12: I think by the words _kunst wieder hervorzurufen_ Hegel rather means to call up art as it was previously cultivated than merely to "stimulate art production." The latter is, however, Professor Bosanquet's translation.]
[Footnote 13: _Subjective_ apparently in the sense of being wholly personal to the writer or philosopher in so far as the form of his treatise deals in classification and arrangement peculiar to himself and so _external_, if not entirely arbitrary.]
[Footnote 14: I agree with the note of Professor Bosanquet (Trans., p.
21) that the word _element_ refers here to the mental constituents of art, as contrasted with the sensuous medium.]
[Footnote 15: That is to say, the essential formative process involved in its necessity.]
[Footnote 16: There must be a misprint or oversight in Professor Bosanquet's rendering of this passage (p. 21). As the sentence now stands it does not appear to me to make sense.]
[Footnote 17: _Von ihm._ The pronoun, I take it, must refer here to _das Andere_ rather than the subject of the verb.]
[Footnote 18: "Makes itself an alien to itself" perhaps expresses the German better.]
[Footnote 19: That is, the work of art.]
[Footnote 20: _Haltpunkte._ Points of arrest in essential ideas necessary which restrain this tendency to purely arbitrary caprice.]
[Footnote 21: I do not think the first part of this sentence ironical.
Hegel admits that a general knowledge is a legitimate feature of modern culture. But he points out that people are only too ready to confuse such a general knowledge with real art scholarship. To bring out this I have translated rather freely.]
[Footnote 22: Detail of historical fact and artistic observation.]
[Footnote 23: It is historical, first, regarded as a survey of historical condition, and, secondly, because facts are collected whether in relation to ancient or modern art as a historian collects his facts.]
[Footnote 24: Lit., the inmost or most ideal (meaning).]
[Footnote 25: _Vollkommen._ Complete or rather completely articulate and rounded in itself. It is not easy to select the English word that exactly corresponds.]
[Footnote 26: _Bestimmte Individualität._ The definition may, as Hegel says, be more significant, but it is for all that not very clearly expressed. Professor Bosanquet translates the words "determinate individual modification."]
[Footnote 27: My view is that what Hegel means to say is that in caricature ugliness is emphasized and made more (_näher_) a part of the content than belongs to the true nature of the characteristic of which it is (in Hegel's opinion) no essential determinant or property.
The view stated in the sentence is therefore a kind of _reductio ad absurdum._ Professor Bosanquet's translation appears to me to leave it doubtful whether the view stated is a just one or not. He translates _näher_ by "closely," not the comparative. In my view Hegel agrees that caricature may be characteristic, but he does not agree that it is a genuine property of the characteristic where it is pressed to the excess of ugliness.]
[Footnote 29: That is, in Hegel's view.]
[Footnote 31: _Den denkenden Begriff._ It is possible that the "notion of thought" would express Hegel's meaning, as it would be a less strange expression. But I have retained the more literal translation as the reference may be to the self-evolution of Thought in its own dialectical process, thought or the Idea thinking out itself in the Hegelian sense. Professor Bosanquet seems to assume this, as he translates "the thinking Idea."]
[Footnote 32: _Kunstschönen._ I have translated this by the expression "fine art" because Hegel in the opening of the introduction makes the expression interchangeable with _schöne kunst._ At the same time it must be recollected that the emphasis here is even more on "beauty" than the fact that it is the beauty of human art. And it is for this reason, I presume, that Professor Bosanquet translates it here "artistic beauty." The only objection I have to make to this, apart from Hegel's words I have referred to, is that the expression "artistic beauty" is sometimes used to signify beauty that is capable of being expressed by art. Of course that is excluded from Hegel's use of the term; he means the beauty of artistic work.]
[Footnote 34: Independent, that is, of the consciousness of any particular individual. Hegel does not necessarily mean independent of consciousness altogether. He has, no doubt, generally in his mind the kind of scepticism which received its most logical exposition in Hume.]
[Footnote 35: This appears to me the meaning of _zufälliger Sinn._ Professor Bosanquet translates it "accidental sense." By that I presume he understands the meaning to be "a sense of beauty that is entirely personal to the recipient," it may be possessed by one man, but not by another. Hegel's illustration hardly supports this, so it seems to me.]
[Footnote 36: I do not know the exact translation of _lemmatisch_, and by a curious slip the sentence is omitted from Professor Bosanquet's translation. The general sense is plain enough. Every particular science accepts its subject-matter as a _datum_. It starts from the empirical fact. Whether it admits the assumption or not, it does assume such facts. It is obvious that Hegel's adoption of this standpoint is only relatively true.]
[Footnote 37: Hegel means, I presume, mainly in the introduction.
After that he does in a qualified degree discuss the profounder import of the Idea of Fine Art. His statements are not perhaps wholly free from inconsistency, because he has previously said that apart from an encyclopaedic consideration of all the sciences, it was not possible to do so, and also some of His statements seem to imply that he does not intend to do so.]
[Footnote 38: That is, in the first Part of the entire treatise.]
[Footnote 39: What Hegel means by the _die letzte einleitende Betrachtung_ I am not quite sure. I presume he means the introduction to the first Part. The whole of this paragraph is not very clear.]
[Footnote 40: By man's sensitive life in its widest sense is, I think, intended.]
[Footnote 41: The German words are _machen_ and _nachmachen._ We have no exact equivalents.]
[Footnote 42: _Lit._, "to fill out (_ausfüllen_) in complete equipment."]
[Footnote 44: The German will admit of the interpretation that the reference is merely to genius, but I think Hegel clearly means that neither one nor the other can be thus conjured up.]
[Footnote 45: At the end of the first main division of the work.]
[Footnote 46: One of Meredith's correspondents has put the question with all gravity whether he considered inspiration could be assisted by wine drinking. With equal gravity our humourist replied that though wine might be something of a restorative after mental effort it was not his experience that it contributed to first-rate artistic work. He actually mentions the case of Schiller. Though I have read somewhere that this poet used to be inspired by the smell of rotten apples I do not recollect reading that he favoured the champagne bottle. Meredith also mentions the case of Hoffmann, and adds that the type of his work does not increase our respect for the precedent.]
[Footnote 47: _Eine äusserliche Arbeit._ A craftsmanship which has to deal with the outside surface. We may translate "external craftsmanship"; but the translation in the text gives the meaning best, I think.]
[Footnote 48: _Keinen geistigen Stoff._ Professor Bosanquet translates "spiritual content." I imagine the emphasis to be mainly on the absence of positive ideas available to knowledge. In any case Hegel appears to press his point of contrast too far. Men of genius such as Mozart (who was probably in his mind) and Schubert may bear him out. But on the other hand we have a Keats, Shelley, and Raphael. Genius matures rapidly, but the greatest works of musical art no less than any other imply a real maturity of mind at least, and more than is here assumed of, I should say, a rich experience. Mozart, of course, upsets any theory, and it is questionable even whether Mozart is really an exception. It depends on the point of view from which we are estimating the intelligible content of music as an expression of soul-life.]
[Footnote 49: The "Iphigenie" was completed in Goethe's thirty-eighth year, fourteen years later than "Götz." The bulk of his more important works are of the same date or later. Schiller's "Wallenstein" was completed after his thirty-fifth year.]
[Footnote 50: This is surely not quite accurate. The medium of painting in the sense that speech or writing is the medium of poetry is not canvas or panel but oil or other colour. Canvas would correspond with the blank pages of a book.]
[Footnote 51: Free, that is, from accidental and irrelevant matter.]
[Footnote 52: Professor Bosanquet translates _sinnliche_ here as "sensitive." I am inclined to think that Hegel here rather leaves out of sight the fact that in the process of Nature we have sensitive organic life no less than unconscious inorganic. His contrast is rather between the conscious life of man and unconscious nature, the conscious life that is not self-conscious being for the object of the contrast treated as equivalent to unconscious. He would also apparently ignore the fact that man himself and the higher beauty which attaches to him is also from ope point of view a part of the natural process.]
[Footnote 53: That is, apart from purely personal ends in its pursuit, which are accidental to its essential notion.]
[Footnote 54: That is, in the medium of conscious life.]
[Footnote 55: _Einmal._ They are there, but they do not know they are there.]
[Footnote 56: _Aus geistiger Bildung, i.e._, a high level of mental culture is necessary before the advent of civilized manners and customs in which spiritual life is reflected with real refinement and directness.]
[Footnote 58: _Lit._, "In the form of the most abstract single subjectivity." That is to say, that the main fact about it is that it is felt; but, except in respect to intensity, it cannot be described as an object of thought with defining attributes, It is abstract individual sensation.]
[Footnote 59: By the expression _Kreis_ Hegel would mean rather an indefinite sphere than a definite circle. The simile is perhaps not very apt. The idea, apparently, is of a sphere of feeling, that is, such as being self-complete, but is so abstract or indefinable that the introduction into it of positive ideas such as justice, etc., are the mere entrance of spectral forms which vanish in such an indefinable medium, without disclosing their nature. They are felt but not cognized for what they really are.]
[Footnote 60: _Blinder_, blind in the sense that it is not guided by deliberate and self-conscious reason, _i.e._, mere animal instinct.]
[Footnote 61: A difficult sentence to translate. I have followed Professor Bosanquet in assuming that the substantive with which _mangelhaft_ agrees must be borrowed from the following sentence, though it seems also to be carried on in a loose kind of way from the previous sentence (_Gesckmacksinn._) The entire sentence is built, as we have it, on the further confusion that there are two parallels which before the sentence ends are regarded as one! That is to say, the general critical sense is contrasted with the critique of particular works of art and further the defect of that general sense in its neglect of _universal_ principles is further contrasted with the way the specific critique deals with _particular_ works. I hardly think, however, that my admirable predecessor is justified in ignoring the comparative degree of _bestimmteres_, or in his translation of _Zeug_ as "power." I take it to mean the material of actual works of art.
The sentence is a good example of, some of the difficulties of Hegel translation.]
[Footnote 62: _Die Sache._ The subject-matter in its most real sense as "content."]
[Footnote 63: That is, the so-called "good taste."]
[Footnote 64: _Begriff._ Concrete notional Idea.]
[Footnote 65: That is, in his physical form.]
[Footnote 66: Hegel is here considering desire abstractedly, that is, on its own account (_als solche._) It may of course in its turn subserve a rational purpose, such as the preservation of health or life. But the contrast here is between the relation of appetite, and that of the theoretic faculty to objects.]
[Footnote 67: _Sein Objekt._ The object in which he finds himself; rather this, I think, than that which he has created.]
[Footnote 68: _Innerlich_, _i.e._, in the world of mind as contrasted with that of the sensuous _vorhandene._] [Footnote 69: Hegel or his editors have "in a converse way." This is obviously a mistake. In both examples the point is that the object is _preserved_ as against _desire_ with its destruction, and the _contemplative intelligence_ with its ideal transformation.]
[Footnote 70: _Ein ideelles._ The meaning is, I think, that the _materia_ is stamped with the hall-mark of deliberate artistic purpose.
The ideality, though relatively jejune on such a work as the pyramids, in the higher reaches of art such as poetry and music affects of course the medium itself, the musical chord being pure ideality. Professor Bosanquet's translation omits this and the previous sentence, probably by an oversight. But it is also possible that this thinker conceived the statement _as here expressed_ to be misleading, or at least open to misconception. In architecture and even painting it is obvious, from a certain point of view, the sensuous _materia_, if directed to an artistic end, remains none the less the material borrowed from natural fact though the fact as natural may be modified in its form. Painting may _represent_ the semblance, but it employs a medium simply sensuous.
Hegel has mainly before his attention here obviously the arts of painting, poetry, and music.]
[Footnote 71: They are _theoretical_ because as applied to a work of art they imply the presence of the contemplative faculty. In a later section of the work Hegel makes a more complete analysis of what is implied in the sense of hearing as applied to musical composition and in the colour sense. In both cases it is obvious the mind contributes to the facts cognized. Hearing is, however, from Hegel's point of view the most _ideal_ of the two, and he conceives the position of the ears itself points to this distinction.]
[Footnote 72: It may at least be questioned whether the ground given here of this distinction, or part of it, is strictly accurate. It may be said that our sense of sight and hearing are both in contact with the waves of the medium, the vibration of which produces the impression we call sound or light. The most obvious distinction then appears to be that the natural object is left as it is by hearing and sight. This at least holds good as against taste. But at least it may be questioned, I think, whether the sense of touch may not be the source of artistic enjoyment, certainly in the case of the blind. And the sense of smell at least leaves objects as they are, and some may contend that it is a source of enjoyment of the beauty of Nature. Hegel would reply, of course, that no works of human art are enjoyed by such means. The main ground is, however, that sight and hearing are the senses closest to intelligence.]
[Footnote 73: By _Anschauungen_ Hegel apparently has in mind all the ideas of poetry. We should certainly rather have expected the word _Vorstellungen_, the word used being rather "visible perceptions." But the three words here seem generally to denote the subject-matter of painting, music, and poetry.]
[Footnote 74: Lit., "Operative in the artist viewed (_i.e._, the artist) as the personal energy (_Subjektivität_) which creates."
Professor Bosanquet's translation "as a productive state of the person" would appear to make "the sensuous side" a subjective state of the artist. But apart from construction, can we speak of this as a "state"?
It is modified by his energy--but it can hardly be regarded as a part of it.]
[Footnote 75: I find it impossible to fix any one English equivalent to Hegel's use of the words _Einbildungskraft_, _Phantasie_, or _Vorstellung_, in the sense at least that fancy, imagination, or phantasy have been used and defined by famous English writers.
Generally speaking, I should say that _Phantasie_, or as it is called sometimes "artistic" or "creative" _Phantasie_, stands for the most intellectual faculty, though _Vorstellung_ is also used in much the same sense. But it is impossible to arrive at any clear distinction such as was originally made so profoundly by Ruskin between fancy, the instrument of poetical talent, the surface gift, and imagination or, as he called it, _penetrative_ imagination, which summarizes all the powers of a genius and personality and enters into the heart of the subject-matter by an illuminating flash which _reveals_ reality rather than illustrates by means of image. The present passage appears to me even more unsatisfactory than the more carefully digested analysis at the end of Part I, when Hegel discusses the artist. It not merely ignores the indispensable presence of imagination in the pioneers of science, but appears to myself to confuse talent as the natural gift of a man with the mode in which it is exercised in presenting ideas in sensuous imagery, or at least makes the former depend on the latter. Professor Bosanquet translates _Phantasie_ here by "fancy."
But "fancy" is, in our way of looking at it, precisely not the faculty which _distinctively_ belongs to "the great mind and the big heart or soul," though other parts of the description are more applicable. And in short, as I say, to fix definite English equivalents to Hegel's phraseology appears to me impossible.]
[Footnote 77: This is, I presume, Hegel's way of putting the simple fact, that much of the process of artistic production is unconscious.
One man instinctively draws, or picks up his notes on the piano, another cannot. I think Hegel rather refers to this _original_ talent than the much more important one in which genius, right into maturity, rides over difficulties without knowing how it does so. Such happy or even miraculous effects--such as artists sometimes playfully call them--are obviously in part, if only in part, the result of profound artistic experience. He is dealing almost exclusively with the natural bias, which makes one man naturally an artist, whether creative or executant, and is absent from another. He hardly approaches the question what constitutes the artist of genius as contrasted with the man of natural talent.]
[Footnote 78: This confirms the conclusion above.]
[Footnote 79: _Für sich._ If merely admired as imitation and nothing more.]
[Footnote 80: _Zur Ekelhaftigkeit._ "Sickeningly like" is Professor Bosanquet's closer translation. The expression "damnably like" is not unknown.]
[Footnote 81: I think with Professor Bosanquet that _phantastischen_ is here not "fantastic" but strictly derived from _Phantasie_ in its sense of imagination. "Completely," of course, as involving no direct imitation of Nature.]
[Footnote 82: Formal, _i.e._, implying no creative supplement from the artist, purely mechanical.]
[Footnote 83: It would be both instructive and interesting to discuss if, and how far, and by virtue of what, that distinct type of modern art known as "still life," such as a few objects of the library, or even a shell or two and so on up to more important organic life was excluded from this condemnation. It is quite clear that Ruskin would have a good deal to say that would imply important qualification.]
[Footnote 84: _Begeisterung._ I think this must be the meaning.
Inspiration hardly makes sense. It is art that is inspired, not those who attend the celebration.]
[Footnote 85: _Im Innersten_ is I think here obviously to be taken with the verb, not with the substantives.]
[Footnote 87: The meaning of _in diesem Gebiete_ is, I presume, the actual world. But if so it is simply otiose, and I have left it out.]
[Footnote 88: _Bestimmung._ The translation given appears to be the sense, though we should rather say weaken a _man_ from the pursuit of a definite course. Professor Bosanquet, who translates the word "aim" a little lower down, evades the word here.]
[Footnote 89: _Raisonnirende_ here and _raissonnement_ below have a depreciatory sense--and signify ordinary reasoning in the first instance and the methods of the popular secularist in the second.]
[Footnote 90: A sentence omitted by Professor Bosanquet, and it seems to amount to little more than a more generalized statement of what has gone before. The end of art both directly and indirectly concerns its subject-matter, or rather, as Hegel puts it, the need of the notion or Idea of it carries us to a further end beyond the end shared in common by its particular content.]
[Footnote 91: I follow Professor Bosanquet in his translation of the words _als Allgemeines für sich zu zuerden_; but I am not sure that the more literal translation is not simply as the words stand, the sense being not to be self-conscious of himself (_für sich_) as the universal principle, to be aware of this property, but rather as universal principle to become _for_ himself, _i.e._ "independent of desire."]
[Footnote 92: _Einheit_--unity to the point of fusion, identity.]
[Footnote 93: _Unmittelbaren Befangenheit._ "Sunkenness" is Professor Bosanquet's translation.]
[Footnote 94: _Theoretic_ as a direct transcript of _θεώρια, θεωρειν._] [Footnote 95: _Gesichtspunkte._ The various points of view necessary to arrive at such a general conclusion.]
[Footnote 96: Though not entirely confident I am right in accepting the words _zu bringen_ as a repetition of the _hervorzubringen_ just before, the alternative of Professor Bosanquet which takes the words _wird zu bringen seyn_ as equivalent to _gebracht seyn sollte_ certainly appears to me no direct translation.]
[Footnote 97: "Poets aim at utility and entertainment alike."]
[Footnote 98: I think that Hegel in his use of _erste_ here rather refers to the fact of past history than a fact in the individual history of nations. "Art is, in the early days of history, the instructress of nations," gives, I think, his meaning. It is the first instructress in the history of nations.]
[Footnote 99: I venture to think if Professor Bosanquet's translation were the right one the German would be _ein in sich selbst gebrochenes._ I do not think _in ihm selbst_ can be a German rendering of "in itself." But I admit the translation is tempting whether Hegel had in his mind the "house divided against itself" or not.]
[Footnote 100: Lit., "the spiritual universal," _i.e._, the universal substance of its ideal content.]
[Footnote 101: Precisely as Ruskin, for example, in his "Modern Painters" condemns both Titian and Tintoret, not because they painted the _Paradise_ or the _Assunta_, to produce fine paintings, or even because they did not or did themselves believe in the truth of their subject-matter, but because they did not paint _in order to make converts_, an extraordinary lapse of judgment.]
[Footnote 102: _Im besten Sinne des Wortes._] [Footnote 103: Professor Bosanquet points out in a note on this passage (p. 101) that _Sittlichkeit_ here, which he translates, as I have done, "respectability," is the _habit_ of virtue, without the reflective aspiration after goodness as an ideal. Of course there is no depreciation in the use of the term. It is simply the morality of ordinary people, who do generally what their neighbours think the right thing. The word _moralität_ and _moralisch_, which I have only been able to translate by a paraphrase, is the morality of the standpoint discussed, which is very much that of Kant or "Duty for duty's sake" in Bradley's "Ethical Studies."]
[Footnote 104: That is the contingency of the world of Nature as contrasted with the essential stability of mind or spirit.]
[Footnote 105: Lit., "To satisfy itself in its _real_ or independent self (_für sich_)." It cannot identify itself with either side as its wholly real self made therein explicit. It is neither fish nor fowl.]
[Footnote 106: _Bestimmüngen_ may here be a reference to man's broadest spiritual characterizations as one of the human family, the race, the nation, and so forth, or, as I think, a reference to his vocation, future destiny, general welfare.]
[Footnote 107: _An und für sich Wahre._] [Footnote 108: _Unbefangenen_, _i.e._, the naïve outlook of ordinary life.]
[Footnote 109: Professor Bosanquet merely translates _are not_ and _are_ in italic as in the text, which of course, except that he adds a comma after _are_, is a literal translation. But the sense, as I understand it, is that the writer says it is not in the sense that these two contradictories do not exist _at all_ (_i.e._, as relative reality), but rather in the sense that in _philosophical thought_ which grasps their essence they are not only present but present as reconciled factors of one truth. Professor Bosanquet's translation appears to me to amount to this: that all Hegel maintains is that the sense he means is not that such contradictory elements are _not_ reconciled, but in the sense that they _are_ reconciled. Perhaps this is his view. But if so, I fail to see the importance of the antithesis, which appears to me between _gar nicht sind_ and _in Versöhnung sind._ Hegel before had expressly said that such contradictory sides were reconciled in philosophy, so I do not see why he should so emphatically repeat himself. The comma, of course, may be a misprint.]
[Footnote 110: _Begriff._ Notion, or concrete Idea of it.]
[Footnote 111: Of that world in its opposition to reason.]
[Footnote 112: _Der Mensch als er geht und steht._ The man in ordinary conditions—-the _average_ man, however, rather than the _natural_ man, which carries slightly different associations.]
[Footnote 113: The difference between a material instrument, which is a mere means to an end conceived by the craftsman, such as a plough for ploughing, a rake for raking, and a purpose inseparable from the organic whole as a mouth for eating, for without life the organism collapses.]
[Footnote 115: In his history of Aesthetic in Germany Lötze disputes this. It seems to some extent a question of definition. In Hegel's view a dead body is not a human body in the full sense, but the _corpse_ of a man. A hand separated from the body, whether we call it a hand or not, is no longer, whatever it may be, a living member, its essential significance as a hand has disappeared. It was only a hand in its coherence as part of a larger whole. It may still for a time preserve the semblance of its life, but it is cut off as the withered leaf.
These are facts at least that are undeniable, and the objection appears to me based on a misunderstanding. A hand is only _an und für sich_ human when it is part of a living man. What is the organic reality in the complete sense is the man as a _whole._ The hand is merely the extremity of one of his arms. You may call a dead hand a hand if you like. The point is what was implied in the fact that you called it a hand at all whether alive or dead.]
[Footnote 116: That is, by Kant, of course.]
[Footnote 117: By _Verwicklung_ I understand the general evolution of ideal philosophy which the defects of the Kantian Critique stimulated.
Professor Bosanquet apparently limits it to a perplexity personal to Schiller. I doubt whether the word will bear this.]
[Footnote 118: That is, the concrete idea of humanity as a collective aggregate.]
[Footnote 119: That is, intelligence as asserted by a society of human beings as public opinion, etc.]
[Footnote 121: "Grace and Dignity."]
[Footnote 122: _Gesinnungen._ "Sentimental views" is probably what is implied.]
[Footnote 124: Professor Bosanquet is clearly right in his view that the order of the words here should be reversed. The words _an und für sich_ are obviously the wider explication of _in sick selbst_, the auxiliary, as not unfrequently in Hegel, being almost equivalent to _nämlich._ Whether a misprint or an oversight I have translated subject to this correction.]
[Footnote 125: I presume the revelation is not merely that of visible shape or even mainly.]
[Footnote 126: _Das alles aus sich setzende und auflösende Ich._ The three points emphasized by Hegel in Fichte's "Philosophy" are: (_a_) The Ego is abstract; (_b_) Everything is a _show_ for it; (_c_) Its own acts are a semblance.]
[Footnote 127: Hegel uses the word _Eitelkeit_ and _eitle_ in their double sense of empty-nothingness--futility and vain or conceited. This cannot be readily reproduced in English.]
[Footnote 128: _Schönseligkeit._ Borrowed no doubt from Goethe's notion of a "fair soul."]
[Footnote 129: Like the "vaulting ambition" of Shakespeare which falls on the other side, is _über sich selbst._] [Footnote 130: _Haltung._ Professor Bosanquet translates this "conduct." I rather think it refers to "bearing, demeanour." They are, as we say, "featureless, flaccid figures."]
[Footnote 131: _Läppische._ I am not quite sure what is exactly meant. Professor Bosanquet translates it "grotesque." But the word is a provincial form of _Schlaff_ apparently--loose, flaccid and so childish, trifling.]
[Footnote 132: _Moment._ A phase in an evolutionary, or, as it is here, a dialectical process. A momentary feature of it.]
[Footnote 133: This final section is called the Division of the Subject.]
[Footnote 134: _Subjektivität._ That is, the ideality of consciousness, or thought.]
[Footnote 135: Professor Bosanquet, in his note on this passage, expresses the opinion that Hegel when he writes thus is referring "To the self-consciousness of individual human beings as constituting, and reflecting on, an ideal unity between them." This no doubt, as he suggests, does put a somewhat unnatural meaning on the word "person" or "subjekt." No doubt there is a sense in which we can ascribe personality to a state, or nation, in the concrete unity of its life.
But while admitting that unity such as this, which is not sensuous but ideal, can be "effective and actual," I find it difficult to conclude that Hegel did himself hold that the unity of the Divine Being was _merely_ identical with the unity or totality of concrete human life as reflected upon by single individuals. How far is human life as a whole on this Earth a unity or totality at all? That question has been discussed by Professor Bradley and others with very different conclusions. Nay, how far does human existence itself exhaust the actually present realization or self-realization of self-conscious