Yet another fatal objection to the expediency-philosophy, is to be found in the fact, that it implies the eternity of govern- ment. It is a mistake to assume that government must neces- sarily last for ever. The institution marks a certain stage of civilization — is natural to a particular phase of human deve- lopment. It is not essential but incidental. As amongst the Bushmen we find a state antecedent to government; so may there be one in which it shall have become extinct. Already has it lost something of its importance. The time was when the history of a people was but the history of its government. It is otherwise now. The once universal despotism was but a manifestation of the extreme necessity of restraint. Feudalism, serfdom, slavery — aU tyrannical institutions, are merely the most vigorous kinds of rule, springing out of, and necessary to, a bad state of man. The progress from these is in all cases the same — less government. Constitutional forms mean this. PoUtical freedom means this. Democracy means this. In societies, associations, joint-stock companies, we have new agencies occupjdng fields filled in less advanced times and countries by the State. With us the legislature is dwarfed by newer and greater powers — is no longer master but slave.
"Pressure from without" has come to be acknowledged as ultimate ruler. The triumph of the Anti-Com-Law League is simply the most marked instance yet, of the new style of government — that of opinion, overcoming the old style— that of force. It bids fair to become a trite remark that the law- maker is but the servant of the thinker. Daily is statecraft held in less repute. Even the Times can see that " the social changes thickening around us estabHsh a truth sufficiently humiliating to legislative bodies," and that " the great stages of our progress are determined rather by the spontaneous workings of society, connected as they are with the progress of 14 INTRODUCTION.
art and science, the operations of nature, and other such un^ poHtical causes, than hy the proposition of a bill, the passing of an act, or any other event of poUtics or of state." * Thus, as civilization advances, does government decay. To the bad it is essential; to the good, not. It is the check which national wickedness makes to itself and exists only to the same degree. Its continuance is proof of still-existing barbarism. What a cage is to the wild beast, law is to the selfish man. Eestraint is for the savage, the rapacious, tlie violent; not for the just, the gentle, the benevolent. All necessity for external force implies a morbid state. Dungeons for the felon; a strait-jacket for the maniac; crutches for the lame; stays for the weak-backed; for the infirm of purpose a master; for the fooHsh a guide; but for the sound mind, in a sound body, none of these. Were there no thieves and murderers, prisons would be unnecessary. It is only because tyranny is yet rife in the world that we have armies. Barristers, judges, juries — all the instruments of law — exist, simply because knavery exists. Magisterial force is the sequence of social vice; and the police- man is but the complement of the criminal. Therefore it is that we call government " a necessary evil."
What then must be thought of a morality which chooses this probationary institution for its basis, builds a vast fabric of conclusions upon its assumed permanence, selects acts of par- liament for its materials, and employs the statesman for its arcliitect? The expediency-philosophy does this. It takes government into partnership — assigns to it entire control of its affairs — enjoins all to defer to its judgment — makes it in short the vital principle, the very soul of its system. When Paley teaches that " the interest of the whole society is binding upon every part of it," he implies the existence of some supreme power by which that " interest of the whole society" is to be determined. And elsewhere he more expUcitly tells us, that for the attainment of a national advantage the private will of the subject is to give way; and that "the proof of this advantage = See Times of October 12, 1846.
INTRODUCTION. 15 lies with the legislature." Still more decisive is Bentham, when he says that " the happiness of the individuals of whom a com- munity is composed, that is, their pleasures and their security, is the sole end which the legislator ought to have in view; the sole standard in conformity with which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislature, to he made to fashion his behaviour." These positions, be it remembered, are not voluntarily assumed; they are necessitated by the premises. If, as its propounder tells us, "expediency" means the benefit of the mass, not of the individual — of the future as much as of the present, it presupposes some one to judge of what will most conduce to that benefit. Upon the "utihty" of this or that measure, the views are so various as to render an umpire essential. Whether protective duties, or established religions, or capital punishments, or poor laws, do or do not minister to the " general good," are questions concerning which there is such difference of opinion, that were nothing to be done till all agreed upon them, we might stand still to the end of time. If each man carried out, independently of a state power, his own notions of what would best secure " the greatest happiness of the greatest number," society would quickly lapse into con- fusion. Clearly, therefore, a morality established upon a maxim of which the practical interpretation is questionable, involves the existence of some authority whose decision re- specting it shall be final — that is, a legislature. And without that authority, such a morality must ever remain inoperative.
See here then the predicament. A system of moral philo- sophy professes to be a code of correct rules for the control of human beings — fitted for the regulation of the best, as well as the worst members of the race — applicable, if true, to the guid- ance of humanity in its highest conceivable perfection. Govern- ment, however, is an institution originating in man's imperfec- tion; an institution confessedly begotten by necessity out of evil; one which might be dispensed with were the world peo- pled with the unselfish, the conscientious, the philanthropic; one, in short, inconsistent with this same " highest conceivable 16 INTRODUCTION.
perfection." How, then, can that be a true system of morality which adopts government as one of its premises?
Of the expediency-philosophy it must therefore be said, in the first place, that it can make no claim to a scientific charac- ter, seeing that its fundamental proposition is not an axiom, but simply an enunciation of the problem to be solved.
Further, that even supposing its fundamental proposition were an axiom, it would still be inadmissible, because expressed in • terms possessing no fixed acceptation.
Moreover, were the expediency theory otherwise satisfactory, it would be still useless; since it requires nothing less than omniscience to c&rry it into practice.
And, waiving all other objections, we are yet compelled to reject a system, which, at the same time that it tacitly lays claim to perfection, takes imperfection for its basis.
The Doctrine of the Moral Sense.
There is no way of coming at a true theoiy of society, but by inquiring into the nature of its component mdividuals. To understand humanity in its combinations, it is necessary to analyze that humanity in its elementary form— for the explana- tion of the compound, to refer back to the simple. We quickly find that every phenomenon exhibited by an aggregation of men, originates in some quality of man himseK A little con- sideration shows us, for instance, that the very existence of society, impUes some natural affinity in its members for such INTRODUCTION. 17 INTRODUCTION. 17 a union. It is pretty clear too, that without a certain fitness in mankind for ruling, and heing ruled, government would he an impossibility. The infinitely complex organizations of com- merce, have grown up under the stimulus of certain desires existing in each of us. And it is from our possession of a sentiment to which they appeal, that rehgious institutions have been called into existence.
In fact, on looking closely into the matter, we find that no other arrangement is conceivable. The characteristics exhibited by beings in an associated state cannot arise from the accident of combination, but must be the consequences of certain in- herent properties of the beings themselves. True, the gather- ing together may call out these characteristics; it may make manifest what was before dormant; it may afford the oppor- tunity for undeveloped peculiarities to. appear; but it evidently does not create them. No phenomenon can be presented by a corporate body, but what there is a pre-existing capacity in its individual members for producing.
This fact, that the properties of a mass are dependent upon the attributes of its component parts, we see throughout nature. In the chemical combination of one element with another, Dalton has shown us that the afiinity is between atom and atom. What we call the weight of a body, is the sum of the gravitative tendencies of its separate particles. The strength of a bar of metal, is the total effect of an indefinite number ofl molecular adhesions. And the power of the magnet, is a cumulative result of the polarity of its independent corpuscles. After the same manner, every social phenomenon must have its origin in some property of the individual. And just as the attractions and affinities which are latent in separate atoms, become visible when those atoms are approximated; so the forces that are dormant in the isolated man, are rendered active by juxtaposition with his fellows.
This consideration, though perhaps needlessly elaborated, has an important bearing on our subject. It points out the path we must pursue in our search after a true social philoc 18 INTRODUCTION.
sophy. It suggests the idea that the moral law of society, like its other laws, originates in some attribute of the human being. It warns us against adopting any fundamental doctrine which, like that of " the greatest happiness to the greatest number," cannot be expressed without presupposing a state of aggrega- tion. On the other hand it hints that the first principle of a code for the right ruhng of humanity in its state of multitude, is to be found in humanity in its state of unitude — that the moral forces upon which social equilibrium depends, are resi- dent in the social atom — man; and that if we would under- stand the nature of those forces, and the laws of that equili- brium, we must look for them in the human constitution.
Had we no other inducement to eat than that arising from the prospect of certain advantages to be thereby obtained, it is scarcely probable that our bodies would be so well cared for as now. One can quite imagine, that were we deprived of that punctual monitor — appetite, and left to the guidance of some reasoned code of rules, such rules, were they never so philosophical, and the benefits of obeying them never so ob- vious, would form but a very inefiicient substitute. Or, in- stead of that powerful affection by which men are led to nourish and protect their offspring, did there exist merely an abstract opinion that it was proper or necessary to maintain the population of the globe, it is questionable whether the annoyance, anxiety, and expense, of providing for a posterity, would not so far exceed the anticipated good, as to involve a rapid extinction of the species. And if, in addition to these needs of the body, and of the race, all other requirements of our nature were similarly consigned to the sole cai-e of tlie intellect — were knowledge, property, freedom, reputation, friends, sought only at its dictation — then would our investi- gations be so perpetual, our estimates so complex, our decisions so difficult, that life would be wholly occupied in the collection of evidence, and the balancing of probabilities. Under such INTRODUCTION. 19 an arrangement the utilitarian philosophy would indeed Lave strong argument in nature; for it would be simply applying to society, that system of governance hy appeal to calculated final results, which already ruled the individual.
Quite different, however, is the method of nature. Answer- ing to each of the actions which it is requisite for us to per- form, we find in ourselves some prompter called a desire; and the more essential the action, the more powerful is the im- pulse to its performance, and the more intense the gratification derived therefrom. Thus, the longings for food, for sleep, for warmth, are irresistible; and quite independent of foreseen advantages. The continuance of the race is secured by others equally strong, whose dictates are followed, not in obedience to reason, but often in defiance of it. That men are not im- pelled to accumulate the means of subsistence solely by a view to consequences, is proved by the existence of misers, in whom the love of acquirement is gratified to the neglect of the ends meant to be subserved. We find employed a like system of regulating our conduct to our fellows. That we may behave in the public sight in the most agreeable manner, we possess a love of praise. It is desirable that there should be a segregation of those best fitted for each other's society — hence the sentiment of friendship. And in the reverence felt by men for superiority, we see a provision intended to secure the supremacy of the best.
May we not then reasonably expect to find a like instru- mentality employed in impelling us to that line of conduct, in the due observance of which consists what we call morality? All must admit that we are guided to our bodily welfare by instincts; that from instincts also, spring those domestic re- lationships by which other important objects are compassed — and that similar agencies are in many cases used to secure our indirect benefit, by regulating social behaviour. Seeing, therefore, that whenever we can readily trace our actions to their origin, we find them produced after this manner, it is, 20 INTRODUCTION.
to say the least of it, highly probable that the same mental mechanism is employed in all cases- — that as the all-important requirements of our being are fulfilled at the solicitations of desire, so also are the less essential ones — that upright con- duct in each being necessary to the happiness of aU, there exists in us an impulse towards such conduct; or, in other ■ words, that we possess a " Moral Sense," the duty of which is to dictate rectitude in our transactions with each other; which receives gratification from honest and fair dealing; and which gives birth to the sentiment of justice.
In bar of this conclusion it is indeed urged, that did there exist such an agency for controlling the behaviour of man to man, we should see universal evidence of its influence. Men would exhibit a more manifest obedience to its supposed dic- tates than they do. There would be a greater uniformity of opinion as to the rightness or wrongness of actions. And we should not, as now, find one man, or nation, considering as a virtue, what another regards as a vice — Malays glorying in the piracy abhorred by civihzed races — a Thug regarding as a religious act, that assassination at which a European shudders — a Russian piquing himself on his successful trickery — a red Indian in his undying revenge — things which with us would hardly be boasted of.
Overwhelming as this objection appears, its fallacy becomes conspicuous enough, if we obsei-ve the predicament into which the general application of such a test betrays us. As thus: — None deny the universal existence of that instinct akeady ad- verted to, which ui-ges us to take the food needfiil to support life; and none deny that such instinct is highly beneficial, and . in all Ukehhood essential to being. Nevertheless there are not wanting infinite evils and incongruities, arising out of its rule. AU know that appetite does not invariably guide men aright in the choice of food, either as to quality or quantity. Neither can any maintain that its dictates are uniform, when reminded of those unnumbered differences in the opinions called " tastes " INTEODUCTION. 21 which it originates in each. The mere mention of " gluttony," " drunkenness," reminds us that the promptings of appetite are not always good. Carbuncled noses, cadaverous faces, fcetid breaths, and plethoric bodies, meet us at every turn; and our condolences are perpetually asked for headaches, flatulence, nightmare, heartburn, and endless other dyspeptic symptoms. Again: — equally great irregularities may be found in the work- ings of that generally recognised feehng — parental affection. Amongst ourselves, its beneficial sway seems tolerably uniform. In the East, however, infanticide is practised now as it ever has been. During the so-called classic times, it was common to expose babes to the tender mercies of wild beasts. And it was the Spartan practice to cast all the newly-born who were not approved by a committee of old men, into a pubUc pit provided for the purpose. If, then, it be argued that the want of uniformity in men's moral codes, together with the weakness and partiality of their influence, prove the non- existence of a feeling designed for the right regulation of our deahngs with each other, it must be inferred from analogous irregularities in men's conduct as to food and offspring, that there are no sach feeUngs as appetite and parental aflPection.
As, however, we do not draw this inference in the one case, we cannot do so in the other. Hence, notwithstanding all the incongruities, we must admit the existence of a Moral Sense to be both possible and probable.
But that we possess such a sense, may be best proved by evidence drawn from the hps of those who assert that we have it not. Oddly enough Bentham unwittingly derives his initial proposition from an oracle whose existence he denies, and at which he sneers when it is appealed to by others. " One man," he remarks, speaking of Shaftesbury, " says he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong; and that it is called a moral sense: and then 22 INTRODUCTION.
he goes to work at his ease, and says such and such a thing is right, and such and such a thing is wrong. Why? 'because my moral sense tells me it is.' " Now that Bentham should have no other authority for his own maxim than this same moral sense, is somewhat unfortunate for him. Yet, on putting that maxim into critical hands, we shall soon discover such to he the fact. Let us do this.
"And so you think," says the patrician, "that the object of our rule should be ' the greatest happiness to the greatest number.' " " Such is our opinion," answers the petitioning plebeian.
" Well now, let us see what your principle involves. Sup- pose men to be, as they very commonly are, at variance in their desires on some given point; and suppose that those forming the larger party will receive a certain amount of hap- piness each, from the adoption of one course, whilst those forming the smaller party •^-ill receive the same amount of hap- piness each, from the adoption of the opposite course: then if ' greatest happiness ' is to be oui guide, it must follow, must it not, that the larger party ought to have their way? " " Certainly."
" That is to say, if you — the people, are a hundred, whilst we are ninety-nine, your happiness must be preferred, should our wishes clash, and should the individual amounts of grati- fication at stake on the two sides be equal."
" Exactly; our axiom involves that."
" So then it seems, that as, in such a case, you decide be- tween the two parties by numerical majority, you assume that the happiness of a member of the one party, is equally im- portant with that of a member of the other."
" Of course."
" Wherefore, if reduced to its simplest form, your doctrine turns out to be the assertion, that all men have equal claims to happiness; or, applying it personally— that you have as good a right to happiness as I have."
" No doubt I have."
INTEODUCTION. 23 " And pray, sir, who told you that you have as good a right to happiness as I have? " "Who told me? — I am sure of it; I know it; I feel it; " Nay, nay, that will not do. Give me your authority. Tell me who told you this — how you got at it— whence you derived it."
Whereupon, after some shuffling, our petitioner is forced to confess, that he has no other authority but his own feeling — • that he has simply an innate perception of the fact; or, in other words, that " his moral sense tells him so."
Whether it rightly teUs him so, need not now be considered. All that demands present notice is the fact, that when cross- examined, even the disciples of Bentham have no alternative but to fall back upon an intuition of this much derided moral sense, for the foundation of their own system.
In truth, none but those committed to a preconceived theory, can fail to recognise, on every hand, the workings of such a faculty. From early times downward there have been con- stant signs of its presence — signs which happily thicken as our own day is approached. The articles of Magna Charta embody its protests against oppression, and its demands for a better administration of justice. Serfdom was abolished partly at its suggestion. It encouraged Wickliffe, Huss, Luther, and Knox, in their contests with Popery; and by it were Hugue- nots, Covenanters, Moravians, stimulated to maintain freedom of judgment in the teeth of armed Ecclesiasticism. It dictated Milton's "Essay on the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing." It piloted the pilgrim fathers to the new world. It supported the followers of George Fox under fines and imprisonment. And it whispered resistance to the Presbyterian clergy of 1662. In latter days it emitted that tide of feeling which undermined and swept away Catholic disabilities. Through 24 INTRODUCTION.
the mouths of anti-slavery orators, it poured out its fire, to the scorching of the selfish, to the melting of the good, to our national purification. It was its heat, too, which warmed our sympathy for the Poles, and made hoil our indignation against their oppressor. Pent-up accumulations of it, let loose upon a long-standing injustice, generated the effervescence of a reform agitation. Out of its gi-owing flame came those sparks hy which Protectionist theories were exploded, and that light which discovered to us the truths of Free-trade. By the pas- sage of its suhtle current is that social electrolysis effected, which classes men into parties — which separates the nation into its positive and negative — its radical and conservative elements. At present it puts on the garh of Anti-State- Church Associations, and shows its presence in manifold societies for the extension of popular power. It huilds monu- ments to political martyrs, agitates for the admission of Jews into Parhament, publishes books on the rights of women, petitions against class-legislation, threatens to rebel against mihtia conscriptions, refuses to pay church-rates, repeals op- pressive debtor acts, laments over the distresses of Italy, and thrills with sympathy for the Hungarians. From it, as from a root, spring our aspirations after social rectitude: it blossoms in such expressions as — "Do as you would he done by," " Honesty is the best policy," " Justice before Generosity; " and its fruits are Equity, Freedom, Safety.
But how, it may be asked, can a sentiment have a percep- tion? how can a desire give rise to a moral sense? Is there not here a confounding of the intellectual with the emotional? It is the office of a sense to perceive, not to induce a certain kind of action; whilst it is the office of an instinct to induce a certain kind of action, and not to perceive. But in the fore- going arguments, motor and percipient fiinctions are attributed to the same agent.
The objection seems a serious one; and were the term sense INTRODUCTION. 25 to be understood in its strictest acceptation, would be fatal. But the word is in this case, as in many others, used to express that feeling with which an instinct comes to regard tlie deeds and objects it is related to; or rather that judgment which, by a kind of reflex action, it causes the intellect to form of them. To elucidate this we must take an example; and perhaps the love of accumulation will afford us as good a one as any.
We find, then, that conjoined with the impulse to acquire property, there is what we call a sense of the value of pro- perty; and we find the vividness of this sense to vary with the strength of the impulse. Contrast the miser and the spendthrift. Accompanying his constant desire to heap up, the miser has a quite peculiar belief in the worth of money. The most strin- gent economy he thinks virtuous; and anything like the most ordinary liberahty vicious; whilst of extravagance he has an absolute horror. Whatever adds to his store seems to hhnffood: whatever takes from it, bad. And should a pass- ing gleam of generosity lead him on some special occasion to open his purse, he is pretty sure afterwards to reproach himself with having done wrong. On the other hand, whilst the spendthrift is deficient in the instinct of acquisition, he also fails to realize the intrinsic worth of property; it does not come home to him; he has httle sense of it. Hence under the influence of other feelings, he regards saving habits as mean; and holds that there is something tiohle in profuse- ness. Now it is clear that these opposite perceptions of the • propriety or impropriety of certain hnes of conduct, do not