" But to what does this doctrine, that men are equally en- titled to the use of the earth, lead? Must we return to the times of unincloscd wilds, and subsist on roots, berries, and TBE EIGHT TO THE USE OF THE EARTH. 123 game? Or are we to be left to the management of Messrs. Fourrier, Owen, Louis Blanc, and Co.? " Neither. Such a doctrine is consistent with the highest state of civilization; may be carried out without involving a community of goods; and need cause no very serious revolu- tion in existing arrangements. The change required would simply be a change of landlords. Separate ownerships would merge into the joint-stock ownership of the pubUc. Instead of being in the possession of individuals, the coimtry would be he held by the great corporate body — Society. Instead of leasing his acres from an isolated proprietor, the farmer would lease them from the nation. Instead of paying his rent to the agent of Sir John or his Grace, he would pay it to an agent or deputy-agent of the community. Stewards would be pubUc officials instead of private ones; and tenancy the only land tenure.
A state of things so ordered would be in perfect harmony with the moral law. Under it aU men would be equally land- lords; all men would be aUke free to become tenants. A, B, C, and the rest, might compete for a vacant farm as now, and one of them might take that farm, without in any way violating the principles of pure equity. All would be equally free to bid; aU would be equally free to refrain. And when the farm had been let to A, B, or 0, all parties would have done that which they willed — the one in choosing to pay a given sum to his fellow-men for the use of certain lands — the others in re- fusing to pay that sum. Clearly, therefore, on such a system, the earth might be inclosed, occupied, and cultivated, in entire subordination to the law of equal freedom.
No doubt great difficulties must attend the resumption, by mankind at large, of their rights to the soil. The question of compensation to existing proprietors is a complicated one — one that perhaps cannot be settled in a strictly-equitable manner.
124 THE EIGHT TO THE USE OF THE EARTH.
Had we to deal with the parties who originally robbed the hu- man race of its heritage, we might make short work of the matter. But, unfortunately, most of our present landowners are men who have, eitlier mediately or immediately — either by their own acts, or by the acts of their ancestors — given for their estates, equivalents of honestly-eai-ned wealth, beheving that they were investing their savings in a legitimate manner. To justly estimate and liquidate the claims of such, is one of the most intricate problems society will one day have to solve. But with this perplexity and our extrication from it, abstract morahty has no concern. Men having got themselves into the dilemma by disobedience to the law, must get out of it as well as they can; and with as little injury to the landed class as may be.
Meanwhile, we shall do well to recollect, that there are others besides the landed class to be considered. In our tender re- gard for the vested interests of the few, let us not forget that the rights of the many are in abeyance; and must remain so, as long as the earth is monopohsed by individuals. Let us remember, too, that the injustice thus inflicted on the mass of inankind, is an injustice of the gravest nature. The fact that it is not so regarded, proves nothing. In early phases of civili- zation even homicide is thought hghtly of. The suttees of India, together with the practice elsewhere followed of sacri- ficing a hecatomb of human victims at the buiial of a chief, show this: and probably cannibals consider the slaughter of those whom " the fortune of war " has made their prisoners, perfectly justifiable. It was once also universally supposed that slavery was a natural and quite legitimate iustitution — a con- dition into which some were bom, and to which they ought to submit as to a Divine ordination; nay, indeed, a great proportion of mankind hold this opinion still. A higher social develop- ment, however, has generated in us a better faith, and we now to a considerable extent recognise the claims of humanity. But our civilization is only partiid. It may by-and-by be perceived, that Equity utters dictates to which we have not yet hstened; THE EIGHT TO THE USE OF THE EARTH. 125 and men may then learn, that to deprive others of their rights to the use of the earth, is to commit a crime inferior only in wickedness to the crime of taking away their lives or personal liberties.
Briefly reviewing the argument, we see that the right of each man to the use of the earth, limited only by the hke rights of liis fellow-men, is immediately deducible from the law of equal freedom. We see that the maintenance of this right necessarily forbids private property in land. On examination all existing titles to such property turn out to be invalid; those founded on reclamation inclusive. It appears that not even an equal ap- portionment of the earth amongst its inhabitants could generate a legitimate proprietorship. We find that if pushed to its ulti- mate consequences, a claim to exclusive possession of the soil involves a landowning despotism. We further find that such a claim is constantly denied by the enactments of our legislature. And we find lastly, that the theory of the co-lieirship of all men to the soil, is consistent with the highest civilization; and that, however difficult it may be to embody that theory in fact, Equity sternly commands it to be done.
CHAPTER X.
THE EIGHT OF PROPERTY.
The moral law, being the law of the social state, is obliged whoUy to ignore the ant«-social state. Constituting, as the principles of pure morality do, a code of conduct for the perfect man, tliey cannot be made to adapt themselves to the actions of the uncivilized man, even under the most ingenious hypo- thetical conditions — cannot be made even to recognise those actions so as to pass any definite sentence upon them. Over- looking this fact, thinkers, in their attempts to prove some of the first theorems of ethics, have commonly fallen into the error of referring back to an imaginary state of savage wildness, instead of referring forward to an ideal civilization, as they should have done; and have, in consequence, entangled them- selves in difBculties arising out of the discordance between ethical principles and the assumed premises. To this circum- stance is attributable that vagueness by which the arguments used to establish the right of property in a logical manner, are characterized. Whilst possessed of a certain plausibility, they yet cannot be considered conclusive; inasmuch as they suggest questions and objections that admit of no satisfactory answers. Let us take a sample of these arguments, and examine its defects.
" Though the earth and all inferior creatures," says Locke, " be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this nobody has a right to but himself The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say are properly his. Whatever then he removes out of the state that THE EIGHT OF PROPERTY. 127 nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is liis own, and thereby makes it his propert)'. It being bj' him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For tliis labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least when there is enough and as good left in common for others."
If inclined to cavil, one might in reply to this observe, that as, according to the premises, "the earth and all inferior creatures"- — all things, in fact, that the earth produces — are " common to all men," the consent of aU men must be obtained before any article can be equitably " removed from the common state nature hath placed it in." It might be argued that the real question is overlooked, when it is said, that, by gathering any natural product, a man " hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby made it his property; " for that the point to be debated is, whether he had any right to gather, or mix his labour with that, which, by the hypothesis, previously belonged to mankind at large. The reasoning used in the last chapter to prove that no amount of labour, bestowed by an individual upon a part of the earth's surface, can nullify the title of society to that part, might be similarly employed to show that no one can, by the mere act of appropriating to himself any wild unclaimed animal or fruit, supersede the joint claims of other men to it. It may be quite true that the laboui- a man expends in catching or gathering, gives him a better right to the thing caught or gathered, than any one other man; but the question at issue is, whether by labour so expended, he has made his right to the thing caught or gathered, greater than the pre-existing rights of all other men put together. And unless he can prove that he has done this, his title to possession cannot be admitted as a matter of right, but can be conceded only on the ground of convenience.
Further difficulties are suggested by the qualification, that 128 THE RIGHT OF PEOPERTi'.
the claim to any article of property thus obtained, is valid only " when there is enough and as good left in common for others." A condition hke this gives birth to such a host of queries, doubts, and limitations, as practically to neutralize the general proposition entirely. It may be asked, for example — How is it to be known that enough is " left in common for others? " Who can determine whether what remains is " as good" as what is taken? How if the remnant is less accessible? If there is not enough " left in common for otJiers," how must the right of appropriation be exercised? Why, in such case, does the mixing of labour with the acquired object, cease to " ex- clude the common right of other men? " Supposing enough to be attainable, but not all equally good,\i-y what rule must each man choose? Out of which inquisition it seems impossible to liberate the alleged right, without such mutilations as to render it, in an ethical point of view, entirely valueless.
Thus, as already hinted, we find, that the circumstances of savage life, render the principles of abstract morality inap- plicable; for it is impossible, under ante-social conditions, to determine the rightness or wrongness of certain actions by an exact measurement of the amount of freedom assumed by the parties concerned. We must not expect, therefore, that the right of propeity can be satisfactorily based upon the premises afforded by such a state of existence.
But, under the system of land tenure pointed out in the last chapter, as the only one that is consistent with the equal claims of all men to the use of the earth, these difficulties disappear; and the right of property obtains a legitimate foundation. We have seen that, without any infraction of the law of equal freedom, an individual may lease from society a given surface of soil, by agreeing to pay in return a stated amount of the produce he obtains from that soil. We found that, in doing tliis, he does no more than what every other man is equally THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 129 &ee with himself to do — that each has the same power with himself to hecome the tenant — and that the rent he pays accrues alike to all. Having thus hired a tract of land from his fellow-men, for a given period, for understood purposes, and on specified terms — having thus obtained, for a time, the exclusive use of that land by a definite agreement with its owners, it is manifest that an individual may, without any infringement of the rights of others, appropriate to himself that portion of produce wliich remains after he has paid to mankind the promised rent. He has now, to use Locke's expression, "mixed his labour with" certain products of the earth; and his claim to them is in this case valid, because he obtained the consent of society before so expending his labour; and having fulfilled the condition which society imposed ia giving that consent — the payment of rent, — society, to fulfil its part of the agreement, must acknowledge his title to that sui-plus which remains after the rent has been paid. " Provided you deliver to us a stated share of the produce which by cultivation you can obtain from this piece of land, we give you the exclusive use of the remainder of that produce: " these are the words of the contract; and in virtue of this contract, the tenant may equitably claim the supplementary share as his private property: may so claim it without any disobedience to the law of equal freedom; and has therefore a right so to claim it.
Any doubt that may be felt as to the fact that this is a logical deduction from our first principle, that every man has freedom to do all that he wills provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man, may be readily cleared up by comparing the respective degrees of freedom assumed in such a case by the occupier and the members of society with whom he bargains. As was shown in the preceding chapter, if the pubhc altogether deprive any individual of the use of the earth, they allow him less liberty than they themselves claim; and by so breaking the law of equal freedom, commit a wrong. If, conversely, an individual usurps a given portion of the earth, to K 130 THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY.
which, as we have seen, all other men have as good a title as himself he hreaks the law, hy assuming more Uberty than the rest. But when an individual holds land as a tenant of society, a balance is maintained between these extremes, and the claims of both parties are respected. A price is paid by the one, for a certain privilege granted by the other. By the fact of the agreement being made, it is shown that such price and privi- lege are considered to be equivalents. The lessor and the lessee have both, within the prescribed limits, done that which they willed: the one in letting a certain holding for a specified sum; the other in agreeing to give that sum. And so long as this contract remains intact, the law of equal freedom is duly observed. If, however, any of the prescribed conditions be not fulfilled, the law is necessarily broken, and the parties are involved in one of the predicaments above named. If the tenant refuses to pay the rent, then he tacitly lays claim to the exclusive use and benefit of the land he occupies — ^practically asserts that he is the sole ovraer of its produce; and conse- quently violates the law, by assuming a greater share of freedom than the rest of mankind. If, on the other hand, society take from the tenant that portion of the fruits obtained by the cul- ture of his farm, which remains with him after the payment of rent, they virtually deny him the use of the earth entirely (for by the use of the earth we mean the use of its products), and in so doing, claim for themselves a greater share of liberty than they allow him. Clearly, therefore, this surplus produce equitably remains with the tenant: society cannot take it without tres- passing upon his freedom; he can take it without trespass- ing on the freedom of society. And as, according to the law, he is free to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other, he is free to take possession of such surplus as his property.
The doctrine that all men have equal rights to the use of the earth, does indeed at first sight, seem to countenance a species of THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 131 social organization, at variance with that from which the right of property has just been deduced; an organization, namely, in which the public, instead of letting out the land to individual members of their body, shall retain it in their own hands; cul- tivate it by joint- stock agency; and share the produce: in fact, what is usually termed Socialism or Communism.
Plausible though it may be, such a scheme is not capable of realization in strict conformity with the moral law. Of the two forms under which it may be presented, the one is ethically im- ' perfect; and the other, although correct in theory, is im- practicable.
. -Thus, if an equal portion of the earth's produce is awarded to every man, irrespective of the amount or quality of the labour he has contributed towards the obtainment of that produce, a breach of equity is committed. Our first principle requires, not that all shall have like shares of the things which minister to the gratification of the faculties, but that all shall have like freedom to pursue. those things — shall have Kke scope. It is one thing to give to each an op- portunity of acquiring the objects he desires; it is another, and quite a different thing, to give the objects themselves, no matter whether due endeavour has or has not been made to obtain them. The one we have seen to be the primary law of the Divine scheme; the other, by interfering with the ordained connection between desire and gratification, shows its disagree- inent with that scheme. Nay more, it necessitates an absolute violation of the principle of equal freedom. For when we assert the entire liberty of each, bounded only by the like liberty of all, we assert that each is free to do whatever his desires dictate, within the prescribed limits — that each is fr-ee, therefore, to claim for himself air those gratifications, and sources of gratification, attainable by him within those limits — aU those gratifications, and •sources of. gratification which he can procure without trespass- ing upon tte'spieres of action of his neighbours. If, therefore, out of many starting with like fields of activity, one obtains, by his greater strength, greater ingenuity, or greater application, 132 THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY.
more gratifications and sources of gratification than the rest, and does this without in any way trenching upon the equal freedom of the rest, the moral law assigns him an exclusive right to all those extra gratifications and sources of gratifica- tion; nor can the rest take them fi-om him without claiming for themselves greater hherty of action than he claims, and thereby violating that law. Whence it follows, that an equal apportion- ment of the fruits of the earth amongst all, is not consistent with pure justice.
If, on the odier hand, each is to have allotted to him a share of produce proportionate to the degree in which he has aided production, the proposal, whilst it is abstractedly just, is no longer practicable. Were all men cultivators of the soil, it would perhaps be possible to form an approximate estimate of their several claims. But to ascertain the respective amounts of help given by different kinds of mental and bodily labourers, towards procuring the general stock of the necessaries of life, is an utter impossibility. We have no means of making such a division save that afibrded by the law of supply and demand, and this means, the hypothesis excludes ^.
An argument fatal to the communist theory, is suggested by the fact, that a desire for property is one of the elements of our nature. Repeated allusion has been made to the admitted truth, that acquisitiveness is an unreasoning impulse quite dis- tinct firom the desires whose gratifications property secures — an impulse that is often obeyed at the expense of those desires. And if a propensity to personal acquisition be really a com- ponent of man's constitution, then that cannot be a right form of society which affords it no scope. Socialists do indeed al- lege that private appropriation is an abuse of this propensity, whose normal function, they say, is to impel us to accumulate " These inferences do not at all militate against joint-stock systems of production and living, which are in all probability what Socialism prophesies.
THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 133 for the benefit of the public at large. But in thus attempting to escape from one difficulty, they do but entangle themselves in another. Such an explanation overlooks the fact that the use and abuse of a faculty (whatever the etymology of the words may imply) differ only in degree; whereas their assumption is, that they differ in hind. Gluttony is an abuse of the desire for food; timidity, an abuse of the feeling which in moderation produces prudence; serviHty, an abuse of the sentiment tliat generates respect; obstinacy, of that from which firmness springs: in all of which cases we find that the legitimate mani- festations differ from the illegitimate ones, merely in quantity, and not in quality. So also with the instinct of accumulation. It may be quite true that its dictates have been, and stiU are, followed to an absurd excess; but it is also true that no change in the state of society will alter its nature and its office. To whatever extent moderated, it must still be a desire for per- sonal acquisition. Whence it follows that a system affording opportunity for its exercise must ever be retained; which means, that the system of private property must be retained; and this presupposes a right of private property, for by right we mean that which harmonizes with the human constitution as divinely ordained.
There is, however, a still more awkward dilemma into which M. Proudhon and his party betray themselves. For if, as they assert, " aU property is robbery " — if no one can equitably become the exclusive possessor of any article — or as we say, obtain a right to it, then, amongst other consequences, itfollows, thata man can have no right to the things he consiunes for food. And if these are not his before eating them, how can they become his at all? As Locke asks, " when do they begin to be his? when he digests? or when he eats? or when he boils? or when he brings them home?" If no previous acts can make them his property, neither can any process of assimilation do it; not even their absorption into the tissues. Wherefore, pursuing the 134 THE RIGHT OF PKOPERTY.
idea, we axrive at the curious conclusion, that as the whole of his bones, muscles, skin, &c., have been thus built up from nutriment not belonging to him, a man has no property in his own flesh and blood— can have no valid title to himself— has no more claim to his own limbs than he has to the limbs of another— and has as good a right to his neighbour's body as to his own! Did we exist after the same fashion as those compound polyps, in which a number of individuals are based upon a living trunk common to them aU, such a theory would be rational enough. But until Communism can be carried to that extent, it will be best to stand by the old doctrine.
Further argument appears to be unnecessary. We have seen that the right of property is deducible from the law of equal freedom — that it is presupposed by the human constitution — and that its denial involves absurdities.
Were it not that we shall frequently have to refer to the fact hereafter, it would be scarcely needful to show that the taking away another's property is an infringement of the law of equal freedom, and is therefore wrong. If A appropriate to himself something belonging to B, one of two things must take place: either B does the like to A, or he does not. If A has no pro- perty, or if his property is inaccessible to B, B has evidently no opportunity of exercising equal freedom with A, by claiming from him something of hke value; and A has therefore assumed a greater share of freedom than he allows B, and has broken the law. If again, A's property is open to B, and A permits B to use like freedom with himseK by taking an equivalent, there is no violation of the law; and the affair practically becomes one of barter. But such a transaction will never take place save in theory; for A has no motive to appropriate B's property with the intention of letting B take an equivalent: seeing that if he really means to let B have what B thinks an equivalent, he will prefer to make the exchange by consent in the ordinary way.
THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY. 135 The only case simulating this, is one in which A takes from B a thing that B does not wish to part ■with; that is, a thing for which A can give B nothing that B thinks an equivalent; and as the amount of gratification which B has in the possession of this thing, is the measure of its value to him, it follows that if A cannot give B a thing which affords B equal gratification, or in other words what he thinks an equivalent, then A has taken from B what affords A satisfaction, hut does not return to B what affords B satisfaction; and has therefore broken the law by assuming the greater share of freedom. Wherefore we find it to be a logical deduction from the law of equal freedom, that no man can rightfully take property from another against his will.
CHAPTER XI.
THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN IDEAS.
It is tolerably self-evident that no violation of the law of equal freedom is committed in the acquisition of knowledge — that knowledge, at least, which is open to aU. A man may read, hear, and observe, to as great an extent as he pleases, without in the least diminishing the hberty of others to do the like — in fact, without affecting the condition of others in any way. It is clear, too, that the knowledge thus obtained may be digested, re-organized, or combined afresh, and new knowledge educed from it by its possessor, without the rights of Ms feUows being thereby trespassed upon. And it is further manifest, that the moral law permits a man who has by his intellectual labour ■ obtained such new knowledge, to keep it for his own exclusive use, or claim it as his private property. He who does this, in no degree exceeds the prescribed limits of individual freedom. He abridges no one's liberty of action. Every other person retains as much scope for thought and deed as before. And each is free to acquire the same facts — to elaborate from them, if he can, the same new ideas — and in a similar manner employ those new ideas for his private advantage. Seeing, therefore, that a man may claim the exclusive use of his original ideas without overstepping the boundaries of equal freedom, it follows that he has a right so to claim them; or, in other words, such ideas are his property.