Each feeling, as we here define it, is any portion of con- sciousness wEich occupies a place sufficiently large to give it a perceivable, individuali ty; which has it s individuality marked off from adjacent portions of consciousness by qualitative con- trasts; and which, when introspectively contemplated., appears to be homogeneous. These are the essentials. Obviously if, under introspection,, a state of consciousness is decomposable into unlike parts that exist either simultaneously or succes- sively,, it is not one feeling but two or more. Obviously if it is indistinguishable from an adjacent portion of con- sciousness, it forms one with that portion — is not an indi- vidual feeling but part of one. And obviously if it does not occupy in consciousness an appreciable area,, or an appreciable duration, it cannot be known, as a feeling.
A relation between feelings is, on the contrary, charac- terized by occupying no appreciable part of consciousness. Take away the terms it unites, and it disappears along with them.; having no independent place — no indivi- duality of its own. It is true that, under an ultimate analysis*, what we call a relation proves to be itself a kind of feeling — the momentary feeling accompanying the tran- sition from_one conspicuous feeling to an adjacent_con- SJDJCUOUS feeling. And it is true that, notwithstanding its extreme brevity, its qualitative character is appreciable; for relations are (as we shall hereafter see) distinguishable from one another only by the unlikenesses of the feelings which accompany the momentary transitions. Each relational feeling may, in fact, be regarded as one of those nervous shocks which we suspect to be the units of composition of feelings; and, though instantaneous, it is known as of greater or less strength and as taking place with greater or less facility. But the contrast between these relational feelings and what we ordinarily call feelings, is so strong that we must class them apart. Their extreme brevity, their small THE COMPOSITION OF MIND. 165 variety., and their dependence on the terms they unite, differentiate them in an unniistakeable way.* Perhaps it will be well to recognize more fully the truth that this distinction cannot be absolnte. Besides admitting that, as an element of consciousness, a relation is a momen- tary feeling, we must also admit that jnst as a relation can have no existence apart from the feelings which form its terms, so a feeling can exist only by relations to other feel- ings which limit it in space or time or both. Strictly speaking, neither a feeling nor a relation is an independent element of consciousness: there is throughout a dependence such that the appreciable areas of consciousness occupied by feelings, can no more possess individualities apart from the relations which link them, than these relations can possess individualities apart from the feelings they link. The essential distinction between the two> then, appears to be that whereas a relational feeling is a portion of con- sciousness inseparable into parts, a feeling ordinarily so- called, is a portion of consciousness that admits imaginary division into like parts which are 'related to one another in sequence or co-existence. A feeling proper is either made up of like parts that occupy time, or it is made up of like parts that occupy space, or both.- In any case, a feeling proper is an aggregate of related like parts, while a rela- tional feeling is undeconiposable.- And this is exactly the contrast between the two which must result if, as we have inferred, feelings are composed of units of feeling, or shocks, § 66 Simple feelings as above defined, are of various kinds. To say anything here about the classification of * It will perhaps be objected that some relations, as those between things which are distant in Space or in Time, occupj7 distinguishable portions of coDSciousness. These, however, are not the simple relations between adjacent feelings which we are here dealing with. They are relations that bridge over great numbers of intervening feelings and relations; and come into existence only by quick transitions through thest? intervening states, eudiug in the consolidation of them- ] 06 THE INDUCTIONS OP PSYCHOLOGY.
them, involves some forestalling of a future chapter. This breach of order, however,, is unavoidable; for until certain provisional groupings have been made^ further exposition is scarcely practicable.
Limiting our attention to seemingly-homogeneous feelings I as primarily experienced, they may be divided into the : feelings which are centrally initiated and the feelings which are peripherally initiated — emotions and sensations. These have widely unlike characters. Towards the close of this volume evidence will be found that while the sensations are relatively simple,, the emotions, though seeming to be sim- ple are extremely compound; and that a marked contrast of character between them hence results. But without referring to any essential unlikeness of composition,, we shall shortly see that between the centrally-initiated feelings and the peripherally-initiated feelings, fundamental distinctions may. j)e established by introspective comparison.
A subdivision has to be made. The peripherally-initiated feelings, or sensation, may be grouped into those which, caused by disturbances at the ends of nerves distributed on the outer surface, are taken to imply outer agencies, and those which, caused by disturbances at the ends of nerves distributed withia the body, are not taken to imply outer agencies j which last, though not peripherally initiated in the ordinary sense, are so in the physiological sense. But as between the exterior of the body and its interior, there are all gradations of depth, it results that this distinction is a broadly marked one, rather than a sharply marked one. We shall, however, find that certain differential characters among the sensations accompany this difference of distribution of the nerves in which they arise; and that they are decided in proportion to the relative sirDerficiality or centrality of these nerves.
In contrast with this class of primary or real feelings^ thus divided and subdivided, has to be set the complemen- tary class of secondary or ideal feelings, similarly divided THE COHklPOSTTION OP MIXD. 167 and subdivided. Speaking generally, the two classes differ greatly in intensity. While the primary or originally-pro- duced feelings are relatively vivid, the secondary or re- produced feelings are relatively faint. It should "be added that the vivid feelings are taken to imply objective exciting agents then and there acting on the periphery of the nervous system; while the faint feelings,, though taken to imply objective exciting agents which thus acted at a past time, are not taken to imply their present action.
We are thus obliged to carry with us a classification based on structure and a classification based on function. The * division into centrally-initiated feelings, called emotions, and peripherally-initiated feelings, called sensations; and the subdivision of these last into sensations that arise on the exterior of the body and sensations that arise in its interior; respectively refer to differences among the parts in action.^, Whereas the division into vivid or real feelings and faint or ideal feelings, cutting across the other divisions at right angles as we may say, refers to difference of amount in the actions of these parts. The first classification has in view unlikenesses of kind among the feelings; and the second, a marked unlikeness of degree, common to all the kinds.
§ 67, From the classes of simple feelings we pass to the classes of simple relations between feelings, respecting which also, something must be said before we can proceed. In default of an ultimate analysis, which cannot be made at present, certain brief general statements must suffice.
As already said, the requisite to the existence of a rela-: tion is the existence of two feelings between which it is the link. The requisite to the existence of two feelings is some difference. 2Lnd therefore the requisite to the exist- ence of 'a relation, is the occurrence of a change — the passage ' from one apparently-uniform state to another apparently- uDifonn state, implying the momentary shock produced by the commencement of a new state.
168 THE INDUCTIONS OP PSYCHOLOGY.
It follows that the degree of the change or shock, con- stituting in other words the consciousness of the degree of difference between the adjacent states, is the ultimate basis of the distinctions among relations. Hence the fundamental division of them into relations between feelings that are equal, or those of likeness, (which however must be divided by some portion of consciousness that is unlike them), and relations between feelings that are unequal, or those of un- Hkeness. These last fall ID to what we may distinguish as relations of descending intensity and relations of ascending intensity., according as the transition is to a greater or to a less amount of feeling. And they are further distinguish- able into relations of quantitative unlikeness, or those occur- ring between feelings of the same nature but different in degree, and relations of qualitative unlikeness, or those occurring between feelings not of the same nature.
Relations thus contemplated simply as changes, and grouped according to the degree of cliange or the kind of change, severally belong to one or otker of two great categories wnick take no account of the terms as like or unlike in nature or amount, but which take account only of their order of occurrence, as either simultaneous or succes- sive. TMs fundamental division of relations into those of co- existence and those of sequence, is, however, itself dependent on the preceding division into relations of equality between feelings and relations of inequality between them. For relations themselves have to be classed as of like or unlike kinds by comparing the momentary feelings that attend the establishment of them, and observing whether these are like or unlike, and, as we shall hereafter see, the relations of co-existence and sequence are distinguished from one another only by a process of this kind.
§ 68. Having defined simple feelings and simple rela- tions, and having provisionally classified the leading kinds of each, we may now go on to observe how Mind is TEE COMPOSITION OP MIND. 169 up of these elements, and how different portions of it are characterized by different modes of combination of them.
Tracts of consciousness formed of feelings that are cen- trally initiated, are widely unlike tracts of consciousness formed of feelings that are peripherally initiated; and of the tracts of consciousness formed of peripherally -initiated feel- ings, those parts occupied by fee^lags that take their rise in the interior of the body are widely unlike those parts occupied by feelings that take their rise on the exterior of the body. The marked unlikenesses are in both cases due to the greater or smaller proportions of the relational elements that are present. "Whereas among centrally-initiated feel- ings, the mutual limitations, both simultaneous and suc- cessive, are vague and far between; and whereas among peripherally-initiated feelings caused by internal disturb- ances, some are extremely indefinite, and few or none definite in a high degree; feelings caused by external dis- turbances are mostly related quite clearly, alike by co- existence and sequence, and among the highest of them the mutual limitations in space or time or both, are extremely sharp. These broad contrasts, dependent on the extent to which the elements of feeling are compounded with the elements of relation, cannot be understood, and their import- j ance perceived, without illustrations. We will begin with j those parts of Mind distinguished by predominance of the' relational elements.
Remembering that the lenses of the eye form a non- sentient optical apparatus that casts images on the retina, we may fairly say that the retina is brought more directly into contact with the external agent acting on it than is any other peripheral expansion of the nervous system. And it is in the tracts of consciousness produced by the various lights reflected from objects around and concentrated on the retina, that we find the elements of feeling most intimately woven UD with the elements of relation. The multitudinous states of consciousness yielded 170 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
by vision, are above all others sharp in their mutual limi- tations: the differences that occur between adjacent ones are extremely definite. It is further to be noted that the relational element is here dominant nnder both of its funda- mental forms. Some of the feelings simultaneously limit one another with great distinctness, and some of them with equal distinctness successively limit one another. The feelings caused by actions on the general surface of the body are also marked off clearly,, though by no means so clearly as those which arise in the retina. Sensations of touch initiated at points on the skin very near one another, form parts of consciousness that are separate though adja- cent j and these are distinguishable not only as co-existing in close proximity, bu.t also as distinct from kindred sensa- tions immediately preceding or immediately succeeding them. Moreover the definiteness of their mutual limita- tions, in space if not in time, is greatest among the sensa- tions of touch proceeding from parts of the surface which have, in a sense, the greatest externality — the parts which, like the tips of the fingers and the tip of the tongue, have the most frequent and varied converse with outer objects.* Next in the definiteness of their mutual limitations come the auditory., feelings..Among such of these as occur together™ the relations are marked with imperfect clearness. Received through uncultivated ears, only a few simultaneous sounds are vaguely separable in consciousness; though received through the ears of a musician, many such sounds may be distinguished and identified. But among successive sounds the relational components of mind are conspicuous. Differences between tones that follow one another, even very rapidly, are clearly * The tongue is a much more active tactual organ than at first appears. The mechanical impressions it receives are not limited to those given by the food which it manages during mastication; but at other times it is perpetually exploring the inner surfaces of the teeth, which are to it external bodies.
THE COMPOSITION OF MIND. 171 perceived. But tlie demarcations are ]ess decided than those between contrasted sensations in the field of Vision. Passing to the sensations of taste, we see that these,, less external in their origin (for it is not in the tip of the tongue,, but over its hinder part and the back ' of the palate, that the gustatory nerves are distributed), are comparatively indefinite in their relations. Such distinc- tions as may be perceived between tastes that co-exist are comparatively vague, and can be extended to but two or three. Similarly, the beginnings and ends of successive tastes are far less sharp than the beginnings and ends of the visual impressions we receive at every glance -} nor can suc- cessive tastes be distinguished with anything like the?aroe rapidity as successive tones Even more undecided are the mutual limitations among sensations of smell, which, like the last, originate at a considerable dis- tance from the surface (for the nose is not the seat of smell: the olfactory chamber, with which the nostrils communicate, is seated high up between the eyes). Of simultaneous^ smells the discrimination is very vague; and probably not more than three can be separately identified. Of smells that follow one another, it is manifest that they begin and end indefinitely, and that they cannot be expe- rienced in rapid succession.
We come now to the peripherally-initiated feelings set up by internal disturbances. Among these the most super- ficial in origin and most relational as they exist in con- sciousness, are the sensations of muscular tension, Though, except when making vigorous efforts, these are but feeble, though such as are present together mutually limit one another in a very vague way j and though their beginnings and ends are so blurred that a series of them is but indis- tinctly separable into parts; yet they are juxtaposed and contrasted to the extent implied by discriminations and recog- nitions of them — discriminations and recognitions so partial, however, as frequently to require indirect verifications. It 172 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
sbould be added that the relations among muscular feelings are variable in abundance and distinctness. They are most conspicuous when the feelings come from muscles that are small,, and in perpetual action,, as those which move the eyes, the fingers, and the vocal organs; and least conspicuous when the feelings come from muscles that are large or centrally seated, or both, as those of the legs and of the trunk. Passing over abnormal feelings of pain and discomfort due to disturbances of nerves distributed within the limbs and body,, among which the small proportion of the relational element is manifest,, it will suffice if we come at once to the feelings originating in parts that are remotest from the external world, and which, as least relational, are most distinguished from those we set out with. Hunger is extremely vague in its beginning and end. Commencing un- obtrusively and ceasing gradually, it is utterly unlike those feelings which, closely contiguous in time, make one another distinct by mutual limitation. Neither is it appreciably marked out by co-existing feelings: its position among simultaneous states of consciousness is indeterminate. And this indefiniteness of relation, both in space and time, cha- racterizes other visceral. feelings, both normal and abnormal. Of the centraUy-mitated feelings, or emotions, much Jhe same has to, be said as of the last. Their beginnings and endings in time are comparatively indefinite, and they have no definite localizations in space. That is to say, they are not limited by preceding and succeeding states of conscious- ness with any precision; and no identifiable bounds are put to them by states of consciousness that co-exist. Here, then, the relational element of mind is extrraelyj^onsgicuous. The sequences among emotions that can occur in a given period, are comparatively few and indeterminate; and between such two or three emotions as can co-exist it is impossible to distinguish in more than a vague way.
§ t>9. Further and equally-important distinctions obtain THE COMPOSITION OF MIND. 173 between the tracts of consciousness thus "broadly contrasted- and they are similarly caused. Presence of the relational elements, seen in the mutual limitations of feelings, simul- taneous and successive, is accompanied by the mutual cohe- sion of feelings; arid absence of the relational elements, seen in the indeterminate boundaries of feelings in space and time, is accompanied by their incoherence. Let us re-observe the tracts of consciousness above compared.
The sharply-defined patches of colour that occur together in a visual impression., are indissolubly united — held rigidly in juxtaposition. And successive visual feelings, s'ach as are produced by transferring the gaze from one object to another, have a strength of connection that gives a fixed consciousness of their order. Thus the visual feelings, above all others distinguished by the sharpness of their mutual limitations, are absolutely coherent in space and very coherent in time. Between sensations of touch given by an object grasped, the cohesion is not so great. Though the two feelings produced by two points felt simultaneously by a finger, hold together so that they cannot be removed far from one another in conscious- ness; yet the bond uniting them has much less rigidity than the bond uniting the visual feelings produced by the two points; and when the feelings are more than two, their con- nections in consciousness are loose enough to permit of much variation in the conception of their relative positions. Still the strength of links between co-existing feelings of touch is considerable; as is also that between successive feelings of the same kind. Among the simultaneous feelings caused by si oiultaneous sounds, especially if they are not in harmony, the defect of cohesion is as marked as the defect of mutual limitation. But among the successive feel- ings produced by successive sounds, we find that along with distinct mutual limitations there go decided mutual cohe- sions. Sequent notes, o?' articulations, cling together witii tenacity. Much less clearly bounded by one 174 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
another as are tastes,, simultaneous and successive, they are also comparatively incoherent. Among co-existent tastes there are no connections like those between co-existent visual feelings, or even like those between the sounds pro- duced at the same instant by a band j and tastes do not hold together in sequence as do the tones of cadence. Of smells the like is true. Along with vagueness in the bound- ing of one by another there goes but a feeble linking together.
The feelings accompanying muscular actions have cohe- sions that are hidden in much the same way as are their limitations. The difficulty of observing the mutual limita- tions of muscular feelings, is due to the fact that each muscle, or set of muscles, passes from a state of rest to a state of action or from a state of action to a state of rest, through gradations that occupy an appreciable time; and that, con- sequently, the accompanying feeling, instead of beginning and ending strongly, shades off at both extremes. Being thus weak at the places where they are contiguous, these feel- ings are incapable of strong cohesions. Indeed, if we except those which accompany great efforts, we may say that they are altogether so faint compared with most others that their relations, both in kind and order, are necessarily incon- spicuous. Their cohesions are in a great degree those of automatic nervous acts j and are by so much the less the cohesions of conscious states. Those very vague feelings which have their seats in the viscera, may, as before, be exemplified by hunger. Here where we reach such ex- treme indefiniteness of limitation, both in space and time, we reach an extreme want of cohesion. Hunger does nob suddenly follow some other into consciousness; nor is it suddenly followed by some other. Neither is there any simultaneous feeling to which it clings. The relational element of Mind is almost absent; holding only in a feeble degree with some tastes and smells.
Lastly, among- the centrally-initiated feelings, or emotions, the same connection of characters occurs. When emotions THE COMPOSITION OF MIND. 175 co-exist; they can scarcely be said to liold together: tie bond between them is so feeble, that each may disappear without affecting the others. Between sequent emotions the links have no appreciable strength: no one is attached to another in such way as to produce constancy of succession. And though between emotions and certain more definite feelings which precede them, there are strong connections, yet these connections are not between emotions and single antecedent feelings, but between emotions and large groups of antecedent feelings; and even this cohesion, very vari- able in its strength, may entirely fail.
§ 70. A further trait in the composition of Mind, de- pendent on these correlated traits, may next be set down. We have seen that tracts of consciousness formed of feelings produced by external disturbances, are mostly distinguished by predominance of the relational element, involving clearness of mutual limitation and strength of cohesion among the component feelings; and we have seen that, contrariwise, the feelings produced by internal disturb- ances, peripheral and central, are mostly distinguished by comparative want of the relational element, involving propor- tionate defect of mutual limitation and cohesion. "We have now to observe that the tracts of consciousness thus broadly contrasted, are, by consequence, broadly contrasted in the respect that, in the one case, the component feelings can unite into coherent and well-defined clusters, while, in the other case, they cannot so unite.
The state of consciousness produced by an_Q,bject seen, is.•• composed of sharply-outlined lights, shades, and colours, • and the co-existent feelings and relations entering into one * of these groups form an indissoluble whole. To a consider- able degree, successive visual feelings cling together in defined groups. As most of them are caused by moving objects more or less complex, it is difficult to trace this clus- tering of them in sequence apart from their clustering in ] 76 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
co-existence. But if we take the case of a bird that suddenly flies past close to a window out of which we are looking, it is manifest that the successive feelings form a con- sciousness of its line of movement so defined and coherent that we know, without having moved the eyes, what was its exact course. The clustering of auditory feelings, comparatively feeble among those occurring simultaneously, is comparatively strong among those occurring successively. Hence the consolidated groups of sounds which we know IB consciousness as words. Hence the chains of notes which we remember as musical phrases. The clustering of tactual feelings in relations of co-existence, though by no means so decided as the clustering of co-existent visual feel- ings, either in the extent or complexity of the clusters or the firmness with which their components are united, is never- theless considerable. When the hand is laid on some small object, as a key, a number of impressions may be dis- tinguished as separate though near one another; but while their mutual relations are so far fixed that approximate limits within which they exist are known, they do not constitute anything like such a fixed and defined group as those given by vision of the key. This imperfect clustering in co-existence is accompanied by imperfect clustering in sequence. The successive feelings produced by a fly creeping over the hand, hold together strongly enough and definitely enough to constitute a consciousness of its general movement as being towards the wrist or from the wrist, across from right to left or from left to right; but they do not form a consciousness of its exact course. Tastes unite only into very simple and incoherent clusters in co-existence; while in sequence they scarcely unite at all. And the like is true of smells.
Such capability of clustering as is displayed by the peri- pherally-initiated feelings caused by internal disturbances, occurs among those accompanying the movements of muscles. But, along with the comparative vagueness of THE COMPOSITION OF MIND. 177