Is it the question of mind? By compounding the reflex with the reflex, Spencer thinks he generates instinct and rational volition one after the other. He fails to see that the specialized reflex, being a terminal point of evolution just as much as perfect will, cannot be supposed at the start. That the first of the two terms should have reached its final form before the other is probable enough; but both the one and the other are _deposits_ of the evolution movement, and the evolution movement itself can no more be expressed as a function solely of the first than solely of the second. We must begin by mixing the reflex and the voluntary. We must then go in quest of the fluid reality which has been precipitated in this twofold form, and which probably shares in both without being either. At the lowest degree of the animal scale, in living beings that are but an undifferentiated protoplasmic mass, the reaction to stimulus does not yet call into play one definite mechanism, as in the reflex; it has not yet choice among several definite mechanisms, as in the voluntary act; it is, then, neither voluntary nor reflex, though it heralds both. We experience in ourselves something of this true original activity when we perform semi-voluntary and semi-automatic movements to escape a pressing danger. And yet this is but a very imperfect imitation of the primitive character, for we are concerned here with a mixture of two activities already formed, already localized in a brain and in a spinal cord, whereas the original activity was a simple thing, which became diversified through the very construction of mechanisms like those of the spinal cord and brain. But to all this Spencer shuts his eyes, because it is of the essence of his method to recompose the consolidated with the consolidated, instead of going back to the gradual process of consolidation, which is evolution itself.
Is it, finally, the question of the correspondence between mind and matter? Spencer is right in defining the intellect by this correspondence. He is right in regarding it as the end of an evolution. But when he comes to retrace this evolution, again he integrates the evolved with the evolved--failing to see that he is thus taking useless trouble, and that in positing the slightest fragment of the actually evolved he posits the whole--so that it is vain for him, then, to pretend to make the genesis of it.
For, according to him, the phenomena that succeed each other in nature project into the human mind images which represent them. To the relations between phenomena, therefore, correspond symmetrically relations between the ideas. And the most general laws of nature, in which the relations between phenomena are condensed, are thus found to have engendered the directing principles of thought, into which the relations between ideas have been integrated. Nature, therefore, is reflected in mind. The intimate structure of our thought corresponds, piece by piece, to the very skeleton of things--I admit it willingly; but, in order that the human mind may be able to represent relations between phenomena, there must first be phenomena, that is to say, distinct facts, cut out in the continuity of becoming. And once we posit this particular mode of cutting up such as we perceive it to-day, we posit also the intellect such as it is to-day, for it is by relation to it, and to it alone, that reality is cut up in this manner. Is it probable that mammals and insects notice the same aspects of nature, trace in it the same divisions, articulate the whole in the same way? And yet the insect, so far as intelligent, has already something of our intellect. Each being cuts up the material world according to the lines that its action must follow: it is these lines of _possible action_ that, by intercrossing, mark out the net of experience of which each mesh is a fact. No doubt, a town is composed exclusively of houses, and the streets of the town are only the intervals between the houses: so, we may say that nature contains only facts, and that, the facts once posited, the relations are simply the lines running between the facts. But, in a town, it is the gradual portioning of the ground into lots that has determined at once the place of the houses, their general shape, and the direction of the streets: to this portioning we must go back if we wish to understand the particular mode of subdivision that causes each house to be where it is, each street to run as it does. Now, the cardinal error of Spencer is to take experience already allotted as given, whereas the true problem is to know how the allotment was worked. I agree that the laws of thought are only the integration of relations between facts. But, when I posit the facts with the shape they have for me to-day, I suppose my faculties of perception and intellection such as they are in me to-day; for it is they that portion the real into lots, they that cut the facts out in the whole of reality. Therefore, instead of saying that the relations between facts have generated the laws of thought, I can as well claim that it is the form of thought that has determined the shape of the facts perceived, and consequently their relations among themselves: the two ways of expressing oneself are equivalent; they say at bottom the same thing. With the second, it is true, we give up speaking of evolution. But, with the first, we only speak of it, we do not think of it any the more. For a true evolutionism would propose to discover by what _modus vivendi_, gradually obtained, the intellect has adopted its plan of structure, and matter its mode of subdivision. This structure and this subdivision work into each other; they are mutually complementary; they must have progressed one with the other. And, whether we posit the present structure of mind or the present subdivision of matter, in either case we remain in the evolved: we are told nothing of what evolves, nothing of evolution.
And yet it is this evolution that we must discover. Already, in the field of physics itself, the scientists who are pushing the study of their science furthest incline to believe that we cannot reason about the parts as we reason about the whole; that the same principles are not applicable to the origin and to the end of a progress; that neither creation nor annihilation, for instance, is inadmissible when we are concerned with the constituent corpuscles of the atom. Thereby they tend to place themselves in the concrete duration, in which alone there is true generation and not only a composition of parts. It is true that the creation and annihilation of which they speak concern the movement or the energy, and not the imponderable medium through which the energy and the movement are supposed to circulate. But what can remain of matter when you take away everything that determines it, that is to say, just energy and movement themselves? The philosopher must go further than the scientist. Making a clean sweep of everything that is only an imaginative symbol, he will see the material world melt back into a simple flux, a continuity of flowing, a becoming. And he will thus be prepared to discover real duration there where it is still more useful to find it, in the realm of life and of consciousness. For, so far as inert matter is concerned, we may neglect the flowing without committing a serious error: matter, we have said, is weighted with geometry; and matter, the reality which _descends_, endures only by its connection with that which _ascends_. But life and consciousness are this very ascension. When once we have grasped them in their essence by adopting their movement, we understand how the rest of reality is derived from them. Evolution appears and, within this evolution, the progressive determination of materiality and intellectuality by the gradual consolidation of the one and of the other. But, then, it is within the evolutionary movement that we place ourselves, in order to follow it to its present results, instead of recomposing these results artificially with fragments of themselves. Such seems to us to be the true function of philosophy. So understood, philosophy is not only the turning of the mind homeward, the coincidence of human consciousness with the living principle whence it emanates, a contact with the creative effort: it is the study of becoming in general, it is true evolutionism and consequently the true continuation of science--provided that we understand by this word a set of truths either experienced or demonstrated, and not a certain new scholasticism that has grown up during the latter half of the nineteenth century around the physics of Galileo, as the old scholasticism grew up around Aristotle.
FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 96: The part of this chapter which treats of the history of systems, particularly of the Greek philosophy, is only the very succinct résumé of views that we developed at length, from 1900 to 1904, in our lectures at the Collège de France, especially in a course on the _History of the Idea of Time_ (1902-1903). We then compared the mechanism of conceptual thought to that of the cinematograph. We believe the comparison will be useful here.]
[Footnote 97: The analysis of the idea of the nought which we give here (pp. 275-298) has appeared before in the _Revue philosophique_ (November 1906).]
[Footnote 98: Kant, _Critique of Pure Reason_, 2nd edition, p. 737: "From the point of view of our knowledge in general...the peculiar function of negative propositions is simply to prevent error." Cf. Sigwart, _Logik_, 2nd edition, vol. i. pp. 150 ff.]
[Footnote 99: That is, we do not consider the sophism of Zeno refuted by the fact that the geometrical progression _a_(1 + 1/_n_ + 1/_n_2 + 1/_n_3 +,...etc.)--in which _a_ designates the initial distance between Achilles and the tortoise, and _n_ the relation of their respective velocities--has a finite sum if _n_ is greater than 1. On this point we may refer to the arguments of F. Evellin, which we regard as conclusive (see Evellin, _Infini et quantité_, Paris, 1880, pp. 63-97; cf. _Revue philosophique_, vol. xi., 1881, pp. 564-568). The truth is that mathematics, as we have tried to show in a former work, deals and can deal only with lengths. It has therefore had to seek devices, first, to transfer to the movement, which is not a length, the divisibility of the line passed over, and then to reconcile with experience the idea (contrary to experience and full of absurdities) of a movement that is a length, that is, of a movement _placed upon_ its trajectory and arbitrarily decomposable like it.]
[Footnote 101: We have tried to bring out what is true and what is false in this idea, so far as spatiality is concerned (see Chapter III.). It seems to us radically false as regards _duration_.]
[Footnote 102: Aristotle, _De anima_, 430 a 14 [Greek: kai hestin ho men toioutos nous tô pynta ginesthai, ho de tô panta poiein, ôs hexis tis, oion to phôs. tropon gar tina ka to phôs poiei ta dynamei onta chrômata energeia chrômata].]
[Footnote 103: _De caelo_, ii. 287 a 12 [Greek: tês eschatês periphoras oute kenon estin exôthen oute topos.] _Phys._ iv. 212 a 34 [Greek: to de pan esti men hôs kinêsetai hesti d' hôs ou. hôs men gar holon, hama ton topon hou metaballei. kyklô de kinêsetai, tôn moriôn gar outos ho topos].]
[Footnote 104: _De caelo_, i. 279 a 12 [Greek: oude chronos hestin hexô tou ouranou]. _Phys._ viii. 251 b 27 [Greek: ho chronos pathos ti kinêseôs].]
[Footnote 105: Especially have we left almost entirely on one side those admirable but somewhat fugitive intuitions that Plotinus was later to seize, to study and to fix.]
[Footnote 106: See page 10.]
[Footnote 108: Descartes, _Principes_, ii. §§ 36 ff.]
[Footnote 109: In a course of lectures on Plotinus, given at the Collège de France in 1897-1898, we tried to bring out these resemblances. They are numerous and impressive. The analogy is continued even in the formulae employed on each side.]
[Footnote 110: "Le Paralogisme psycho-physiologique" (_Revue de métaphysique et de morale_, Nov. 1904, pp. 895-908). Cf. _Matière et mémoire_, Paris, 1896, chap. i.]
INDEX (Compiled by the Translator) Absence of order, 231, 234, 274. _See_ Disorder Absoluteness of duration, 206 of understanding, xi, 47, 152, 190, 197, 199 Accumulation of energy, function of vegetable organisms, 253, 255 Achilles and tortoise, in Zeno, 311, 312-3 Act, consciousness as inadequacy of, to representation, 144 form (or essence), quality, three classes of representation, 302-3 Action, creativeness of free, 192, 247 and concepts, 160, 297 and consciousness, xiii, 5, 143-4, 145, 179-80, 207, 262 discontinuity of, 154, 307 freedom of, in animals, 130 as function of nervous system, 262-3 indivisibility of, 94, 95, 308-9 and inert matter, 96, 136, 141-2, 156, 187, 198, 226, 366 instinct and, 136, 141 instrument of, consciousness, 180 instrument of, life, 162 instrument of matter, 161, 198-9 as instrument of consciousness, 180 and intellect. _See_ Intellect and action intensity of consciousness varies with ratio of possible, to real, 145 meaning of, 301-3 moves from want to fulness, 297, 298 organism a machine for, 252, 254, 300 and perception, 5, 11, 12, 93, 188, 189, 206, 227-30, 300, 307, 368 possible, 12, 13, 96, 144, 145, 146-7, 159, 165, 179-81, 188, 264 and science, 93, 195-6, 198-9, 329-30 and space, 203 sphere of the intellect, 155 tension in a free, 200, 207, 238, 240, 301-2 Activity, dissatisfaction the starting-point of, 297 of instinct, continuous with vital process, 139, 140 life as, 128-9, 247 mutually inverse factors in vital, 248 and nervous system, 110, 130, 132-3, 134-5, 180, 252, 261-3 organism as, 174 potential. _See_ Action, possible tension of free, 200, 202, 207-8, 223-4, 237, 239, 300-1 and torpor in evolution, 109, 111, 113, 114, 119-20, 129-30, 135-6, 181, 292 vital, has evolved divergently, 134 _See_ Divergent lines of evolution Adequate and inadequate in Spinoza, 353 Adjectives, substantives and verbs, 303-4, 315 Aesthetics and philosophy, 177 Affection, Role of, in the idea of chance, 234 in the idea of nought, 281-3, 289, 293, 295, 296 in negation, 286-7 Affirmation and negation, 285-6, 293 Age and individuality, 15-6 Albuminoid substances, 121-2 Alciope, 96 Alexandrian philosophy, 322, 323 Algae in illustration of probable consciousness in vegetable forms, 112 Allegory of the Cave, 191 Alternations of increase and decrease of mutability of the universe, 245-6 Alveolar froth, 33-4 Ambiguity of the idea of "generality" in philosophy, 230-1, 320-1 of primitive organisms, 99, 112, 113, 129-30 Ammophila hirsuta, paralyzing instinct in, 173 Amoeba, in illustration of imitation of the living by the unorganized, 33-6 in illustration of the ambiguity of primitive organisms, 99 in illustration of the mobility characteristic of animals, 108 in illustration of the "explosive" expenditure of energy characteristic of animals, 120, 253 Anagenesis, 34 Anarchy, idea of, 233, 234. _See_ Disorder Anatomy, comparative, and transformism, 25 Ancient philosophy, Achilles and tortoise, 311-2 Alexandrian philosophy, 322-3 Allegory of the Cave, 191 Anima (De), 322 _note_ Apogee of sensible object, 344, 345, 349 Archimedes, 343-4 Aristotle, 135, 174-5, 227-8, 314, 316, 321, 323, 324, 328-33, 347, 349, 353, 356, 370 Arrow of Zeno, 308-13 ascent toward God, in Aristotle, 323 Astronomy, ancient and modern, 334-6 attraction and impulsion in, 323-4 becoming in, 313-4, 317 bow and indivisibility of motion, 308-9 Caelo (De), of Aristotle, 322 _note_, 324 _note_ and Cartesian geometry, 334-5 causality in, 323, 325-6 change in, 313-4, 317, 328-9, 342-3 cinematographical nature of, 315 circularity of God's thought, 323-4 concentric spheres, 328 concepts, 326-7, 356 "conversion" and "procession" in, 323 degradation of ideas into sensible flux, 317-8, 321, 323-4, 327, 328, 343-5, 352-3 degrees of reality, 323-4, 327 diminution, derivation of becoming by. _See_ Degradation of Ideas, etc. duration, 317-9 _note_, 323-4, 327-9 Eleatic philosophy, 308, 314 Enneads of Plotinus, 210 _note_ essence and accident, 354 essence or form, 314-5 eternal, 317-8, 324-6 Eternity, 317-8, 320, 324, 328-9 extension, 210 _note_, 318, 324, 327 form or idea, 314-20, 322, 327, 329-31, 352 geometry, Cartesian, and ancient philosophy, 334 God of Aristotle, 196-7, 322-4, 349, 352, 356 [Greek: hylê], 353 Idea, 314-22, 352-3 and indivisibility of motion, 307-8, 311 intelligible reality in, 326 intelligibles of Plotinus, 353 [Greek: logos], of Plotinus, 210 _note_ matter in Aristotle's philosophy, 316, 327 and modern astronomy, 333-4, 335 and modern geometry, 333-4 and modern philosophy, 226-7, 228-9, 232, 281-2, 344-5, 346, 349-51, 364, 369 and modern science, 329-30, 336, 342-3, 344-5, 357 motion in, 307-8, 312-3 necessity in, 327 [Greek: noêseôs noêsis], 356 non-being, 316, 327 [Greek: nous poiêtikos], 322 oscillation about being, sensible reality as, 317-8 Physics of Aristotle, 227-8 _note_, 324 _note_, 330-1 Plato, 48, 156, 191, 210 _note_, 316-8, 321-4, 327, 330, 348, 349 Plotinus, 210, 316, 323, 326 _note_, 349, 352-4 procession in Alexandrian philosophy, 323 [Greek: psychê], 210 _note_, 350 realism in, 232 refraction of idea through matter or non-being, 317 sectioning of becoming, 318-9 sensible reality, 314, 316-8, 321, 327-9, 352-3 [Greek: sôma], 350 space and time, 317-9, 320 Timaeus, 318 _note_ time in ancient and in modern science, 330-1, 336-7, 341-4 time and space, 317-9, 320 vision of God in Alexandrian philosophy, 322 Zeno, 308, 313 Ancient science and modern, 329-31, 336-7, 342-5, 357 Anima (De), of Aristotle, 322 _note_ Antagonistic currents of the vital impetus, 129, 135-6, 181, 184, 250, 258-9 Anthophora, 146-7 Antinomies of Kant, 204, 205 Antipathy. _See_ Sympathy, Feeling, Divination Antithesis and thesis, 205 Ape's brain and consciousness contrasted with man's, 263 Aphasia, 181 Apidae, social instinct in the, 171 Apogee of instinct in the hymenoptera and of intelligence in man, 174-5 _See_ Evolutionary superiority Apogee of sensible object, in philosophy of Ideas, 343-4, 349 Approximateness of the knowledge of matter, 206-7 Approximation, in matter, to the mathematical order, 218. _See_ Order Archimedes, 333-4 Aristotle. _See_ Ancient Philosophy, Aristotle Arrow, Flying, of Zeno, 308-9, 310, 312-3 Artemia Salina, transformations of, 72, 73 Arthropods in evolution, 130-5, 142 Articulate species, 133 Articulations of matter relative to action, 156, 367 of motion, 310-1 of real time, 332-3 Artificial, how far scientific knowledge is, 197, 218-9 instruments, 138, 139, 140-1 Artist, in illustration of the creativeness of duration, 340-1 Ascent toward God, in Aristotle, 323 Association of organisms, 260. _See_ Individuation universal oscillation between association and individuation, 259, 260. _See_ Societies Astronomy and deduction, 213 and the inert order, 224 modern, in reference to ancient science, 334-6 Atmosphere of spatiality bathing intelligence, 204 Atom, 240, 254, 255 as an intellectual view of matter, 203, 250 and interpenetration, 207 Attack and defence in evolution, 131-2 Attention, 2, 148-9, 154, 184, 209 discontinuity of, 2 in man and in lower animals, 184. _See_ Tension and instinct, Tension as inverted extension, Tension of personality, Sympathetic appreciation, etc., Relaxation and intellect Attraction and impulsion in Greek philosophy, 323, 324 Attribute and subject, 148 Automatic activity, 145 as instrument of voluntary, 252 order, 224, 231-4. _See_ Negative movement, etc., Geometrical order Background of instinct and intelligence, consciousness as, 186 Backward-looking attitude of the intellect, 47, 48, 237 Bastian, 212 _note_ Bateson, 63 Becoming, 164, 236, 248-9, 273, 299-304, 307-8, 313-4, 316, 337-8, 342-3, 345, 363 in ancient philosophy, 313-4, 317 in Descartes's philosophy, 346 in Eleatic philosophy, 313-4, 315 in general, or abstract becoming, 304, 306-7 instantaneous and static views of, 272, 304-5 states of, falsely so called, 164, 247-8, 273, 298-301, 307-8 in the successors of Kant, 363. _See_ Change, New, Duration, Time, Views of reality Beethoven, 224 Berthold, 34 _note_ Bethe, 176 _note_ Bifurcations of tendency, 54. _See_ Divergent lines of evolution Blaringhem, 85 Bodies, 156, 188, 189, 300-1, 360. _See_ Inert matter as a relaxation of the unextended into the extended defined as bundles of qualities, 349 Boltzmann, 245 Bombines, social instincts in, 171 Bouvier, 142 _note_ Bow, strain of, illustrating indivisibility of motion, 308-10 Brandt, 66 _note_ Breast-Plate, in reference to animal mobility, 130, 131. _See_ Carapace, Cellulose envelope Brown-Séquard, 80-2 Bulb, medullary, in the development of the nervous system, 110, 252 Busquet, 259 _note_ Bütschli, 33 _note_ Butterflies, in illustration of variation from evolutionary type, 72 Caelo (De), of Aristotle, 322 _note_, 324 _note_ Calcareous sheath, in reference to animal mobility, 130-1 Calkins, 16 _note_ Canal, in illustration of the relation of function and structure, 93 Canalization, in illustration of the function of animal organisms, 93, 95, 110, 126, 256, 270 Canvas, embroidering "something" on the, of "nothing," 297 Caprice, an attribute not of freedom but of mechanism, 47 Carapace, in reference to animal mobility, 130-1 Carbohydrates, in reference to the function of the animal organism, 121-2 Carbon, in reference to the function of organisms, 107, 113, 114, 117, 254, 255 Carbonic acid, in reference to the function of organisms, 254, 255 Cartesian geometry, compared with ancient, 334 Cartesians, 358. _See_ Spinoza, Leibniz Carving, the, of matter by intellect, 155 Categorical propositions, characteristic of instinctive knowledge, 149-50 Categories, conceptual, x, xiii, 48, 147, 148-9, 165, 189-90, 195-7, 207, 220-1, 257-60, 265, 358, 361. _See_ Concept deduction of, and genesis of the intellect, 196, 207, 359. _See_ Genesis of matter and of the intellect innate, 147, 148-9 misfit for the vital, x, xiii, 48, 165, 195-9, 220-1, 257-9 in reference to the adaptation to each other of the matter and form of knowledge, 361 Cats, in illustration of the law of correlation, 67 Causal relation in Aristotle, 325 between consciousness and movement, 111 in Greek philosophy, 324-5 Causality, mechanical, a category which does not apply to life, x, xiv, 177 in the philosophy of Ideas, 323-6 Causation and adaptation, 101, 102 final, involves mechanical, 44 Cause and effect as mathematical functions of each other, 20, 21 efficient, 238, 277, 323 efficient, in Aristotle's philosophy, 324 efficient, in Leibniz's philosophy, 353 final, 40, 44, 238 final, in Aristotle's philosophy, 324 by impulsion, release and unwinding, 73 mechanical, as containing effect, 14, 233, 269 in the vital order, 95, 164 Cave, Plato's allegory of the, 191 Cell, 16, 24, 33, 162, 166, 167, 260, 269 as artificial construct, 162 in the "colonial theory," 260 division, 16, 24, 33 instinct in the, 166, 167 in relation to the soul, 269 Cellulose envelope in reference to vegetable immobility and torpor, 108, 111, 130 Cerebro-spinal system, 124. _See_ Nervous system Certainty of induction, 215, 216 Chaos, 232. _See_ Disorder Character, moral, 5, 99-100 Charrin, 81 _note_ Child, intelligence in, 147-8 adolescence of, in illustration of evolutionary becoming, 311-3 Chipped stone, in paleontology, 139 Circle of the given, broken by action, 192, 247 logical and physical, 277 vicious, in intellectualist philosophy, 193, 197, 320 vicious, in the intuitional method is only apparent, 192, 193 Circularity of God's thought in Aristotle's philosophy, 324 of each special evolution, 128 Circulation, protoplasmic, imitated, 32-3 in plants and animals, 108 Classes of words corresponding to the three kinds of representation, 303-4 Clausius, 243 Clearness characteristic of intellect, 160 Cleft between the organized and the unorganized, 190, 196-9 Climbing plants, instincts of, 170 _note_ Coincidence of matter with space as in Kant, 206, 207, 244 of mind with intellect as in Kant, 48, 206 of qualities, 216 of seeing and willing, 237 of self with self, definition of the feeling of duration, 199-200 Coleopter, instinct in, 146 Colonial theory, 259, 260 Colonies, microbial, 259 Color variation in lizards, 72, 74 Coming and going of the mind between the without and the within gives rise to the idea of "Nothing," 279 between nature and mind, the true method of philosophy, 239 Compenetration, 352-3. _See_ Interpenetration Complementarity of forms evolved, xii, xiii, 51, 101, 103, 113, 116-7, 135, 136, 254, 255 of instinct and intelligence, 146, 173. _See_ Opposition of Instinct and Intelligence of intuition and intellect, 343, 345 in the powers of life, 49, 96-7, 140-3, 177, 178-9, 183-5, 239, 246, 254, 343 of science and metaphysics, 344 Complexity of the order of mathematics, 208-10, 217, 251 Compound reflex, instinct as a, 174 Concentration, intellect as, 191, 301 of personality, 198-9, 201 Concentric spheres in Aristotle's philosophy, 328 Concept accessory to action, ix analogy of, with the solid body, ix in animals, 187 externality of, 160, 168, 175-8, 199-200, 251, 306, 311, 314 fringed about with intuition, 46 and image distinguished, 160, 279 impotent to grasp life, ix-xiii, 49 intellect the concept-making faculty, vi, 49 misfit for the vital, 48 representation of the act by which the intellect is fixed on things, 161 synthesis of, in ancient philosophy, 325-6, 356. _See_ Categories, Externality, Frames, Image, Space, Symbol Conduct, mechanism and finality in the evolution of, 47. _See_ Freedom, Determination, Indetermination Confused plurality of life, 257 Conjugation of Infusoria, 16 Consciousness and action, ix, 5, 144, 145, 179-80, 207, 260-1 consciousness as appendage to action, ix consciousness as arithmetical difference between possible and real activity, 145 consciousness as auxiliary to action, 179-80 consciousness as inadequacy of act to representation, 144 consciousness as instrument of action, 180 consciousness as interval between possible and real action, 145, 179 consciousness as light from zone of possible actions surrounding the real act, 179 consciousness and locomotion, 262 consciousness plugged up by action, 144, 145. _See_ Torpor, Sleep consciousness as sketch of action, 207 intensity of, varies with ratio of possible to real action, 145 Consciousness in animals, as distinguished from the consciousness of plants, 130, 135-6, 143 as distinguished from the consciousness of man, 139-43, 180, 183, 184, 187, 188, 212, 263-9. _See_ Torpor, Sleep characteristic of animals, torpor of plants, 109, 111, 113, 120, 128-9, 135-6, 181, 182, 292 as background of instinct and intelligence, 186 and brain, 180, 262, 263, 269, 270, 354 and choice, 110, 144-5, 179, 262-4 coextensive with universal life, 186, 270 and creation, consciousness as demand for creation, 261 current of, penetrating matter, 181, 270 as deficiency of instinct, 145 in dog and man, 180 double form of, 179 function of, 207 as hesitation or choice, 143, 144 imprisonment of, 180, 183-4, 264 as invention and freedom, 264, 270 in man as distinguished from, in lower forms of life, 180, 263, 264, 267, 268 and matter, 179, 181-2 as motive principle of evolution, 181-2 nullified, as distinguished from the absence of consciousness, 143 and the organism, 270 in plants, 131, 135-6, 143 as world principle, 237, 261 Conservation of energy, 243, 244 Construction, 139-42, 150-1, 156, 157-8, 180, 182. _See_ Manufacture, Solid the characteristic work of intellect, 163-4 as the method of Kant's successors, 364-5 Contingency, 96, 255, 268. _See_ Accident, Chance the, of order, 231, 235 Continuation of vital process in instinct, 138, 139, 166, 167, 246. _See_ Variations, Vital process Conventionality of science, 207 "Conversion" and "procession" in Alexandrian philosophy, 323 Cook, Plato's comparison of the, and the dialectician, 156 Correlation, law of, 66, 67 Correspondence between mind and matter in Spencer, 368. _See_ Simultaneity Cortical mechanism, 252, 253, 262. _See_ Cerebral mechanism Cosmogony and genesis of matter, 188. _See_ Genesis of matter and of intellect, Spencer Cosmology the, that follows from the philosophy of Ideas, 315, 328 as reversed psychology, 208 Counterweight representation as, to action, 145 Counting simultaneities, the measurement of time is, 338, 341-2