CHAP, in REAL DURATION AND PREDICTION 183 not in the relation of this act to what it is not or to what it might have been. All the difficulty arises from the fact that both parties picture the deliberation under the form of an oscillation in space, while it really consists in a dynamic pro gress in which the self and its motives, like real living beings, are in a constant state of becoming. The self, infallible when it affirms its immediate experiences, feels itself free and says so; but, as soon as" it tries to explain its freedom to itself, it no longer perceives itself except by a kind of refraction through space. Hence a symbolism of a mechanical kind, equally incapable of proving, disproving, or illustrating free will.
But determinism will not admit itself beaten, and, putting the question in a new form, it will is prediction saY: " Let us leave aside actions al- aS-~ rea(ty performed: let us consider only - actions that are to come. The ques- cf118- tion is whether, knowing from now onwards all the future antecedents, some higher intelligence would not be able to predict with absolute certainty the decision which will result." — We gladly agree to the question being put in these terms: it will give us a chance of stating our own theory with greater precision. But we shall first draw a distinction between those who th'.nk that the knowledge of antecedents would enible us to state a probable conclusion and thosp. wl o speak of an infallible foresight. To say that 184 TIME AND FREE WILL CHAP, in a certain friend, under certain circumstances, will very probably act in a certain way, is not so much to predict the future conduct of our friend as to pass a judgment on his present character, that is to say, on his past. Although our feelings, our ideas, our character, are constantly altering, a sudden change is seldom observed; and it is still more seldom that we cannot say of a person whom we know that certain actions seem to accord fairly well with his nature and that certain others are absolutely inconsistent with it. All philosophers will agree on this point; for to say that a given action is consistent or inconsistent with the present character of a person whom one knows is not to bind the future to the present. But the determinist goes much further: he asserts that our solution is provisional simply because we never know all the conditions of the prc^ blem; that our forecast would gain in probability in proportion as we were provided with a larget number of these conditions; that, therefore- complete and perfect knowledge of all the antf cedents without any exception would make our forecast infallibly true. Such, then, is the hypo thesis which we have to examine.
For the sake of greater defmiteness, let us imagine a person called upon to make a seemingly TO know com- free decision under serious circumstancesplefely the * antecedents we shall call him Peter. The question and conditions, ls wnetner a philosopher Paul, living at t; the same period as Peter, or, if you CHAP, in REAL DURATION AND PREDICTION 185 prefer, a few centuries before, would have been able, knowing all the conditions under which Peter acts, to foretell with certainty the choice which Peter made.
There are several ways of picturing the mental condition of a person at a given moment. We try to do it when e.g. we read a novel; but whatever care the author may have taken in depicting the feelings of his hero, and even in trac ing back his history, the end, foreseen or unfore seen, will add something to the idea which we had formed of the character: the character, therefore, was only imperfectly known to us. In truth, the deeper psychic states, those which are translated by free acts, express and sum up the whole of our past history: if Paul knows all the conditions under which Peter acts, we must suppose that no detail of Peter's life escapes him, and that his imagination reconstructs and even lives over again Peter's history. But we must here make a vital distinction. When I myself pass through a cer tain psychic state, I know exactly the intensity of this state and its importance in relation to the others, not by measurement or comparison, but because the intensity of e.g. a deep-seated feeling is nothing else than the feeling itself. On the other hand, if I try to give you an account of this psychic state, I shall be unable to make you realize its intensity except by some definite sign of a mathematical kind: I shall have to measure its importance, compare it with what goes before and l86 TIME AND FREE WILL CHAP, ni what follows, in short determine the part which it plays in the final act. And I shall say that it is more or less intense, more or less important, according as the final act is explained by it or apart from it. On the other hand, for my own consciousness, which perceived this inner state, there was no need of a comparison of this kind: the intensity was given to it as an inexpressible quality of the state, itself. In other words, the intensity of a psychic state is not given to con sciousness as a special sign accompanying this state and denoting its power, like an exponent in algebra; we have shown above that it expresses rather its shade, its characteristic colouring, and that, if it is a question of a feeling, for example, its intensity consists in being felt. Hence we have to distinguish two ways of assimilating the con scious states of other people: the one dynamic, which consists in experiencing them oneself; the other static, which consists in substituting for the consciousness of these states their image or rather their intellectual symbol, their idea. In this case the conscious states are imagined instead of being reproduced; but, then, to the image of the psychic states themselves some indication of their intensity should be added, since they no longer act on the person in whose mind they are pictured and the' latter has no longer any chance of experiencing their force by actually feeling them. Now, this indication itself will necessarily assume a quan titative character: it will be pointed out, for CHAP, in REAL DURATION AND PREDICTION 187 example, that a certain feeling has more strength than another feeling, that it is necessary to take more account of it, that it has played a greater part; and how could this be known unless the later history of the person were known in advance, with the precise actions in which this multiplicity of states or inclinations has issued? Therefore, if Paul is to have an adequate idea of Peter's state at any moment of his history, there are only two courses open; either, like a novelist who knows whither he is conducting his characters, Paul must already know Peter's final act, and must thus be able to supplement his mental image of the successive states through which Peter is going to pass by some indication of their value in relation to the whole of Peter's history; or he must make up his mind to pass through these different states, not in imagination, but in reality. The former hypothesis must be put on one side since the very point at issue is whether, the ante cedents alone being given, Paul will be able to foresee the final act. We find ourselves compelled, therefore, to alter radically the idea which we had formed of Paul: he is not, as we had thought at first, a spectator whose eyes pierce the future, but an actor who plays Peter's part in advance. And notice that you cannot exempt him from any detail of this part, for the most common-place events have their importance in a life-story; and even supposing that they have not, you can not decide that they are insignificant except in l88 TIME AND FREE WILL CHAP, m relation to the final act, which, by hypothesis, is not given. Neither have you the right to cut short — were it only by a second — the different states of consciousness through which Paul is going to pass before Peter; for the effects of the same feeling, for example, go on accumulating at every moment of duration, and the sum total of these effects could not be realized all at once un less one knew the importance of the feeling, taken in its totality, in relation to the final act, which is the very thing that is supposed to remain unknown. But if Peter and Paul have experienced the same feelings in the same order, if their minds have the same history, how will you distinguish one from the other? Will it be by the body in which they dwell? They would then always differ in some respect, viz., that at no moment of their history would they have a mental picture of the same body. Will it be by the place which they occupy in time? In that case they would no longer be present at the same events: now, by hypothesis, they have the same past and the same present, having the same experience. You must now make up your mind about it: Peter and Paul are one and the same person, whom you call Peter when he acts and Paul when you recapitulate his history. The more complete you made the sum of the conditions which, when known, would have enabled you to predict Peter's future action, the closer became your grasp of his existence and the nearer you came to living his life over again CHAP, m REAL DURATION AND PREDICTION 189 down to its smallest details: you thus reached the very moment when, the action taking place, there was no longer anything to be foreseen, but only something to be done. Here again any at tempt to reconstruct ideally an act really willed ends in the mere witnessing of the act whilst it is being performed or when it is already done.
Hence it is a question devoid of meaning to ask: Could or could not the act be foreseen, given Hence mean- the sum total of its antecedents? whethert0anaact For there are two ways of assimilating se^n when0"/" these antecedents, the one dynamic the dLtrS" other static. In the first case we shall given. ke ie(j kv imperceptible steps to identify ourselves with the person we are dealing with, to pass through the same series of states, and thus to get back to the very moment at which the act is performed; hence there can no longer be any question of foreseeing it. In the second case, we presuppose the final act by the mere fact of annexing to the qualitative description of the previous states the quantitative appreciation of their importance. Here again the one party is led merely to realize that the act is not yet per formed when it is to be performed, and the other, that when performed it is performed. This, like the previous discussion, leaves the ques tion of freedom exactly where it was to begin with.
By going deeper into this twofold argument, we I go TIME AND FREE WILL CHAP, m shall find, at its very root, the two fundamental illusions of the reflective consciousness.
The two lalla-.,...cies involved: The first consists m regarding intensity £tensuyarasnl as a mathematical property of psychic ; states and not, as we said at the beginmaterial ning of this essay, as a special quality, dynamic °Jro- as a particular shade of these variou? states. The second consists in substitut ing for the concrete reality or dynamic progress, which consciousness perceives, the material symbol of this progress when it has already reached its end, that is to say, of the act already accomplished together with the series of its antecedents. Cer tainly, once the final act is completed, I can ascribe to all the antecedents their proper value, and pic ture the interplay of these various elements as a conflict or a composition of forces. But to ask whether, the antecedents being known as well as their value, one could foretell the final act, is to beg the question; it is to forget that we cannot know the value of the antecedents without knowing the final act, which is the very thing that is not yet known; it is to suppose wrongly that the sym bolical diagram which we draw in our own way for representing the action when completed has been drawn by the action itself whilst progressing, and drawn by it in an automatic manner.
Now, in these two illusions themselves a third one is involved, and you will see that the question whether the act could or could not be foreseen always comes back to this: Is time space?
CHAP, m REAL DURATION AND PREDICTION You begin by setting side by side in some ideal space the conscious states which suc- Claiming to r.
foresee an ceed one another in Peter s mind, and comes back you perceive his life as a kindol path to confusing J,,.
time with M O X Y traced out by a moving body M in space. You then blot out in thought the part O X Y of this curve, and you inquire whether, knowing M 0, you would have been able to determine the portion 0 X of the curve which the moving body describes beyond O. Such is, in the main, the question which you put when you M ^Ss*vv^__^^--xxX<^ V sopher Paul, who lives before Peter and has to picture to himself the conditions under which Peter will act. You thus materialize these conditions; you make the time to come into a road already marked out across the plain, which we can contemplate from the top of the mountain, even if we have not traversed it and are never to do so. But, now, you soon notice that the know ledge of the part M O of the curve would not be enough, unless you were shown the position of the points of this line, not only in relation to one another, but also in relation to the points of the whole line M O X Y; which would amount to being given in advance the very elements which have to be determined. So you then alter your hypo thesis; you realize that time does not require to be seen, but to be lived; and hence you conclude that, if your knowledge of the line M O was not TIME AND FREE WILL CHAP, m a sufficient datum, the reason must have been that you looked at it from the outside instead of identi fying yourself with the point M, which describes not only M O but also the whole curve, and thus making its movement your own. Therefore, you persuade Paul to come and coincide with Peter; and naturally, then, it is the line M O X Y which Paul traces out in space, since, by hypothesis, Peter describes this line. But in no wise do you prove thus that Paul foresaw Peter's action; you only show that Peter acted in the way he did, since Paul became Peter. It is true that you then come back, unwittingly, to your former hypothesis, because you continually confuse the line M O X Y in its tracing with the line M O X Y already traced, that is to say, time with space. After causing Paul to come down and identify himself with Peter as long as was required, you let him go up again and resume his former post of observation. No wonder if he then perceives the line M O X Y complete: he himself has just been completing it. What makes the confusion a natural and almost an unavoidable one is that science seems to point n. to many cases where we do anticipate Confusion * Confusion * arising from the future. Do we not determine beprediction ol...astronomical forehand the coni unctions of heavenly phenomena.,.. J J bodies, solar and lunar eclipses, in short the greater number of astronomical phenomena? Does not, then, the human intellect embrace in the present moment immense intervals of duration still to come? No doubt it does; but an anticipa- CHAP, in REAL DURATION AND PREDICTION IQ3 tion of this kind has not the slightest resemblance to the anticipation of a voluntary act. Indeed, as we shall see, the reasons which render it possible to foretell an astronomical phenomenon are the very ones which prevent us from determining in advance an act which springs from our free ac tivity. For the future of the material universe, although contemporaneous with the future of a conscious being, has no analogy to it.
In order to put our ringer on this vital difference, let us assume for a moment that some mischievous illustration genius, more powerful still than the dS tSera- mischievous genius con j ured up by Des- caT movp£ysi~ cartes> decreed that all the movements ments. Of ^he universe should go twice as fast. There would be no change in astronomical phe nomena, or at any rate in the equations which enable us to foresee them, for in these equations the symbol t does not stand for a duration, but for a relation between two durations, for a certain number of units of time, in short, for a certain number of simultaneities: these simultaneities, these coincidences would still take place in equal number: only the intervals which separate them would have diminished, but these intervals never make their appearance in our calculations. Now these intervals are just duration lived, duration which our consciousness perceives, and our consciousness would soon inform us of a short ening of the day if we had not experienced the usual amount of duration between sunrise and 194 TIME AND FREE WILL CHAP, in sunset. No doubt it would not measure this shortening, and perhaps it would not even per ceive it immediately as a change of quantity; but it would realize in some way or other a decline in the usual storing up of experience, a change in the progress usually accomplished between sun rise and sunset.
Now, when an astronomer foretells e.g. a lunar eclipse, he merely exercises in his own way the power which we have ascribed to our prophecy such mischievous genius. He decrees that tion. time shall go ten times, a hundred times, a thousand times as fast, and he has a right to do so, since all that he thus changes is the nature of the conscious intervals, and since these intervals, by hypothesis, do not enter into the calculations. Therefore, into a psychological duration of a few seconds he may put several years, even several centuries of astronomical time: that is his pro cedure when he traces in advance the path of a heavenly body or represents it by an equation, What he does is nothing but establishing a series of relations of position between this body and other given bodies, a series of simultaneities and coincidences, a series of numerical relations: as for duration properly so called, it remains out side the calculation and could only be perceived by a consciousness capable of living through the intervals and, in fact, living the intervals them selves, instead of merely perceiving their extremi ties. Indeed it is even conceivable that this CHAP, in REAL DURATION AND PREDICTION IQ5 consciousness could live so slow and lazy a life as to take in the whole path of the heavenly body in a single perception, just as we do when we per ceive the successive positions of a shooting star as one line of fire. Such a consciousness would find itself really in the same conditions in which the astronomer places himself ideally; it would see in the present what the astronomer perceives in the future. In truth, if the latter foresees a future phenomenon, it is only on condition of making it to a certain extent a present pheno menon, or at least of enormously reducing the interval which separates us from it. In short, the time of which we speak in astronomy is a number, and the nature of the units of this number cannot be specified in our calculations; we may therefore assume them to be as small as we please, provided that the same hypothesis is extended to the whole series of operations, and that the successive rela tions of position in space are thus preserved. We shall then be present in imagination at the phe nomenon we wish to foretell; we shall know ex actly at what point in space and after how many units of time this phenomenon takes place; if we then restore to these units their psychical nature, we shall thrust the event again into the future and say that we have foreseen it, when in reality we have seen it.
But these units of time which make up living duration, and which the astronomer can dispose of as he pleases because they give no handle to TIME AND FREE WILL CHAP, in science, are just what concern the psychologist, in dealing ^or psychology deals with the intervals with states oi themselves and not with their extremconsciousness we cannot ities. Certainly pure consciousness does vary their da- * * ration without no^- perceive time as a sum of units of altering their nature. duration: left to itself, it has no means and even no reason to measure time; but a feeling which lasted only half the number of days, for example, would no longer be the same feeling for it; it would lack thousands of impressions which gradually thickened its substance and altered its colour. True, when we give this feeling a certain name, when we treat it as a thing, we believe that we can diminish its duration by half, for example, and also halve the duration of all the rest of our history: it seems that it would still be the same life, only on a reduced scale. But we forget that states of consciousness are processes, and not things; that if we denote them each by a single word, it is for the convenience of language; that they are alive and therefore constantly chang ing; that, in consequence, it is impossible to cut off a moment from them without making them poorer by the loss of some impression, and thus altering their quality. I quite understand that the orbit of a planet might be perceived all at once or in a very short time, because its successive positions or the results of its movement are the only things that matter, and not the duration of the equal intervals which separate them. But when we have to do with a feeling, it has no precise