Jon. And, in order to know its force and influence, it may not be amifs to inquire, what it was underitood to be, and what light it was placed in, by thofe who firfl con- fidered it, and gave it a name. To kalon> according to Ariflotle, is the epoineton, or laudable: according to Plato, it is the ediiy or ophetimon, pleafant, or profitable, which is meant with refpedv. to a reafonable mind, and its true intereft. Now I would fain know, whether a mind, which confiders an action as laudable, be not carried be- yond the bare action itfelf, to regard the opinion of others concerning it?
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — And whether this be a fufficient ground or principle of virtue, for a man to act upon, when he thinks himfelf removed from the eye and obfervation of every other intelligent being r Alc. — It feems not.
Euph. — Again, I afk whether a man, who doth a thing pleafant or profitable as fuch, muft not be fuppo- fed to forbear doing it, or even to do the contrary, upon the profpect of greater pleafure or profit?
Alc-*— He muft.
Euph. — Doth it not follow from hence, that the beau- ty of virtue, or to kalon, in either Artjlotles or Plato's fenfe, is not a fufficient principle, or ground, to engage fenfual and worldly-minded men in the practice of it?
Alc— What then?
Euph. — Why, then it will follow, that hope of re- ward, and fear of punifhment, are highly expedient to caft the balance of pleafant and profitable on the fide of virtue, and thereby very much conduce to the benefit of human fociety. Alciphron, upon this, appealed: Gen- tlemen, faid he, you are witnefies of this unfair proceed- ing of Euphranor, who argues againft us, from explica- tions given by Plato and Ari/Iotle, of the beauty of virtue, which are things we have nothing to fay to \ the philoh4 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. HI.]
fophers of our feci: abftra&ing from all praife, pleafure, and intereft, -when they are enamoured and tranfport- ed with that fublime idea. I beg pardon, replied Eu- phranor, for fuppofing the Minute Philofophers, of Our days, think like thofe ancient fages. But you muft tell me, Alciphrotiy fince you do not think fit to adopt the fenfe of Plato or Arificile, what fenfe is it in which you underftand ihe beauty of virtue? Define it, explain it, make me to underftand your meaning, that fo we may argue about the fame thing, without which we can never come to a conclufion.
V. Alc. — Some things are better underftood by de- finitions and defcriptions; but I have always obferved, that thofe, who would define, explain, and difpute about this point, make the lead of it. Moral beauty is of fo peculiar and abftra£ted a nature, fomething fo fubtile, fine, and fugacious, that it will not bear being handled and infpe&ed, like every grofs and common fubjecl:. You will, therefore, pardon me, if I (land upon my philofophic liberty; and choofe rather to intrench myfelf, within the general and indefinite fenfe, rather than, by entering into a precife and particular explication of this beauty, per- chance lofe fight of it •, or give you fome hold whereon to cavil, and infer, and raife doubts, queries, and difficulties, about a point as clear as the fun, when nobody reafons upon it.
Euph. — How fay you, A/ciphron, is that notion clear- eft when it is not confidered?
Alc. — I fay, it is rather to be felt than underftood, a certain je ne Jcai quoi. An object, not of the difcurfive faculty, but of a peculiar fenfe, which is properly called the moral fenfe, being adapted to the perception of moral beauty, as the eye to colours, or the ear to founds.
Euph. — That men have certain inftint~tive fenfations, or paflions, from nature, which make them amiable and [Dial. III.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 125 ufeful to each other, I am clearly convinced. Such are fellow-feeling with the diftreffed, a tendernefs for our offspring, an affection towards our friends, our neighbors, and our country, an indignation againft things bafe, cru- el, or unjuft. Thefe paflions are implanted in the human foul, with feveral other fears and appetites, averfions and defires, fome of which are ftrongeft and uppermoft in one mind, others in another. Should it not, therefore, feem a very uncertain guide in morals, for a man to follow his paffion or inward feeling? And would not this rule infal- libly lead different men different ways, according to the prevalency of this or that appetite, or paffion?
Alc. — I do not deny it.
Euph. — And will it not follow from hence, that duty and virtue are in a fairer way of being pra&ifed, if men are led by reafon and judgment; balancing low and fen- fual pleafures with thofe of a higher kind, comparing pre- fent loffes with future gains, and the uneafinefs and dif- guft of every vice, with the delightful practice of the oppofite virtue, and the pleafing reflexions and hopes which attend it? Or, can there be a ftronger motive to virtue, than the fhewing that, confidered in all lights, it is every man's true intereft?
VI. Alc. — I tell you, Euphranor, we contemn the vir- tue of that man, who computes and deliberates, and muft have a reafon for being virtuous. The refined moralifts of our feci: are ravifhed and tranfported with the abftraft beauty of virtue. They difdain all forenfical motives to it; and love virtue only for virtue's fake. Oh rapture! Oh enthufiafm! Oh the quinteflence of beauty! Methinks I could dwell for ever on this contemplation. But rather than entertain myfelf, I muft endeavor to convince you. Make an experiment on the firft man you meet. Propofe a villainous or unjuft action. Take his firft fenfe of the matter, and you (hall find he detefts it. He may indeed 126 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. III.]
be afterwards mifled by arguments, or overpowered by temptation; but his original, unpremeditated, and genu- ine thoughts, are juft and orthodox. How can we account for this, but by a moral fenfe, which, left to itfelf, hath as quick and true a perception of the beauty and deformity of human actions, as the eye hath of colors.
Euph. — May not this be fufficiently accounted for, by conscience, affection, paffion, education, reafon, cuftom, religion, which principles and habits, for aught I know, may be what you metaphorically call a moral fenfe?
Alc — What I call a moral fenfe, is ftri&ly, properly, and truly fuch, and, in kind, different from all thofe things you enumerate. It is what all men have, though all may not obferve it. Upon this, Euphranor fmiled, and faid, Alciphron has made difcoveries where I leaft expected it. For, faid he, in regard to every other point, I mould hope to learn from him j but for the knowledge of myfelf, or the faculties and powers of my own mind, I mould have looked at home. And there I might have looked long enough, without finding this new talent, which even now, after being tutored, I cannot comprehend. For Alciphron, I mult needs fay, is too fublime and enigmatical upon a point, which, of all others, ought to be moft clearly under- ftood. I have often heard that your deepeft adepts and oldeft profeflbrs in fcience are the obfcureft. Lyftdes is young, and fpeaks plain. Would he but favor us with his fenfe of this point, it might, perhaps, prove more upon a level with my apprehenfion.
VII. Lyftdes fhook his head, and in a grave and earneft manner addrefled the company. Gentlemen, faid he, Alciphron ftands upon his own legs. I have no part in thefe refined notions he is at prefent engaged to defend. If I muft fubdue my pafiions, abftracl:, contemplate, be en- amoured of virtue; in a word, if I muft be an enthufiaft, I owe fo much deference to the laws of my country, as [Dial. III.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 127 to choofe being an enthufiaft in their way. Befides, it is better being fo for fome end, than for none. This doc- trine hath all the folid inconveniencies, without the amu- fing hopes and profpecls of the chriftian.
Alc. — I never counted on Lyficles for my fecond in this point; which, after all, doth not need his afliftance or explication. All fubjeds ought not to be treated in the fame manner. The way of definition and divificn is dry and pedantic. Befides, the fubjecl; is fometimes too ob- fcure, fometimes too fimple, for this method. One while we know too little of a point, another too much, to make it plainer by difcourfe.
Cri. — To hear Alciphron talk, puts me in mind of that ingenious Greek, who having wrapt a man's brother up in a cloak, afked him whether he knew that perfon? being ready, either by keeping on, or pulling off the cloak, to confute his anfwer, whatever it fhould be. For my part, I believe, if matters were fairly ftated, that rational fatif- fa&ion, that peace of mind, that inward comfort, and con- fcientious joy, which a good chriftian finds in good actions, would not be found to fall fhort of all the ecftafy, rapture, and enthufiafm fuppofed to bk the effecl: of that high and undefcribed principle. In earned, can any ecftafy be higher, any rapture more affecting, than that which fprings from the love of God and man, from a confeience void of offence, and an inward difcharge of duty, with the fe- cret delight, truft, and hope that attend it?
Alc. — O Euphratwr, we votaries of truth do not envy, but pity, the groundlefs joys and miftaken hopes of a chriftian. And, as for confeience and rational pleafure, how can we allow a confeience, without allowing a vindic- tive Providence? or how can we fuppofe, the charm of virtue confifts in any pleafure, or benefit attending virtuous actions,* without giving great advantages to the chriftian * There can never be lefs felf-enjoyment than in thefe fuppofed wife characters, thefe felfifh computers of happinels and private good. Charac- terises, Vol. 3. p. 301.
xa8 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial, in.]
religion, which, it feems, excites its believers to virtue by the higheft interefts and pleafures in reversion. Alas! mould we grant this, there would be a door opened to all thofe rufty declaimers upon the neceffity and ufefulnefs of the great points of faith, the immortality of the foul, a fu- ture ftate, rewards and punifhments, and the like exploded conceits; which, according to our fyftem and principles, may perhaps produce a low, popular, interefted kind of virtue, but mull abfoluteiy deitroy and extinguifh it in the fublime and heroic fenfe.
VIII. Euph.1 — What you now fay is very intelligible: I wim I underftood your main principle as well.
Alc. — And are you then in earned at a lofs? Is it pof- fible you mould have no notion of beauty, or that, having it, you fhould not know it to be amiable, amiable I fay, in itfelf, and for itfelf?
Euph. — Pray tell me, Alciphron> are all mankind agreed, in the notion of a beauteous face?
Alc. — Beauty in human kind feems to be of a more mixt and various nature: forafmuch as the paflions, fenti- ments, and qualities of the foul being feen through! and blending with the features, work differently on differ- ent minds, as the fympathy is more or lefs. But, with regard to other things, is there no fteady principle of beau- ty? Is there upon earth, a human mind, without the idea of order, harmony, and proportion?
Euph. — O Alciphron^ it is my weaknefs, that I am apt to be loft in abftracHons and generalities, but a particular thing is better fuited to my faculties. I find it cafy to confider and keep in view the objects of fenfe; let us therefore try to difcover what their beauty is, or wherein it confifts j and fo, by the help of thefe fenfible things, as a fcale or ladder, afcend to moral and intellectual beauty. Be pleafed then to inform me, what it is we call beauty in the objects of fenfe?
[Dial. III.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. I2j Alc — Every one knows beauty is that which pleafes.
Eupk. — There is then beauty in the fmeli of a rofe, or the tafte of an apple.
Alc. — By no means. Beauty is, to fpeak properly, perceived only by the eye.
Euph. — It cannot, therefore, be defined, in general, that which pieafeth.
Alc — I grant it cannot.
Euph. — How then fhall we limit or define it? Aid- phroriy after a fhort paufe, faid, that beauty confided in a certain fymmetry, or proportion, pleafing to the eye.
Euph. — Is this proportion one and the fame in all things, or is it different in different kinds of things?
Alc — Different, doubtlefs. The proportions of an ox would not be beautiful in an horfe. And we obferve, alfo in things inanimate, that the beauty of a table, a chair, a door, confilts in different proportions.
Euph. — Doth not this proportion imply the relation of one thing to another?
Alc — It doth.
Euph. — And are not thefe relations founded in fize and fhape?
Alc — They are.
Euph. — And, to make the proportions juft, muft not thefe mutual relations of fize and fhape, in the parts, be fuch, as fhall make the whole complete and perfect in its kind?
Alc — -I grant they muft.
Euph. — Is not a thing faid to be perfect in its kind, when it anfwers the end for which it was made?
Alc — It is.
Euph. — The parts, therefore, in true proportions, muft be fo related, and adjufted to one another, as that they may beft confpire to the ufe and operation of the whole.
Alc — It feems fo.
R i3o MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. III.]
Euph. — But the comparing parts one with another, the confidering them as belonging to one whole, and the re- fering this whole to its ufe and end, mould feem the work of reafon: mould it not?
Alc — It mould.
Euph. — Proportions, therefore, are not, ftriclly fpeak- ing, perceived by the fenfe of fight, but only by reafon, through the medium of fight.
Alc. — This I grant.
Euph.-— Confequently beauty, in your fenfe of it, is an obje£t, not of the eye, but of the mind.
Alc. — It is.
Euph. — The eye, therefore, alone, cannot fee that a chair is handfome, or a door well proportioned.
Alc — It feems to follow *, but I am not clear as to this point.
Euph.— -Let us fee, if there be any difficulty in it. — Could the chair you fit on, think you, be reckoned well proportioned, or handfome, if it had not fuch a height, breadth, widenefs, and was not {o far reclined, as to af- ford a convenient feat?
Alc. — It could not.
Euph. — The beauty, therefore, or fymmetry of a chair, cannot be apprehended, but by knowing its ufe, and comparing its figure with that ufe, which cannot be done by the eye alone, but is the effecl: of judgment. It is, therefore, one thing to fee an object, and another to difcern its beauty.
Alc. — I admit this to be true.
IX. Euph. — The architects judge a door to be of a beautiful proportion, when its height is double of the breadth. But if you mould invert a well proportioned door, making its breadth become the height, and its height the breadth, the figure would ftill be the fame, but with- out that beauty in one fituation, which it had in another.
[Dial. III.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 131 What can be the caufe of this, but that in the foremention- ed fuppofkron, the door would not yield a convenient en- trance to creatures of a human figure? But, if in any- other part of the univerfe, there mould be fuppofed ra- tional animals of an inverted ftature, they muft be fuppo- fed to invert the rule for proportion of doors: and to them that would appear beautiful, which, to us, was difagreeable.
Alc- — Againft this, I have no objection.
Euro. — Tell me, Alciphron, is there not fomething truly decent and beautiful in drefs?
Alc. — Doubtlefs, there is.
Euph. — Are any likelier to give us an idea of this beauty in drefs, than painters and fculptors, whofe pro- per bufinefs and ftudy it is, to aim at graceful represent- ations?
Alc. — I believe not.
Euph. — Let us then examine the draperies of the great mailers m thefe arts: How, for inftance, they ufe to clothe a matron, or a man of rank. Call an eye on thofe figures (faid he, pointing to fome prints after Ra- phael and Guidoy that hung upon the wall) what appear- ance, do you think, an Englijh courtier, or magillrate, with his Gothic, fuccin£l, plaited garment, and his full- bottomed wig; or one of our ladies in her unnatural drefs, pinched, and ftiffened, and enlarged with hoops, and whale-bone, and buckram, mull make; among thole fi- gures fo decently clad in draperies, that fall into fuch a variety of natural, eafy, and ample folds \ that cover the body without incumbering it, and adorn without altering the fhape?
Alc. — Truly, I think they mull make a very ridicu- lous appearance.
Euph. — And what do you think this proceeds from? Whence is it, that the eaflern nations, the Greeks and the Romans, naturally run into the moll becoming drefles; i32 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. III.]
while our Gothic gentry, after fo many centuries racking their inventions, mending, and altering, and improving, and whirling about in perpetual rotation of faftiions, have never yet had the |uck to (tumble on any that was not ab- furd and ridiculous? Is it not from hence, that inflead of confulting ufe, reafon, and convenience, they abandon themfelves to fancy, the unnatural parent of monfters? Whereas the ancients, confidering the ufe and end of drefs, made it fubfervient to the freedom, eafe, and conve- nience of the body, and, having no notion of mending or changing the natural ihape, they aimed only at fhewing it with decency and advantage. And, if this be fo, are we not to conclude, that the beauty of drefs depends on its fubferviency to certain ends and ufes?
Alc. — This appears to be true.
Euph. This fubordinate, relative nature of beauty, perhaps will be yet plainer, if we examine the refpective beauties of a hoife and a pillar. VirgW$ defcription of the former is, — — llli ardna cervix, Argutumque caput, brevis alvus, obefaque terga, Luxuriatque toris animofum pectus.
Now I would fain know, whether the perfections and ufe s of a horfe may not be reduced to thefe three points, courage, ffcrength, and fpeed? and whether each of the beauties enumerated, doth not occafion, or betoken, one of thefe perfections? After the fame manner, if we in- quire into the parts and proportions of a beautiful pillar, we mail perhaps find them anfwer to this fame idea. Thofe who have confidered the theory of architecture, tell us, * the proportions of the three Grecian Orders were taken from the human body, as the moft beautiful and perfect * See the learned patri?rch of Aquileia's Commentary on Vitruvius, I [Dial. III.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 133 production of nature. Hence were derived thofe grace- ful ideas of columns, which had a character of ftrength without clumfinefs, or of delicacy without weaknefs. — Thofe beautiful proportions were, I fay, taken originally from nature, which, in her creatures, as hath been already obferved, referreth them tofome end, ufe, or defign. The Gonfiezza alfo, or fwelling, and the diminution of a pillar, is it not in fuch proportion, as to make it appear ltrong and light at the fame time? In the fame manner, muft not the whole entablature, with its projections, be fo pro- portioned, as to feem great, but not heavy, light, but not little: inafmuch as a deviation into either extreme would thwart that reafon and ufe of things, wherein their beauty is founded, and to which it is fubordinate? The entabla- ture, and all its parts and ornaments, architrave, freeze, cornice, triglyphs, metopes, modiglions, and the reft, have each an ufe, or appearance of ufe, in giving firmnefs and union to the building, in protecting it from the weather, and calling off the rain, in reprefenting the ends of beams with their intervals, the production of rafters, and fo forth. And, if we confider the graceful angels in frontispieces, the fpaces between the columns, or the ornaments of their capitals; mail we not find, that their beauty rifeth from the appearance of ufe, or the imitation of natural things, whofe beauty is originally founded on the fame principle? which is, indeed, the grand diftinclion between Grecian and Gothic architecture; the latter being fantaftical, and, for the mod part, founded neither in nature, nor in rea- fon, in neceffity nor ufe, the appearance of which, ac- counts for all the beauty, grace and ornament, of the other.
Cri. — What Euphra7ior\\i\S\ faid, confirms the opinion, I always entertained, that the rules of architecture were founded, (as all other arts which flourifhed among the Greeks) in truth, and nature, and good fenfe. But the ancients, who, from a thorough confideration of the i34 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. III.]
grounds and principles of art, formed their idea of beauty, did not always confine themfelves ftri£tly to the fame rules and proportions: But, whenever the particular diftance, polition, elevation, or dimenfion of the fabric, or its parts, feemed to require it, made no fcruple to depart from them, without deferting the original principles of beauty, which governed whatever deviations they made. This latitude, or licence, might not, perhaps, be fafely trufted with moll ' modern architects, who, in their bold fallies, feem to acl: without aim Or defign; and to be governed by no idea, no reafon, or principle of art, but pure caprice, joined with a thorough contempt of that noble fimplicity of the an- cients, without which there can be no unity, gracefulnefs, or grandeur in their works; which, of confequence, mull ferve only to disfigure and dilhonor the nation, being fo many monuments to future ages of the opulence and ill tafte of the prefent; which, it is to be feared, would fuc- ceed as wretchedly, and make as mad work in other affairs, were men to follow, inftead of rules, precepts, and mod- els, their own tafte and firft thoughts of beauty.
Alc. — I mould now, methinks, be glad to fee a little more diftin&Iy, the ufe and. tendency of this digreflion upon architecture.
Euph.—- Was not beauty the very thing we inquired after?
Alc. — It was.
Euph. — What think you, Alciphron, can the appearance of a thing pleafe at this time, and in this place, which pleafed two thoufand years ago, and two thoufand miles off, without fome real principle of beauty?
Alc. — It cannot.
Euph. — And is not this the cafe with refpecl: to a jufl piece of architecture?
Alc — No body denies it.
Euph. — Architecture, the noble offspring of judgment and fancy, was gradually formed in the molt polite and [Dial. HI.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. i35 knowing countries of Afta> Egypt, Greece and Italy. It was cherifhed and edeemed by the moft flourifhing dates, and mod renowned princes, who, with vad expenfe, improved and brought it to perfection. It feems, above all other arts, peculiarly converfant about order, proportion, and fymmetry. May it not, therefore, be fuppofed, on all ac- counts, mod likely to help us to fome rational notion of theyV nefcai quoi in beauty? And, in effect, have we not learned from this digreffion, that, as there is no beauty without proportion, fo proportions are to be edeemed juft and true, only as they are relative to fome certain ufe or end, their aptitude and fubordination to which end is, at bottom, that which makes them pleafe and charm? Alc — I admit all this to be true.
X. Euph. — According to this doctrine, I would fain know what beauty can be found in a moral fydem, form- ed, connecled, and governed by chance, fate, or any other blind unthinking principle? forafmuchas, without thought, there can be no end or defign; and, without an end, there can be no ufe; and, without ufe, there is no aptitude or fit- nefs of proportion, from whence beauty fprings.
Alc. — May we not fuppofe a certain vital principle of beauty, order, and harmony, diffufed throughout the world, without fuppofing a Providence, infpecting, punifhing, and rewarding the moral actions of men? without fuppofmg the immortality of the foul, or a life to come; in a word, without admitting any part of what is commonly called faith, worfhip, and religion?
Cri. — Either you fuppofe this principle intelligent, or not intelligent: If the latter, it is all one with chance, or fate, which was jud now agreed againd: If the former, let me intreat Alciphron to explain to me, wherein confids the beauty of a moral fydem, with a Supreme Intelligence at the head of it, which neither protects the innocent, pun- iflies the wicked, nor rewards the virtuous? To fuppofe, i36 MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. [Dial. III.]
indeed, a Society of rational agents, acting under the eye of Providence, concurring in one dtfign to promote the com- mon benefit of the whole, and conforming their actions to the eftabliihed laws and order of the Divine Paternal Wif- doin: Wherein each particular agent fhall not. confider himfelf apart, but as the member of a great city, whofe author and founder is God: In which the civil laws are no other, than the rules of virtue, and the duties of reli- gion: And where every one's true interefl is combined with his duty: to fuppofe this, would be delightful: On this fuppofition, a man need be no ftoic or knight-errant, to account for his virtue. In fuch a fyftem, vice is mad- nef&, cunning is folly, wifdom and virtue are the fame thing, where, notwithstanding all the crooked paths and by-roads, the wayward appetites and inclinations of men, Sovereign reafon is fure to reform whatever feems amifs, to reduce that which is devious, make ftraight that which is crooked, and, in the laft act, wind up the whole plot, according to the exacted rules of wifdom and juftice* In fuch a fyftem, or fociety, governed by the wifeft precepts, enforced by the higheft rewards and difcouragements, it is delightful to confider, howT the regulation of laws, the distribution of good and evil, the aim of moral agents, do all confpire, in due Subordination, to promote the noble ft end, to wit, the complete happinefs, or well-being, of the whole. In contemplating the beauty of fuch a moral fyf- tem, we may cry out, with the pfalmift, Very excellent things are fpohen of thee, though City of God.
XL In a fyftem of fpirits, Subordinate to the will, and under the direction, of the Father of fpirits, governing them by laws, and conducting them by methods, Suitable to wife and good ends, there will.be great beauty. But in an in- coherent fortuitous fyftem, governed by chance, or in a blind fyftem, govetned by fate, or in any fyftem where Providence doth not prefide, how can beauty be, which can- [Dial. III.] MINUTE PHILOSOPHER. 137 not be without order, which cannot be without defign? when a man is confcious that his will is inwardly conform- ed to the divine will, producing order and harmony in the univerfe, and conducting the whole by the jufteft methods to the beft end: This gives a beautiful idea. But on the other hand, a confcioufnefs of virtue overlooked, neglected, diftrefied by men, and not regarded or rewarded by God, ill-ufed in this world, without hope or profpecl: of being better ufed in another, I would fain know, where is the pleafure of this reflexion, whej-e is the beauty of this fcene? or, how could any man, in his fenfes, think the fpreading fuch notions the way to fpread or propagate virtue in the world? Is it not, I befeech you, an ugly fyftem, in which you can fuppofe no law, and prove no duty, wherein men thrive by wickednefs, and fuffer by virtue? Would it not be a difagreeable fight to fee an honeft man peeled by (harp- ers, to fee virtuous men injured and defpifed, while vice triumphed? An enthufiaft may entertain himfelf with vifions, and fine talk, about fuch a fyftem; but when it comes to be confidered by men of cool heads, and clofe reafon, I believe they will find no beauty nor perfection in it; nor will it appear, that fuch a moral fyftem can