. — Pall, Jie Ve Obedience, 2 OR, THE 2 I Chriſtian Doctrine Of Not Reſiſting the SUPREME POWER, Proved and indicated upon the PRINCIPLES O F THE LAW of NATURE.
ar EO FO CON By GEORGE BERKELET, V. A. Fellow of Trinity- )-Colege, Bali. | * "1 Nec vero aut per Senatum aut per b ſol vi hac _ * Cicerd 6 de W — The Second Edition.
LONDON: £7132, in. St. Paul's Church-Yard.
H AT an Abſolute Paſſive Obedi- - ence ought not to be paid any Civil Power: But that Submiſfon to Govern- ment ſhou'd be Meaſured and Limited by the Public Good of the Society; and that therefore Subjects may Lawſully Reſiſt the Supreme Authority, in thoſe Caſes where the Public Good ſhall plainly ſeem to re- quire it: Nay, that it 1s their Duty to do ſo, inaſmuch as theykare all under an indi- ſpenſable Obligation to promote the Common er: T beſe and the like Notions, which T cannot help thinking Pernicious to Man- kind and Repugnant to Right Reaſon, ha- ving of late Tears been Induſtriouſly Culti- vated, and ſet in the moſt Advantageous Lights by Men of Parts and Learning, it ſeemed neceſſary to Arm the Touth of our Univer ſity againſt them, and take care they go into the World well Principled; I do | not mean Obſtinately Prejudic'd in favour of - } 111 To the Reader.
a Party, but from an early Acquaintance with their Duty, and the clear Rational Grounds of it, Determin'd to ſuch Pracli- ces as may ſpeak them Good Chriſtians and Loyal Subjects.
In this View, I made three Diſcourſes not many Months ſince in the College- Chapel, which ſome who heard them thought it might be of Uſe to make more Public: And indeed, the falſe Accounts hat are gone abroad concerning them, have wade it neceſſary. Accoramply J now ſend them into the World under the Form of one entire Diſcourſe. Þ 20 Conclude; As in Writing thefe T houzhts it was my Endeavour to Preſerve that Cool and Impartial Temper which be- comes every ſincere Enquirer after Truth, fo I heartily wiſh they may be Read with the ſame Diſpoſition.
V. hoſoever Reſifteth the Power, Re -Sſt- eth the Ordinance of God.
J. I is not my Deſign to enquire into the particular Nature of the Government and Conſtitution of theſe Kingdoms; much leſs to pretend to determine concerning the Merits of the different Parties now reigning in the State, Thoſe Topicks I profels to lie out of my Sphere, and they will probably be choughr by moſt Men, improper to be Treated of in an Audience almoſt wholly made up of young Perſons, ſet apart from the buſineſs and noiſe of the World, for their more convenient inſtruction in Learning and Piety. But ſurely it is in no re- ſpect unſuitable to the circumſtances of this place to inculcate and explain every branch of the Law of Nature; or thoſe Virtues and Duties which are equally binding in every Kingdom or Society of Men under Heaven; and of this kind I take to be that Chriſtian Duty of not Reſiſting the Supreme Power implied in my Text. Mhoſoe ver Reſiſteth the Power, Reſiſteth the Ordinance of God. In Treating - which Words I ſhall obſerve the following ethod.
II. Firſt, I ſhall endegvour to prove, That there 5 an abſolute unlimited Non-Reſiſtance or Paſſive :. Obedience (2) Obedience due to the Supreme Civil Power, where: ever placed in any Nation. Secondly, I ſhall en. quire into the Grounds and Reaſons of the contre. ry Opinion. Thirdly, I ſhall conſider the Ohje. ctions drawn from the pretended conſequences of Non-Reſiſtance to the Supreme Power. In hand.
ling theſe Points, I intend not to build on the Au i thoricy of Holy Scripture, but altogether on the Principles of Reaſon common to all mankind, and that, becauſe there are ſome very rational and learned Men, who being verily perſwaded, an ab. ſolute paſſive Subjection to any earthly Power, i; repugnant to right Reaſon, can never bring them- ſelves to admit ſuch an Interpretation of Holy Scripture (however natural and obvious from the words) as ſhall make that a part of Chriſtian Re- ligion, which ſeems to them in it ſelf manifeſtly abſurd, and deſtructive of the Original inherent Rights of humane Nature. | | III. I do not mean to Treat of that ſubmiſſion, which Men are either in Duty or Prudence obliged to pay inferior or executive Powers; neither ſhal I conſider where, or in what Perſons the Supreme or Legiſlative Power is lodged in this or that Go- yernment. Only thus much I ſhall take for gran- ted, That there is in every Civil Community, ſome where or other, placed a Supreme Power di making Laws, and enforcing the Obſervation of them. The fulfilling of thoſe Laws, either by 1 punctual performance of what is enjoyned in them, or, if that be inconſiſtent with Reaſon or Con- ſcience, by a patient Submiſſion to whatever Pe- nalties the Supreme Power hath annexed to the Neglect or Tranſgreſſion of them, is termed Loyal- ty; as on the other hand, the making Uſe of Force and open Violence, either to withſtand the exe cution _— OO.
22 my, — — $05 — —4 bog — 2 {37 -ution of the Laws, or ward off the Penalties ap- pointed by the Supreme Power, is properly Named Rebellion. Now to make it evident, that every de- ee of Rebellion is Criminal in the Subject; 1 Hall in the firſt place endeavour to prove that Loyalty is a natural or moral Duty; and Diſloyalty or Rebellion in the moſt ſtrict and proper Senſe, 2 Vice or Breach of the Law of Nature. And Se- condly, I propoſe to ſhew that the Prohibitions of Vice, or Negative Precepts of the Law of Nature, , Thou ſhalt not commit Adultery, Thou ſhalt not Forſwear thy ſelf, Thou ſhalt not Reſiſt the Su- preme Power, and the like, ought to be taken in à moſt abſolute, neceſſary, and immutable Senſe: Inſomuch, that the attainment of the greateſt Good, or deliverance from the greateſt Evil, that can be- fal any Man or number of Men in this Life, may not juſtifie the leaſt Violation of them. - Firſt then am to ſhew that Loyalty is a Moral Duty, and Diſloyalty or Rebellion in the moſt ſtrict and pro- per Senſe a Vice, or breach of the Law of Nature.
IV. Tho' it be a Point agreed amongſt all Wiſe Men, that there are certain Moral Rules or Laws of Nature, which carry with them an eternal and indiſpenſable Obligation; yet concerning the pro- per Methods for diſcovering thoſe Laws, and di- ſtinguiſhing them from others dependent on the Humour and Diſcretion of Men, there are various Opinions; ſome direct us to look for them in the Divine Ideas, others in the natural Inſcriptions on te Mind; ſome derive them from the Authority of Learned Men, and the Univerſal Agreement and Conſent of Nations. Laſtly, others hold that they are only to be diſcovered by the deductions of Reaſon. The three firſt Methods muſt be acknow- gd to labour under great Difficulties, and the laſt ff © nnd laſt has not, that I know, been any where diſting: ly explained, or treated of ſo fully as the impor. cance of the Subject doth deſerve. I hope there. fore it will be Pardon d, if in a Diſcourſe of Paſ. five Obedience, in orc to lay the Foundation of that Duty the deeper, we make ſome Enquiry into the Origine, Nature, and Obligation of Moral Duties in general, and the C#ittrions whereby they are to be. known. | | V. Self-Love being a Principle of all others the moſt Univerſal, and the moſt deeply engraven in our Hearts, it is natural for us to regard things, as they are fitted to augment or impair our own Hap- pineſs; andaccordingly we denominate them Good or Evil. Our Judgment- is ever employ'd in di- ſtinguiſhing between theſe two, and it is the whole baſineſs of our Lives, to endeavour, by a proper application of our Faculties, to procure the one and avoid the other. At our firſt coming into the World, we are entirely guided by the Impreflions of Senſe, ſenſible Pleaſure being the infallible Chi- racteriſtic of preſent Good, as Pain is of Evil. But by degrees, as we grow up in our acquaintance with the Nature of Things, experience informs us that preſent Good is afterwards oft attended with 3 greater Evil; and on the other fide, that preſent Evil is not leſs frequently the occaſion of procuring to us à greater future Good. Beſides, 25 the No- bler Faculties of the human Soul begin to diſplay themſelves, they diſcover to us Goods far more excellent than thoſe which affect the Senſes. Hence an alteration is wrought in our Judgments, we no lofiger comply with the firſt ſolicitations of Senſe, ut ſtay to conſider the remote conſequences of an Action, what Good may be hoped, or what Evil feared from it, according to the wonted Courſe of things.
$2 things. This obliges us frequently to overlook preſent momentary Enjoyments, when they come in competition with greater and more laſting Goods, tho' too far off, or of too refin'd a Nature to affect our Senſes.
VI. But as the whole Earth, and the entire du- ration of thoſe periſhing Things contained in it, is altogether inconſiderable, or in the Propher's ex- preſſive Stile, Jeſs than wothing in reſpect of Ezernity, who ſees not that every reaſonable Man ought fo to frame his Actions, as that they may molt effe- &ually contribute to promote his Eternal Intereſt? And fince it is a Truth evident by the Light of Na- ture, that there is a Sovereign Omniſcient Spirit, who alone can make us for ever Happy, or for ever Miſerable; it plainly follows, that a Confor- mity to his Will, and not any Proſpe& of Tem- poral Advantage, is the ſole Rule whereby every Man who acts up to the Principles of Reaſon, muſt Govern and Square his Actions. The ſame Concluſion doth likewiſe evidently Reſult from the Relation which God bears to his Creatures. God alone is Maker and Preſerver of all Things. He is therefore with the moſt undoubted Right the great Legiſlator of the World; and-Mankind are by all the Ties of Duty, no leſs than Intereſt, bound to Obey his Laws.
VII. Hence we ſhould above all things endea- vour to trace out the Divine Will, or the general deſign of Providence with regard to Man&ind, and the Methods moſt dire&ly tending to the accom- pliſnment of that deſign, and this ſeems the ge- nuine and proper way for diſcovering the Laws of Nature. For Laus being Rules directive of our Actions to the end intended by the Legiſlator, in B order (6) order to attain the Knowledge of God's T.aws, we ought firſt to enquire what that end is, which he deſigns ſhould be carried on by human Actions. Now, as God is a Being of Infinite Goodneſs, it is plain the end he propoſes is Good. But God en- joying in himſelf all poſſible Perfection, it fol- lows that it is not his own Good, but that of his Creatures. Again, the Moral Actions of Men are entirely terminated within themſelves, ſo as to have no influence on the other orders of Intelli- gences or reaſonable Creatures: The end there- fore to be procured by them, can be no other than the good of Men. But as nothing in a natural State can entitle one Man more than another to the favour of God, except only Moral Goodneſs, which conſiſting in a Conformity to the Laws of God, doth preſuppoſe the being of ſuch Laws, and Law ever ſuppoſing an end, to which it guides our Actions, it follows that Antecedent to the end propoſed by God, no diſtinction can be conceived between Men; that end therefore it ſelf or general deſign of Providence is not determined or limited by any Reſpect of Perſons: It is not therefore the private Good of this or that Man, Nation or Age, but the general well-being of all Men, of all Nations, of all Ages of the World, which God deſigns ſhould be procured by the con- curring Actions of each individual. Having thus diſcoverd the great end, to which all Moral Obli- gations are Subordinate; it remains, that we enquire what Methods are neceſſary for the obtain- ing that End.
VIII. The well-being of Mankind muſt necel- farily be carried on one of theſe two ways: Either firſt, withour the injunction of any certain uni- verſal Rules of Morality, only by obliging every one 7 one upon each particular Occaſion, to conſult the publick Good, and always to do that, which to him ſnall ſeem in the preſent time and circumſtan- ces, moſt to conduce to it. Or Secondly, by en- joining the Obſervation of ſome determinate, e- ſtabliſn'd Laws, which, if Univerſally practis'd, have from the Nature. of things an Eſſential fit- neſs to procure the well-being of Mankind; tho? in their particular Applicacion, they are ſome- times through untoward accidents, and the per- verſe irregularity of human Wills, the occaſions of great Sufferings, and Misfortunes, it may be, to very many good Men. Againſt the former of theſe Methods there lie ſeveral ſtrong Objections, For brevity I ſhall mention only two.
IX. Firſt, it will thence follow, that the Beſt Men for want of Judgment, and the Wiſeſt for want of knowing all the hidden circumſtances and conſequences of an Action, may very often be at 2 loſs how to behave themſelves; which they would not be, in caſe they judged of each Action, by comparing it wich ſome particular Precept, rather than by examining the Good or Evil which in that ſingle inſtance it trends to pro- cure: It being far more eaſy to Judge with cer- tainty, whether ſuch or ſuch an Action be aTrani- greſſion of this or that Precept, than whether it will be attended with more good or ill Conſe— quences. In ſhort, to calculate the events of each particular Action is impoſſible, and tho' it were not, would yet take up too much time to be of Uſe in the affairs of Life. Secondly, if that Me- thod be obſerv'd, it will follow that we can have no ſure Standard, to which comparing the Acti- ons of another, we may pronounce them good or bad, Virtues or Vices. 0 ſince the meaſure and 2 rule i ' OG. on (3) rule of every good Man's Actions is ſuppoſed © be nothing elſe, but his own private difntereſteg Opinion, of what makes moſt for the publick Good at that juncture: And ſince this Opinion muſt unavoidably in different Men, from their parti. cular Views and Circumſtances, be very different: It is impoſſible to know, whether any one inſtance of Parricide or Perjury, for example, be Criminal, The Man may have had his Reaſons for it, and that which 1n me would have been a heinous Sin, may be in him a Duty. Every Man's particular Rule is buried in his own Breaſt, inviſible to all but himſelf, who therefore can only tell whether he Obſerves it or no. And fince that Rule is fitted to particular Occaſions, it muſt ever change as they do: Hence it is not only various in different Men, but in one and the ſame Man at different times. | X. From all which it follows, there can be no Harmony or Agreement between the Actions of good Men: No apparent Steddineſs or Conſiſten— cy of one Man with himfcif, no adhering to Principles: The beſt Actions may be Condemn'd, and the moſt Viilanous mcet with Applauſe. In a Werd, there enſues the moſt horrible confuſion of Vice and Virtue, Sin and Duty, that can pol- ſibly be imagined. It follows therefore that the reat end, to which God requires the concurrence of human Actions, muſt of neceſſity be carried en by the ſecond Method prop«led, namely, the cbſervation of certain, univerſal, determinate Rules or Moral Precepts, which, in their own Nature, have a neceſſary tendency to promote the Wellbeing of the Sum of Mankind, taking in all Nations and Ages, from the beginning to the end of the World. | | XI. Hence q a 2a aan c- + —— 8 8 — — 595959989 0 c „ fa. CC CD "TI XI. Hence upon an equal comprehenſive Sur- vey of the general Nature, the Paſſions, Intereſts, and mutual Reſpects of Mankind; whatſoever practical Propoſition doth to right Reaſon evi- denrly appear to have a neceſſary connexion with the univerſal Well-being -included in it, is to be look'd upon as enjoined by the Will of God. For he that willeth the end, doth will the neceſſary means conducive to that end; but it hath been ſhewn, that God willeth the Univerſal Well. be- ing of Mankind ſhould be promoted by the con- currence of each particular Perſon; therefore e- very ſuch practical Propoſition, neceſſarily tend- ing thereto, 1s to be eſteemed a Decree of God, and is conſequently a Law to Man.
XIT. Theſe Propofitions are called Laws of Na- ture, becauſe they are univerſal, and do not de- rive their Obligation from any Civil Sanction, but immediately from the Author of Nature him- ſelf. They are ſaid to be ffamped on the Mind, to be engraver on the Tables of the Heart, becauſe they zre well known to Mankind, and ſuggeſted and inculcated by Conſcience. Laſtly, they are term- ed Eternal Rules of Reaſon, becauſe they neceſſarily reſule from the Nature of Things, and may he TA by the infallible deductions of — 7-7; XIIT. And notwithſtanding that theſe Rules are too often, either: by the unhappy concutrence of vents, or more eſpecially by the wickedneſs of perverſe Men, who will not Conform to them, made accidental cauſes of Miſery to thoſe good Men, who do; yet this doth not vacate their Ob- gation, they are ever to be eſteemed the fixed : unal- : unal- (10) unalterable Standards of Moral Good and Evil!
no private Intereſt, no Love of Friends, no Re. gard to the publick Good, ſhould make us depar from them. Hence, when any doubt ariſes con. cerning the Morality of an Action, tis plain, thi; cannot be determined by computing the publick Good, which in that particular Caſe it is attend. ed with, but only by comparing it with the Eter. nal Law of Reaſon. He who ſquares his actions by this Rule, can never do amiſs, tho' thereby he ſhould bring himſelf to Poverty, Death, or Dil. grace: No, not tho' he ſhould involve his Fami- ly, his Friends, his Country in all thoſe Evil,, which are accounted the Greateſt, and moſt inſup. rtable to human Nature. Tenderneſs and Be. nevolence of Temper are often motives to the beſt.and greateſt Actions; but we muſt not make them the ſole Rule of our Actions; they are Paſ- fions rooted in our nature, and like all other Paſ- ſions muſt be reſtrain'd and kept under, other- ' wiſe they may poſſibly betray us into as great Enor- mities, as any other unbridled Luſt. Nay, they are more dangerous than other Paſſions, inſomuch as they are more plauſible, and apt to dazzle, and corrupt the Mind, with the appearance of Goodneſs and Generoſity. | XIV. For the Illuſtration of what has been ſaid, it wall not be amiſs, if from the Moral we turn our Eyes on the Natural World. Homo ortn eft (ſays Balous in Cicero“) ad Mundum contem- plandum, & imitandum: And ſurely, it is not pol- fible for free intellectual Agents to propoſe a no- bler Pattern for their imitation than Nacure, which — ® De Natura Deorum, Lib. 2.
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nothing elſe but a ſeries of free Actions produced by the beſt and wiſeſt Agent. But it is evident hat thoſe Actions are not adapted to particular Views, but all conformed to certain general Rules, which being collected from Obſervation, are by philoſophers termed Laws of Nature. And theſe indeed are excellently ſuited to promote the gene- I well-being of the Creation: But what from caſual combinations of events, and what from the roluntary motions of Animals, it often falls out, that the natural good not only of private Men, but of entire Cities and Nations, wou'd be better pro- noted by a particular Suſpenſion, or Contradicti- on, than an exact Obſervation of thoſe Laws. Yet for all that, Nature ſtill takes its courſe; nay, it is plain that Plagues, Famines, Inundations, Earth- quakes, with an infinite variety of Pains and Sor- rows; in a word all kinds of Calamities publick and private do ariſe from a uniform ſteddy obſer- ration of thoſe general Laws, which are once eſta- bliſh'd by the Author of Nature, and which he will not change or deviate from upon any of thoſe Ac- counts, how wiſe or benevolent ſoever it may be thought by fooliſh Men to do ſo. As for the Mi- racles Recorded in Scripture, they were always wrought for Confirmation of ſome Doctrine or Miſhon from God, and not for the ſake of the particular natural goods, as Health or Life, which ſome Men might have reaped from them. From all which it ſeems ſufficiently plain, that we can- not be at a loſs, which way to determine, in caſe we think God's own Methods the propereſt to ob- tain his ends, and that it is our Duty to Copy after them, ſo far as the frailty of our Nature will ermit.
XV. Thus (12) XV. Thus far in general, of the nature and ne. ceflity of moral Rules, and the Criterion or Mark whereby they may be known. As for the particu- lars, from the foregoing Diſcourſe, the principal of them may without much difficulty be deduced, It hath been ſhewn that the Law of Nature is q Syſtem of ſuch Rules or Precepts, as that if they be all of them, at all times, in all places, and by all Men obſerved, they will neceſſarily promote the well-being. of Mankind, fo far as it is attainable by human Actions. Now, let any one who hath the uſe of Reaſon, take but an impartial Survey of the general frame and circumſtances of human Na. ture, and it will appear plainly to him, that the conſtant obſervation of Truth, for inſtance, of Juſtice, and Chaſtity, hath a neceſſary connexion with their univerſal well-being, that therefore they are to be eſteemed Virtues or Duties, and that, Thou ſhalt not Forſwear thy ſelf, Thou ſhalt not Commit Adultery, Thou ſhalt not Steal, are ſo many unaltera- ble Moral Rules, which to violate in the leaſt de- gree is Vice or Sin. I ſay, the agreement of theſe particular practical Propoſitions, with the Defini- tion, or Criterion premiſed, doth ſo clearly reſult from the nature of Things, that it were a needle: digreſſion, in this place to enlarge upon it. And l; from the ſame Principle, by the very ſame Res- ſoning, it follows that Loyalty is a moral Virtue, and, Thou ſhalt not Reſiſt the Supreme Power, a Rule or Law of Nature, the leaſt breach whereof hath the inherent ſtain of Moral Turpitude.
CHI voy: wn Co nnd. Dec at cows ac as eos ae ins. EEE ER 7 — XVI. The Miſeries inſeparable from a State of Anarchy are eaſily imagined. So inſufficient isthe;, Wit or Strength of any ſingle Man, either to avet the Evils,- or procure the Bleflings of Life, and ol, | apt (13) zpt are the Wills of different Perſons to contradict and thwart each other, that it is abſolutely neceſſa- ry, ſeveral independent Powers be combin'd toge- cher, under the Direction (if I may ſo ſpeak) of one and the ſame Will, I mean the Law of the Society. Without this there is no Politeneſs, no Order, no Peace among Men, but the World is one great heap of Miſery and Confuſion; the Strong as well as the Weak, the Wiſe as well as the Fooliſh,ſtanding on all ſides expoſed to all thoſe Calamities, which Man can be liable to in a State where he has no other Security, than the not being poſſeſſed of any thing which may raiſe Envy or Deſire in another. A State! by ſo much more in- eligible than that of Brutes, as a reaſonable Crea- ture hath a greater reflexioa and foreſight of Mi- ſeries than they. From all which it plainly fol- lows, that Loyalty or Submiſſion to the Supreme Civil Authority, hath, if univerſally practis'd in conjunction with all other Virtues, a neceſſary con- nexion with the well-being of the whole Sum of Mankind; and by conſequence, if the Criterion we have laid down, be True, it is, ſtrictly ſpeak- ing, a Moral Duty, or branch of Natural Reli- gion. And therefore, the leaſt degree of Rebel- lion is with the utmoſt ſtrictneſs and propriety, a Sin: Not only in Chriſtians, but alſo in thoſe who haxe the Light of Reaſon alone for their Guide. Nay, upon a thorough and impartial View, this Submiſſion will, I think, appear one of the very firſt and fundamental Laws of Nature, inaſmuch as it is Civil Government which ordains and marks out the various Relations between Men, and regulates Property, thereby giving Scope and lay- ing a foundation for the exerciſe of all other Du- ties. And in Truth, whoever conſiders the Condition of Man, will ſcarce conceive it poſſible that Te the Pave r 7 3.
n FRA oo 2 RR — we (14) | the practice of any one Moral Virtue ſhou'd Ob- tain, in the naked, forlorn State of Nature.
XVII. But ſince it muſt be confeſs'd, that in all Caſes our Actions come not within the Direction of certain fixed Moral Rules, it may poſſibly be ſtill queſtioned, whether Obedience to the Su- preme Power be not one of thoſe exempted Caſes, and conſequently to be regulated by the Prudence and Diſcretion of every ſingle Perſon, rather than adjuſted to the Rule of abſolute Non Reſiſtance. I ſhall therefore endeavour to make it yet more plain, that, Thou ſhalt not Refiſl the Supreme Power, is an undoubted Precept of Morality; as will appear from the following Conſiderations. Firſt then, Submiſſion to Government is a Point important enough to be eſtabliſhed by a Moral Rule. Things of inſignificant and trifling Concern are, for that very Reaſon, exempted from the Rules of Mora- lity. But Government, on which ſo much depend the Peace, Order, and Well-being of Mankind, cannot ſurely be thought of too ſmall Importance? to be Secur'd and Guarded by a Moral Rule. Government, I ſay, which is it ſelf the principal Source under Heaven, of thoſe particular Advan- tages, for the procurement and conſervation whereof, ſeveral unqueſtionable Moral Rules were preſcribed to Men. | XVIII. Secondly, Obedience to Government is a Caſe Univerſal enough to fall under the Direction of a Law of Nature. Numberleſs Rules there may be for regulating Affairs of great Con- cernment, at certain Junctures, and to ſome parti- cular Perſons or Societies, which notwithſtanding are not to be eſteemed Moral or Natural Laws, but may be cither totally abrogated or diſpenſed with; =; | becauſe (15) becauſe the private Ends they were intended to promote, reſpe& only ſome particular Perſons, as engaged in Relations not founded in the general Nature of Man, who on various Occaſions, and in different Poſtures of Things, may proſecute their own Deſigns by different Meaſures, as in Humane Prudence ſhall ſeem convenient, But what rela- tion is there more extenſive and univerſal than that of Subject and Law? This is confin'd to no particular Age or Climate, but uniyerſally obtains at all Times, and in all Places, wherever Men live in a ſtate exalted above that of Brutes. Ir is there- fore evident, that the Rule forbidding Reſiſtance to the Law or Supreme Power, is not upon pre- rence of any defect in point of Univerſality, to be excluded from the Number of the Laws of Nature.
XIX. Thirdly, There is another Conſideration; which confirms the Neceflity of admitting this Rule for a Moral or Natural Law; namely, becauſe the Caſe it regards is of too Nice and Difficult a Na- ture to be left to the Judgment and Determination of each private Perſon. Some Caſes there are ſo plain and obvious to judge of, that they may ſafely be truſted to the Prudence of every reaſonable Man; but in all Inſtances, to determine, whether a Civil Law is fitted to promote the Publick Intereſt; or whether Submiſſion or Reſiſtance will prove moſt advantageous in the Conſequence; or when it is, that the general Good of a Nation may require an Alteration of Government, either in its Form, or in the Hands which Adminiſter it: theſe are Points too arduous and intricate, and which require too great a degree of Parts, Leiſure, and liberal Edu- cation, as well as Diſintereſtedneſs and thorough Knowledge in the particular Stare of a Kingdom, tor every Subject to take upon him the Determi- G2 nation 5 1 ; N 15 5 { 1 j 3 ES J nation of them. From which it follows, that up- on this account alſo, Non-Reſiſtance, which, in the main, no body can deny to be a moſt profita- ble and wholſome Duty, ought not to be limited by the Judgment of private Perſons to particular Occaſions, but eſteemed a moſt Sacred Law of Nature.
XX. The foregoing Arguments do, I think, make it manifeſt, that the Precept againſt Rebel. lion is on a Level with other Moral Rules. Which will yet farther appear from this fourth and laſt Conſideration. It cannot be denied, that Right Reaſon doth require ſome common ſtated Rule or Meaſure, whereby Subjects ought to ſhape their Submiſſion to the Supreme Power. Since any claſhing or diſagreement in this Point muſt una- voidably tend to weaken, and diſſolve the Society. And it is unavoidable, that there ſhou'd be gre: claſhing, where it is left to the breaſt of each In- dividual to ſuit his Fancy with a different meaſure of Obedience. But this common ſtated Meaſure muſt be either the general Precept forbidding Re: ſiſtance, or elſe the publick Good of the whole Nation: Which laſt, tho' it is allowed to be in i: ſelf ſomething certain and determinate; yet, for- aſmuch as Men can regulate their Conduct only by what appears to them, whether in Truth it be what it appears or no; and ſince the Proſpet: Men' form to themſelves of a Country's publick Good, are commonly as various as its Landſchapes, winch meet the Eye in ſeveral Situations: It clear- ly follows, that to make the publick Good the Rule oi Obedience, is in effect, not to eſtabliſh any de- terminate, agreed, common Meaſure of Loyalty, but to leave every Subject to the Guidance of hi own particular mutable Fancy, XXI. From & ray wy — — m . = ©