Cri.— —They who caft about for difficulties, will be fure to find, or make them upon every fubjecl:: But he that would, upon the foot of reafon, erecl: himfelf into a judge, in order to make a wife judgment on a fubjecl: of that nature, will not only confider the doubtful and difficult parts of it, but take a comprehenfive view of the whole, confider it in all its parts and relations, trace it to its original, examine its principles, effects, and tenden- cies, its proofs internal and external: he will diftinguifh between the clear points and the obfcure, the certain and uncertain, the efiential and the circumftantial, between what is genuine and what foreign. He will confider the different forts of proof, that belong to different things: where evidence is to be expected: Where probability may iuffice: And where it is reafonable to fuppofe there fhould [Dial. VI.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 331 be doubts and fcruples. He will proportion his pains and exa&nefs to the importance of the inquiry, and check that difpofition of his mind to conclude all thofe notions, groundlefs prejudices, with which it was imbued before it knew the reafon of them. He will filence his paflions, and liften to truth. He will endeavor to untie knots as well as to tie them, and dwell rather on the light parts of things, than the obfcure. He will balance the force of his underftanding with the difficulty of the fubje£t, and to render his judgment impartial, hear evidence on all fides, and fo far as he is led by authority, choofe to follow that of the honefteft and wifeft men. Now it is my fin- cere opinion, the chriftian religion may well ftand the teft of fuch an inquiry.
Lys.— — But fuch an inquiry would coft too much pains and time. We have thought of another method, the bringing religion to the teft of wit and humour: This we find a much fhorter, eafier, and more effectual way. And, as all enemies are at liberty to choofe their weapons, we make choice of thofe we are moft expert at: And we are the better pleafed with this choice, having obferved that of all things, a folid divine hates a jell.
Euph. — To confider the whole of the fubjecl:, to read and think on all fides, to objecT: plainly, and anfwer di- rectly, upon the foot of dry reafon and argument, would be a very tedious and troublefome affair. Befides it is at- tacking pedants at their own weapons. How much more delicate and artful is it, to give a hint to cover one's felf, with an senigma, to drop a double entendre, to keep it in one's power to recover, and flip afide, and leave his an- tagonift beating the air?
Lys.— This hath been pra&ifed with great fuccefs, and I believe it the top method to gain profelytes, and con- found pedants.
332 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VI.]
Cri. — I have feen feveral things written in this, way, which, I fuppofe, were copied from the behavior of a fly fort of fcorners, one may fometimes meet with. Sup- pofe a conceited man that would pafs for witty, tipping the wink upon one, thrufting out his tongue at another; one while waggifhly fmiling, another with a grave mouth and ludicrous eyes; often affe&ing the countenance of one who fmothered a jeft, and fometimes bursting out in a horfe-laugh: What a figure would this be, I will not fay in the fenate or council, but in a private vifit among well-bred men? And yet this is the figure that certain great authors, who in this age, would pafs for models, and do pafs for models, make in their polite and elaborate writings on the moft weighty points.
Alc. — I, who profefs myfelf an admirer, an adorer of reafon, am neverthelefs obliged to own, that in fome cafes, the fharpnefs of ridicule can do more than the ftrength of argument. But if we exert ourfelves in the ufe of mirth and humor, it is not for want of other wea- pons. It mail never be faid, that a free-thinker was afraid of reafoning. No Crito, we have reafons in ftore: The beft are yet to come: And if we can find an hour for an- other conference before we fet out to-morrow morning, I'll undertake you (hall be plied with reafons, as clear, and home, and clofe to the point as you could wifh.
THE SEVENTH DIALOGUE.
I. Chriftian Faith impofftble. II. Words Jiand for Ideas. : III. No Knowledge or Faith without Ideas. IV. Grace, no Idea of it. V. Suggefling Ideas not the only life of Wards. VI. Force as difficult to form an Idea of as Grace. VII. Notwithstanding which, ufeful Proportions may be formed concerning it. VIII. Belief of the Trini- ty and other Myfleries not abfurd. IX. Mi/lakes about Faith an Occafion of profane Raillery. X. Faith, its true Nature and Efecls. XI. Illuf rated by Science. XII. By Arithmetic in particular. XIII. Sciences converfant about Signs. XIV. The true End of Speech, Reafon, Science, and Faith. XV. Metaphyseal Objections as Jlrong again/} Human Sciences as Articles of Faith. XVI. No Religion, becau/e no Human Liberty. >XVII. Farther Proof againfl Human Liberty. XVIIL Fatalifm a Con- fequence of erroneous Suppofitions. XIX. Man an ac- countable Agent. XX. Inconftflency, Singularity, and Credulity of Minute Philofophers. XXI. Untroden Paths and new Light of the Minute Philofophers. XXII. So- phiflry of the Minute Philofophers. XXIII. Minute Phi- lofophers ambiguous, enigmatical, unfathomable. XXIV. Scepticifm of the Minute Philofophers. XXV. How a. Sceptic ought to behave. XXVI. Minute Philofophers, why difficult to convince. XXVII. Thinking, not the epidemical Evil of thefe times. XXVIII. Infidelity, not an Effecl of Reafon or Thought, its true Motives affigned. XXIX. Variety of Opinions about Religion, Effects there- of* XXX. Method for proceeding with Minute Philofo- phers. XXXI. Want of Thought, and want of Educa- tion Defects of the prefent Age.
[Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 335 HE philofophers having refolved to fct out for London next morning, we aflembled at break of day in the library. Atciphron began witli a declaration of his fincerity, alluring us, he had very maturely and with a mod unbiased mind confidered all that had been faid, the day before. He added that, upon the whole, he could not deny feveral probable reafons were produced for em- bracing the chriftian faith. But, faid he, thofe reafons being only probable can never prevail againft abfolute cer- tainty and demonftration. If therefore, I can demon- ftrate your religion to be a thing altogether abfurd and in- confiftent, your probable arguments in its defence do, from that moment, lofe their force, and with it, all right to be anfwered or confidered. The concurring teftimony of fincere and able witneffes hath, without queftion, great weight in human affairs. I will even grant, that things odd and unaccountable to human judgment or experience, may fometimes claim our afTent on that fole motive.- — And I will alfo grant it poflible, for a tradition to be con- veyed with moral evidence through many centuries. But at the fame time, you will grant to me, that a thing de- monstrably and palpably falfe, is not to be admitted on any teftimony whatever, which at bed can never amount to demonftration. To be plain, no teftimony can make nonfenfe fenfe: No moral evidence can make contradic- tions confident. Know then, that as the ftrength of our caufe doth not depend upon, fo neither is it to be deci- ded by any critical points of hiftory, chronology, or lan- guages. You are not to wonder, if the fame fort of tradition and moral proof, which governs our afient with refpecl: to fa£ts in civil or natural hiftory is not admitted as a fuflicient voucher for metaphyfical abfurdities and ab- folute impoflibilities. Things obfcure and unaccountable in human affairs, or the operations of nature, may yet 336 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VIL] be poflible, and, if well attefted, may be aflented unto: But religious aflent, or faith, can be evidently fhewn in its own nature to be impracticable, impofiible, and abfurd. This is the primary motive to infidelity. This is our cita- del and fortrefs, which may, indeed, be graced with out- works of various erudition, but, if thofc are demolished, remains in itfelf, and of its own proper ftrength impreg- nable.
Euph. — This, it muft be owned, reduceth our inquiry within a narrow compafs: Do but make out this, and I (hall have nothing more to fay.
Alc. — Know then, that the fhallow mind of the vuU gar, as it dwells only on the outward furface of things, and confiders them in the grofs, may be eafily impofed on. Hence a blind reverence for religious faith and myftery. But when an acute philofopher comes to difle£t and analyfe thefe points, the import ure plainly appears: And as he has no blindnefs, fo he has no reverence for empty no- tions, or, to fpeak more properly, for mere forms of fpeech, which mean nothing, and are of no ufe to man- kind.
II. Words are figns: They do or fhould ftand for ideas; which fo far as they fuggeft they are fignificant. But words that fuggeft no ideas are infignificant. He who an- nexeth a clear idea to every word he makes ufe of, fpeaks fenfe: But where fuch ideas are wanting, the fpeaker ut- ters nonfenfe. In order, therefore, to know whether any man's fpeech be fenfelefs and infignificant, we have no- thing to do but lay afide the words and confider the ideas fuggefted by them. Men, not being able immediately to communicate their ideas one to another, are obliged to make ufe of fenfible figns, or words; the ufe of which is to raife thofe ideas in the hearer, which are in the mind of the fpeaker: And if they fail of this end, they ferve to [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 337 no purpofe. He, who really thinks hath a train of ideas fucceeding each other and connected in his mind: And when he exprefleth himfelf by difcourfe, each word fug- gefts a diftinft idea to the hearer or reader; who by that means hath the fame train of ideas in his, which was in the mind of the fpeaker or writer. As far as this effect is produced, fo far the difcourfe is intelligible, hath fenfe and meaning. Hence it follows, that whoever can be fuppofed to underftand what he reads or hears, muft have a train of ideas raifed in his mind, correfpondent to the train of words read or heard. Thefe plain truths, to which men readily aflent in theory, are but little attended to in practice, and therefore deferve to be enlarged on, and inculcated however obvious and undeniable. Man- kind are generally averfe from thinking, though apt enough to entertain difcourfe either in themfelves or others: The effecl: whereof is, that their minds are rather ftored with names than ideas, the hulk of fcience rather than the thing. And yet thefe words without meaning do often make diftinttions of parties, the fubjecl: matter of their difputes, and the object of their zeal. This is the moft general caufe of error, which doth not influence ordinary minds alone, but even thofe who pafs for acute and learned philofophers, are often employed about names in- ftead of things or ideas, and are fuppofed to know when they only pronounce hard words, without a meaning.
III. Though it is evident that, as knowledge is the per- ception of the connexion or difagreement between ideas, he who doth not diltinclly perceive the ideas marked by the terms, fo as to form a mental propofition anfwering to the verbal, cannot poflibly have knowledge: No more can he be faid to have opinion or faith which imply a weaker aflent, but ftill it muft be to a propofition, the terms of which, are underftood as clearly, although the agreement T t 338 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII] or difagrecment of the ideas may not be fo evident, as in the cafe of knowledge. I fay, all degrees of aflent whether founded on reafon or authority, more or lefs co- gent, are internal acts of the mind, which alike terminate in ideas as their proper object: Without which there can be really no fuch thing as knowledge, faith, or opinion. We may perhaps raife a duft and difpute about tenets purely verbal: But what is this at bottom, more than mere trifling? All which will be eafily admitted with ref- pect to human learning and fcience; wherein it is an al- lowed method to expofe any doctrine or tenet, by {trip- ping them of the words, and examining what ideas are underneath, or whether any ideas at all? This is often found the fhortaft way to end difputes, which might oth- ervvife grow, and multiply without end, the litigants nei- ther underflanding one another nor themfelves. It were needlefs to illuftrate what mines by its own light, and is ad- mitted by all thinking men. My endeavor fhall be only to apply it in the prefent cafe. I fuppofe I need not be at any pains to prove, that the fame rules of reafon and good fcnk, which obtain in all other fubjects, ought to take place in religion. As for thofe, who confider faith and reafon as two diftinct provinces, and would have us think good fenfe has nothing to do where it is moll concerned, I am refoived never to argue with fuch men, but leave them in quiet pofTeiTion of their prejudices. And now, for the particular application of what I have faid, I lliall not fingle out any nice difputed points of fchool divinity, -or thofe that relate to the nature and eflence of God, which being allowed infinite you might pretend to fcreen them, under the general notion of difficulties attending the na- ture of infinity.
IV. Grace is the main point in the chriftian difpenfa- is cftner mentioned or more confidered [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 339 throughout the New Teftament; wherein it is reprefent- ed as fomewhat of a very particular kind, diftin£t, from any thing revealed to the Jews, or known by the light of nature. This fame grace is fpoken of, as the gift of God, as coming by Jefus Chrifty as reigning, as abounding, as operating. Men are faid to fpeak through grace, to be- lieve through grace. Mention is made of the glory of grace, the riches of grace, the Rewards of grace. Chris- tians are faid to be heirs of grace, to receive grace, grow in grace, be ftrong in grace, to (land in grace, and to fall from grace. And laftiy, grace is faid to juftify, and to fave them. Hence chriitianity is Puled the covenant or difpenfation of grace. And it is well known, that no point hath created more controverfy in the church, than this doctrine of grace. "What difputes about its nature, extent, and effects, about univerfal, efficacious, fufEcient, preventing, irrefiflible grace, have employed the pens of proteftant as well as popim divines, of Janfemjls and Mo- lin'ijisy of Lutherans^ Calvinifls, and Arminians, as I have not the lead curiofity to know, fo I need not fay. It fuf- ficeth to obferve, that there have been, and are (till fub- fifting great contefls upon thefe points. Only one thing I fnould defire to be informed of, to wit, what is the clear and diftincl: idea marked by the word grace? I pre- fume a man may know the bare meaning of a term, with- out going into the depth of all thofe learned inquiries. This furcly is an eafy matter, provided there is an idea an- nexed to fuch term. And if there is not, it can be nei- ther the fubject of a rational difpute, nor the object of real faith. Men may indeed impofe upon themfelves or others, and pretend to argue and believe, when at bottom there is no argument or belief, farther than mere verbal trifling. Grace taken in the vulgar fenfe, either for beau- ty, or favor, I can eafily underftand. But when it de- 34o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.)
notes an active, vital, ruling principle, influencing and ope- rating on the mind of man, diftimtl from every natural power or motive, I profefs myfelf altogether unable to underftand it, or frame any diftincl: idea of it: And, therefore, I cannot aflent to any propofition concerning it, nor confequently have any faith about it: And it is a felf-evident truth, that God obligeth no man to impoffibil- ities. At the requeit of a philofophical friend, I did caft an eye on the writings he (hewed* me of fome divines, and talked with others, on this fubje£t, but after all I had read or heard, could make nothing of it, having always found,- whenever I laid afide the word gracey and looked into my own mind, a perfect vacuity or privation of all ideas. And, as I am apt to think men's minds and faculties are made much alike, I fufpecl: that other men, if they examined what they call grace, with the fame exactnefs and indifference, would agree with me, that there was nothing in it but an empty name. This is not the only inftance, where a word often heard and pronounced, is believed intelligible, for no other reafon but becaufe it is familiar. Of the fame kind are many other points reput- ed neceiTary articles of faith. That which in the prefent cafe impofeth upon mankind, I take to be partly this. Men fpeak of this holy principle, as of fomething that a&s, moves, and determines, taking their ideas from cor- poreal things, from motion, and the force or Momentum of bodies, which being of an obvious and fenfible nature they fubftitute in place of a thing fpiritual, and incompre- henfible, which is a manifeft delufion. For though, the idea of corporeal force be ever fo clear and intelligible, it will not, therefore, follow, that the idea of grace, a thing perfectly incorporeal, miift be fo too. And though, we may reafon diftin&ly, perceive,' aflent, and form opin- ions about the one, it will by no means, follow that, we can do fo of the other. Thus it comes to pafs, that a [Dial. VII.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 341 clear fenfible idea of what is real, produceth, or rather, is made a pretence for an imaginary, fpiritual faith, that terminates in no object; a thing impoffible! For there can be no afient, where there are no ideas: And where there is no aflent, there can be no faith: And what can- not be, that no man is obliged to. This is as clear as any thing in Euclid.
V. Euph. — Be the ufe of v/ords or names, what it will, I can never think it is to do things impoffible. Let us then inquire what it is? And fee if we can make fenfe of our daily practice. Words, it is agreed, are figns: It may not, therefore, be amifs to examine the ufe of oth- er figns, in order to know that of words. Counters, for inftance, at a card-table are ufed, not for their own fake, but only as figns fubftituted for money, as words are for ideas. Say now, Alciphron, is it neceflary every time thefe counters are ufed, throughout the whole progrefs of a game, to frame an idea of the diitinct, fum or value, that each reprefents?
Alc. — By no means: It is fufiicient, the players at firft agree on their refpedtive values, and at laft fubftitute thofe values in their ftead.
Euph. — And in calling up a fum, where the figures (land for pounds, millings, and pence, do you think it necefiary, throughout the whole progrefs of the operation, in each ftep, to form ideas of pounds, millings, and pence?
Alc. — I do not, it will fuffice, if in the conclufion, thofe figures direct our actions with refpecl: to things.
Euph. — From hence, it feems to follow, that words may not be infignificant, although they fhould not every time they are ufed, excite the ideas they fignify in our minds, it being fufiicient, that we have it in our power to fubftitute things or ideas for their figns when there is 342 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
occafion. It feems alfo to follow, that there may be another ufe of words, befides that of marking and fug- gefting diftinct ideas, to wit, the influencing our conduct and actions; which may be done, either by forming rules for us to act by, or by railing certain paflions, difpofitions, and emotions in our minds. A difcourfe, therefore, that directs how to acl:, or excite to the doing or forbearance of an action may, it feems, be ufeful and fignificant, al- though the words whereof it is compofed, mould not bring each a diftinfr, idea into our minds.
Alc. — It feems fo.
Euph. — Pray tell me, Alciphron, is not an idea altogeth- er inactive?
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — An agent, therefore, an active mind, or fpirit, cannot be an idea, or like an idea. Whence it mould feem to follow, that thofe words, which denote an active principle, foul, or fpirit, do not, in a ftrict, and proper fenfe, ftand for ideas: And yet they are not infignificant neither: Since I underftand what is fignified by the term /, or myfelf, or know what it means, although it be no idea, nor like an idea, but that which thinks and wills, and apprehends ideas and operates about them. Certainly it muft be allowed that we have fome notion, that we un- derftand, or know what is meant by the terms myfelf, will, memory, love, hate, and fo forth, although, to fpeak exactly, thefe words do not fuggeft fo many diftict ideas.
Alc. — What would you infer from this?
Euph. — What hath been inferred already, that words may be fignificant, although they do not ftand for ideas.* The contrary whereof having been prefumed, feems to have produced the doctrine of abftract ideas.
Alc — Will you not allow then, that the mind can ab- ftract?.
* See the Principles of Human Knowledge. Sect, 135. and the Intro- duction. Sect. 20.
[Dial. VIL] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 343 Euph. — I do not deny it may abftracl: in a certain fenfe; inafmuch as thofe things that can really exift, or be really perceived afunder, may be conceived afunder, or abftracled one from the other; for inftance, a man's head from his body, colour from motion, figure from weight. But it will not thence follow, that the mind can frame, abftracl: general ideas, which appear to be impof- fible.
Alc. — And yet it is a current opinion, that every fub- ftantive name marks out, and exhibits to the mind, one diftincl: idea feparate from all others.
Euph. — Pray, Alciphrony is not the word number, fuch a fubftantive name?
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — Do but try now, whether you can frame an idea of number, in abftract exclufive of all figns, words, and things numbered. I profefs, for my own part, I cannot.
Alc. — Can it be fo hard a matter to form a fimple idea of number, the object of a mod evident demonftrable fcience? Hold, let me fee, if I cannot abftracl: the idea of number, from the numeral names and characters, and all particular numerable things. Upon which, Alciphron paufed a while, and then faid: To confefs the truth, I do not find that I can.
Euph. — But though, it feems, neither you nor I can form diftincl:, fimple ideas of number, we can neverthe- Iefs, make a very proper and fignificant ufe of numeral names. They direct us in the difpofition, and manage- ment of our affairs, and are of fuch necefTary ufe, that we (liould not know how to do without them. And yet, if other men's faculties may be judged of by mine, to attain a precife, fimple abftracl: idea of number, is as diffi- cult as to comprehend any myftery in religion.
344 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. VII.]
" VI. But to come to your own inftance, let us examine what idea we can frame of force abftra&ed from body, motion, and outward fenfible efFe£ts. For myfelf, I do not find that I have or can have any fuch idea.
Alc. — Surely every one knows what is meant by force.
Euph. — And yet I queftion whether every one can form a diftin6t idea of force. Let me intreat you, Alci- phron, be not amufed by terms, lay afide the word force, and exclude every other thing from your thoughts, and then fee what precife idea you have of force.
Alc— Force is that in bodies, which produceth motion and other fenfible effe&s.
Euph. — It is then fomething diftindt from thofe effects.
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — Be pleafed now to exclude the confederation of its fubje£t and effects, and contemplate force itfelf in its own precife idea.
Alc — I profefs I find it no fuch eafy matter.