CHAPTEE III.
THE DIVINE IDEA, AND THE CONDITIONS OF ITS REALIZATION.
,Tf, instead of proposing it as the rule of human conduct, Bentham had simply assumed "greatest happiness" to be the creative purpose, his position would have been tenable enough. Almost all men do in one way or other assert the same. There have indeed been times when such a faith -was far from uni- versal. Had the proposition been made before Simeon StyHtes on the top of his column, he would very Ukely have demurred to it. Probably the Flagellants of the thirteenth century may have thought otherwise. And even now it is possible that the Fakeers of India hold a contrary opinion. But, whilst it may be true that a savage asceticism attributes to the Deity a barbarity equal to its own, and conceives him as delighting in human sacrifices; whilst it may be true that amongst our- selves the same notion yet lingers, under the form of occasional fasts and penances; still there are few if any amongst civi- hzed people who do not agree that human well-being is in accordance Tvith the Divine will. The doctiine is taught by all our rehgious teachers; it is assumed by every writer on morality: we may therefore safely consider it as an admitted truthH [It is one thing, however, to hold that gi-eatest happiness is the creative purpose, and a quite different thing to hold that greatest happiness should be the immediate aim of man. It has been the fatal error of the expediency - philosophers to confound these positions. They have not observed that the truth has two sides, a Divine side and a human side; and that it matters much to us which we look at. Greatest Happiness and Morality, are the face and obverse of the same fact: what THE DIVINE IDF-A, ETC. G7 is written on the one surface is beyond our interpretation: what is \ratten on the other we may read easily enough.
Or dropping metaphor, and speaking in philosophical lan- guage, we may say thaHit is for us to ascertain the conditions by conforming to which this greatest happiness may be at- tained.; Not to put tmst in guesses: not to do this or that, because we think it will be beneficial: but to find out what really is the line of conduct that leads to the desired end. For unquestionably there must be in the nature of things some definite and fixed pre-requisites to success. Man is a visible, tangible entity, having properties. In the circumstances that surround him there are certain unchanging necessities. Life is dependent upon the fulfilment of specific functions; and happiness is a particular kind of life. Surely then if we would know how, in the midst of these appointed circumstances, the being Man must live, so as to achieve the result — greatest happiness, we ought first to determine what the essential con- ditions are. If we solve the problem, it can only be by con- sulting these and submitting ourselves to them. To suppose that we may, in ignorance or disregard of them, succeed by some haphazard speculation, is sheer folly. Only in one way can the desideratum be reached. What that one way is must depend upon the fundamental necessities_ofjyjr_gositipn. And if we would discover it, our first step must be to ascertain those necessities.
At the head of them stands this unalterable fact — the social state. I In the pre-ordained course of things^' men have multi- plied until they are constrained to live more or less in presence of each other. That, as being needful for the support of the greatest sum of life, such a condition is preliminaiy to the production of the greatest sum of happiness, seems highly probable. Be that as it may, however, we find this state established; are henceforth to continue in it; and must there- fore set it down as one of those necessities which our rales for C8 THE DIVINE IDEA, AND the achievement of the greatest happiness must recognise and conform to.
In this social state the sphere of activity of each individual being limited by the spheres of activity of other individuals, it follows that the men who are to realize this greatest sum of /happiness, must be men of whom each can obtain complete ; happiness within his own sphere of activity, without diminish- i ing the spheres of activity required for the acquisition of hap- ipiness by others. For manifestly, if each or any of them cannot receive complete happiness without lessening the spheres of activity of one or more of the rest, he must either liimself come short of complete happiness, or must make one or more do so; and hence under such circumstances, the sum total of happiness cannot be as great as is conceivable, or cannot be greatest happiness. Here then is the first of those fixed con- ditions to the obtainment of greatest happiness, necessitated by the social state. It is the fulfilment of this condition which we express by the vioxA justice.
To this all-essential pre-requisite there is a supplementary one of kindred nature. We find that without trenching upon each other's spheres of activity, men may yet behave to one another in such a way as to produce painful emotions. And if any have feelings that lead them to do this, it is clear that the total amount of happiness is not so great as it would be were they devoid of those feeUngs. Hence, to compass greatest happiness, the human constitution must be such (as~ that each man may [perfectly] fulfil his own nature, not only without diminishing other men's spheres of activity, but without giving unhappiness to other men in any direct or indirect way. This condition, as we shall by-and-by see, needs to be kept quite distinct from the foregoing one. The observance of it may be called negative beneficence.
Yet another requirement is there by fulfilment of which the happiness flowing from comphance with the foregoing ones is indefinitely muMpfied: Let a race of beings be so constituted as that each individual may be able to obtain full satisfaction THE CONDITIONS OF ITS REALIZATION. 69 for all liis desires, without deducting from the satisfacdouS obtainable by otheiSindividaalg, and we have a state of things in which the amount of isolated happiness is the greatest conceivable. But let these beings be so constituted as- that each, in addition to the pleasurable emotions personally re- ceived by him, can sympathetically participate in the pleasm-able emotions of aH others, and the sum-total of happiness becomes lai'gely -iaeiteasedT Hence, to the primary requisite that each shall be able to get complete happiness without diminisliiug the happiness of the rest, we must now add the secondary one that each shall be capable of receiving happiness from the happi- ness of the rest. Compliance with this requisite implies posi- tive ienejicence.
Lastly there must go to the production of the greatest happi- ness the further condition, that, whilst duly regardful of the preceding limitations, each individual shall perform all those acts required to fill up the measure of his own private happi- ness.
These then are necessities. They are not matters of opinion, but matters of uaalterable fact. Denial of them is impossible, for nothing else can be stated but what is self-contradictory. i-iVithout any alternative, heings who are to realize the Divine Idea must be thus constituted. Before greatest happiness can be brought about, every man must answer to these definitions; and all approach to greatest happiness, presupposes an approach ' towards conformity with them.^ Schemes of government and culture which ignore them, cannot but be essentially absurd. Everything must be good or bad, right or wrong, in virtue of its accordance or discordance with them. [We have no need to perplex ourselves with investigations into the expediency of every measure, by trying to trace out its ultimate results in all their infinite ramifications — a task which it is folly to attempt. Our course is to inquire concerning such measure, whether or not it fully recognises these fundamental necessities, and to be sure that it must he proper or improper accordingly^ Ouj- whole code of duty is comprehended in the endeavour to hvc 70 THE DIVINE IIIEA, AND up to these necessities. If we fiud pleasure in doing tliis, it is well; if not, our aim must be to acquire that pleasure. Greatest happiness is obtaiiiecl only when conformity to them is spon- taneous; seeing that the restraint of desires inciting to trespass implies pain, or deduction from greatest happiness. Hence it is for us to habituate ourselves to fulfil these requirements as fast as we can. The social state is a necessity. The conditions of greatest happiness under that state are fixed. Our characters are the only things not fixed. They, then, must be moulded into fitness for the conditions. And all moral teaching and discipline, must have for its object, to hasten this process.
I Objection may be taken to the foregoing classification of the conditions needful to greatest happiness, as being in some degree artificial. It will perhaps be said that the distinction between justice and beneficence cannot be maintained, for that the two graduate into each other imperceptibly. Some may argue that it is not allowable to assume any essential difference between right conduct towards others and right conduct towards self, seeing that what ai-e generally considered purely private actions, do eventually affect others to such a degree, as to render them public actions; as witness the collateral effects of drunk- enness or suicide. Others again may contend that all morality should be classed as private; because with the rightly-con- stituted or moral man, con-ect conduct to others is merely incidental upon the fulfilment of his own nature.
In each of these allegations there is much truth; and it is not to be denied that under a final analysis, all such distinc- tions as those above made must disappear. But it should be borne in mind that similar criticisms may be passed upon all classifications whatever. It might after the same fashion be argued that we ought not to separate the laws of heat from those of mechanics, because fire when applied to water gene- rates mechanical force. On like grounds Optics ought to be THE CONDITIONS OF ITS REALIZATION. 71 identified with Chemistry; seeing that in the photographic process, light becomes a chemical agent. Considering that muscles contract when stimulated by a galvanic current, we ought to treat of Physiology and Electricity as forming one science. Nor should we even distinguish between vegetable and animal life; for these are found to have a common root, and it is hardly possible to say of the lowest organisms which division they belong to. So that unless such objectors are prepai-ed to say that Botany and Zoology should be regarded as one, and that all lines of demarcation between the physical sciences should be abolished, they must in consistency tolerate an analogous classification in moral science; and must admit that whilst this is in a certain sense artificial, it may be an essential preliminary to anything Hke systematic investigation. The same finite power of comprehension which compels us to deal viith natural phenomena by separating them into groups and studying each group by itself, may also compel us to separate those actions wliich place a man in direct relationship with his fellows, fcom others which do not so place him; although it may be true that such a separation cannot be strictly mtdn- tained. And even in deahng with one of these sections — in developing the principles of right conduct to others, it may be further necessary to distinguish, as above, the primary and most imperative piinciple, from the secondary and less imperative one; notwithstanding that these have a common root.
The realization of the Divine Idea being reduced to the ful- filment of certain conditions, it becomes the of&ce of a scientific morality, to make a detailed statement of the mode in which life must be regulated so as to conform to them. On each of these axiomatic truths it must be possible to build a series of theorems immediately bearing upon our daily conduct; or, inverting the thought — every act stands in a certain relationship to these truths, and it must be possible in some way or other 72 THE DIVINE I PEA, ETC.
to solve the problem, whether that relationship is one of accord- ance or discordance. When such a series of theorems has been elaborated, and solutions have been given to such a series of problems, the task of the morahst is accomplished.
Each of these axioms, however, may have its own set of consequences separately deduced, or indeed, as already hinted, must have them so deduced. Their respective developments constitute independent departments of moral science, requiring to be dealt with in the order of their natural sequence. For the present, therefore, our attention vr\\\ be confined to the first and most essential of them. Individual or private moraUty, as distinguished from social or public morality, is not to be entered upon in the following pages. Neither ■will there be found in them any statement of that class of moral obligations above comprehended under the terms positive and negative beneficence^. It is with the several inferences to be drawn from that primary condition to greatest happiness, the observ- ance of wliich is vaguely signified by the word justice, that we have now to deal. Our work will be to unfold that condition into a system of equity; to mark out those limits put to each man's proper sphere of activity, by the Hke spheres of other men; to dehneate the relationships that are necessitated by a recognition of those limits; or — in other words — to develop the principles of Social Statics.
* These other divisions of the subject may be taken up on a future occasion should circumstances favour.
PART 11.
CHAPTER IV.
" DERIVATION OF A FIRST PRINCIPLE.
i There ■will possibly be some for whom the a j)rio?i eonsider- atioiis set forth in the foregoing chapter, are too abstract for distinct comprehension. It is easy, however, to reason our way to that first principle of ethical science which we are about to follow out to its consequences, without any appeal to these. And it will be desirable now to do this. Starting afresh then, from the admitted truth, that human happiness is the Divine will, let us look at the means appointed for the obtainment of that happiness, and observe what conditions they presuppose.
Happiness is a certain state of jjojjaeiousness. That state must be produced by the action upon consciousness of certain modifying influences — by certain affections of it. All affec- tions of consciousness we term sensations. And amongst the rest, those affections of it which constitute happiness must be sensations.
But how do we receive sensations? Through what are called faculties. It is certain that a man cannot see without eyes. Equally certain is it that he can experience no impres- sion of any kind, unless he is endowed with some power fitted to take in that impression; that is, a faculty. All the mental states which he calls feelings and ideas, are affections of his consciousness received through the faculties — sensations given to it by them.
There next comes the question — under what circumstances do the faculties yield those sensations of which happiness con- sists? The reply is — when they are exercised. It is from the activity of one or more of them that all gratification arises. To the healthful perfonnanoe of each function of mind or 76 DKRIVATION OF A FIRST PRINCIPLE.
body attaches a pleasurable feeling. And tliis pleasurable feeling is obtainable only by the performance of the function; that is, by the exercise of the correlative faculty. Every faculty in turn affords its special emotion; and the sura of these constitutes happiness.
Or the matter may be briefly put thus. A desire is the need for some species of sensation. A sensation is producible only by the exercise of a faculty. Hence no desire can be satisfied except thi-ough the exercise of a faculty. But happiness con- sists in the due satisfaction of all the desires; that is, happi- ness consists in the due exercise of all the faculties.
Now if God wills man's happiness, and man's happiness can be obtained only by the exercise of his faculties, then God A\'ills that man should exercise his faculties; that is, it is man's duty to exercise his faculties; for duty means fulfilment of the Divine will. That it is man's duty to exercise his faculties is further proved by the fact, that what we call punishment attaches to the neglect of that exercise. Not only is the normal activity of each faculty productive of pleasure, but the continued suspension of that activity is productive of pain. As the stomach hungers to digest food, so does every bodily and mental agent hunger to perform its appointed ac- tion. And as the refusal to satisfy the cravings of the diges- tive faculty is productive of suffering, so is the refusal to satisfy the cravings of any other faculty also productive of suffering, to an extent proportionate to the importance of that facult}'. But as God wills man's happiness, that line of con- duct which produces unhappiness is contrary to his wiU. Therefore the non-exercise of the faculties is contrary to his ■wiU. Either way then, we find that the exercise of the facul- ties is God's wiU and man's duty.
But the fulfilment of this duty necessarily presupposes free- dom of action. Man caimot exercise his faculties without DERIVATION 01? A FIRST PRINCIPLE. 77 certain scope. He must have liberty to go and to come, to see, to feel, to speak, to work; to get food, raiment, shelter, and to provide for each and all of the needs of his nature. He must be free to do everything -which is directly or indi- rectly requisite for the due satisfaction of every mental and bodily want. Without this he cannot fulfil his duty or God's will. But if he cannot fulfil God's will without it, then God commands him to take it. He has Divine authority, therefore, for claiming this freedom of action. God intended him to have it; that is, he has a right to it.
From this conclusion there seems no possibility of escape. Let us repeat the steps by which we arrive at it. God wills man's happiness. Man's happiness can only be produced by / the exercise of his faculties. Then God wills that he should / exercise Lis faculties. But to exercise his faculties he must j have hberty to do all that his faculties naturally impel him to I do. Then God intends he should have that Hberty. There-! fore he has a right to that liberty.
This, however, is not the right of one but of all. All are endowed with faculties. All are bound to fulfil the Divine will by exercising them. All therefore must be free to do those things in which the exercise of them consists. That is, all must have rights to liberty of action. <: And hence there necessarily arises a limitation. Foruf men have like claims to that freedom which is needful for the exer- cise of their faculties, then must the freedom of each be bounded by the similar freedom>3f all. When, in the pursuit of their respective ends, two individuals clash, the movements of the one remain free only in so far as they do not interfere with the like movements of the other. This sphere of existence into which we are thrown not affording room for the unre- strained activity of all, and yet all possessing in virtue of their constitutions similar claims to such unrestrained activity, there 78 DERIVATION OF A FIRST PRINCIPLE.
is no course but to apportion out tlie unavoidable restraint equally. Wherefore we arrive at the general proposition, that every man may claim the Mlest liberty to exercise his facul- ties compatible with the possession of like liberty by eveiy other man.
Upon a partial consideration this statement of the law will perhaps seem open to criticism. It may be thought better to limit the right of each to exercise his faculties, by the pro- viso that he shall not hurt any one else— shall not inflict pain on any one else. But although at first sight satisfactory, tliis expression of the law allows of eiToneous deductions. It is true that men, answering to those conditions of greatest hap- piness set forth in the foregoing chapter, cannot exercise their faculties to the aggrieving of one another. It is not, however, that each avoids giving pain by refraining from the full exer- cise of his faculties; but it is that the faculties of each are such that the full exercise of them offends no one. And herein lies the difference. The giving of pain may have two causes. Either the abnormally-constituted man may do something displeasing to the normal feelings of his neighbours, in which case he acts wrongly; or the behaviour of the nonnally-con- stituted man may irritate the abnormal feelings of his neigh- bours; in which case it is not his behaviour that is wrong, but their characters that are so. Under such circumstances the due exercise of his faculties is right, although it gives pain; and the remedy for the evil lies in the modification of those abnormal feelings to which pain is given.
To elucidate this distinction let us take a few illustrations. An honest man discovers some friend, of whom he had pre- viously thought well, to be a rogue. He htis certain high instincts to which roguery is repugnant; and allowing free play to these, he drops the acquaintanceship of this unworthy one. Now, though in doing so he gives pain, it does not foUow that he transgresses the law. The evil must he as- DKRIVATION OF A FIRST PRINCIPLE. 79 cribed, not to au undue exercise of faculties Ijy liim, but to the immorality of the man who suifers. Again, a Protestant in a Roman Catholic country, refuses to uncover his head on the passing of the host. In so obeying the promptings of certain sentiments, he annoys the spectators; and were the above modified expression of the law correct, would be blame- able. The fault, however, is not with him, but with those who are offended. It is not that he is culpable in thus testi- fying to Ms belief, but it is that they ought not to have so tyrannical an intolerance of other opinions than their own. Or again, a son, to the great displeasure of his father and family, marries one who, though in all respects admirable, is dowerless. In thus obeying the dictates of his nature he may entail considerable distress of mind upon his relatives; but it does not follow that his conduct is bad; it foUows rather that the feelings which his conduct has wounded are bad.
Hence we see that in hourly-occurring cases like these, to limit the exercise of faculties by the necessity of not giving pain to others, would be to stop the proper exercise of faculties in some persons, for the purpose of allowing the improper exer- cise of faculties in the rest. Moreover, the observance of such a rule does not, as at first sight appears, prevent pain. For tliough he who is restrained by it avoids inflicting suffering on his fellows, he does so at the expense of suffering to him- self. The evil must be borne by some one, and the question is by whom. Shall the Protestant, by showing reverence for what he does not revere, tell a virtual Ue, and thus do violence to his conscientious feeling that he may avoid vexing the in- tolerant spirit of his Catholic neighboui's? or shall he give tlie rein to his own healthy sincerity and independence, and offend their unhealthy bigotry? Shall the honest man repress those sentiments that make him honest, lest the exhibition of them should give pain to a rogue? or shall he respect Ms ovm nobler feelings, and hurt the other's baser ones? Between these al- ternatives no one can well pause. And here indeed we get down to the root of the matter. For be it remembered 80 DERIVATION OF A FIRST PRINCIPLE.
the universal law of life is, that the exercise or gratification of faculties sti-engthens them; whilst, on the contraiy, the curbing or inflicting pain upon them, entails a diminution of their power. And hence it follows that when the action of a normal faculty is checked, to prevent pain being given to the abnormal facul- ties of others, those abnormal faculties remain as active as they were, and the nonnal one becomes weaker or abnormal. Whereas under converse circumstances the normal one remains strong, and the abnormal ones are weakened, or made more normal. In the one case the pain is detrimental, because it retards the approximation to that form of human nature under wliich the faculties of each may be fully exercised without dis- pleasure to the like faculties of all. In the other case the pain is beneficial, because it aids the approximation to that form. Thus, that fij-st expression of the law which arises immediately from the conditions of social existence, turns out to be the true one: any such modification of it as the above, necessitating con- duct that is in many cases absolutely mischievous.
And yet, on the other hand, when we seek to express the law by saying that every man has full liberty to exercise his facul- ties, provided always he does not trench upon the similar liberty of any other, we commit ourselves to an imperfection of an opposite character; and we find that there are many cases in wliich the above modified expression answers better. Various ways exist in which the faculties may be exercised to the aggrieving of other persons, without the law of equal free- dom being overstepped. A man may behave unamiably, may use harsh language, or annoy by disgusting habits; and whoso thus ofiends the normal feelings of his fellows, manifestly di- minishes happiness. If we say that every one is free to exer- cise his faculties so long only as he does not inflict pain upon any one else, we forbid all such conduct. Whereas if we simply limit the liberty of each by the like • hberty of all, we do not forbid it; seeing that he who exercises his faculties in this way, does not hinder others from exercising theire in the same way, and to the same extent. How then are we to es- DERIVATION OF A FIRST PRINCIPLE. 81 cape from this difficulty? Neither statement of the law quite fulfils our requirement, and yet we must choose one of them. Which must it he, and why?