By what reasoning then is it, and by what arguments, according to that invincible logic of his, that he wins back the opinion of the mass of men, and follows out at his pleasure this line of thought, that as the God Who is over all is conceived and spoken of both as “Creator” and as “Father,” the Son has a close connection with both titles, being equally called both “product of creation” and “product of generation”? For as customary accuracy of speech distinguishes between names of this kind, and applies the name of “generation” in the case of things generated from the essence itself, and understands that of “creation” of those things which are external to the nature of their maker, and as on this account the Divine doctrines, in handing down the knowledge of God, have delivered to us the names of “Father” and “Son,” not those of “Creator” and “work,” that there might arise no error tending to blas- phemy (as might happen if an appellation of the latter kind repelled the Son to the position of an alien and a stranger), and that the impious doctrines which sever the Only-begotten from essential affinity with the Father might find no entrance—seeing all this, I say, he who declares that the appellation of “product of making” is one befitting the Son, will safely say by consequence that the name of “Son” is properly applicable to that which is the product of making; so that, if the Son is a “product of making,” the heaven is called “Son,” and the individual things that have been made are, according to our author, properly named by the appellation of “Son.” For if He has this name, not because He shares in nature with Him that begat Him, but is called Son for this reason, that He is created, the same argument will permit that a lamb, a dog, a frog, and all things that exist by the will of their maker, should be named by the title of “Son.” If, on the other hand, each of these is not a Son and is not called God, by reason of its being external to the nature of the Son, it follows, surely, that He Who is truly Son is Son, and is confessed to be God by reason of His being of the very nature of Him that begat Him. But Eunomius abhors the idea of generation, and excludes it from the Divine doctrine, slandering the term by his fleshly speculations. Well, our dis- course, in what precedes, showed sufficiently on this point that, as the Psalmist says, “they are afraid where no fear is®>.” For if it was shown in the case of men that not all generation exists by way of passion, but that that which is material is by passion, while that which is spiritual is pure and incorruptible, (for that which is begotten of the Spirit is spirit and not flesh, and in spirit we see no condition that is subject to passion,) since our author thought it necessary to estimate the Divine power by means of examples among ourselves, let him persuade himself to conceive from the other mode of generation the passionless character 653 Cf. Ps. liii. 6 He then exposes argument about the “Generate,” and the “product of making,”...of the Divine generation. Moreover, by mixing up together these three names, of which two are equivalent, he thinks that his readers, by reason of the community of sense in the two phrases, will jump to the conclusion that the third is equivalent also. For since the appellation of “product of making,” and “product of creation,” indicate that the thing made is external to the nature of the maker, he couples with these the phrase, “product of generation,” that this too may be interpreted along with those above mentioned. But argument of this sort is termed fraud and falsehood and imposition, not a thoughtful and skilful demonstration. For that only is called demonstration which shows what is unknown from what is acknow- ledged; but to reason fraudulently and fallaciously, to conceal your own reproach, and to confound by superficial deceits the understanding of men, as the Apostle says, “of corrupt minds,” this no sane man would call a skilful demonstration.
Let us proceed, however, to what follows in order. He says that the generation of the essence is “without intervention,” and that it “preserves indivisible its relation to its Gener- ator, Maker, and Creator.” Well, ifhe had spoken of the immediate and indivisible character of the essence, and stopped his discourse there, it would not have swerved from the orthodox view, since we too confess the close connection and relation of the Son with the Father, so that there is nothing inserted between them which is found to intervene in the connection of the Son with the Father, no conception of interval, not even that minute and indivisible one, which, when time is divided into past, present, and future, is conceived indivisibly by itself as the present, as it cannot be considered as a part either of the past or of the future, by reason of its being quite without dimensions and incapable of division, and unobservable, to whichever side it might be added. That, then, which is perfectly immediate, admits we say, of no such intervention; for that which is separated by any interval would cease to be immediate. If, therefore, our author, likewise, in saying that the generation of the Son is “without intervention,” excluded all these ideas, then he laid down the orthodox doctrine of the conjunction of Him Who is with the Father. When, however, as though in a fit of re- pentance, he straightway proceeded to add to what he had said that the essence “preserves its relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator,” he polluted his first statement by his second, vomiting forth his blasphemous utterance upon the pure doctrine. For it is clear that there too his “without intervention” has no orthodox intention, but, as one might say that the hammer is mediate between the smith and the nail, but its own making is “without intervention,” because, when tools had not yet been found out by the craft, the hammer came first from the craftsman’s hands by some inventive process, not®> by means of any 655 It seems necessary for the sense to read ov 61 Etépou tivoc Opyavov, since the force of the comparison consists in the hammer being produced immediately by the smith: otherwise we must understand 8v étépou Tivoc Opycvov to refer to the employment of some tool not properly belonging to the téxvn of the smith: but even so the parallel would be destroyed.
He then exposes argument about the “Generate,” and the “product of making,”...
other tool, and so by it the others were made; so the phrase, “without intervention,” indicates that this is also our author’s conception touching the Only-begotten. And here Eunomius is not alone in his error as regards the enormity of his doctrine, but you may find a parallel also in the works of Theognostus® © who says that God, wishing to make this universe, first brought the Son into existence as a sort of standard of the creation; not perceiving that in his statement there is involved this absurdity, that what exists, not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else, is surely of less value than that for the sake of which it exists: as we provide an implement of husbandry for the sake of life, yet the plough is surely not reckoned as equally valuable with life. So, if the Lord also exists on account of the world, and not all things on account of Him, the whole of the things for the sake of which they say He exists, would be more valuable than the Lord. And this is what they are here establishing by their argument, where they insist that the Son has His relation to His Creator and Maker “without intervention.”
656 Theognostus, a writer of the third century, is said to have been the head of the Catechetical School at Al- exandria, and is quoted by S. Athanasius as an authority against the Arians. An account of his work is to be found in Photius, and this is extracted and printed with the few remaining fragments of his actual writings in the 3rd volume of Routh’s Reliquic Sacre.
He then clearly and skilfully criticises the doctrine of the impossibility...§7. He then clearly and skilfully criticises the doctrine of the impossibility of comparison with the things made after the Son, and exposes the idolatry contrived by Eunomius, and con- cealed by the terminology of “Son” and “Only-begotten,” to deceive his readers.
In the remainder of the passage, however, he becomes conciliatory, and says that the essence “is not compared with any of the things that were made by it and after it™”.” Such are the gifts which the enemies of the truth offer to the Lord®®, by which their blasphemy is made more manifest. Tell me what else is there of all things in creation that admits of comparison with a different thing, seeing that the characteristic nature that appears in each absolutely rejects community with things of a different kind®?? The heaven admits no comparison with the earth, nor this with the stars, nor the stars with the seas, nor water with stone, nor animals with trees, nor land animals with winged creatures, nor four-footed beasts with those that swim, nor irrational with rational creatures. Indeed, why should one take up time with individual instances, in showing that we may say of every single thing that we behold in the creation, precisely what was thrown to the Only-begotten, as if it were something special—that He admits of comparison with none of the things that have been produced after Him and by Him’? For it is clear that everything which you conceive by itself is incapable of comparison with the universe, and with the individual things which compose it; and it is this, which may be truly said of any creature you please, which is allotted by the enemies of the truth, as adequate and sufficient for His honour and glory, to the Only-begotten God! And once more, putting together phrases of the same sort in the remainder of the passage, he dignifies Him with his empty honours, calling Him “Lord” and “Only-begot- ten”: but that no orthodox meaning may be conveyed to his readers by these names, he promptly mixes up blasphemy with the more notable of them. His phrase runs thus:—“Inasmuch,” he says, “as the generated essence leaves no room for community to anything else (for it is only-begotten®™), nor is the operation of the Maker contemplated as common.” O marvellous insolence! as though he were addressing his harangue to brutes, or senseless beings “which have no understanding™',” he twists his argument about in 657 Oehler’s proposal to read “vel invitis libris quod sententia flagitat tiv 5i dutod Kai wet’ abtov” does not seem necessary. avtij¢ and avtryv refer to ovoia, the quotation being made (not verbally) from Eunomius, not from Theognostus, and following apparently the phrase about “preserving the relation,” etc. If the clause were a continuation of the quotation from Theognostus, we should have to follow Oehler’s proposal. 658 Reading, according to Cotelerius’ suggestion, (mentioned with approval by Oehler, though not followed by him,) 5wpoopodow for dopu@opotoww 659 That is to say, because there is no “common measure” of the distinct natures. 660 Altering Oehler’s punctuation; it is the fact that the essence is uovoyeviys which excludes all other things from community with it. 661 Ps. xxxii. 9.
He then clearly and skilfully criticises the doctrine of the impossibility...
contrary ways, as he pleases; or rather he suffers as men do who are deprived of sight; for they too behave often in unseemly ways before the eyes of those who see, supposing, because they themselves cannot see, that they are also unseen. For what sort of man is it who does not see the contradiction in his words? Because it is “generated,” he says, the essence leaves other things no room for community, for it is only-begotten; and then when he has uttered these words, really as though he did not see or did not suppose himself to be seen, he tacks on, as if corresponding to what he has said, things that have nothing in common with them, coupling “the operation of the maker” with the essence of the Only-begotten. That which is generated is correlative to the generator, and the Only-begotten, surely, by consequence, to the Father; and he who looks to the truth beholds, in co-ordination with the Son, not “the operation of the maker,” but the nature of Him that begat Him. But he, as if he were talking about plants or seeds, or some other thing in the order of creation, sets “the operation of the maker” by the side of the existence™™ of the Only-begotten. Why, if a stone or a stick, or something of that sort, were the subject of consideration, it would be logical to pre-suppose “the operation of the maker”; but if the Only-begotten God is confessed, even by His ad- versaries, to be a Son, and to exist by way of generation, how do the same words befit Him that befit the lowest portions of the creation? how do they think it pious to say concerning the Lord the very thing which may be truly said of an ant or a gnat? For if any one understood the nature of an ant, and its peculiar ties in reference to other living things, he would not be beyond the truth in saying that “the operation of its maker is not contemplated as com- mon” with reference to the other things. What, therefore, is affirmed of such things as these, this they predicate also of the Only-begotten, and as hunters are said to intercept the passage of their game with holes, and to conceal their design by covering over the mouths of the holes with some unsound and unsubstantial material, in order that the pit may seem level with the ground about it, so heresy contrives against men something of the same sort, cov- ering over the hole of their impiety with these fine-sounding and pious names, as it were with a level thatch, so that those who are rather unintelligent, thinking that these men’s preaching is the same with the true faith, because of the agreement of their words, hasten towards the mere name of the Son and the Only-begotten, and step into emptiness in the hole, since the significance of these titles will not sustain the weight of their tread, but lets them down into the pitfall of the denial of Christ. This is why he speaks of the generated essence that leaves nothing room for community, and calls it “Only-begotten.” These are the coverings of the hole. But when any one stops before he is caught in the gulf, and puts forth the test of argument, like a hand, upon his discourse, he sees the dangerous downfall of idolatry lying beneath the doctrine. For when he draws near, as though to God and the Son of God, he finds a creature of God set forth for his worship. This is why they proclaim 662 vmootkoe.
He then clearly and skilfully criticises the doctrine of the impossibility...high and low the name of the Only-begotten, that the destruction may be readily accepted by the victims of their deceit, as though one were to mix up poison in bread, and give a deadly greeting to those who asked for food, who would not have been willing to take the poison by itself, had they not been enticed to what they saw. Thus he has a sharp eye to the object of his efforts, at least so far as his own opinion goes. For if he had entirely rejected from his teaching the name of the Son, his falsehood would not have been acceptable to men, when his denial was openly stated in a definite proclamation; but now leaving only the name, and changing the signification of it to express creation, he at once sets up his id- olatry, and fraudulently hides its reproach. But since we are bidden not to honour God with our lips, and piety is not tested by the sound ofa word, but the Son must first be the object of belief in the heart unto righteousness, and then be confessed with the mouth unto salvation®4 tion®4 , and those who say in their hearts that He is not God, even though with their mouths they confess Him as Lord, are corrupt and became abominable, as the prophet says,—for this cause, I say, we must look to the mind of those who put forward, forsooth, the words of the faith, and not be enticed to follow their sound. If, then, one who speaks of the Son does not by that word refer to a creature, he is on our side and not on the enemy’s; but if any one applies the name of Son to the creation, he is to be ranked among idolaters. For they too gave the name of God to Dagon and Bel and the Dragon, but they did not on that account worship God. For the wood and the brass and the monster were not God.
663 Cf. Is. xxix. 13 665 Cf. Ps. xiii. 2 He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father...§8. He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father and the Son: wherein he expounds many forms of variation and harmony, and explains the “form,” the “seal,” and the “express image.”
But what need is there in our discourse to reveal his hidden deceit by mere guesses at his intention, and possibly to give our hearers occasions for objection, on the ground that we make these charges against our enemies untruly? For lo, he sets forth to us his blasphemy in its nakedness, not hiding his guile by any veil, but speaking boldly in his absurdities with unrestrained voice. What he has written runs thus:—“We, for our part,” he says, “as we find nothing else besides the essence of the Son which admits of the generation, are of opinion that we must assign the appellations to the essence itself, or else we speak of ‘Son’ and ‘be- gotten’ to no purpose, and as a mere verbal matter, if we are really to separate them from the essence; starting from these names, we also confidently maintain that the essences are variant from each other.”
There is no need, I imagine, that the absurdity here laid down should be refuted by ar- guments from us. The mere reading of what he has written is enough to pillory his blasphemy. But let us thus examine it. He says that the essences of the Father and the Son are “variant.” What is meant by “variant”? Let us first of all examine the force of the term as it is applied by itself’, that by the interpretation of the word its blasphemous character may be more clearly revealed. The term “variance” is used, in the inexact sense sanctioned by custom, of bodies, when, by palsy or any other disease, any limb is perverted from its natural co-ordin- ation. For we speak, comparing the state of suffering with that of health, of the condition of one who has been subjected to a change for the worse, as being a “variation” from his usual health; and in the case of those who differ in respect of virtue and vice, comparing the licentious life with that of purity and temperance, or the unjust life with that of justice, or the life which is passionate, warlike, and prodigal of anger, with that which is mild and 666 The whole passage is rather obscure, and Oehler’s punctuation renders it perhaps more obscure than that which is here adopted. The argument seems to be something like this:—“The generated essence is not compared with any of the things made by it, or after it, because being only-begotten it leaves no room for a common basis of comparison with anything else, and the operation of its maker is also peculiar to itself (since it is immediate, the operation in the case of other things being mediate). The essence of the Son, then, being so far isolated, it is to it that the appellations of yévvnua, moinua, and xtioua are to be assigned; otherwise the terms ‘Son’ and ‘Only-begotten’ are meaningless. Therefore the Son, being in essence a notnya or Ktioua, is alien from the Father Who made or created Him.” The word napnAAdxGan, used to express the difference of essence between the Father and the Son, is one for which it is hard to find an equivalent which shall suit all the cases of the use of the word afterwards instanced: the idea of “variation,” however, seems to attach to all these cases, and the verb has been translated accordingly.
667 Following Oehler’s suggestion and reading ég’ Eavtijc.
He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father...
peaceful—and generally all that is reproached with vice, as compared with what is more excellent, is said to exhibit “variance” from it, because the marks observed in both—in the good, I mean, and the inferior—do not mutually agree. Again, we say that those qualities observed in the elements are “at variance” which are mutually opposed as contraries, having a power reciprocally destructive, as heat and cold, or dryness and moisture, or, generally, anything that is opposed to another as a contrary; and the absence of union in these we ex- press by the term “variation”; and generally everything which is out of harmony with another in their observed characteristics, is said to be “at variance” with it, as health with disease, life with death, war with peace, virtue with vice, and all similar cases.
Now that we have thus analyzed these expressions, let us also consider in regard to our author in what sense he says that the essences of the Father and the Son are “variant from each other.” What does he mean by it? Is it in the sense that the Father is according to nature, while the Son “varies” from that nature? Or does he express by this word the perversion of virtue, separating the evil from the more excellent by the name of “variation,” so as to regard the one essence in a good, the other in a contrary aspect? Or does he assert that one Divine essence also is variant from another, in the manner of the opposition of the elements? or as war stands to peace, and life to death, does he also perceive in the essences the conflict which so exists among all such things, so that they cannot unite one with another, because the mixture of contraries exerts upon the things mingled a consuming force, as the wisdom of the Proverbs saith of such a doctrine, that water and fire never say “It is enough,” express- ing enigmatically the nature of contraries of equal force and equal balance, and their mutual destruction? Or is it in none of these ways that he sees “variance” in the essences? Let him tell us, then, what he conceives besides these. He could not say, I take it, even if he were to repeat his wonted phrase°™ , “The Son is variant from Him Who begat Him”; for thereby the absurdity of his statements is yet more clearly shown. For what mutual relation is so closely and concordantly engrafted and fitted together as that meaning of relation to the Father expressed by the word “Son”? And a proof of this is that even if both of these names be not spoken, that which is omitted is connoted by the one that is uttered, so closely is the one implied in the other, and concordant with it: and both of them are so discerned in the 668 Cf. Prov. xxx. 15 (LXX.).
669 The sense given would perhaps be clearer if we were to read (as Gulonius seems to have done) dovvrjOn for ovvOn. This might be interpreted, “He could not say, I take it, even if he uses the words in an unwonted sense, that the Son is at variance with Him Who begat Him.” The ovvrj8n would thus be the senses already considered and set aside: and the point would be that such a statement could not be made without manifest absurdity, even if some out-of-the-way sense were attached to the words. As the passage stands, it must mean that even if Eunomius repeats his wonted phrase, that can suggest no other sense of “variance” than those enumerated.
He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father...
one that one cannot be conceived without the other. Now that which is “at variance” is surely so conceived and so called, in opposition to that which is “in harmony,” as the plumb- line is in harmony with the straight line, while that which is crooked, when set beside that which is straight, does not harmonize with it. Musicians also are wont to call the agreement of notes “harmony,” and that which is out of tune and discordant “inharmonious.” To speak of things as at “variance,” then, is the same as to speak of them as “out of harmony.” If, therefore, the nature of the Only-begotten God is at “variance,” to use the heretical phrase, with the essence of the Father, it is surely not in harmony with it: and inharmoniousness cannot exist where there is no possibility of harmony°””, For the case is as when, the figure in the wax and in the graying of the signet being one, the wax that has been stamped by the signet, when it is fitted again to the latter, makes the impression on itself accord with that which surrounds it, filling up the hollows and accommodating the projections of the engrav- ing with its own patterns: but if some strange and different pattern is fitted to the engraving of the signet, it makes its own form rough and confused, by rubbing off its figure on an en- graved surface that does not correspond with it. But He Who is “in the form of God®’” has been formed by no impression different from the Father, seeing that He is “the express image” of the Father’s Person”’“, while the “form of God” is surely the same thing as His essence.
For as, “being made in the form of a servant’ °,” He was formed in the essence of a servant, not taking upon Him the form merely, apart from the essence, but the essence is involved in the sense of “form,” so, surely, he who says that He is “in the form of God” signified essence by “form.” If, therefore, He is “in the form of God,” and being in the Father is sealed with the Father’s glory, (as the word of the Gospel declares, which saith, “Him hath God the d°’4»__whence also “He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father®””,”) then “the image of goodness” and “the brightness of glory,” and all other similar titles, testify that the Father seale essence of the Son is not out of harmony with the Father. Thus by the text cited is shown the insubstantial character of the adversaries’ blasphemy. For if things at “variance” are not in harmony, and He Who is sealed by the Father, and displays the Father in Himself, both being in the Father, and having the Father in Himself®”®, shows in all points His close relation and harmony, then the absurdity of the opposing views is hereby overwhelmingly shown.
670 The reading of Oehler is here followed: but the sense of the clause is not clear either in his text or in that of the Paris editions.
He proceeds to show that there is no “variance” in the essence of the Father...
For as that which is at “variance” was shown to be out of harmony, so conversely that which is harmonious is surely confessed beyond dispute not to be at “variance.” For as that which is at “variance” is not harmonious, so the harmonious is not at “variance.” Moreover, he who says that the nature of the Only-begotten is at “variance” with the good essence of the Father, clearly has in view variation in the good itself. But as for what that is which is at variance with the good—“O ye simple,” as the Proverb saith, “understand his craftiness®’’!”
677 Prov. viii. 5 (LXX.).
Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty...§9. Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty and frivolous language of Eunomius to be like a rattle. He proceeds to show that the language used by the great Basil on the subject of the generation of the Only-begotten has been grievously slandered by Eunomius, and so ends the book.
I will pass by these matters, however, as the absurdity involved is evident; let us examine what precedes. He says that nothing else is found, “besides the essence of the Son, which admits of the generation.” What does he mean when he says this? He distinguishes two names from each other, and separating by his discourse the things signified by them, he sets each of them individually apart by itself. “The generation” is one name, and “the essence” is another. The essence, he tells us, “admits of the generation,” being therefore of course something distinct from the generation. For if the generation were the essence (which is the very thing he is constantly declaring), so that the two appellations are equivalent in sense, he would not have said that the essence “admits of the generation”: for that would amount to saying that the essence admits of the essence, or the generation the generation,—if, that is, the generation were the same thing as the essence. He understands, then, the generation to be one thing, and the essence to be another, which “admits of generation”: for that which is taken cannot be the same with that which admits it. Well, this is what the sage and system- atic statement of our author says: but as to whether there is any sense in his words, let him consider who is expert in judging. I will resume his actual words.
He says that he finds “nothing else besides the essence of the Son which admits of the generation”; that there is no sense in his words however, is clear to every one who hears his statement at all: the task which remains seems to be to bring to light the blasphemy which he is trying to construct by aid of these meaningless words. For he desires, even if he cannot effect his purpose, to produce in his hearers by this slackness of expression, the notion that the essence of the Son is the result of construction: but he calls its construction “generation,” decking out his horrible blasphemy with the fairest phrase, that if “construction” is the meaning conveyed by the word “generation,” the idea of the creation of the Lord may receive a ready assent. He says, then, that the essence “admits of generation,” so that every construc- tion may be viewed, as it were, in some subject matter. For no one would say that that is constructed which has no existence, so extending “making” in his discourse, as if it were some constructed fabric, to the nature of the Only-begotten God®”®. “If, then,” he says, “it 678 This whole passage, as it stands in Oehler’s text, (which has here been followed without alteration,) is obscure: the connection between the clauses themselves is by no means clear; and the general meaning of the passage, in view of the succeeding sentences, seems doubtful. For it seems here to be alleged that Eunomius considered the katackevn to imply the previous existence of some material, so to say, which was moulded by generation—on the ground that no one would say that the essence, or anything else, was constructed without being existent. On the other hand it is immediately urged that this is just what would be said of all created things.
Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty...
admits of this generation,’—wishing to convey some such meaning as this, that it would not have been, had it not been constructed. But what else is there among the things we contemplate in the creation which is without being made? Heaven, earth, air, sea, everything whatever that is, surely is by being made. How, then, comes it that he considered it a pecu- liarity in the nature of the Only begotten, that it “admits generation” (for this is his name for making) “into its actual essence,” as though the humble-bee or the gnat did not admit generation into itself®”’, but into something else besides itself. It is therefore acknowledged by his own writings, that by them the essence of the Only-begotten is placed on the same level with the smallest parts of the creation: and every proof by which he attempts to establish the alienation of the Son from the Father has the same force also in the case of individual things. What need has he, then, for this varied acuteness to establish the diversity of nature, when he ought to have taken the short cut of denial, by openly declaring that the name of the Son ought not to be confessed, or the Only-begotten God to be preached in the churches, but that we ought to esteem the Jewish worship as superior to the faith of Christians, and, while we confess the Father as being alone Creator and Maker of the world, to reduce all other things to the name and conception of the creation, and among these to speak of that