It is not, therefore, surprising that abortion is exceedingly common in all civilized and progressive countries. It cannot, indeed, unfortunately, be said that abortion has been conducted in accordance with eugenic considerations, nor has it often been so much as advocated from the eugenic standpoint. But in numerous classes of cases of undesired pregnancy, occurring in women of character and energy, not accustomed to submit tamely to conditions they may not have sought, and in any case consider undesirable, abortion is frequently resorted to. It is usual to regard the United States as a land in which the practice especially flourishes, and certainly a land in which the ideal of chastity for unmarried women, of freedom for married women, of independence for all, is actively followed cannot fail to be favorable to the practice of abortion. But the way in which the prevalence of abortion is proclaimed in the United States is probably in large part due to the honesty of the Americans in setting forth, and endeavoring to correct, what, rightly or wrongly, they regard as social defects, and may not indicate any real pre-eminence in the practice. Comparative statistics are difficult, and it is certainly true that abortion is extremely common in England, in France, and in Germany. It is probable that any national differences may be accounted for by differences in general social habits and ideals. Thus in Germany, where considerable sexual freedom is permitted to unmarried women and married women are very domesticated, abortion may be less frequent than in France where purity is stringently demanded from the young girl, while the married woman demands freedom for work and for pleasure. But such national differences, if they exist, are tending to be levelled down, and charges of criminal abortion are constantly becoming more common in Germany; though this increase, again, may be merely due to greater zeal in pursuing the offence.
Brouardel (op. cit., p. 39) quotes the opinion that, in New York, only one in every thousand abortions is discovered. Dr. J.F. Scott (_The Sexual Instinct_, Ch. VIII), who is himself strongly opposed to the practice, considers that in America, the custom of procuring abortion has to-day reached "such vast proportions as to be almost beyond belief," while "countless thousands" of cases are never reported. "It has increased so rapidly in our day and generation," Scott states, "that it has created surprise and alarm in the minds of all conscientious persons who are informed of the extent to which it is carried." (The assumption that those who approve of abortion are necessarily not "conscientious persons" is, as we shall see, mistaken.) The change has taken place since 1840. The Michigan Special Committee on Criminal Abortion reported in 1881 that, from correspondence with nearly one hundred physicians, it appeared that there came to the knowledge of the profession seventeen abortions to every one hundred pregnancies; to these, the committee believe, may be added as many more that never came to the physician's knowledge. The committee further quoted, though without endorsement, the opinion of a physician who believed that a change is now coming over public feeling in regard to the abortionist, who is beginning to be regarded in America as a useful member of society, and even a benefactor.
In England, also, there appears to have been a marked increase of abortion during recent years, perhaps specially marked among the poor and hard-working classes. A writer in the _British Medical Journal_ (April 9, 1904, p. 865) finds that abortion is "wholesale and systematic," and gives four cases occurring in his practice during four months, in which women either attempted to produce abortion, or requested him to do so; they were married women, usually with large families, and in delicate health, and were willing to endure any suffering, if they might be saved from further child-bearing. Abortion is frequently effected, or attempted, by taking "Female Pills," which contain small portions of lead, and are thus liable to produce very serious symptoms, whether or not they induce abortion. Professor Arthur Hall, of Sheffield, who has especially studied this use of lead ("The Increasing Use of Lead as an Abortifacient," _British Medical Journal_, March 18, 1905), finds that the practice has lately become very common in the English Midlands, and is gradually, it appears, widening its circle. It occurs chiefly among married women with families, belonging to the working class, and it tends to become specially prevalent during periods of trade depression (cf. G. Newman, _Infant Mortality_, p. 81). Women of better social class resort to professional abortionists, and sometimes go over to Paris.
In France, also, and especially in Paris, there has been a great increase during recent years in the practice of abortion. (See e.g., a discussion at the Paris Société de Médecine Légale, _Archives d'Anthropologie Criminelle_, May, 1907.) Doléris has shown (_Bulletin de la Société d'Obstétrique_, Feb., 1905) that in the Paris Maternités the percentage of abortions in pregnancies doubled between 1898 and 1904, and Doléris estimates that about half of these abortions were artificially induced. In France, abortion is mainly carried on by professional abortionists. One of these, Mme. Thomas, who was condemned to penal servitude, in 1891, acknowledged performing 10,000 abortions during eight years; her charge for the operation was two francs and upwards. She was a peasant's daughter, brought up in the home of her uncle, a doctor, whose medical and obstetrical books she had devoured (A. Hamon, _La France en 1891_, pp. 629-631). French public opinion is lenient to abortion, especially to women who perform the operation on themselves; not many cases are brought into court, and of these, forty per cent. are acquitted (Eugène Bausset, _L'Avortement Criminel_, Thèse de Paris, 1907). The professional abortionist is, however, usually sent to prison.
In Germany, also, abortion appears to have greatly increased during recent years, and the yearly number of cases of criminal abortion brought into the courts was, in 1903, more than double as many as in 1885. (See, also, Elisabeth Zanzinger, _Geschlecht und Gesellschaft_, Bd. II, Heft 5; and _Sexual-Probleme_, Jan., 1908, p. 23.)
In view of these facts it is not surprising that the induction of abortion has been permitted and even encouraged in many civilizations. Its unqualified condemnation is only found in Christendom, and is due to theoretical notions. In Turkey, under ordinary circumstances, there is no punishment for abortion. In the classic civilization of Greece and Rome, likewise, abortion was permitted though with certain qualifications and conditions. Plato admitted the mother's right to decide on abortion but said that the question should be settled as early as possible in pregnancy. Aristotle, who approved of abortion, was of the same opinion. Zeno and the Stoics regarded the foetus as the fruit of the womb, the soul being acquired at birth; this was in accordance with Roman law which decreed that the foetus only became a human being at birth.[438] Among the Romans abortion became very common, but, in accordance with the patriarchal basis of early Roman institutions, it was the father, not the mother, who had the right to exercise it. Christianity introduced a new circle of ideas based on the importance of the soul, on its immortality, and the necessity of baptism as a method of salvation from the results of inherited sin. We already see this new attitude in St. Augustine who, discussing whether embryos that died in the womb will rise at the resurrection, says "I make bold neither to affirm nor to deny, although I fail to see why, if they are not excluded from the number of the dead, they should not attain to the resurrection of the dead."[439] The criminality of abortion was, however, speedily established, and the early Christian Emperors, in agreement with the Church, edicted many fantastic and extreme penalties against abortion. This tendency continued under ecclesiastical influence, unrestrained, until the humanitarian movement of the eighteenth century, when Beccaria, Voltaire, Rousseau and other great reformers succeeded in turning the tide of public opinion against the barbarity of the laws, and the penalty of death for abortion was finally abolished.[440] Medical science and practice at the present day--although it can scarcely be said that it speaks with an absolutely unanimous voice--on the whole occupies a position midway between that of the classic lawyers and that of the later Christian ecclesiastics. It is, on the whole, in favor of sacrificing the foetus whenever the interests of the mother demand such a sacrifice. General medical opinion is not, however, prepared at present to go further, and is distinctly disinclined to aid the parents in exerting an unqualified control over the foetus in the womb, nor is it yet disposed to practice abortion on eugenic grounds. It is obvious, indeed, that medicine cannot in this matter take the initiative, for it is the primary duty of medicine to save life. Society itself must assume the responsibility of protecting the race.
Dr. S. Macvie ("Mother _versus_ Child," _Transactions Edinburgh Obstetrical Society_, vol. xxiv, 1899) elaborately discusses the respective values of the foetus and the adult on the basis of life-expectancy, and concludes that the foetus is merely "a parasite performing no function whatever," and that "unless the life-expectancy of the child covers the years in which its potentiality is converted into actuality, the relative values of the maternal and foetal life will be that of actual as against potential." This statement seems fairly sound. Ballantyne (_Manual of Antenatal Pathology: The Foetus_, p. 459) endeavors to make the statement more precise by saying that "the mother's life has a value, because she is what she is, while the foetus only has a possible value, on account of what it may become."
Durlacher, among others, has discussed, in careful and cautious detail, the various conditions in which the physician should, or should not, induce abortion in the interests of the mother ("Der Künstliche Abort," _Wiener Klinik_, Aug. and Sept., 1906); so also, Eugen Wilhelm ("Die Abtreibung und das Recht des Arztes zur Vernichtung der Leibesfrucht," _Sexual-Probleme_, May and June, 1909). Wilhelm further discusses whether it is desirable to alter the laws in order to give the physician greater freedom in deciding on abortion. He concludes that this is not necessary, and might even act injuriously, by unduly hampering medical freedom. Any change in the law should merely be, he considers, in the direction of asserting that the destruction of the foetus is not abortion in the legal sense, provided it is indicated by the rules of medical science. With reference to the timidity of some medical men in inducing abortion, Wilhelm remarks that, even in the present state of the law, the physician who conscientiously effects abortion, in accordance with his best knowledge, even if mistakenly, may consider himself safe from all legal penalties, and that he is much more likely to come in conflict with the law if it can be proved that death followed as a result of his neglect to induce abortion.
Pinard, who has discussed the right to control the foetal life (_Annales de Gynécologie_, vols. lii and liii, 1899 and 1900), inspired by his enthusiastic propaganda for the salvation of infant life, is led to the unwarranted conclusion that no one has the rights of life and death over the foetus; "the infant's right to his life is an imprescriptible and sacred right, which no power can take from him." There is a mistake here, unless Pinard deliberately desires to place himself, like Tolstoy, in opposition to current civilized morality. So far from the infant having any "imprescriptible right to life," even the adult has, in human societies, no such inalienable right, and very much less the foetus, which is not strictly a human being at all. We assume the right of terminating the lives of those individuals whose anti-social conduct makes them dangerous, and, in war, we deliberately terminate, amid general applause and enthusiasm, the lives of men who have been specially selected for this purpose on account of their physical and general efficiency. It would be absurdly inconsistent to say that we have no rights over the lives of creatures that have, as yet, no part in human society at all, and are not so much as born. We are here in presence of a vestige of ancient theological dogma, and there can be little doubt that, on the theoretical side at all events, the "imprescriptible right" of the embryo will go the same way as the "imprescriptible right" of the spermatozöon. Both rights are indeed "imprescriptible."
Of recent years a new, and, it must be admitted, somewhat unexpected, aspect of this question of abortion has been revealed. Hitherto it has been a question entirely in the hands of men, first, following the Roman traditions, in the hands of Christian ecclesiastics, and later, in those of the professional castes. Yet the question is in reality very largely, and indeed mainly, a woman's question, and now, more especially in Germany, it has been actively taken up by women. The Gräfin Gisela Streitberg occupies the pioneering place in this movement with her book _Das Recht zur Beiseitigung Keimenden Lebens_, and was speedily followed, from 1897 onwards, by a number of distinguished women who occupy a prominent place in the German woman's movement, among others Helene Stöcker, Oda Olberg, Elisabeth Zanzinger, Camilla Jellinek. All these writers insist that the foetus is not yet an independent human being, and that every woman, by virtue of the right over her own body, is entitled to decide whether it shall become an independent human being. At the Woman's Congress held in the autumn of 1905, a resolution was passed demanding that abortion should only be punishable when effected by another person against the wish of the pregnant women herself.[441] The acceptance of this resolution by a representative assembly is interesting proof of the interest now taken by women in the question, and of the strenuous attitude they are tending to assume.
Elisabeth Zanzinger ("Verbrechen gegen die Leibesfrucht," _Geschlecht und Gesellschaft_, Bd. II, Heft 5, 1907) ably and energetically condemns the law which makes abortion a crime. "A woman herself is the only legitimate possessor of her own body and her own health...Just as it is a woman's private right, and most intimate concern, to present her virginity as her best gift to the chosen of her heart, so it is certainly a pregnant woman's own private concern if, for reasons which seem good to her, she decides to destroy the results of her action." A woman who destroys the embryo which might become a burden to the community, or is likely to be an inferior member of society, this writer urges, is doing a service to the community, which ought to reward her, perhaps by granting her special privileges as regards the upbringing of her other children. Oda Olberg, in a thoughtful paper ("Ueber den Juristischen Schutz des Keimenden Lebens," _Die Neue Generation_, June, 1908), endeavors to make clear all that is involved in the effort to protect the developing embryo against the organism that carries it, to protect a creature, that is, against itself and its own instincts. She considers that most of the women who terminate their pregnancies artificially would only have produced undesirables, for the normal, healthy, robust woman has no desire to effect abortion. "There are women who are psychically sterile, without being physically so, and who possess nothing of motherhood but the ability to bring forth. These, when they abort, are simply correcting a failure of Nature." Some of them, she remarks, by going on to term, become guilty of the far worse offence of infanticide. As for the women who desire abortion merely from motives of vanity, or convenience, Oda Olberg points out that the circles in which these motives rule are quite able to limit their children without having to resort to abortion. She concludes that society must protect the young life in every way, by social hygiene, by laws for the protection of the workers, by spreading a new morality on the basis of the laws of heredity. But we need no law to protect the young creature against its own mother, for a thousand natural forces are urging the mother to protect her own child, and we may be sure that she will not disobey these forces without very good reasons. Camilla Jellinek, again (_Die Strafrechtsreform_, etc., Heidelberg, 1909), in a powerful and well-informed address before the Associated German Frauenvereine, at Breslau, argues in the same sense.
The lawyers very speedily came to the assistance of the women in this matter, the more readily, no doubt, since the traditions of the greatest and most influential body of law already pointed, on one side at all events, in the same direction. It may, indeed, be claimed that it was from the side of law--and in Italy, the classic land of legal reform--that this new movement first begun. In 1888, Balestrini published, at Turin, his _Aborto, Infanticidio ed Esposizione d'Infante_, in which he argued that the penalty should be removed from abortion. It was a very able and learned book, inspired by large ideas and a humanitarian spirit, but though its importance is now recognized, it cannot be said that it attracted much attention on publication.
It is especially in Germany that, during recent years, lawyers have followed women reformers, by advocating, more or less completely, the abolition of the punishment for abortion. So distinguished an authority as Von Liszt, in a private letter to Camilla Jellinek (op. cit.), states that he regards the punishment of abortion as "very doubtful," though he considers its complete abolition impracticable; he thinks abortion might be permitted during the early months of pregnancy, thus bringing about a return of the old view. Hans Gross states his opinion (_Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie_, Bd. XII, p. 345) that the time is not far distant when abortion will no longer be punished. Radbruch and Von Lilienthal speak in the same sense. Weinberg has advocated a change in the law (_Mutterschutz_, 1905, Heft 8), and Kurt Hiller (_Die Neue Generation_, April, 1909), also from the legal side, argues that abortion should only be punishable when effected by a married woman, without the knowledge and consent of her husband.
The medical profession, which took the first step in modern times in the authorization of abortion, has not at present taken any further step. It has been content to lay down the principle that when the interests of the mother are opposed to those of the foetus, it is the latter which must be sacrificed. It has hesitated to take the further step of placing abortion on the eugenic basis, and of claiming the right to insist on abortion whenever the medical and hygienic interests of society demand such a step. This attitude is perfectly intelligible. Medicine has in the past been chiefly identified with the saving of lives, even of worthless and worse than worthless lives; "Keep everything alive! Keep everything alive!" nervously cried Sir James Paget. Medicine has confined itself to the humble task of attempting to cure evils, and is only to-day beginning to undertake the larger and nobler task of preventing them.
"The step from killing the child in the womb to murdering a person when out of the womb, is a dangerously narrow one," sagely remarks a recent medical author, probably speaking for many others, who somehow succeed in blinding themselves to the fact that this "dangerously narrow step" has been taken by mankind, only too freely, for thousands of years past, long before abortion was known in the world.
Here and there, however, medical authors of repute have advocated the further extension of abortion, with precautions, and under proper supervision, as an aid to eugenic progress. Thus, Professor Max Flesch (_Die Neue Generation_, April, 1909) is in favor of a change in the law permitting abortion (provided it is carried out by the physician) in special cases, as when the mother's pregnancy has been due to force, when she has been abandoned, or when, in the interests of the community, it is desirable to prevent the propagation of insane, criminal, alcoholic, or tuberculous persons.
In France, a medical man, Dr. Jean Darricarrère, has written a remarkable novel, _Le Droit d'Avortement_ (1906), which advocates the thesis that a woman always possesses a complete right to abortion, and is the supreme judge as to whether she will or not undergo the pain and risks of childbirth. The question is, here, however, obviously placed not on medical, but on humanitarian and feminist grounds.
We have seen that, alike on the side of practice and of theory, a great change has taken place during recent years in the attitude towards abortion. It must, however, clearly be recognized that, unlike the control of procreation by methods for preventing conception, facultative abortion has not yet been embodied in our current social morality. If it is permissible to interpolate a personal opinion, I may say that to me it seems that our morality is here fairly reasonable.[442] I am decidedly of opinion that an unrestricted permission for women to practice abortion in their own interests, or even for communities to practice it in the interests of the race, would be to reach beyond the stage of civilization we have at present attained. As Ellen Key very forcibly argues, a civilization which permits, without protest, the barbarous slaughter of its carefully selected adults in war has not yet won the right to destroy deliberately even its most inferior vital products in the womb. A civilization guilty of so reckless a waste of life cannot safely be entrusted with this judicial function. The blind and aimless anxiety to cherish the most hopeless and degraded forms of life, even of unborn life, may well be a weakness, and since it often leads to incalculable suffering, even a crime. But as yet there is an impenetrable barrier against progress in this direction. Before we are entitled to take life deliberately for the sake of purifying life, we must learn how to preserve it by abolishing such destructive influences--war, disease, bad industrial conditions--as are easily within our social power as civilized nations.[443] There is, further, another consideration which seems to me to carry weight. The progress of civilization is in the direction of greater foresight, of greater prevention, of a diminished need for struggling with the reckless lack of prevision. The necessity for abortion is precisely one of those results of reckless action which civilization tends to diminish. While we may admit that in a sounder state of civilization a few cases might still occur when the induction of abortion would be desirable, it seems probable that the number of such cases will decrease rather than increase. In order to do away with the need for abortion, and to counteract the propaganda in its favor, our main reliance must be placed, on the one hand, on increased foresight in the determination of conception and increased knowledge of the means for preventing conception,[444] and on the other hand, on a better provision by the State for the care of pregnant women, married and unmarried alike, and a practical recognition of the qualified mother's claim on society.[445] There can be little doubt that, in many a charge of criminal abortion, the real offence lies at the door of those who have failed to exercise their social and professional duty of making known the more natural and harmless methods for preventing conception, or else by their social attitude have made the pregnant woman's position intolerable. By active social reform in these two directions, the new movement in favor of abortion may be kept in check, and it may even be found that by stimulating such reform that movement has been beneficial.
We have seen that the deliberate restraint of conception has become a part of our civilized morality, and that the practice and theory of facultative abortion has gained a footing among us. There remains a third and yet more radical method of controlling procreation, the method of preventing the possibility of procreation altogether by the performance of castration or other slighter operation having a like inhibitory effect on reproduction. The other two methods only effect a single act of union or its results, but castration affects all subsequent acts of sexual union and usually destroys the procreative power permanently.
Castration for various social and other purposes is an ancient and widespread practice, carried out on men and on animals. There has, however, been on the whole a certain prejudice against it when applied to men. Many peoples have attached a very sacred value to the integrity of the sexual organs. Among some primitive peoples the removal of these organs has been regarded as a peculiarly ferocious insult, only to be carried out in moments of great excitement, as after a battle. Medicine has been opposed to any interference with the sexual organs. The oath taken by the Greek physicians appears to prohibit castration: "I will not cut."[446] In modern times a great change has taken place, the castration of both men and women is commonly performed in diseased conditions; the same operation is sometimes advocated and occasionally performed in the hope that it may remove strong and abnormal sexual impulses. And during recent years castration has been invoked in the cause of negative eugenics, to a greater extent, indeed, on account of its more radical character, than either the prevention of conception or abortion.
The movement in favor of castration appears to have begun in the United States, where various experiments have been made in embodying it in law. It was first advocated merely as a punishment for criminals, and especially sexual offenders, by Hammond, Everts, Lydston and others. From this point of view, however, it seems to be unsatisfactory and perhaps illegitimate. In many cases castration is no punishment at all, and indeed a positive benefit. In other cases, when inflicted against the subject's will, it may produce very disturbing mental effects, leading in already degenerate or unbalanced persons to insanity, criminality, and anti-social tendencies generally, much more dangerous than the original state. Eugenic considerations, which were later brought forward, constitute a much sounder argument for castration; in this case the castration is carried out, by no means in order to inflict a barbarous and degrading punishment, but, with the subject's consent, in order to protect the community from the risk of useless or mischievous members.