As elsewhere shown (page 29), moral sense becomes a trust- worthy guide only when it has logic for an interpreter. Nothing but its primary intuition is authoritative. From the funda- mental law to which it gives utterance,-reason has to deduce the consequences; and from these, when correctly drawn, there 164 THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN.
is no appeal. It proves nothing, therefore, that there are some who do not feel command to be improper. It is for such to inquire whether command is or is not consistent -with that first principle expressive of the Divine will — that axiom to which the Moral Sense responds. And they will find that, thus judged by the law of equal freedom, command is at once pronounced wrong; for whoso commands, manifestly claims more freedom than whoso is commanded.
A future beUef that subordination of sex is inequitable, is clearly prophesied by the change civilization is working in men's sentiments. The ai-bitrary rule of one human being over another, no matter in what form it may appear, is fast getting recognised as essentially rude and brutal. In our day, the man of refined feeling does not like to play the despot over his fellow. He is disgusted if one in humble circumstances cringes to him. So far from wishing to elevate himself by de- pressing his poor and ignorant neighbours, he strives to put them at their ease in his presence — encourages them to behave in a less submissive and more self-respecting manner. He feels that a fellow-man may be enslaved by imperious words and manners as well as by tyrannical deeds; and hence he avoids a dictatorial style of speech to those below him. Even paid domestics, to whose services he has obtained a right by contract, he does not like to address in a tone of authority. He seeks rather to disguise his character of master: to this end wraps up his commands in the shape of requests; and continually em- ploys the phrases, " If you please," and " Thank you."
In the conduct of the modem gentleman to his friend, we have additional signs of this growing respect for another's dignity. Every one must have observed the carefulness with which those who are on terms of affectionate intimacy, shun anything in the form of supremacy on either side, or en- deavour to banish from remembrance, by their behaviour to each other, whatever of supremacy there may exist. Who is THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN. 165 there that has not witnessed the dilemma in which the wealthier of two such is sometimes placed, between the wish to confer a benefit on the other, and the fear that in so doing he may offend by assuming the attitude of a patron? And who is there that does not feel how destructive it would be of the sentiment subsisting between himself and his friend, were he to play the master over his friend, or his friend to play the master over him?
A further increase of this same refinement will show men that there is a fatal incongruity between the matrimonial ser- vitude which our law recognises, and the relationship that ought to exist between husband and wife. Surely if he who possesses any generosity of nature dislikes speaking to a hired domestic in a tone of authority — if he cannot bear assuming towards his friend the behaviour of a superior — how utterly repugnant to him should it be, to make himself ruler over one on whose behalf all his kindly sentiments are specially enlisted; one to whom he is bound by the strongest attachment that his nature is capable of; and for whose rights and dignity he ought to have the most active sympathy!
Command is a blight to the affections. Whatsoever of re- finement— whatsoever of beauty — whatsoever of poetry, there is in the passion that unites the sexes, withers up and dies in the cold atmosphere of authority. Native as they are to such vpidely-separated regions of our nature. Love and Coercion can- not possibly flourish together. The one grows out of our best feelings: the other has its root in our worst. Love is sym- pathetic: Coercion is callous. Love is gentle; Coercion is harsh. Love is self-sacrificing: Coercion is selfish. How then can they co-exist? It is the property of the first to attract; whilst it is that of the last to repel: and, conflicting as they thus do, it is the constant tendency of each to destroy the other. Let whoever thinks the two compatible imagine himself acting the master over his betrothed. Does he believe 166 THE EIGHTS OF WOMEN.
that he could do this without any injury to the subsisting relationship? Does he not know rather that a bad effect would be produced upon the feehngs of both parties by the assumption of such an attitude? And confessing this, as he must, is he superstitious enough to suppose that the going through a form of words will render harmless that use of command which was previously hurtful?
Of all the causes which conspire to produce the disappomt- ment of those glowing hopes with which mamed hfe is usually entered upon, none is so potent as this supremacy of sex this degradation of what should be a free and equal relation- ship into one of ruler and subject — this supplanting of the sway of affection by the sway of authority. Only as that con- dition of slavery to which women are condemned amongst barbarous nations is amehorated, does ideal love become possi- ble; and only when that condition of slavery shall have been wholhj abohshed, will ideal love attain fulness and per- manence. The facts around us plainly indicate this. Where- ever anything worth calling connubial happiness at present exists, we shall find that the subjugation of wife to husband is not enforced; though perhaps still held in theory, it is practi- cally repudiated.
There are many who think that authority, and its ally com- pulsion, are the sole agencies by which human beings can be controlled. Anarchy or government are, with them, the only conceivable alternatives. Believing in notliing but what they see, they cannot realize the possibility of a condition of things in which peace and order shall be maintained without force, or the fear of force. By such as these, the doctrine that the reign of man over woman is wrong, will no doubt be combated on the ground that the domestic relationsliip can only exist by the help of such supremacy. The impracticability of an equality of rights between the sexes will be urged by them in disproof of its rectitude. It will be argued, that were they put upon a level THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN. 167 husband and wife would be for ever in antagonism — that as, when their wishes clashed, each would possess a hke claim to have his or her way, the matrimonial bond would daily be en- dangered by the jar of opposing wills, and that, involving as it would a perpetual conflict, such an arrangement of married life must necessarily be an erroneous one.
A very superficial conclusion this. It has been already pointed out (p. 37), that there must be an inconsistency between the perfect law and an imperfect state. The worse the con- dition of society, the more visionary must a true code of morality appeaj. The fact that any proposed principle of conduct is at once fully practicable — req^uires no reformation of human nature for its complete reaUzation — is not a proof of its truth: is proof rather of its error. And, conversely, a certain degree of incon- gruity between such a principle and humanity as we know it, though no proof of the correctness of that principle, is at any rate a fact in its favour. Hence the allegation that mankind are not good enough to admit of the> sexes hving together har- moniously under the law of equal freedom, in no way mihtates against the vahdity or saoredness of that law.
But the never-ceasing process of adaptation will gradually remove this obstacle to domestic rectitude. Recognition of the moral law, and an impulse to act up to it, going hand in hand, as we have seen that they must do (p. 26), equality of rights in the manied state wiU become possible as fast as there arises a perception of its justness. That selfish conflict of claims which, according to the foregoing objection, would reduce a union, founded on the law of equal freedom, to a condition of anarchy, presupposes a deficiency in those feehngs with which a belief in the law of equal freedom originates, and would de- crease with the growth of those feehngs. As elsewhere shown (p. 97), the same sentiment which leads us to maintain our own rights, leads us, by its sympathetic excitement, to respect the rights of our neighbours. Other things equal, the sense of justice to ourselves, and the sense of justice to our fellow- creatures, bear a constant ratio to each other. A state in 168 THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN.
which -every one is jealous of his natural claims, is not there- fore a litigious state, because it is one in which there is of necessity a diminished tendency to aggression. Experience proves this. For, as it cannot be denied that there is now a greater disposition amongst men towards the assertion of indi- vidual hberty than existed during the feudal ages, so neither can it be denied that there is now a less disposition amongst men to trespass against each other than was then exhibited. The two changes are co-ordinate, and must continue to be so. Hence, whenever society shall have become civilized enough to recognise the equality of rights between the sexes — when women shall have attained to a clear perception of what is due to them, and men to a nobihty of feeling which shall make them concede to women the freedom which they themselves claim — humanity will have undergone such a modification as to render an equaUty of rights practicable.
Married life under this ultimate state of things will not be characterised by perpetual squabbles, but by mutual concessions. Instead of a desire on the part of the husband to assert his claims to the uttermost, regardless of those of his wife, or on the part of the wife to do the like, there will be a watchful desire on both sides not to transgress. Neither will have to stand on the defensive, because each wiU be solicitous for the rights of the other. Not eijcroachment, but self-sacrifice, mil be the rahng principle. The struggle will not be which shall gain the mastery, but which shall gjve way. Committing a trespass will be the thing feared, and not the being trespassed against. And thus, instead of domestic discord, will come a higher harmony than any we yet know.
There is nothing Utopian in this. We may already trace the begionings pf it. An attitude like that described is not uncommonly maintained in the deahngs of honourable men with each other; and if so, why should it not,exjst between the sexes? Here and there, indeed, may be found, even now, a wedded pair who preserve such a relationship. Apd what is at present the exception may one day be the rule.
THE EIGHTS OF WOMEN. 169 The extension of the law of equal freedom to both sexes ■will doubtless be objected to., on the ground that the pohtical privileges exercised by men must thereby be ceded to women also. Of course they must; and why not? Is it that women are ignorant of state affairs? Why then their opinions would be those of their husbands and brothers; and the practical effect would be merely that of giving each male elector two votes instead of one. Is it that they might by-and-by become better informed, and might then begin to act independently? Why, in such case, they would be pretty much as competent to use their power with intelligence as the members of our present constituencies.
We are told, however, that "woman's mission" is a domestic one — that her character and position do not admit of her taking a part in the decision of public questions — that politics are be- yond her sphere. But this raises the question — Who shall say what her sphere is? Amongst the Pawnees and Sioux it is that of a beast of burden; she has to carry the baggage, to drag home fuel from the woods, and to do everything that is menial and laborious. In slave-countries it is witliin woman's sphere to work side by side with men, under the lash of the task- master. Clerkships, cashierships, and other responsible busi- ness situations, are comprised in her sphere in modem France. Whilst, on the other hand, the sphere of a Turkish or Egyp- tian lady extends scarcely an inch beyond the walls of the harem. Who now will tell us what woman's sphere really is? As the usages of mankind vary so much, let us hear how it is to be shown that the sphere we assign her is the true one — that the limits we have set to female activity are just the proper limits. Let us hear why on this one point of our social poHty we are exactly right, whilst we are wrong on so many others.
It is indeed said, that the exercise of pohtical power by women is repugnant to our sense of propriety — conflicts with 170 THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN.
our ideas of the feminine character — is altogether condemned hy our feehngs. Granted; but what then? The same plea has been urged in defence of a thousand absurdities, and if valid in one case is equally so in all others. Should a travel- ler in the East inquire of a Turk why women in his country conceal their faces, he would be told that for them to go un- veiled would be considered indecent; would offend the feelings of the spectators. In Eussia female voices are never heard in church: women not being thought worthy " to sing the praises of God in the presence of men;" and the disregard of this regulation would be censured as an outrage upon public feel- ing. There was a time in Trance when men were so enamoured of ignorance, that a lady who pronounced any but the com- monest words correctly, was blushed for by her companions; a tolerable proof that y^o^Xq^ feelings then blamed in a woman that literateness which it is now thought a disgrace for her to be without. In Cliina cramped feet are essential to female refinement; and so strong is the feeling in this matter, that a Chinese will not believe that an Englishwoman who walks naturally, can be one of a superior class. It was once held unfeminine for a lady 'to write a book; and no doubt those who thought it so, would have quoted feelings in support of their opinion. Yet, with facts like these on every hand, people assume that the enfranchisement of women cannot be right, because it is repugnant to their feelings!
We have some feelings that are necessary and eternal; we have others that, being the results of custom, are changeable and evanescent. And there is no way of distinguishing those feehngs which are natural from those which are conventional, except by an appeal to first principles. If a sentiment responds to some necessity of our condition, its dictates must be re- spected. If otherwise — if opposed to a necessity, instead of in harmony with one, we must regard that sentiment as the product of circumstances, of education, of habit, and conse- quently without weight. However much, therefore, the giving of political power to women may disagree with our notions of THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN. 171 propriety, we must conclude that, being required by that first pre-requisite to greatest happiness — the law of equal freedom — such a concession is unquestionably right and good.
Thus it has been shown that the rights of women must stand or faU with those of men; derived as they are from the same authority; involved in the same axiom; demonstrated by the same argument. That the law of equal freedom apphes alike to both sexes, has been further proved by the fact that any other hypothesis involves us in inextricable difficulties. The idea that the rights of women are not equal to those of men, has been condemned as akin to the Eastern dogma, that women have no souls. It has been argued that the position at present held by the weaker sex is, of necessity a wrong one, seeing that the same selfishness which vitiates our pohtical institutions, must inevitably vitiate our domestic ones also. Subordination of females to males has been also repudiated, because it impUes the use of command, and thereby reveals its descent from barbarism. Proof has been given that the atti- tudes of mastery on the one side, and submission on the other, are essentially at variance with that refined sentiment which should subsist between husband and wife. The argument that married life would be impracticable under any other arrange- ment, has been met by pointing out how the relationship of equality must become possible as fast as its justness is recognised. And lastly, it has been shown that the objections commonly raised against giving political power to women, are founded on notions and prejudices that will not bear exami- nation.
CHAPTER XVII.
THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN.
If we are once sure of our law — sure that it is a Diviae ordi- nation— sure that it is rooted in the nature of things, then whithersoever it leads we may safely follow. As elsewhere pointed out (Lemma II.), a true rule has no exceptions. When therefore that first principle fi"om which the rights of adults are derived, turns out to he a source from which we may de- rive the rights of children, and when the two processes of deduction prove to he identical, we have no choice but to abide by the result, and to assume that the one inference is equally authoritative with the other.
That the law — Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man— applies as much to the young as to the mature, becomes manifest on referring back to its origin. God wills human happiness; that happiness is attainable only through the me- dium of faculties; for the production of happiness those facul- ties must be exercised; the exercise of them pre-supposes hherty of action: these are the steps by which we find our way from the Divine will to the law of equal freedom. But the demonstration is fully as complete when used on behalf of the child, as when used on behaK of the man. The child's happiness, too, is willed by the Deity; the child, too, has facul- ties to be exercised; the child, too, needs scope for the exercise of those faculties; the child therefore has claims to freedom — ■ rights, as we call them — co-extensive with those of the adult. We cannot avoid this conclusion, if we would. Either we must reject the law altogether, or we must include under it both sexes and all ages.
THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN. 173 The candid thinker will find himself obliged to concede this, when he considers the many perplexities which follow in the train of any other theory. Por, if it he asserted that the law of equal freedom applies only to adults; that is, if it be as- serted that men have rights, hut that children have none, we are immediately met by the question — When does the child become a man? at what period does the human being pass out of the condition of having no rights, into the condition of having rights? None will have the folly to quote the arbi- trary dictum of the statute-book as an answer. The appeal is to an authority above that of legislative enactments — demands on what these are to be founded — on what attribute of man- hood recognition by the law of equal freedom depends. Shall the youth be entitled to the rights of humanity when the pitch of his voice sinks an octave? or when he begins to shave? or when he ceases growing? or when he can lift a hundred weight? Are we to adopt the test of age, of stature, of weight, of strength, of viriUty, or of intelligence? Much may no doubt be said in favour of each of these; but who can select the true one? And who can answer the objection, that whichever qualification is chosen, will class many as men who are not at present considered such; whilst it will reject from the list, others who are now by universal consent included in it?
Nor is this all. For even supposing that, by some undis- covered species of logic, it has been determined on what par- ticular day of his life the human being may equitably claim his freedom, it stiU remains to define the position he holds previously to this period. Has the minor absolutely no rights at all? If so, there is nothing wrong in infanticide. If so, robbery is justifiable, provided the party robbed be under age. If so, a child may equitably be enslaved. For, as already shown (pp. 112, 134), murder, theft, and the holding of others in bondage are wrong, simply because they are violations of human rights; and if children have no rights, they cannot become the subjects of these crimes. But if, on the other hand, it be held, as it wheld, that children h&ye so?ne 174 THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN.
rights; if it be held that the youth has an equal claim to life with the adult; if it be held that he has something hke the same title to liberty; and if it be held (though not by law, yet by pubUc opinion) that he is similarly capable of owning pro- perty, then it becomes needful to show why these primary rights must be conceded, but no others. They who assert that children are wholly without rights, and that, hke the inferior animals, they exist only by permission of grown men, take up a precise, unmistakable position. But they who sup- pose children to occupy a place morally above that of brutes, and yet maintain that whilst cliildren have certain rights, their rights are not equal with those of men, are called upon to draw the line, to explain, to define. They must say what rights are common to children and adults, and why. They must say where the rights of adults exceed those of children, and why. And their answers to these queries must be drawn, not from considerations of expediency, but from the original constitution of things.
Should it be argued, that the relationship in which a parent stands to his child, as supplying it with the necessaries of life, is a different one from that subsisting between man and man, and that consequently the law of equal freedom does not apply, the answer is, that though by so maintaining it a parent establishes a certain claim upon his child — a claim which he may fairly expect to have discharged by a Hke kindness to- wards himself should he ever need it, yet he estabhshes no title to dominion. For if the conferring an obligation establishes a title to dominion in this case, then must it do so in others; whence it will follow that if one man becomes a benefactor to an- other, he thereby obtains the right to play the master over that other; a conclusion which we do not admit. Moreover, if in virtue of his position a parent may ti-ench upon the hberties of his child, there necessarily arises the question — To what extent may he do this? may he destroy them entirely, as by committing murder? If not, it is required to ascertain the hmit up to -which he may go, but which he must not exceed; a problem equally insoluble with the similar one just noticed.
THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN. 175 Unless, therefore, the reader can show that the train of reasoning by which the law of equal freedom is deduced from the Divine will, does not recognise children, which he cannot; unless he can show exactly at what time the child becomes a man, which he cannot; unless he can show why a certain share of liberty naturally attaches to both childhood and manhood, and another share to only one, which he cannot; he must admit that the rights of the youth and the adult are co-extensive.
There is indeed one plausible-looking way of meeting these arguments. It may be urged that ia the child many of the faculties of the future man are undeveloped, and that as rights are primarily dependent on faculties, the rights of children can- not be co-extensive with those of adults, because their faculties are not so. A fatal objection this, did it touch the question; but it happens to be wholly beside it. The fullest endowment of rights that any being can possess, is perfect freedom to exer- cise all his faculties. And if each of two beings possesses perfect freedom to exercise all his faculties, each possesses complete rights; that is, the rights of the two are equal; no matter whether their faculties are equal or not. For, to say that the rights of the one are less than those of the other, because his faculties are fewer, is to say that he has no right to exercise the faculties he has not got! — a curious compound of truism and absurdity.
Due warning was given (p. 51) that our first principle car- ried in it the germs of sundry uulocked-for conclusions. We have now met with one of these. We have just found our- selves committed to a proposition at war with the convictions of almost all. Truth, however, must of necessity be consistent. We have therefore no alternative but to re-examine our pre- conceived opinions, in the expectation of finding them en-o- neous.
That we may. enter upon tliis task in a philosophical spirit, 170 THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN.
it will be well, at the risk even of something like repetition, to glance at the influences by which our beliefs are in danger of being warped. We need constantly reminding of these. As an abstract truth, we all admit that passion distorts judgment; yet never inquire whether our passions are influencing us. We all decry prejudice, yet are all prejudiced. We see how habits, and interests, and likings, mould the theories of those around us; yet forget that our Own theories are similarly moulded. Nevertheless, the instances in which our feehngs bias us in spite of ourselves are of hourly recurrence. That proprietary pas- sion, which a man has for his ideas, veils their defects to him as efiectually as maternal fondness blinds' a mother to the im- perfections of her ofispring. An author cannot, for the Hfe of him, judge correctly of what he has just written; he has to wait untU lapse of time enables him to read it as though it were a stranger's, and he then discerns flaws where all had seemed perfect. It is only when his enthusiasm on its behalf has gi-own cold, that the artist is able to see the faults of his picture. Whilst they are transpiring, we do not perceive the ultimate bearing of our own acts or the acts of others towards