There is considerable assoeiability of co-existences with sequences — those sequences, at least, in which the co- ezistingpositions composing Space are traversed in successive THE ASSOCIABILITY OK RELATIONS. 261 instants of Time. This association of relations, underlying as we shall hereafter see our conceptions of Space and Time, leads by perpetual repetition to indissoluble connexions in consciousness, which govern our thoughts absolutely. It will be instructive here to observe how multitudinous expe- riences have so fused together certain of these relations, that one being presented brings up the consciousness of the other spite of every effort to exclude it. Let us take an instance. We move about day by day on foot and in vehicles, perpetually passing objects., some of them also moving, but most of them, stationary. In all these cases there is relative motion, which, as visually perceived, is, other things equal, the same whether it results from the motion of the subject while the object is stationary, or whether it results from the motion of the object while the subject is stationary. Ordinarily we can distinguish between these two causes of relative motion. The relative motion of stationary ob- jects is always accompanied by the consciousness of either our own locomotive activity or the activity of something carrying us — the action of the horse, or the jolting of the carriage, or both. Conversely, when relative motion is seen while we are stationary, we habitually see along with it those vital or mechanical actions which cause locomotion. Hence the relative motion of adjacent objects which do not exhibit any of the direct or indirect concomitants of locomotion, comes to be strongly associated in thought with our own motion; and, unless other perceptions furnish evidence to the contrary, the perception of relative motion under such conditions causes an irresistible consciousness of our own motion, even when we are motionless. This is remarkably illustrated when sitting in a train at a railway station with another train standing along-side in such way as to exclude the view of all other objects (so shutting out contradictory evidence.) When one of the two trains starts, the relative motion which we perceive on looking at the other train is just 2»j2 THE INDUCTIONS OP PSYCHOLOGY.
as likely to be due to the starting of the otter train as to the starting of our own. Bat the tendency always is to think that our own train is moving. Continually we find our- selves wrong-; but the knowledge of the fact that under these conditions the sense of our own motion is often illu- sive, does not enable us to exclude it. The association of these relations has become automatic, and the resulting o:\sranic inference, taking possession of consciousness, re- tains it until some decisive contradictory impression sud- denly, with a shock, dispels it.
§ 119. Before seeking the ultimate law of associa- tion of relations, let us observe how relations, like feel- ings, aggregate with their respective classes and sub- classes.
When we see two things, or two parts of a thing, simul- taneously, the relation between them automatically classes itself with relations of Co-existence in general. We cannot prevent it from cohering* with that great division of rela- tions the terms of which do not differ in their order of pre- sentation— space-relations. So, too, when watch- ing the motion of a body from one place to another, when listening to successive words, or when perceiving light after striking a match, the relation between the states of con- sciousness produced, instantly and irresistibly associates itself with. Sequences. To be conscious of the relation at all, is to be conscious of it as belonging to that great division of relations the terms of which differ in their order of pre- sentation. It automatically classes itself with time-rela- tions. Equally, the observation of a difference be- tween two impressions, whether simultaneous or successive, implies its assimilation to Differences in general. While in the order of its terms the relation can be known at all only as a relation of co-existence or sequence, its terms can be known at all as standing in relation, only by distinguishing between them in consciousness; and the act of distinguish- THE ASSOCIABILITY OF RELATIONS. 263 ing between them Is the act of classing their relation along with relations of Difference.
At the same time each relation passes into one or other of certain sub-classes. A co-existence between visual feel- ings, unites itself rigidly with that marvellous aggregate of relations constituting our consciousness of visually-per- ceived space. But when two impressions are simultaneously received from things touched in the dark,, the relation between them, while it coheres with the general class of co-existences, coheres with the sub-class of tactually-per- ceived co-existences — a sub-class constituting a compara- tively rudimentary consciousness of space, which, though it arouses an ideal-consciousness of visually-known space, differs wholly in quality from this. And the thing to be noted is, that a tactually -perceived relation of co-existence is never confounded with a visually-perceived one; but is only, by a comparatively deliberate act of thought, remem- bered to have the same objective equivalent. Re- lations of Sequence associate themselves into the sub-classes of internal and external. This classification of them neces- sarily accompanies the classification of their terms. The sequences between internal feelings and those between ex- ternal feelings, are, in the act of knowing the feelings as inwardly or outwardly initiated, distinguished as sequences belonging to the Ego or sequences belonging to the Non- ego; and no member of either group is transferable to the other. The instantaneous sub-grouping of relations of Difference scarcely needs pointing out. We observe two heights or two breadths to be unlike, and in thinking them unlike think of their difference as a difference in space- occupancy — cannot think of it as a difference between times or intensities. In being conscious of two notes in music as standing to one another in the ratio of minim and crotchet, the unlikeness between their lengths is cognizable only as an unlikeness between portions of time. And simi- larly, the contrast in strength between two colours or two 264 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
tastes., passes in the moment of perception into the sub- class of contrasts in intensity — refuses to be thought of as a contrast in dimension or duration.
Among space-relations may be observed a farther stage of this process. Though they have no sub-sub-classes divided as definitely as are the sub-sub -classes of certain feelings, especially the epi-peripheral; yet they are habi- tually thought of as belonging to vaguely-distinguished assemblages which have reference to the arrangements of the limbs and senses. In the moment of perception a visual relation of co-existence falls into that aggregate of such relations composing the consciousness of the space before us — cannot be associated with the aggregate of such relations composing the vaguely-conceived space behind us. In like manner the relation at once coheres with the still more special group of relations constituting the space we distinguish as above,, or the space we distinguish as below • and it is at the same time automatically classed with space- relations to the right or to the left. Only when it is very near to the ideal boundaries we make between these regions of space, may there be an association of it with some other than its own group.
We are now in a position to appreciate the significance of the ultimate segregations. On looking, say at a flower by the roadside, the relations among the feelings of colour which we receive from its petals, instantly associate them- selves with relations of Co-existence in general, with the sub-class of visually-perceived relations of co-existence, with the sub-sub-class of these relations forming the space in front of us, and with the still smaller group of these rela- tions aggregated into our conception of the space low down to the right. But they do more than this. With equal, or with almost equal, rapidity, (I say almost equal because this minor classification varies in rapidity with the goodness of the vision) these relations of co-existent positions presented by the petals of the flower, associate themselves in con- THE ASSOCIABILITY OP RELATIONS. 2G5 sciousness with, the relations of co-existent positions consti- tuting the space immediately about the flower — the parti- cular portion of space that is not only the same in direction but the same in distance. For, on observing what happens when the axes of the two eyes are converged on an object, it will be perceived that we become conscious of the space it occupies, and of the closely-environing space, with much more distinctness than we are conscious of any other space. Under such conditions we are scarcely at all conscious of the space behind us; we are scarcely at all conscious of the space far beyond the object, if opaque matter shuts out im- pressions from things contained in it; we are conscious in but a vague way of the space far to the right or to the left,, much above or below; we are conscious with some clearness of the space between our eyes and the object, so far as this consciousness is involved in the conception of distance; but we have what may be called a detailed consciousness of the space in and around the object. It needs only to look now at a thing quite near and now at a thing further off, now at one on this hand and now at one on the other, to perceive that the respective portions of space in which they exist, severally become indistinct in consciousness as we turn our eyes away; and that distinctness in our consciousness of each portion of space, results only when the eyes yield a distinct image of something placed in it. That is to say, any co-existing positions visually presented are immediately asso- ciated in thought with the cluster of co-existing positions similarly related to us — each perceived position standing in a relation of co-existence with self, associates itself most closely with other positions standing in like relations of co- existence with self. And in being classed with these rela- tions which it is most like, it arouses a consciousness of them; just as a colour in being recognized as red of a parti- cular shade, brings into consciousness ideas of other reds of the same, or nearly the same, shade. Moreover, as we before saw that while a particular feeling of redness associates itself 266 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
irresistibly and in a moment with the great class of epi- peripheral feelings, with the sub-class of visual feelings, with the sub -s ub -class of reds, but less quickly with its particular variety of reds; so here we may see that while this relation of co-existent positions associates itself in- stantly and rigidly with relations of co-existent positions in general, with visual relations of co-existent positions, with the relations of co-existent positions constituting the region of space low down to the right, it associates itself less promptly with the relations of co-existent positions that are almost identical: there is some uncertainty in the estimation of the distance — an uncertainty which is considerable in a person with but one eye, who continually finds himself wrong, and has to modify his estimate, or to re-class the relation. This general law may be similarly traced among time-relations. Suppose I recall an event that occurred yesterday; as, for instance, the unexpected arrival of a friend. It is observable, in the first place, that all those associated and consolidated rela- tions of sequence which constitute the conception of the time before yesterday, do not (unless by some secondary act) enter into consciousness at all. It is observable, in the second place, that the united relations of sequence which form a con- ception of the time between now and yesterday, are not dis- tinctly represented, but are represented only in such general way as to yield a measure of the distance back at which the event occurred. While it is observable, in the third place, that the portion of time to which retrospective consciousness is directed, becomes comparatively distinct in detail. On remembering the first sight of niy friend's face yesterday, I think not only of his smile of recognition, of my quick step towards him, of our shaking hands, of the words that followed, but I also think of the immediately-preceding occurrences — of my entrance into the room, of my seeing the back of some person looking at a picture, of his turning round on hearing me, of my surprise on seeing who it THE ASSOCIABILITY OF RELATIONS. 267 was. I find,, too, that tlie moments immediately adjacent to any one of these remembered actions, become more distinct in consciousness than those at some distance on either side of it. If I recall my entrance into the room, the positions in time which made up the interval before my friend turned round, represent themselves quite clearly — far more clearly than those preceding his knock at the door or those succeeding* our salutation. To make these portions of time equally clear, I must adjust my retrospective glance to positions adjacent to them. Thus it is with Time as with Space, that each place in it associates itself with places at the same distance from the place we at present occupy; and as we turn our attention now to one part of the past and now to another, the relations of sequent positions which constitute our consciousness of that part become clear, while all others lapse into vagueness.
§ 120. Every relation then, like every feeling, on being presented to consciousness, associates itself with like pre- decessors. Knowing a relation, as well as knowing a feeling, is the assimilation of it to its past kindred; and knowing it completely is the assimilation of it to past kindred exactly like it. But since within each great class the relations pass one into another insensibly, there is always, in consequence of the imperfection of our perceptions, a certain range with- in which the classing is doubtful — a certain cluster of rela- tions nearly like the one perceived, which become nascent in consciousness in the act of assimilation. Along with the perceived position in Space or Time the contiguous positions arise in consciousness.
Hence results the so-called Law of Association by Con- tiguity. When we analyze it, Contiguity resolves itself into likeness of relation in Time or in Space or in both. Let us observe how in the association of like relations there is involved the association of contiguous feelings.
On the one hand, relations of difference and the time-rela- 268 THE INDUCTIONS O.1" PSYCHOLOGY.
tions implied in the cognition of successive differences; are elements without which, there can be no consciousness. Ou the other hand, tliere can be no consciousness of these rela- tions without consciousness of some feelings which simul- taneously yield them. We can think of space-relations, all but absolutely empty, but we cannot think of anything approaching to empty time-relations. Time having but one dimension, and the measure of that dimension being the series of contained feelings, it follows that unless occupied by some feelings, real or ideal, Time has no dimension. If the objects around are perfectly stationary and silent, we have still the rhythm of our functions and the current of our thoughts to yield us marks by which to measure duration. Necessarily, then, when we think of any position in past time, we cannot associate it with its cluster of almost equi- distant positions in time, without being conscious more or less clearly of the feelings which occupied those almost equi- distant or contiguous positions. Association of feelings contiguous in time, is involved by association of their like time-relations. Passing to contiguous co-existent feelings, we may see that the association of them results from a further complication of the same process. Feelings known in sequence, and serving as marks that measure duration, may be sounds or odours which do not necessarily connote Space at all in a rudimentary consciousness. But in a consciousness containing tactual and visual experiences, there always, along with the sequent feelings caused by inner or outer changes, occur certain feelings, received by touch or sight or both, which continue to co-exist while the sequent feelings are passing. These simultaneously- experienced feelings yielded by things contiguous in space, which persist side by side in consciousness over an appreci- able period measured by sequent feelings, are necessarily associated with these in their time-relations. Hence on re- calling any relations of sequence, there are apt to recur the various relations of co-existence which were perceived along THE ASSOCIABILITY OP RELATIONS. 269 with them. And the feelings that occupied these nearly equi- distant positions in space that were presented in these nearly eqni-distaat positions in time, being among the feel- ings -which made marks in consciousness at that tirne, the representation of that time entails a recurrence of these marks.
The process thus described as taking place with simple relations having simple feelings for their terms, equally holds in a plexus of relations among many feelings; as in the perception of an ordinary object. When, for instance,, in recognizing a face we saw last week,, we associate each of the many combined relations of position constituting its form, with the respective like relations before experienced; and when along with the recognition there arises the con- sciousness of a redness on the cheek that was before present but is now absent; this recollection of the colour that occupied a particular place, results simply because it was one of the elements entangled in the plexus of relations which gave the consciousness its individuality. On before seeing the face, this colour was a term to various rela- tions of difference involved in the consciousness; it was presented at the same instant of time with the many other related feelings which the consciousness contained; and as having a position fixed in reference to all parts of the face, it entered into a great number of relations of co-exist- ence. Hence, having served as a common term to many different but combined relations, it happens that when these are again presented, the assimilation of them to the like relations before seen, entails a consciousness of the missing term of these like relations before seen. The colour is thought of in thinking of the relations; and the difference between the face as remembered and the face as perceived becomes manifest.
Thus, the fundamental law of association of relations, like the fundamental law of association of feelings, is that each, at the moment of presentation, aggregates with its like in 279 THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
past experience. The act of recognition a^id the act of association are two aspects of the same act. And the im- plication is that besides this law of association there is no other; "but that all further phenomena of association are incidental.
§ J21. The congruity between this conclusion and the facts of nervous structure and function is evident.
Changes in nerve- vesicles are the objective correlatives of what we know subjectively as feelings; and the discharges through fibres that connect nerve- vesicles are the objec- tive correlatives of what we know subjectively as relations between feelings. It follows that just as the association of a feeling with its class, order, genus, and species, group within group, answers to the localization of the nervous change within some great mass of nerve-vesicles, within some part of that mass, within some part of that part, &c.; so the asso- ciation of a relation with its class, order, genus, and species, answers to the localization of the nervous discharge within some great aggregate of nerve-fibres, within some division of that aggregate, within some bundle of that division. Moreover, as we before concluded that the association of each feeling with its exact counterparts in past experience, answers to the re- excitation of the same vesicle or vesicles; so here we conclude that the association of each relation with its exact counterparts in past experience, answers to the re- excitation of the same connecting fibre or fibres. And since, on the recognition of any object, this re-excitation of the plexus of fibres and vesicles before jointly excited by it, answers to the association of each constituent relation and each constituent feeling with the like relation and the like feeling contained in the previous consciousness of the object; it is clear that the whole process is comprehended under the principle alleged. If the recognized object, now lacking one of its traits, arouses in consciousness an ideal feeling answer- ing to some real feeling which this trait once aroused; TBJ ASSOCIABILJTY OF RELATIONS. 271 the cause is that along with the strong discharge through the whole plexus of fibres and vesicles directly excited, there is apt to go a feeble discharge to those vesicles which answer to the missing feeling, through those fibres which answer to its missing relations, involving a repre- sentation of the feeling and its relations.
CHAPTER IX.
PLEASURES AND PAIXS.
§ 122. THE foregoing chapters contain such an on time of the Inductions of Psychology as the plan of this work requires. To fill in this ontline would take more space than can be afforded,, and would too much interrupt the general argument.
There is, however,, one other side of mental pheno- mena as inductively generalized, which cannot be omitted * without leaving this outline incomplete. Thus far we have spoken of Feelings as central or peripheral,, as strong or weak, as vague or definite, as coherent or incoherent, as real or ideal; and where we have considered them as differ- ing in quality, the differences named have been such as do not connote anything more than a state of indifference in the subject of them — a passive receptivity. But there are certain common characters in virtue of which Feelings other- wise quite unlike, range themselves together either under the head of pleasurable or under the head of painful. Just as we saw that the division of Feelings into real and ideal., which is based on a functional difference, cuts across the divisions into central, ento -peripheral, and epi-peripheral, which are based on structural differences; so here we may see that the division of Feelings into agreeable and disagreeable, traverses all other lines of demarkation — groups into one heterogeneous assemblage sensations from all parts and PLEASURES AND PAINS. 2*3 emotions of various kinds, together with tlie ideas of such sensations and emotions, and into another assemblage sensa- tions and emotions, real and ideal,, similarly heterogeneous. To treat fully of consciousness under this further aspect, would carry us still more widely out of our course j for the phenomena of Pleasure and Pain are perhaps the most obscure and involved which Psychology includes. It must suffice to set down here what appear to be the essentials.
§ 123. Pleasures and Pains are concomitants of certain states, local or general — certain actions, I was about to say, but since pains of one class accompany what we dis- tinguish as inactions (though these can. never be absolute while the life, general or local, continues) it is better to use the word states. Hpt that all living states, either of the whole organism or of any organ, are accompanied by plea- sures or pains; for many of them, as those of the viscera during the normal discharge of their functions, yield to consciousness no feelings of any kind; and there are also feelings yielded by higher organs that are neither pleasure- able nor painful, as an ordinary sensation of touch. But while certain states cause no feelings, and other states cause indifferent feelings, the feelings distinguished as plea- surable and painful manifestly result from states of some kind; and the question is What are the states which I yield Pains and what are the states which yield Pleasures? I As implied by the parenthetical remark just made, there * are pains arising, from states of inaction — pains we call them, since we here use the word as antithetical to plea- sures; but they are best known as discomforts or cravings, from having a quality in which they are like one another and unlike pains commonly so-called. Let us glance at their leading kinds. The cravings due to inaction of the organs yielding the higher epi-peripheral feelings, are rarely strong because these organs are rarely quite inactive, sensations of touch being incessant, the want of them is T 274- THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.
•never felt. Sounds are so habitually lieard everywhere that few experience the desire for them which follows continued silence. Only after being confined for days in the dark does there come a positive longing for light and colour. The absence of odours never becomes an element of discomfort. And though after persistent denial of them certain natural tastes, as those of sweetness, and still more certain acquired tastes, as those of alcohol and tobacco, come to be much desired; yet the cravings for them are by no means so strong as the accompanying ento -peripheral cravings with which they are apt to be confounded. Among cravings of the ento-peripheral order occur some of the strongest. Inaction of the alimentary canal is soon ^followed by hunger; and if the inaction continues, this, rising presently to a distinct discomfort, eventually passes into something more intense. So, too, that allied in- action due to deficiency of liquid in the ingesta, brings on the longing we call thirst, which also may rise to a great height. And similarly with the abnormal ap- petites for habitual stimulants. We must not omit the disagreeable state of consciousness caused by muscular inaction. The irritation that accompanies enforced qui- escence, often very manifest in children, must be numbered among the ento-peripheral cravings. There remain