My part, faid I, {hall be to ftandby, as I have hither- to done, and takes notes of all that pafleth during this memorable event: while a Minute Philofopher, not fix foot high, attempts to dethrone the Monarch of the univerfe. Alas! replied Alciphron, arguments are not to be mea- fured by feet and inches. One man may fee more than a million: and a fhort argument, managed by a free- thinker, may be fufficient to overthrow the moil gigantic chimera. As we were engaged in this difcourfe, Crito * Lucretius.
i$z MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV] and Euphranor joined us. I find you have been before- hand with us to-day, faid Crito to Alciphron, and taken the advantage of folitude and early hours, while Euphra- nor and I v/ere afleep in our beds. We may, therefore, expe£t to fee atheifm placed in its beft light, and fup- ported by the ftrongeft arguments.
II. Alc — The being of a God is a fubjecT: upon which there has been a world of common-place, which it is need- lefs to repeat. Give me leave, therefore, to lay down certain rules and limitations, in order to fhorten our prefent con- ference. For, as the end of debating is to perfuade, all thofe things which are foreign to this end, fhould be left out of our debate. Firft then, let me tell you, I am not to be perfuaded by metaphyseal arguments •, fuch, for inftance, as are drawn from the idea of an all-perfecl; Being, or the abfurdity of an infinite progreflion of cauf- es. This fort of arguments I have always found dry and jejune: and, as they are not fuited to my way of think- ing, they may, perhaps, puzzle, but never will convince me. Secondly, I am not to be perfuaded by the autho- rity either of paft or prefent ages, of mankind in general, or of particular wife men: all which paffeth for little or nothing with a man of found argument and free thought.
Thirdly, all proofs drawn from utility, or convenience, are foreign to the purpofe. They may prove, indeed, the ufefulnefs of the notion, but not the exiftenee of' the thing. Whatever legiflators or ftatefmen may think, truth and convenience are very different things to the rig- orous eyes of a philofophcr. And now, that I may not feem partial, I will limit myfelf, alfo, not to object, in the firft place, from any thing that may feem irregular, or unaccountable in the works' of nature, againft a caufe of infinite power and wifdom: becaufe I already, know the anfwer vou would make, to wit, that no one can . judge of the fymmetry and ufe of the parts of an in- [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 153 finite machine, which are all relative to each other, and to the whole, without being able to comprehend the en- tire machine, or the whole univerfe. And, in the fecond place, I (hall engage myfelf not to obje£t againft the jus- tice, and providence of a Supreme Being, from the evil that befalls good men, and the profperity which is often the portion of wicked men in this life: becaufe I know that, inftead of admitting this to be an objection againft a Deity, you would make it an argument for a future ftate; in which there fhall be fuch a retribution of rewards and punifhments, as may vindicate the divine attributes, and fet all things right in the end. Now thefe anfwers, though they mould be admitted for good ones, are, in truth, no proofs of the being of a God, but only folutions of cer- tain difficulties which might be objected, fuppofing it al- ready proved by proper arguments. Thus much I thought fit to premife, in order to fave time and trouble both to you, and myfelf.
Cri. — I think that, as the proper end of our confer- ence ought to be fuppofed the difcovery and defence of truth, fo truth may be juftified, not only by perfuading its adverfaries, but, where that cannot be done, by mewing them to be unreafonable. Arguments, therefore, which carry light, have their effec~t, even againft an opponent who fhuts his eyes, becaufe they (hew him to be obftinate and prejudiced. Befides, this diftin£tion between argu- ments that puzzle, and that convince, is leaft of all, ob- ferved by Minute Philofophers, and need not, therefore^ be obferved by others, in their favor. But, perhaps, Euphranor may be willing to encounter you on your own terms, in which cafe I have nothing farther to fay.
III. Euph. — Alciphron a&s like a fkilful general, who is bent upon gaining the advantage of the ground, and alluring the enemy out of their trenches. We, who be- lieve a God, are intrenched within tradition, cuftom, au- U i54 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
thority and law. And neverthelefs, inftead of attempting to force us, he propofes that we fhould voluntarily, aban- don thefe intrenchments, and make the attack: when we may ae~l on the defenfive with much fecurity and eafe, leaving him the trouble to difpoflefs us, of what we need not refign. Thofe reafons (continued he, addreffing him- felf to Alciphron) which you have muttered up in this morning's meditation, if they do not weaken, muft eftab- lifh our belief of a God: For the utmoft is to be expected from fo great a matter in his profeffion, when he fets his ftrength to a point.
Alc. — I hold the confufed notion of a Deity, or fome invifible power, to be, of all prejudices, the molt uncon- querable. When half a dozen ingenious men are got to- gether over a glafs of wine, by a chearful fire, in a room well-lighted; we banilh with eafe all the fpe&res of fancy, or education, and are very clear in our decifions. But as I was taking a folitary walk before it was broad day-light, in yonder grove, methought the point was not quite fo clear: nor could I readily recollect the force of thofe ar- guments, which ufed to appear fo conclufive at other times. I had, I know not, what awe upon my mind, and feemed haunted by a fort of panic, which I cannot otherwife ac- count for, than by fuppofing it the effe£t of prejudice: For you muft know, that I, like the reft of the world, was once upon a time, catechifed, and tutored into the belief of a God, or Spirit. There is no furer mark of prejudice, than the believing a thing without reafon. What neceffity then can there be that I mould fet myfelf the difficult talk of proving a negative, when it is fufficient to obferve, that there is no proof of the affirmative, and that the admit- ting it without proof is unreafonable? prove, therefore, your opinion, or, if you cannot, you may indeed remain in porTeffion of it, but you will only be poffefled of a pre- judice.
Euph.— O Alciphron I to content you, we muft prove, [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. i55 it feems, and we muft prove upon your own terms. But, in the firft place, let us fee what fort of proof you expect.
Alc. — Perhaps I may not expect it, but I will tell you what fort of proof I would have: And that is, in fhort, fuch proof, as every man of fenfe requires of a matter of fa£t, or the exiftence of aciy other particular thing. For inftance, fhould a man afk^why I believe there is a king of Great Britain P I might anfwer, becaufe I had feen him: Or a king of Spain P becaufe I had feen thofe who faw him. But as for this king of kings, I neither faw him myfelf, nor any one elfe, that ever did fee him. Surely if there be fuch a thing as God, it is very ftrange that he fhould leave himfelf without a witnefs; that men fhould ftill difpute his being; and that there fhould be no one evident, fenfible, plain proof of it, without recourfe to phi- lofophy or metaphyfics. A matter of fact is not to be proved by notions, but by fa£ts. This is clear and full to the point. You fee what I would be at. Upon thefe principles I defy fuperftition.
Euph.— You believe then, as far as you can fee.
Alc. — That is my rule of faith.
Euph. — How! will you not believe the exiftence of things which you hear, unlefs you alfo fee them?
Alc — I will not fay fo neither. When I infilled on feeing, I would be underftood to mean perceiving in gener- al. Outward objects make very different impreflions up- on the animal fpirits, all which are comprifed under the common name of fenfe. And whatever we can perceive by any fenfe we may be fure of.
IV. Euph. — What! do you believe then there are fuch things as animal fpirits?
Alc- — Doubtlefs.
Euph. — By what fenfe, do you perceive them?
Alc. — I do not perceive immediately by any of my fen- fes. I am neverthelefs perfuaded of their exiftence, bei$6 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
caufe I can collect it from their effects and operations. They are the meffengers, which, running to and fro in the nerves, preferve a communication between the foul and outward objects.
Euph.— You admit then, the being of a foul.
Alc. — Provided I do not admit an immaterial fubftance, I fee no inconvenience in admitting there may be fuch a thing as a foul. And this may be no more than a thin fine texture of fubtile parts, or fpirits, refiding in the brain.
Euph. — I do not afk about its nature. I only aik whether you admit that there is a principle of thought and action, and whether it be perceivable by fenfe.
Alc. — I grant that there is fuch a principle, and that it is not the object of fenfe itfelf, but inferred from appear- ances which are perceived by fenfe..
Euph. — If I underftand you rightly, from animal func- tions and motions, you infer the exiftence of animal fpirits; and from reafonable acts you infer the exiftence of a rea- sonable foul. Is it not fo?
Alc — It is.
Euph. — It fhould feem therefore, that the being of things, imperceptible to fenfe, may be collected from ef- fects and figns, or fenfible tokens.
Alc. — It may.
Euph. — Tell me, Alciphron, is not the foul that which makes the principal diftinctio.n between a real perfon and a fhadow, a living man and a carcafs?
Alc. — -I grant it is.
Euph. — I cannot, therefore, know that you, for inftance, are a diftinct thinking individual, or a living real man, by furer, or other figns, than thofe from which it can be infer- red that you have a foul.
Alc — You cannot.
Euph. — Pray tell me, are not all acts, immediately and properly perceived by fer.fe, reducible to motion?
Alc — Thev are.
[Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. i57 Euph. — Prom motions therefore, you infer a mover, or caufe: And from reafonable motions (or fuch as appear calculated for a reafonable end) a rational caufe, foul, or fpirit.
Alc. — Even fo.
V. Euph. The foul of man actuates but a fmall body, an infignificant particle, in refpe£r. of the great mafies of nature, the elements, and heavenly bodies, and the fyf- tem of the world. And the wifdom that appears in thofe motions, which are the effetl: of human reafon, is incom- parably lefs than that which difcovers itfelf, in the ftruc- ture and ufe of organized natural bodies, animal or veget- able. A man, with his hand, can make no machine fo admirable as the hand itfelf: Nor can any of thofe mo- tions, by which we trace out human reafon, approach the fkill and contrivance of thofe wonderful motions of the heart, and brain, and other vital parts, which do not depend on the will of man.
Alc. — AIL this is true.
Euph. — Doth it not follow then, that from natural motions, independent of man's will, may be inferred both power and wifdom, incomparably greater than that of the human foul?
Alc. — It fhould feem fo.
Euph. — Further, is there not, in natural productions and effects, a vifible unity of council and defign? Are not the rules affixed and immoveable? Do not the fame laws of motion obtain throughout? The fame in China and here, the fame two thouftind years ago, and at this day?
Alc — All this I do not deny.
Euph. — Is there not alfo a connexion, or relation, be- tween animals and vegetables; between both and the elements; between the elements and heavenly bodies; fo that, from their mutual refpe&s, influences, fubordina- 158 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
tions, and ufes, they may be colle&ed to be parts of one whole, confpiring to one and the fame end, and fulfilling the fame defign?
Alc. — Suppofing all this to be true.
Euph. — Will it not then follow, that this vaftly great or infinite power and wifdom, muft be fuppofed in one and the fame agent, fpirit or mind; and that we have, at leaft, as clear, full, and immediate certainty of the being of this infinitely wife and powerful, Spirit, as of any one human foul whatfoever, befides our own?
Alc. — Let me confider: I fufpect we proceed too haftily. What! Do you pretend you can have the fame affurance of the being of God, that you can have of mine, whom you actually fee (land before you, and talk to you?
Euph. — The very fame, if not greater.
Alc — How do you make this appear?
Euph. — By the perfon Alciphrony is meant an indivi- dual thinking thing, and not the hair, fkin, or vifible fur- face, or any part of the outward form, colour, or ihape of Alciphron.
Alc — This I grant.
Euph. — And in granting this, you grant that, irua ftric~t. fenfe, I do not fee Alciphron> i. e. that individual thinking thing, but only fuch vifible figns and tokens, as fuggeft and infer the being of that invifible thinking prin- ciple, or foul. Even fo, in the felf fame manner, it feems tome, that though I cannot, with eyes of flefh, behold the invifible God; yet I do, in the ftri&eft fenfe, behold and perceive, by all my fenfes, fuch figns and tokens, fuch effe&s and operations, as fuggeft, indicate, and demon* ftrate an invifible God, as certainly, and with the fame evidence, at leaft, as any other figns, perceived by fenfe, do fugged to me the exiftence of your foul, fpirit, or thinking principle j which I am convinced of only by a few figns or effects, and the motions of one fmali organ- ized body: Whereas I do, at all times, and in all places, [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. iS9 perceive fenfible figns, which evince the being of God. The point, therefore, doubted or denied by you at the beginning, now feems manifeftly to follow from the pre- mifes. Throughout this whole enquiry, have we not confidered every ftep with care, and made not the leaft advance without clear evidence? You and I examined and affented fingly to each foregoing propofition: What {hall we do then with the conclufion? For my part, if you do not help me out, I find myfelf under an abfolute necefiity of admitting it for true. You muft, therefore, be content, henceforward to bear the blame, if I live and die in the belief of a God.
VI. Alc. — It muft be confeft, I do not readily find an anfwer. There feems to be fome foundation for what you fay. But, on the other hand, if the point was fo clear as you pretend, I cannot conceive how fo many fa- gacious men, of our fe£l, mould be fo much in the dark, as not to know or believe one fyllable of it.
Euph. — Ozilciphron> it is not our prefent bufinefs to account for the overfights, or vindicate the honor of thofe great men, the free-thinkers, when their very exiftencc is in danger of being called in queftion.
Alc. — How fo?
Euph. — Be pleafed to recollect the conceflions you have made, and then fhe\tf me, if the arguments for a Deity be not conclufive, by what better arguments you can prove the exiftence of that thinking thing, which in ftri&nefs conflitutes the free-thinker.
As foon as Euphraner had uttered thefe words, Alci- phron ftopt fhort, and flood in a pofture of meditation, while the reft of us continued our walk, and took two or three turns, after which he joined us again with a fmiling countenance, like one who had made fome difcovery. I have found, faid he, what may clear up the point in dif- pute, and give Euphranor entire fatisfaftion; I would fay i6o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
an argument, which will prove the exiftence of a free- thinker, the like whereof cannot be applied to prove the exiftence of a God. You muft know then, that your notion of our perceiving the exiftence of God, as certain- ly and immediately as we do that of a human perfon, I could by no means digeft, though I muft own it puzzled me, till I had confidered the matter. At firft methought, a particular ftru&ure, ihape, or motion, was the mod certain proof of a thinking, reafonable foul. But a little attention fatisfied me, that thefe things have no necefiary connexion with reafon, knowledge, and wifdom. And that, allowing them to be certain proofs of a living foul, they cannot be fo of a thinking and reafonable one. Up- on fecond thoughts, therefore, and a minute examina- tion of this point, I have found, that nothing fo much convinces me of the exiftence of another perfon as his fpeaking to me. It is my hearing you talk, that, in Uriel: arid philofophical truth, is to me the beft argument for your being. And this is a peculiar argument, inappli- cable to your purpofe: For you will not, I fuppofe, pre- tend that God fpeaks to man in the fame clear and fenfi- ble manner, as one man doth to another.
VII. Euph. — How! is then the impreffion of found fo much more evident than that of other fenfes? Or, if it be, is the voice of man louder than that of thunder?
Alc. — Alas! You miftake the point. What I mean is not the found of fpeech, merely as fuch, but the arbi- trary ufe of fenfible figns, which have no fimilitude or ne- cefTary connexion with the things fignified j fo as by the oppofite management of them, to fuggeft and exhibit to my mind an endlefs variety of things, differing in nature, time, and place j thereby informing me, entertaining me, and directing me how to a£t, not only with regard to things near and prefent, but alfo, with regard to things [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 161 diftant and future. No matter whether thefe figns arc pronounced or written, whether tVy enter by the eye or the ear: They have the fame ufe, and are equally proofs of an intelligent, thinking, defigning caufe.
Euph. — But what if it mould appear that God really fpeaks to man; mould this content you?
Alc.— I am for admitting no inward fpeech, no holy inftin&s, or fuggeftions of light or fpirit. All that, you muft know, pafTeth with men of fenfe for nothing. If you do not make it plain to me, that God fpeaks to men, by outward fenfible figns, of fuch fort, and in fuch man- ner, as I have defined, you do nothing.
Euph. — But if it fhall appear plainly, that God fpeaks to men by the intervention and ufe of arbitrary, outward, fenfible figns, having no refemblance or neceflary connex- ion with the things they (land for and fuggeft: If it fhall appear, that by innumerable combinations of thefe figns, an endlefs variety of things is difcovered, and made known to us; and that we are thereby i n fir u died, or informed, in their different natures; that we are taught and admon- ifhed what to fhun, and what to purfue; and are directed how to regulate our motions, and how to acl: with refpedt to things diftant from us, as well in time as place; will this content you?
Alc. — It is the very thing I would have you make out; for therein confifts the force, and ufe, and nature of lan- guage.
VIII. Euph. — Look, A!ciphron> do you not fee the caf- tie upon yonder hill?
Alc. — I do.
Euph. — Is it not at a great diftance from you?
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — Tell me, Jlciphroiiy is not diftance. 3 line turn- ed end-wife to the eye?
Alc. — Doubtlefs.
W i6z MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
EupH. — And can a line, in that fituation, project more than one tingle point on the bottom of the eye?
Alc. — It cannot.
Euph. — Therefore the appearance of a long and of a fhort diftance, is of the fame magnitude, or rather of no magnitude at all, being, in all cafes, one fingle point.
Alc. — It feems fo.
Euph. — Should it not follow, from hence, that diftance is not immediately perceived by the eye?
Alc — It fhould.
Euph.— Muft it not then be perceived by the media- don of fome other thing?
Alc. — It muft.
Euph.— To difcoverwhat this is, let us examine what alteration there may be in the appearance of the fame ob- ject, placed at different diftances from the eye. Now I find, by experience, that, when an object is removed ftill farther and farther off, in a direct line from the eye, its viiible appearance ftill grows lefier and fainter: And this change of appearance, being proportional and univerfal, feems to me to be, that by which we apprehend the various degrees of diftance.
Alc. — I have nothing to object to this.
Euph. — But littlenefs or faintnefs, in their own nature, feem to have no necefTary connexion with greater length of diftance.
Alc — I admit this to be true.
Euph. — Will it not follow then, that they could never fuggeft it but from experience?
Alc — It will.
Euph. — That is to fay, we perceive diftance, not im- mediately, but by mediation of a fign, which hath no like- nefs to it, or necefTary connexion with it, but only fuggefts it from repeated experience, as words do things.
Alc — Hold, Euphranor: Now I think of it, the wri- ters in optics tell us of an angle made by the two optic ax- [Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. j6?
cs, where they meet in the vifible point or object; which angle, the obtufer it is, the nearer it fhews the object to be, and by how much the acuter, by fo much the farther oft -, and this from a neceffary demonflrable connexion.
Euph. — The mind then finds out the diflance of things by geometry.
Alc It doth.
Euph. — Should it not follow, therefore, that nobody could fee, but thofe who had learned geometry, and knew fomething of lines and angles?
Alc. — There is a fort of natural geometry, which is got without learning.
Euph.— —Pray inform me, Alclphron^ in order to frame a proof of any kind, or deduce one point from another, is it not necefiary, that I perceive the connexion of the terms in the premifes, and the connexion of the premifes with the conclufion: And, in general, to know one thing by means of another, muft I not firft know that other thing? when I perceive your meaning by your v.*ords, muft I not firfl perceive the words themfelves? and mud I not know the premifes, before I infer the conclufion?
Alc — All this is true.
Euph. — Whoever, therefore, collects a nearer diflance from a wider angle, or a farther diflance from an acuter angle, muft firfl perceive the angles themfelves. And he who doth not perceive thofe angles, can infer nothing from them. Is it fo or not?
Alc — It is as you fay.
Euph. — Afk now the firfl man you meet, whether he perceives or knows any thing of thofe optic angles? or whether he ever thinks about them, or makes any inferen- ces from them, either by natural or artificial geometry? What anfwer do you think he would make?
Alc — To fpeak the truth, I believe his anfwer would that! he knew nothing of thofe matters.
&*4 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial; IV.]
Euph. — It cannot therefore be, that men judge of dis- tance by angles: Nor consequently can there be any force in the argument you drew from thence, to prove that dif- tance is perceived by means of fomething which hath a r.ecefTary connexion with it.
Alc. — I agree with you.
IX. Euph. — To me it feems, that a man may know whether he perceives a thing or no: and if he perceives it, whether it be immediately, or mediately: and if mediate- ly, whether by means of fomething like, or unlike, necef- farily, or arbitrarily connected with it.
Alc. — It feems fo.
Euph.-— And is it not certain, that diftance is perceived only by experience, if it be neither perceived immediately by itfelf, nor by means of any image, nor of 2ny lines and angles, which are like it, or have a necefiary connexion with it?
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — Doth it not feem to follow, from what hath been' faid and allowed by you, that before all experience a man would not imagine, the things he faw were at any diflance from him?
Alc— —How! let me fee.
Euph. — The littlenefs or faintnefs of appearance, or any other idea or fenfation, not necelTarily connected with, or rcfembling diflance, can no more fuggeft different de- • grees of diftance, or any diflance at all, to the mind, which hath not experienced a connexion of the things fignifying and fignified, than words can fuggeft notions before a man hath learned the language.
Alc. — I allow this to be true.
Euph.— Will it not thence follow, that a man born blind, and made to fee, would, upon firfl: receiving his fight, take the things he faw, not to be at any diftance from him. but in his eve, or rather in his mind?
[Dial. IV.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. i6s Alc. — I mud own it fcem fo: And yet, on the other hand, I can hardly perfuade myfelf, that, if I were in fuch a ft ate, I mould think thofe objects, which I now fee at fo great a diftance, to be at no diftance at all.
Euph. — It feems then, that you now think the objects of fight are at a diftance from you.
Alc. — Doubtlefs I do. Can any one queftion but yon- der caftle is at a great diftance?
Euph. — Tell me, Alciphron, can you difcern the doors, windows, and battlements of that fame caftle?
Alc. — I cannot. At this diftance it feems only' a fmall round tower.
Euph. — But I, who have been at it, know that it is no fmall round tower, but a large fquare building, with battlements and turrets, which it feems you do not fee.
Alc — What will you infer from thence?
Euph. — I would infer, that the very object, which you ftri&ly and properly perceive by fight, is not that thing which is feveral miles diftant.
Alc— Why fo?
Euph. — Becaufe a little round objetl is one thing, and a great fquare object is another., Is it not?
Alc — I cannot deny it.
Euph. — Tell me, is not the vifible appearance alone the proper objeel: of fight?
Alc — It is. What think you now (faid Euphranor, pointing towards the heavens) of the vifible appearance cf yonder planet? Is it not a round luminous flat, not big- ger than a fixpence?
Alc — What then?
Euph. — Tell me then, what you think of the planet itfelf. Do you not conceive it to be a vaft opaque globe, with feveral unequal rifings and vallies?
Alc — I do.
Euph. — How can you, therefore conclude, that the proper objeel: of your fight exifts at a diftance?
i66 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. IV.]
Alc. — I confefs I know not.
Euph. — For your farther conviction, do but confider that crimfon cloud. Think you, that if you were in the very place where it is, you would perceive any thing like what you now fee?
Alc. — By no means. I mould perceive only a dark milt.
Euph. — Is it not plain, therefore, that neither the caftle, the planet, nor the cloud, which you fee here, are thofe real ones, which you fuppofe exift at a diftance?
X. Alc. — "What am I to think then? Do we fee any thing at all, or is it altogether fancy and illufion?
Euph.— Upon the whole, it feems the proper objects of fight are light and colours, with their feveral (hades and degrees; all which, being infinitely diverfified and combined, form a language wonderfully adapted to fug- geft and exhibit to us the diftances, figures, fituations, dimenfions, and various qualities of tangible objects: not by fimilitude,. nor yet by inference of neceiTary connexion, but by the arbitrary impofition of Providence: juft as words fuggeft the things fignified by them.
Alc. — How! Do we not, ftrictly fpeaking, perceive by fight fuch things as trees, houfes, men, rivers, and the like?