I can mean (for my part) nothing else by equal triangles than triangles containing equal numbers of points.
I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines wch ’tis indifferent whether of them I take, lines in wch I observe by my senses no difference, & wch therefore have the same name.
Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases? but then imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight. Say you, pure intellect must be judge. I reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the mind.
If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician in things of which I am certain, ’tis to avoid disputes, to make men careful to think before they answer, to discuss my arguments before they go to refute them.
I would by no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty & submission to better judgments. Wt I lay before you are undoubted theorems; not plausible conjectures of my own, nor learned opinions of other men. I pretend not to prove them by figures, analogy, or authority.
Let them stand or fall by their own evidence.
(M51) When you speak of the corpuscularian essences of bodys, to reflect on sect. 11. & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke. Motion supposes not solidity. A meer colour’d extension may give us the idea of motion.
(M52) Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke.
(M53) Well, say you, according to this new doctrine, all is but meer idea—there is nothing wch is not an _ens rationis_. I answer, things are as real, and exist _in rerum natura_, as much as ever. The difference between _entia realia_ & _entia rationis_ may be made as properly now as ever. Do but think before you speak. Endeavour rightly to comprehend my meaning, and you’ll agree with me in this.
(M54) Fruitless the distinction ’twixt real and nominal essences.
We are not acquainted with the meaning of our words. Real, extension, existence, power, matter, lines, infinite, point, and many more are frequently in our mouths, when little, clear, and determin’d answers them in our understandings. This must be well inculcated.
(M55) Vain is the distinction ’twixt intellectual and material world(86).
V. Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is far more beautiful than this.
(M56) Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not for (M57) them the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all. All...of introversion, meditation, contemplation, and spiritual acts, as if these could be exerted before we had ideas from without by the senses, are manifestly absurd. This may be of great use in that it makes the happyness of the life to come more conceivable and agreeable to our present nature.
The schoolemen & refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest.
The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes is, that we do not consider our own notions. I mean consider them in themselves—fix, settle, and determine them,—we regarding them with relation to each other only. In short, we are much out in study[ing] the relations of things before we study them absolutely and in themselves. Thus we study to find out the relations of figures to one another, the relations also of number, without endeavouring rightly to understand the nature of extension and number in themselves. This we think is of no concern, of no difficulty; but if I mistake not ’tis of the last importance, (M58) I allow not of the distinction there is made ’twixt profit and pleasure.
(M59) I’d never blame a man for acting upon interest. He’s a fool that acts on any other principles. The not considering these things has been of ill consequence in morality.
My positive assertions are no less modest than those that are introduced with “It seems to me,” “I suppose,” &c.; since I declare, once for all, that all I write or think is entirely about things as they appear to me.
It concerns no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine.
This in the Preface.
(M60) Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings one with another. 1st. Words signifying the operations of the mind are taken from sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words as used by the vulgar are taken in some latitude, their signification is confused. Hence if a man use words in a determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either of not being understood, or of speaking improperly. All this remedyed by studying the understanding.
Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering the word one. All number consists in relations(87).
Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the Schoolemen.
(M61) We have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other things besides ourselves & order, præcedaneous(88). To the knowledge of our own existence—in that we must have ideas or else we cannot think.
(M62) We move our legs ourselves. ’Tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from Malbranch(89).
(M63) Mem. Nicely to discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke(90).
(M64) Mem. Again and again to mention & illustrate the doctrine of the reality of things, rerum natura, &c.
(M65) Wt I say is demonstration—perfect demonstration. Wherever men have fix’d & determin’d ideas annexed to their words they can hardly be mistaken. Stick but to my definition of likeness, and ’tis a demonstration yt colours are not simple ideas, all reds being like, &c. So also in other things. This to be heartily insisted on.
(M66) The abstract idea of Being or Existence is never thought of by the vulgar. They never use those words standing for abstract ideas.
(M67) I must not say the words thing, substance, &c. have been the cause of mistakes, but the not reflecting on their meaning. I will be still for retaining the words. I only desire that men would think before they speak, and settle the meaning of their words.
(M68) I approve not of that which Locke says, viz. truth consists in the joining and separating of signs.
(M69) Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without treating of words and propositions. This makes for me against abstract general ideas.
Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6.
(M70) Men have been very industrious in travelling forward. They have gone a great way. But none have gone backward beyond the Principles. On that side there lies much terra incognita to be travel’d over and discovered by me. A vast field for invention.
Twelve inches not the same idea with a foot. Because a man may perfectly conceive a foot who never thought of an inch.
A foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this respect, viz.
they contain both the same number of points.
[Forasmuch as] to be used.
Mem. To mention somewhat wch may encourage the study of politiques, and testify of me yt I am well dispos’d toward them.
(M71) If men did not use words for ideas they would never have thought of abstract ideas. Certainly genera and species are not abstract general ideas. Abstract ideas include a contradiction in their nature. Vide A various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a various or mixt effect.
This demonstrable from the definition of a cause; which way of demonstrating must be frequently made use of in my Treatise, & to that end definitions often præmis’d. Hence ’tis evident that, according to Newton’s doctrine, colours cannot be simple ideas.
(M72) I am the farthest from scepticism of any man. I know with an intuitive knowledge the existence of other things as well as my own soul.
This is wt Locke nor scarce any other thinking philosopher will pretend to(92).
(M73) Doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all the sciences. Mem. Barrow’s remark. Entirely owing to language.
Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas by words amongst the uses and not the abuses of language.
(M74) Of great use & ye last importance to contemplate a man put into the world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see how after long experience he would know wthout words. Such a one would never think of genera and species or abstract general ideas.
(M75) Wonderful in Locke that he could, wn advanced in years, see at all thro’ a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & was consequently thick.
This more to be admir’d than yt he did not see farther.
Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either as including or excluding identity of circumstances, such as time, place, &c.
(M76) I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer, wiser, &c.
than I. This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. ’Tis certain that if the happyness of my acquaintance encreases, & mine not proportionably, mine must decrease. The not understanding this & the doctrine about relative good, discuss’d with French, Madden(93), &c., to be noticed as 2 causes of mistake in judging of moral matters.
Mem. To observe (wn you talk of the division of ideas into simple and complex) that there may be another cause of the undefinableness of certain ideas besides that which Locke gives; viz. the want of names.
(M77) Mem. To begin the First Book(94) not with mention of sensation and reflection, but instead of sensation to use perception or thought in general.
(M78) I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without an idea, or an idea without perception.
(M79) Locke’s very supposition that matter & motion should exist before thought is absurd—includes a manifest contradiction.
Locke’s harangue about coherent, methodical discourses amounting to nothing, apply’d to the mathematicians.
They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an equation. Wt mean they by this? Wt would they signify by the word points? Do they stick to the definition of Euclid?
(M80) We think we know not the Soul, because we have no imaginable or sensible idea annex’d to that sound. This the effect of prejudice.
(M81) Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we examine what we mean by the word knowledge. Neither doth this argue any defect in our knowledge, no more than our not knowing a contradiction.
The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul(95).
(M82) Consciousness(96), perception, existence of ideas, seem to be all one.
Consult, ransack yr understanding. Wt find you there besides several perceptions or thoughts? Wt mean you by the word mind? You must mean something that you perceive, or yt you do not perceive. A thing not perceived is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you do not perceive is a contradiction. We are in all this matter strangely abused by words.
Mind is a congeries of perceptions(97). Take away perceptions and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind.
Say you, the mind is not the perception, not that thing which perceives. I answer, you are abused by the words “that a thing.” These are vague and empty words with us.
(M83) The having ideas is not the same thing with perception. A man may have ideas when he only imagines. But then this imagination presupposeth perception.
(M84) That wch extreamly strengthens us in prejudice is yt we think we see an empty space, which I shall demonstrate to be false in the Third Book(98).
There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean in revealed Theology, as contradistinguish’d from natural; for tho’ the principles may be founded in faith, yet this hinders not but that legitimate demonstrations might be built thereon; provided still that we define the words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence ’twere no very hard matter for those who hold episcopacy or monarchy to be established _jure Divino_ to demonstrate their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to demonstrate or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd. Here an implicit faith becomes us.
(M85) Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas of reflection & others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception and white, black, sweet, &c.? Wherein, I pray you, does the perception of white differ from white men...I shall demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of demonstration to be set forth and insisted on in the Introduction(99). In that I must needs differ from Locke, forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about abstract ideas, wch I say we have not nor can have.
(M86) The understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will and passions?
(M87) A good proof that Existence is nothing without or distinct from perception, may be drawn from considering a man put into the world without company(100).
(M88) There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv’d. Thus we see that common speech confirms my doctrine.
(M89) No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those intervals are nothing; each person’s time being measured to him by his own ideas.
(M90) We are frequently puzzl’d and at a loss in obtaining clear and determin’d meanings of words commonly in use, & that because we imagine words stand for abstract general ideas which are altogether inconceivable.
(M91) “A stone is a stone.” This a nonsensical proposition, and such as the solitary man would never think on. Nor do I believe he would ever think on this: “The whole is equal to its parts,” &c.
(M92) Let it not be said that I take away existence. I only declare the meaning of the word, so far as I can comprehend it.
(M93) If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from beasts? I answer, by shape, by language. Rather by degrees of more and less.
Wt means Locke by inferences in words, consequences of words, as something different from consequences of ideas? I conceive no such thing.
(M94) N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of language(101).
(M95) But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless Substance may exist, though not extended, moved, &c., but with other properties whereof we have no idea. But even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, wn I come to treat more particularly of Existence.
Will not rightly distinguish’d from Desire by Locke—it seeming to superadd nothing to the idea of an action, but the uneasiness for its absence or non-existence.
(M96) Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery, viz. How it is that I can cast about, think of this or that man, place, action, wn nothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts, wn they have no perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested by my senses at the present?
(M97) ’Tis not to be imagin’d wt a marvellous emptiness & scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his meditations.
(M98) Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see substances with.
(M99) Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to naming.
(M100) The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of distance by angles(102), strengthens men in their prejudice that they see things without and distant from their mind.
(M101) I am persuaded, would men but examine wt they mean by the word existence, they wou’d agree with me.
c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the mathematicians.
(M102) The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes away all real truth, & consequently brings in a universal scepticism; since all our knowledge and contemplation is confin’d barely to our own ideas(103).
(M103) Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary to make use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory or meditation, yet at least in writing—without which he could scarce retain his knowledge.
We read in history there was a time when fears and jealousies, privileges of parliament, malignant party, and such like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a meaning, were words of much sway. Also the words Church, Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction and dispute.
(M104) The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has been one great cause of imagining material substances(104).
(M105) That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest argument against Locke’s proofs that the Will cannot be conceiv’d, put into action, without a previous uneasiness.
(M106) The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that uneasiness may be without volition.
(M107) Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason.
(M108) Also from uneasiness and idea together.
The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas.
The Will not distinct from particular volitions.
(M109) It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may be without all volition or act.
The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from ye will.
This allow’d hereafter.
(M110) To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question, for the word _can_ presupposes volition.
(M111) Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic vertue, Hylaschic principle—all these vanish(105).
(M112) Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think that’s all(106).
Qu. whether it be the vis inertiæ that makes it difficult to move a stone, or the vis attractivæ, or both, or neither?
Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may be. Also to be full and particular in answering objections(107).
(M113) To say ye Will is a power; [therefore] volition is an act. This is idem per idem.
Wt makes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate them from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to be distinct from thought, and to exist in unthinking substance.
An extended may have passive modes of thinking good actions.
There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there might be the greatest uneasiness wthout any volition, therefore the...(M114) Matter once allow’d, I defy any man to prove that God is not Matter(108).
(M115) Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we but settle the signification of the word _free_—if we had an idea annext to the word free, and would but contemplate that idea.
(M116) We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can, &c.
(M117) Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident by experience.
(M118) Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession of its ideas. Observe how volition comes into the mind. This may perhaps acquaint you with its nature.
(M119) Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or coincide wth & constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness.
(M120) You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. I answer, tell me wt you mean by the word free, and I shall resolve you(109).
(M121) Qu. Wt do men mean when they talk of one body’s touching another? I say you never saw one body touch, or (rather) I say, I never saw one body that I could say touch’d this or that other; for that if my optiques were improv’d, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind those whch now seem to touch.
Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty—to confute the mathematicians wth the utmost civility & respect, not to style them Nihilarians, &c.
N. B. To rein in ye satyrical nature.
Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude. ’Tis wt cannot be helpt. ’Tis the fault of language that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words.
Say you, there might be a thinking Substance—something unknown—wch perceives, and supports, and ties together the ideas(110). Say I, make it appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for me. I care not to take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist.
I affirm ’tis manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world can be given why a man should use a word without an idea(111). Certainly we shall find that wt ever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we take it in, must be compleatly known.
’Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself with words.
(M122) We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt man and God may be imagin’d; or infinitely greater(112) difference.
(M123) We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. We may imagine in God a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number of ours, is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and number, old and known, we apply to that wch is unknown. But I am embrangled(113) in words—’tis scarce possible it should be otherwise.
The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil of words(114). This has occasion’d ignorance & confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines.
(M124) The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of our ideas; whereas in truth ’tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it.
’Tis _toto cælo_ different from the understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I answer, there is an homonymy(115) in the word _thing_, wn apply’d to ideas and volition and understanding and will. All ideas are passive(116).
(M125) Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning.
Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions.
Now these are no ideas(117).
(M126) There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be volition without perception?
(M127) Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not distinguish’d therefrom.
(M128) N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. ’Tis this diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time—or _is_ time itself.
Wt would the solitary man think of number?
(M129) There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us(118).
(M130) Locke seems to be mistaken wn he says thought is not essential to the mind(119).
(M131) Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this too. In sleep and trances the mind _exists not_—there is no time, no succession of ideas(120).
(M132) To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing.
(M133) Folly to inquire wt determines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine the Will(121).
(M134) Again, wt mean you by determine?
(M135) (M136) For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, &c., men are forc’d into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time.
(M137) ’Twas the opinion that ideas could exist unperceiv’d, or before perception, that made men think perception(122) was somewhat different from the idea perceived, i.e. yt it was an idea of reflection; whereas the thing perceiv’d was an idea of sensation. I say, ’twas this made ’em think the understanding took it in, receiv’d it from without; wch could never be did not they think it existed without(123).
(M138) Properly speaking, idea is the picture of the imagination’s making.
This is ye likeness of, and refer’d to the real idea, or (if you will) thing(124).
(M139) To ask, have we an idea of Will or volition, is nonsense. An idea can resemble nothing but an idea.
(M140) If you ask wt thing it is that wills, I answer, if you mean idea by the word thing, or anything like any idea, then I say, ’tis no thing at all that wills(125). This how extravagant soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth. We are cheated by these general terms, thing, is, &c.
(M141) Again, if by is you mean is perceived, or does perceive, I say nothing wch is perceived or does perceive wills.
(M142) The referring ideas to things wch are not ideas, the using the term “idea of(126),” is one great cause of mistake, as in other matters, so also in this.
(M143) Some words there are wch do not stand for ideas, viz. particles, will, &c. Particles stand for volitions and their concomitant ideas.
(M144) There seem to be but two colours wch are simple ideas, viz. those exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays; [the others], being the intermediate ones, may be formed by composition.
(M145) I have no idea of a volition or act of the mind, neither has any other intelligence; for that were a contradiction.
N. B. Simple ideas, viz. colours, are not devoid of all sort of composition, tho’ it must be granted they are not made up of distinguishable ideas. Yet there is another sort of composition. Men are wont to call those things compounded in which we do not actually discover the component ingredients. Bodies are said to be compounded of chymical principles, which, nevertheless, come not into view till after the dissolution of the bodies—wch were not, could not, be discerned in the bodies whilst remaining entire.
(M146) All our knowledge is about particular ideas, according to Locke.
All our sensations are particular ideas, as is evident. Wt use then do we make of abstract general ideas, since we neither know nor perceive them?
(M147) ’Tis allow’d that particles stand not for ideas, and yet they are not said to be empty useless sounds. The truth really is, they stand for operations of the mind, i.e. volitions.
(M148) Locke says all our knowledge is about particulars. If so, pray wt is the following ratiocination but a jumble of words? “Omnis homo est animal; omne animal vivit: ergo omnis homo vivit.” It amounts (if you annex particular ideas to the words “animal” and “vivit”) to no more than this: “Omnis homo est homo; omnis homo est homo: ergo, omnis homo est homo.” A mere sport and trifling with sounds.
(M149) We have no ideas of vertues & vices, no ideas of moral actions(127). Wherefore it may be question’d whether we are capable of arriving at demonstration about them(128), the morality consisting in the volition chiefly.
(M150) Strange it is that men should be at a loss to find their idea of Existence; since that (if such there be distinct from perception) it is brought into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection(129), methinks it should be most familiar to us, and we best acquainted with it.
(M151) This I am sure, I have no idea of Existence(130), or annext to the word Existence. And if others have that’s nothing to me; they can never make me sensible of it; simple ideas being incommunicable by language.
(M152) Say you, the unknown substratum of volitions & ideas is something whereof I have no idea. I ask, Is there any other being which has or can have an idea of it? If there be, then it must be itself an idea; which you will think absurd.
(M153) There is somewhat active in most perceptions, i.e. such as ensue upon our volitions, such as we can prevent and stop: e.g. I turn my eyes toward the sun: I open them. All this is active.
(M154) Things are twofold—active or inactive. The existence of active things is to act; of inactive to be perceiv’d.
(M155) Distinct from or without perception there is no volition; therefore neither is there existence without perception.
(M156) God may comprehend all ideas, even the ideas wch are painfull & unpleasant, without being in any degree pained thereby(131). Thus we ourselves can imagine the pain of a burn, &c. without any misery or uneasiness at all.
(M157) Truth, three sorts thereof—natural, mathematical, & moral.
(M158) Agreement of relation onely where numbers do obtain: of co-existence, in nature: of signification, by including, in morality.
(M159) Gyant who shakes the mountain that’s on him must be acknowledged.
Or rather thus: I am no more to be reckon’d stronger than Locke than a pigmy should be reckon’d stronger than a gyant, because he could throw off the molehill wch lay upon him, and the gyant could onely shake or shove the mountain that oppressed him. This in the Preface.
(M160) Promise to extend our knowledge & clear it of those shamefull contradictions which embarrass it. Something like this to begin the Introduction in a modest way(132).
(M161) Whoever shall pretend to censure any part, I desire he would read out the whole, else he may perhaps not understand me. In the Preface or Introduction(133).
(M162) Doctrine of identity best explain’d by taking the Will for volitions, the Understanding for ideas. The difficulty of consciousness of wt are never acted surely solv’d thereby.
(M163) I must acknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers who have gone before me. They have given good rules, though certainly they do not always observe them. Similitude of adventurers, who, tho’ they attained not the desired port, they by their wrecks have made known the rocks and sands, whereby the passage of aftercomers is made more secure & easy.
Preface or Introduction.
(M164) The opinion that men had ideas of moral actions(134) has render’d the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them.
(M165) An idea being itself unactive cannot be the resemblance or image of an active thing.
(M166) Excuse to be made in the Introduction for using the word _idea_, viz. because it has obtain’d. But a caution must be added.
Scripture and possibility are the onely proofs(135) with Malbranch. Add to these what he calls a great propension to think so: this perhaps may be questioned. Perhaps men, if they think before they speak, will not be found so thoroughly persuaded of the existence of Matter.
(M167) On second thoughts I am on t’other extream. I am certain of that wch Malbranch seems to doubt of, viz. the existence of bodies(136).
(M168) Mem. To bring the killing blow at the last, e.g. in the matter of abstraction to bring Locke’s general triangle in the last(137).
(M169) They give good rules, tho’ perhaps they themselves do not always observe them. They speak much of clear and distinct ideas, though at the same time they talk of general abstract ideas, &c. I’ll [instance] in Locke’s opinion of abstraction, he being as clear a writer as I have met with.
Such was the candour of this great man that I perswade myself, were he alive(138), he would not be offended that I differ from him: seeing that even in so doing I follow his advice, viz. to use my own judgement, see with my own eyes, & not with another’s. Introduction.
(M170) The word thing, as comprising or standing for idea & volition, usefull; as standing for idea and archetype without the mind(139), mischievous and useless.
(M171) To demonstrate morality it seems one need only make a dictionary of words, and see which included which. At least, this is the greatest part and bulk of the work.
(M172) Locke’s instances of demonstration in morality are, according to his own rule, trifling propositions.
(M173) Qu. How comes it that some ideas are confessedly allow’d by all to be onely in the mind(140), and others as generally taken to be without the mind(141), if, according to you, all are equally and only in the mind?
Ans. Because that in proportion to pleasure or pain ideas are attended with desire, exertion, and other actions which include volition. Now volition is by all granted to be in spirit.
(M174) If men would lay aside words in thinking, ’tis impossible they should ever mistake, save only in matters of fact. I mean it seems impossible they should be positive & secure that anything was true wch in truth is not so. Certainly I cannot err in matter of simple perception. So far as we can in reasoning go without the help of signs, there we have certain knowledge. Indeed, in long deductions made by signs there may be slips of memory.
(M175) From my doctrine there follows a cure for pride. We are only to be praised for those things which are our own, or of our own doing; natural abilitys are not consequences of our volitions.
(M176) Mem. Candidly to take notice that Locke holds some dangerous opinions; such as the infinity and eternity of Space and the possibility (M177) Once more I desire my reader may be upon his guard against the fallacy of words. Let him beware that I do not impose on him by plausible empty talk, that common dangerous way of cheating men into absurditys. Let him not regard my words any otherwise than as occasions of bringing into his mind determin’d significations. So far as they fail of this they are gibberish, jargon, & deserve not the name of language. I desire & warn him not to expect to find truth in my book, or anywhere but in his own mind.
Wtever I see myself ’tis impossible I can paint it out in words.
(M178) N. B. To consider well wt is meant by that wch Locke saith concerning algebra—that it supplys intermediate ideas. Also to think of a method affording the same use in morals &c. that this doth in mathematiques.
(M179) _Homo_ is not proved to be _vivens_ by means of any intermediate idea. I don’t fully agree wth Locke in wt he says concerning sagacity in finding out intermediate ideas in matter capable of demonstration & the use thereof; as if that were the onely means of improving and enlarging demonstrative knowledge.
(M180) There is a difference betwixt power & volition. There may be volition without power. But there can be no power without volition. Power implyeth volition, & at the same time a connotation of the effects following the volition(143).
(M181) We have assuredly an idea of substance. ’Twas absurd of Locke(144) to think we had a name without a meaning. This might prove acceptable to the Stillingfleetians.
(M182) The substance of Body we know(145). The substance of Spirit we do not know—it not being knowable, it being a _purus actus_.
(M183) Words have ruin’d and overrun all the sciences—law, physique, chymistry, astrology, &c.
(M184) Abstract ideas only to be had amongst the learned. The vulgar never think they have any such, nor truly do they find any want of them. Genera & species & abstract ideas are terms unknown to them.
(M185) Locke’s out(146)—the case is different. We can have an idea of body without motion, but not of soul without thought.
(M186) God ought to be worship’d. This easily demonstrated when once we ascertain the signification of the words God, worship, ought.
(M187) No perception, according to Locke, is active. Therefore no