A further quantitative variation,; essentially similar in origin to that which takes place nvith advancing years> accompanies variation in external cir-cunistances, when this increases or decreases the numbers of vivid experiences within a given interval. If, after a monotonous life, a journey of pleasure brings within a week many exciting novelties., the remark habitually made is, that it seems far more than a week since home scenes were left behind. Even a comparatively monotonous 'state of consciousness: appears long if it is intense: instance the time during which/ a severe pain is suffered; or instance an interval of impatient expectation, the seeming length of which is popularly illus- trated by the proverb — " The watchied pot never boils/'' The estimation of Time varies also) with the constitutional state. Whatever exalts the vital activities, and so makes mental impressions stronger, exaggerates the conceptions of durations. This is notably the case in persons under the influence of.opium. Detailing his experiences of this influ- ence, De Quiiicey says that he soniejtimes seemed " to have lived for 70 or 100 years in one nijvht;" nay, to have had, "feelings representative of a millennium passed in that time, or, however, of a duration far beyond the limits of any human experience/'' / One more cause of quantitative variation in the conscious- ness of a compound relation of j Sequence, is change of position among our experiences. I Intervals of Time, like " intervals of Space, become apparently small in proportion' to their remoteness. An evening/ spent at a friend's house, seems of considerable length whe^i looked back iipon at the; moment of departure. When /recalled a week after, it subtends by no means so great ah angle in consciousness;' and the angle it subtends in consciousness when we are reminded of it a year after, is very small. There is a con- viction that it was several hours lobg; but when contemplated it cannot be made of equal apparent length with the several hours just passed, any more,'than the apparently-small 213 THE IXIIDCCTIOXS OP PSYCHOLOGY.
distance between two', objects on tlie horizon, can be made in actual perception lij'.ke the great interval which appeared between them when ipve saw them close at hand. In other words, there is a for ^-shortening of protensive quantity analogous to the fo;' "re-shortening -of extensive quantity; whence it results thjjat the intervals between passing ex- periences begin to selem less as soon as they are past, and continually dwindle a*\s we get farther from them, until at last their lengths become inappreciable. To this law of mental perspective is ^lue the feet that, in retrospect^ life seenis no, longer at for:";ty than it did at twenty.
Hence, concerning.'compound relations of -Sequence, as concerning compound delations of Co-existence, we must say that probably they are Bnot qualitatively like the connexions to which they answer,-; and certainly they are not quanti- •: tatively like them. £ For suspecting that whatever : objectively originates (four subjective conception of Time, is : no i identical in nature ^ dth it, we have the reason that Time, ;.•; considered as an abstract from relations of Sequence, must I present a different aspe (ct according to the degree of its disj sociation from paruciila*ir sequences. To a lowly-endowed creature, conscious onlv* of internally-initiated changes, it I cannot appear what it Idoes to a creature chiefly occupied t with changes thai are externally initiated.; since, in the last, it is partially dissociated from both orders -of changes.
1 Whence it seenis inferable that, only partially dissociated as it is, it cannot have -. in consciousness that qualitative character which absolute., dissociation would give it, and 'f which we must suppose it jto have objectively. And I that compound relations o*>f Sequence as we conceive them, cannot be quantitatively/ like the connexions beyond consciousness to which, thsy refer, is proved by -the fact that they vary in their apparent;* lengths with the structure of the organism, with its size, with its age, with its constitutional state, with the number amd vividness of the impressions it receives, and with, their relative positions in consciousness.
THE RELATIVITY OP RELATIONS. 219 Manifestly, as no one of tliese variously-estimated lengths can be taken as valid rather tlian the others, it becomes impossible to suppose equalitj between an interval of time as present to consciousness and any nexus of tilings which it symbolizes.
§ 92. Deeper than the compound relations of Co- existence and Sequence, is the compound relation of DifEeBgpe; since,, besides being involved in the comparisons of spaces and of times, this is involved in comparisons of the Forces manifested in Space and Time. We may fitly limit ourselves to illustrations taken from this last class of cases.
As into a conception of two things co-existing at an assignable distance apart, there enters the consciousness of many or few co-existing positions between them; and as into the conception of two changes separated by an assign- able interval of time, there enters the consciousness of many or few intervening sequent positions; so into the conception of two forces that have an assignable inequality, there enters the consciousness of many or few degrees of difference;" and the conceived amount of difference is determined by the number of these degrees. What we have here to observe is, that our conceptions of^jimounts, of difference, so con- stituted, Have relativities analogous to those which exist in our conceptions of amounts of spaces' and amounts of times.
That the compound relation of Difference varies qualita- tively according to the structure of the species, we have no distinct evidence. But since a cornpound relation of Dif- ference has to be conceived in terms of impressions that differ; and since the conception df Difference cannot be dissociated from the order of impressions in which it is presented, if there is but one such order; it may be inferred thai;, in proportion as the impressions become more multi- tudinous in their kinds, the conception of Difference becomes more independent of particular differences; and THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
that, therefore, in higher creatures it is not qualitatively the same as in lower; creatures.
That quantitative! variations in the conception accompany specific uniikenessesi of structure, becomes manifest when it is remembered that ja difference in forces does or does not give rise to a difference in feelings, according as the or- ganization is or is (not highly recipient. Inmdent forces that seem alike to a Slowly-endowed creature, seeni conspicu- ously unlike to a creature endowed with the sense-organs required ibr aj^r^cijating ihem. Where eyes are so little developed that approaching objects are recognized only as intercepting the sunshine, it is obvious that contrasts of light and shade which seem marked to animals with de- veloped eyes, are cpuite imperceptible. Similarly among; highly- endowed animals of diverse kinds. Between odours both of which producfB in a man no impression whatever, a dog perceives differences |of strength, probably of many degrees. Even the structural lunlikenesses of individuals entail such results. A.goo.d ealr detects several gradations between tones which to a bad fear seem alike.
The bulk^ of the prjfeanism is also a.factor in m^di^ing quantitatively th^^rell'ition of Difference. The manifesta- tions of force betweeifi which a creature can perceive un- likenesses, are limited'?? at the one extreme by its ability to bear them and at th® other extreme by its capacity for being sensibly affected! by them; and its size partly deter- mines these limits. A. grain and half-a-grain are hardly distinguishable by theirl pressures on the finger; but if suc- animal not more than a grain in livisible into many degrees would between them. Conversely, a man trast in weight between a ton and o put forth a force sufficient to lift cely be questioned that in the con- prt, now loaded with one and now s produced would have an unlikenes^ cessively borne by an j weight, a difference doubtless be perceptiblq cannot perceive the coi] half-a-ton, for he fails either; but it can scarj sciousness of an elepl with the other, the feeling THE RELATIVITY OF RELATIONS. ^1 that might be graduated. Objective differences, all equal in degree, are thus manifestly appreciable by any creature only within a range that is really very narrow. Moreover, it is demonstrable that towards either extremity of this range, the conceptions of Difference become quantitatively more and more vague; and no.^ere^ throughout the range can there be maintained a parallelism between the contrasts of inner feelings and the contrasts of outer forces to which they refer. l?or when a mass is- poised in the hand, certain muscles,^re strained to the degree required to support the mass plus the arm. If the weight of the mass is small, the weight- of tiie arm becomes the larger part of the force to be antagonized; while if the mass is large, the weight of the aritf becomes the smaller part. Clearly, then, the effort put fort*1 for the support of the arm being a constant element in tBe compared states of consciousness, must modify the seeming difference between weights to a different extent according as t]ie absolute amounts of the weights are increased dr decreased.
How variations of constitutional ^tate; whether deter- mined by disorder or by age, also cap56 quantitative varia- tions in the relations of Difference as 'conceived by us, need not be shown in detail. It is obvious from wliat kas beea said that all exaltations and depress^0313 of energy and of sensibility, must alter the range wi^n which differences are appreciable, and must modify thel appreciations of them: more especially towards each extremp °* the range.
We conclude,, then, that the cpmp ound relation of Difference as we know it, is ^dependent o on.constitutional state. The same have no subjective difference -answ< forces between which it exists Are either excessive or defective in amount. Within the lif i structure, OIL size, and Dbjective difference may Ting to itj because the of appreciation, the same objective difference may seem (great or small according to the percipient's nature and temporary condition. And as we cannot fix on any one of thesj^ relations in conscious- 222 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
f ^ ness, rather than any other, as like the reality beyond con- sciousness, we inus't infer that there is no likeness between any one of them ancl the reality beyond consciousness.
§ 93. But now 'what are we to say about the pure relations of Co-exis^tence, of Sequence, and of Difference; considered apart from amounts of Space, of Time, and of Contrast? Can we^ say that the relation of Co-existence^ conceived simply as >( implying two terms that exist at the same time, but are ^not specified in their relative positions, has anything ans wearing to it beyond consciousness? Can we say that out of fpurselves there is such a thing as Suc- cession, corresponding to the conception we have of one thing coming after a^nother, without reference to the time between them? Ai^d can. we say that what we know as Difference, apart fr£>m any particular degree of it, has objective unlikeness &s its cause?
The reply is that yipe cannot frame ideas of Co-existence, of Sequence, and of Difference, without there entering into them ideas of cjuantit-y.. Though we have examined apart the compound relations of these orders, into which con- sciousness of quantity avowedly enters; and though, in above defining the sample relations of these orders, the avowed contemplation! of quantity is excluded; yet, on looking closely into thtp matter, we find that a tacit recog- nition of quantity is always present. Co-existence cannot be I thought "of without iome amount of space. Sequence i cannot^ be thought oi? without some interval of time. ; Difference ^ cannot.be tl nought of without some degree of ^| contrast. Hence what l^ias been said above respecting these relations in their definitely Tcompound forms, applies to them under those form|% which, by a__fiction, we regard^as simple. AH the proofed of relativity that held where the conceived quantities w0re large, hold however small the conceived quantities became. And as the conceived quan- tities cannot disappear!* from consciousness without the THE RELATIVITY OF RELATIONS 223 relations themselves disapp earing., it follows inevitably that the relativities hold of the relations, themselves in their ultimate elements. We are thus forced to the conclusion that the relations of Co-existence, of Sequence, and of Difference, as we know them, do not obtain beyond con- sciousness., Let us simplify the matter by reducing derivative rela- tions to the fundamental relation; £.,nd we shall, then see more clearly the truth of this apparently -incredible pro- position.. * Every particular relation of Co-existence involves a cogni- tion of some difference in thepositionsgof the things co-exist- ing; resolvable, ultimately, into differences of relative posi- tion towards self. And differences ^f relative position can be known only through differences between the states of con- sciousness accompanying the disclosure of the positions. But while positions in Space, and co-existing objects occupying them, are known through relations; of Difference between the feelings accompanying disclosure of them;. they are known through relations of Likenf ss, in respect of their order of presentation. The relation! of JJo^existence, which? is that out of which all Space-conceptions are built, is one in which neither term is first or (last: the terms exhibit; equality in their order — no difference in their order.
Phenomena occurring in "succession, like those occurring simultaneously, are known as occuptfing different positions in consciousness. Intervals between jthem are distinguished by differences in the feelings that aris^ in passing over the inter- vals; and where the intervals are alifce, they are so classed from the absence of such differences. ' But while the relations among phenomena in Time are; known as such or such through conceptions of Difference £ncl E"o-difference yielded by comparisons of them, they are! known as alike in this, that their terms are unequal in or4er of presentation — differ. in their order, Thus all Space-relations and l^me-relations— all relations 224 THE rSpUCTIONS OP PSYCHGLO&Y.
of Co-existence and Sequence,, are known through, relations .of Difference and No 4 difference. Sequence is Difference of ; order; Co-existence iss No-difference of order. Hence we ^have at last to deal Jwith the relations of Difference and No-difference. And our entire consciousness being built up of feelings which {present these relations, both in them- selves and in the secondary feelings constituting conscious- ness of their order,, tlie whole question of the relativity of relations among feelings is reducible to the question of the relativity of the relatjion of Difference. This is readily demonstrable. f The sole elements, a|nd the indissoluble elements, of the relation are these: — A. feeling of some kind; a feeling coniirg next to it, \ which, being distinguishable as another feeling, provesfs itself to be not homogeneous with the first; a feeling of "shock., more or less decided, accom- panying the transition:1. This shock, which arises from the difference of the two feelings., becomes the measure of that difference — constitutes fby its occurrence the consciousness \of a relation of difference, and by its degree the conscious- ness of the amount of "^difference. That is, the relation of Difference as present!in consciousness is nothing mo_re, ithan a change in consciousness. How, then, can it fresemble, or be in anj- way akin to, its source beyond ^consciousness? Here * are two colours which, we call "V -unlike. As they exist" objectively, the two colours are quite independent — there* is nothing between them, answer- ing to the change which f, results in us from, contemplating first one and then the cither. Apart from our conscious- ness they are not linked fas are the two feelings they pro- duce in us. Their relation as we think it, being nothing else than a change of ouif- state, cannot possibly be parallel to anything between then\_, when they liave both remained unchanged. ": unchanged. ": 'i § 94. It is proper to po^nt out that all these conclusions, THE RELATIVITY OF RELATIONS. 225 down to the last of them, are in harn&ony with those which may be directly deduced from the dat& supplied by Physio- logy to Psychology. j Each feeling being the concomitant of some molecular change in a portion of vesicular nei^ye -matter; and each relation being1 the concomitant of so'me wave of molecular transformation propagated along a ierve-iibre, or fibres, from one portion of vesicular nervetmatter to another; it results, in the first place, that the \ various relations as we know them are composed of elements essentially alike; and it results., in the second place, that not being in- trinsically different in their ultimate natures, they cannot resemble intrinsically-different objective connexions.
Indeed^ it needs but to think for &n instant of a brain as a seat of nervous discharges, intermediate between actions in the outer world and actions in the world of thought, to be impressed with the absurdity of supposing thai; the con- nexions among outer actions, after being transferred through the medium of nervous discharges, caia re-appear in the world of thought in the forms they originally had.
§ 95. But here let us not omit toj recognize the assump- tion made throughout, and ine^iaply made in all reason- ing used to prove the relativity cbf relations, that there: exist beyond consciousness, conditions of objective _inani- • festation which are symbolized^ by;jrela,tiop.s as we conceive '••• them. I: The very proposition that what we know as a relation! is qualitatively and quantitatively! determined by our own] nature, and does not resamble any order or nexus beyondi consciousness, implies that there exists some such order or nexus beyond consciousness; and levery step in every argu-i ment by which this proposition is established, distinctly posits this order or nexus, and cannot be taken on any other condition. Further, the argument assumes, andjs obliged...to assume, fundamental; differences,_of objective 226 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
order which are symbolized by fundamental differences of subjective order.
For to say that w;hat we know as a relation between positions in Space, canjnot be like any objective nexus, since this relation of positions as conceived by us varies inde- finitely, is to say thai] there exists an objective nexus which has not varied. Two- verdicts of consciousness respecting a given magnitude are found to be unlike under unlike conditions of perception; whence it is inferred that neither of them is like the magnitude. But the inference is nonsense if by this magnitude is meant something in consciousness, instead of something beyond consciousness. As it was before shown in the case of feelings, so it might here be shown in the case of relations Between feelings, the reasoning used becomes both false in |ts premises and meaningless in its conclusion. /Of course, changing the terms, the like holds with periods1 of Time. Every argument proving that our conceptions of Time are relative, falls to pieces on 1 withdrawing the assumption that there exists some form of ' Things from which Timje, as a form of Thought, is derived.
The assumption of ail objective source for the subjective relation of Difference, ijs implied in the last two assumptions. If, as shown above, aljl special cognitions of spaces and times involve cognition^ of differences • and if, as shown above, Space in general], which is resolvable into relations of Co-existence, and Tim«p in general, which is resolvable into relations of Sequence, sire separable from one another as being respectively constituted, the last by difference of order, and the first by nofdifference of order; it is clear that the^postulation of 'objectives _ sources of these subjective forms, implies postulation~"6f a|n objective source of Difference.^ And this postulation of V a objective source of Difference, equally implied in all ^tle arguments which prove the relativity of the conceptual of Difference, has for its^ulti^ •j mate^arrant the deepest assignable wammt— the Persistence ofJForce. Though the relation of Difference, constituted, as THE RELATIVITY OF RELATIONS. 227 I.
we have seen, by a change in consciousness, ca.Lnot be; identified with anything beyond consciousness; yet that there is something beyond consciousness to which it is due, is an inevitable conclusion; since to | think otherwise is to, think of change taking place without ah. antecedent.
More certain, then, than the Relativity of Relations as we conceive them, is the existence oi* Non-relative Forms to which they refer; since proof of ^he first involves per- petual assumption of the last. There is some ontologica-H order whence arises the phenomenal order we know as! Space; there is some ontological order whence arises the? phenomenal order we know as Time; and there is some' ontological nexus whence arises the phenomenal relation, we • know as Difference. v i CHAPTER Y.
THE EEV^ABILITY OF FEELINGS.
§ 96. As was poiniBd out in the second chapter of this part, Feelings almit of a double ciassification. On grounds of structure "hey are divisible into the centrally- initiated and" the peripherally-initiated; which last are re-divisible into those which are peripherally initiated by external actions and t'^ose which are peripherally initiated by internal actions. And on grounds of function they are divisible by a line crossing these transversely, into those primary or vivid feelings produced by direct excitations, and those secondary <?r faint feelings produced by indirect excitations. The one c?lass, known as sensations, are some- times called presentative feelings; and the other class, known as ideas (though, this word is more commonly applied to clusters of t!?iein), are sometimes called re-pre- sentative feelings. ^ Thus far little regard «has keen paid to this grouping of feelings which has in vie^vv not difference of kind but differ- ence of degree. Thousfh throughout the last two chapters, we have tacitly recoo-nizejd the distinction — though, in dealing with the relativities of* feelings and of relations, we have been obliged to take foi— granted an established connexion between the vivid feelings or sensations directly presented, and the faint feelings or i:deas in which they arc represented; yefc no definite statement3^ have been made respecting the i THE EEVIVABILITY OP FILLINGS. 229 dependence of the second class on th|e first. Here we have to inquire how, when vivid forms of '.feelings have been ex- perienced^ it happens that faint forais of feelings like them afterwards arise. We have to inquiry what determines this revivability — what conditions they?.&re which render the revivals more or less distinct.* \ Since feelings are rarely,, or indeed], never, revived singly — since the things we remember aife, as the word implies,, put together out of feelings standinjg in certain relations; it results that in the illustrations to >t>e given we shall have to deal more with clusters of revived feelings than with individual revived feelings. But wh|at is alleged of the first always holds of the last. * § 97. Speaking generally, feelingte are revivable in pro- portion as they are relational. Th|e peripherally-initiated feelings of external origin are more rjepresentable than those of internal origin; and both of thjese can be represented with greater facility than the ceiitrg ,lly-initiated feelings.
The most highly relational feelings are the visual; and these are of all feelings the moist easily reproduced in thought. The redness of a soldiers coat, the blue of the sky, the whiteness of the snow-cpovered ground, can be revived in consciousness at any njionient with scarcely an effort, and with relatively-great clearness. The glare of an electric light may be so vividly | conceived as to produce something like a sense of dazzling. Ideal feelings of sound arise before the rpind with a facility and a strengtE almost as great. The report of a cannon, the * I here use the word revivability rather than the word recoverability, because it has less objectionable implicatioins. To recover anything involves a voluntary act; and to call a thing recoverable, is to say that it is some-.,, thing which can be re-obtained by a voluntary act. But ajjreat part of our if ideal feelings arise without volition, arid of ten^in spite of volition. Ther word revivable applies equally well to th^j ideal feelings which are voluntary and those which are involuntary. \ 230 THE IOT; OF PSYCHOLOGY.
blast of a trumpet, a, S™^> or a Mss> ma7 be imagined instantly and very distf inc%- Sensations of touch and pressure, if less ret Presentable, are representable readily and with considerable | clearness. The softness and hardness, the smoothness and. roughness, of different surfaces, have tolerably distf *ct ideal forms that recur with ficilitv Thi3 ^ess relational feelings externally initiated— those of tasl.^ and smell—are neither so easily nor so strongly reproduced! A colour or sound may be remem- bered in an instant; W-^ a specified flavour or odour is not so quickly recalled, an*1 the ideal feeling does not approach in vividness so nearly t?e° *ke real feeling.
We pass to the periipheraUy-initiated feelings of internal origin A particular m muscular effort canno.t be represented as quickly or as •cleaapy as a particular sound or colour; and though an intense| pain suffered in a limb may be re- called with considerable distinctness, it is observable that the ideal pain does no| t approach so nearly to the real pain as does a remembered ^ scream to the consciousness of an actual scream, or as doe^ the thought of a flash of lightning to the perception of a flasftt of lightning. When we come to those peripherally-initiated feelings to which ordinary states of the viscera- give rise, we find the degree of revivability very smalf.1- It is difficult to call into con- sciousness the feeling of ^feSBK?!- To think of the circum- stances along with which^ hunger occurs is easy; but after a hearty meal it is next to jimpossible to represent any degree of that craving for fooci^ which existed before the meal. Similarly with thirst. I Of the centrally-initiate^ feelings or emotions, the like is true in a qualified sense J. As before 'pointed out, there is not between actual anc1! ideal emotions the same sharp division as between actual and ideal feelings of other kinds. Emotions are excited, no^\ by physical agencies themselves . relations among them. Hence, only complex relations are ideal 5 THE EEVIVABILITY OF PEELINGS. 231 emotions aroused. When so aroused, however, they may rise to any degree of vividness,, until they become actual emotions. But the fact which we ha^e here to note as con- forming to the principle enunciated., is that an emotion cannot be at once revived in the same way that a feeling of light or sound can. It is impossible to bring instantly into consciousness the passion of anger, or that of joy, in however faint a form. Representation of either can be achieved, only by imagining, and dwelling upon, some circumstances calculated to produce it; and this takes an appreciable; time.
§ 98. The revivability of past feelings varies inversely as the vividness of present feelings. This antagonism holds to a certain degree between past and present feelings in general; but it holds to a much greater degree between past and present feelings belonging to the same order.