H II SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
The universal law that, other things equal, the cohesion /of psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which they have followed one another in experience, I supplies an explanation of the so-called "forms of.ttou^t," * as soon as it is supplemented hy the law that habitual psychical successions entail some hereditary tendency to \ such successions, which, under persistent conditions, will become cumulative in generation after generation We saw that the establishment of those compound reflex actions called instincts, is comprehensible on the principle that inner relations are, by perpetual repetition, organized into correspondence with outer relations. We have now to observe that the establishment of those consolidated, those indissoluble, those instinctive mental relations constituting our ideas of Space and Time, is comprehensible on the same principle. """ For if even to external relations that are often experienced during the life of a single organism, answering internal relations are established that become next to automatic — if such a combination of psychical changes as that which guides a savage in Mtting a bird the earlier part of the evidence; the fragmentary and obscure character of that which, remains; and the total lack of information respecting the in- finitely-varied and involved causes that have been at work; it would be strange were there not such difficulties. Imperfect as it is, how- ever, the evidence in favour appears to me greatly to preponderate over the evidence against. Save tor those who still adhere to the Hebrew myth, or to the doctrine of special creations derived • from it, there is no alternative but this hypotEesis or'no^Eypothesis. The neutral state of having no hypothesis, can be completely preserved only so long as the con- flicting evidences appear exactly balanced: such a state is one of unstable equilibrium, which can hardly be permanent. For myself, finding that there is no positive evidence of special creations, and that there is so7ne positive evidence of evolution — alike in the history of tbe human race, in the modifications undergone by all organisms under changed conditions, in the^ development of every living creature— I adopt the hypothesis until better instructed: and I see the more reason for '""Soirig this, in the facts, that it appears to be the unavoidable conclusion pointed to by tbe foregoing investjigations, and that rfc furnishes a solution of the coatroversy between the disciples of Locke and those of Kant."
t REASON. 467 with an arrow, becomes, by constant repetition, so organ- ized as to be performed almost without thought of the pro- cesses of adjustment gone through — and if skill of this kind is so far transmissible that particular races of men become characterized by particular aptitudes, which are nothing else than partially-organized psychical connexions; then, if there exist certain external relations which are expe- rienced by all organisms at all instants of their waking lives — relations which are absolutely constant, absolutely uni- versal— there will be established answering internal rela- tions that are absolutely constant, absolutely universal. Such relations we have in those of Space and Time. The organization of subjective relations adjusted to these ob- jective relations has been cumulative, not in each race of creatures only, but throughout successive races of creatures; and such subjective relations have, therefore, become more consolidated than all others. Being experienced in every perception and every action of each creature, these con- nexions among outer existences must, for this reason too, be responded to by connexions among inner feelings, that are, above all others, indissoluble. As the substrata of all * other relations in the non-ego, they must be responded to by conceptions that are tho substrata of all other relations, in the ego. Being the constant and infinitely-repeated ele- ments of thought, they, must become the automatic ele-1 merits of thought — the elements of thought which it is impossible to get rid of — the " forms of intuition/' Such, it seems to me, is the only possible reconciliation between the experience-hypothesis and the hypothesis of the transcendentalists; neither of which is tenable by itself. Insurmountable difficulties are presented by the Kantian doctrine (as we shall* hereafter see); an<l the anl%6nist doctrine, taken alone, presents difficulties that are equally insurmountable. Tqv jest with the ^ unqualified assertign antecedent to experience, the jnind is a blank, is to ignore the questions — whence,cornes the power of organizing expe.
SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
rlf-nces? whence arise the different degrees of that power -.— 3 d by different races of organisms, and different 4!v;i*:iiuals of the same race? If^ at birth, there exists t\ L" but a passive receptivity of impressions,, why i- t^t'a horse as educable as a man? Should it be v i " 1 r Jot language makes the difference, then why do *' <• rh- cat aud the dog, reared in the same household, .rr-vo at equal degrees and kinds of intelligence? Under- o, «1 in its current form, the experience-hypothesis implies •hit rli? presence of a definitely-organized nervous system i> a circumstance of no moment — a fact not needing to be ji^n into account I Yet it is the all-important fact — the ta.'t to which, in one sense, the criticisms of Leibnitz and others pointed — the fact without which an assimilation of ex- periences is inexplicable. Throughout the animal 1 kingdom in general, the actions are dependent on the nervous structure. The^jghysiologist shows us that each it. Hex movement implies the agency of certain nerves and pmglia; that a development of complicated instincts is accompanied by complication of the nervous centres and their commissural connexions; that the same creature in different stages, as larva and imago for example, changes its instincts as its nervous structure changes; and that as we advance to creatures of high intelligence, a vast increase in the size and in the complexity of the nervous system takes place. Whatjis ^ the obvious inference? It is that the ability to co-ordinate impressions and to perform the appro- priate actions, always implies the jpre-existence of certain serves arranged in a certain way. What is the meaning of * ihe human, brain? It is that the many established rela- tions among*" its parts, stand for so many established rela- tions among the psychical changes. Bach of the constant connexions among the fibres of the cerebral masses, answers to some constant connexion of phenomena in the experi- ences of the race. Just as the organized arrangement sub- sisting between the sensory nerves of the nostrils and the REASON. 469 motor nerves of tlie respiratory muscles, not only makes possible a sneeze, but also, in the newly-born infant, implie? sneezings to be hereafter performed; so, all the organized * arrangements subsisting among the nerves of the infant's brain, not only make possible certain combinations of im- pressions, but also imply that such combinations will here- after be made — imply that there are answering combina- tions in tho outer world — imply a preparedness to cognize these combinations — implj faculties of comprehending them. It is true that the resulting compound psychical changes, do not take place with the same readiness and automatic precision as the simple reflex action instanced — it is true that some individual experiences seem required to establish them. But while this is partly due to the fact that these combinations are highly involved, extremely varied in their modes of occurrence, made up therefore of psychical rela- tions less completely coherent, and hence need further repe- ti tions to perfect them; it is in a much greater degree due to the fact that at birth the organization of the brain is in- complete, and does not cease its spontaneous progress for twenty or thirty years afterwards. Those who contend that knowledge results wholly from the experiences of the individual, ignoring as* they do the mental evolution which accompanies the autogenous development of the nervous system, fall into an error as great as if they were to ascribe all bodily growth and structure to exercise, for- getting the innate tendency to assume the adult form. Were the infant 'born with a full-sized and completely-1* constructed brain, their position would be less untenable, j But, as the case stands, the gradually-increasing intelli- / gence displayed throughout childhood and youth, is more i attributable to the completion of the cerebral organization, than to the individual experiences — a truth proved bj the j fact that in adult life there is sometimes displayed a high j endowment of some faculty which, during education, was / never brought into play. Doubtless, experiences received \ SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
by the individual furnish the concrete materials for all thought. Doubtless, the organized and semi-organized arrangements existing among the cerebral nerves, can give no knowledge until there has been a presentation of the external relations to which they correspond. And doubt- less,, the chiidjs daily observations and reasonings aid the formation of those involved nervous connexions that are iu process of spontaneous evolution; just as its daily gambols aid the development of its limbs. But saying this is quite a different thing from saying that its intelligence is wholly produced by its experiences. That is an utterly inadmis- sible doctrine — a doctrine which makes the presence of a * brain meaningless — a doctrine which makes idiotcy unac- countable.
In the sense, then, that there exist in the nervous system certain pre-established relations answering to relations in the environment, there is truth in the doctrine of ' ' forms of intuition" — not the truth which its defenders suppose, but a parallel truth. Corresponding to absolute external rela- tions, there are established in the structure of the nervous system absolute internal relations — relations that are poten- tially present before birth in the shape of definite nervous connexions; that are antecedent to, and independent of, individual experiences; and that are automatically dis- closed along with the first cognitions. And, as here un- derstood, it is not only these fundamental relations which are thus pre- determined; but also hosts of other relations of a more or less constant kind, which are congenitally represented by more or less complete nervous connex- ions. But these pre-determined internal relations, } though independent of the experiences oF the individual, are not independent of experiences in general: they have ; been determined by the experiences "of preceding organisms. The corollary here drawn from the general argument is, that the^human.brain is an organized register of infinitely- numerous experiences receive'S during jjh[g evolution of jjyjb, REASON. 471 REASON. 471 or rather, during the evolution of that series of organisms through which the human organism has been reached. The eifects~^Tthe most uniform and frequent of these experiences have been successively bequeathed, principal and interest; aud have slowly amounted to that high intelligence which lies latent in the brain of the infant — which the infant in after life exercises and perhaps strengthens or further com- plicates— and which, with minute additions,, it bequeaths to future generations. And thus it happens that the European inherits from twenty to thirty cubic inches more brain than the Papuan. Thus it happens that faculties, as of music, which scarcely exist in some inferior human races, become congenital in superior ones. Thus it happens that out of savages unable to count up to the number of their fingers, and speaking a language containing only nouns and verbs, arise at length our Newtons and Shakspeares.
CHAPTEE VIII.
THE FEELINGS.
§ 209. The assertion that those psychical states which we class as Feelings, are involved with, and inseparable from, those which we class as intellectual processes, seems a con- tradiction to direct internal perceptions. It will^jjadeed, be atjonce admitted that intellectual processes canno| be sepa- jrated from ejai-peripheral feelings, real or ideal • since, inva- riably, these are either the immediate terms, or the ultimate components of the terms, between which relations are esta- blished in every cognition. But while all will grant that the feelings initiated in us by the forces of the external world, are, in their presentative or representative forms, the indispensable materials of thought, and that therefore to this extent intellect and fe^Hng:mcannot be parted; manyf will demur to the proposition that feelings of the ento-! peripheral and central classes are not separable from Intel- j lectual processes. ^ Some approach towards a right comprehension of the matter, will be gained by recalling certain leading conclu- sions set down among the Inductions of Psychology. We saw thatJUind is ^composed of feelings and the relations be- tween feelings. We saw that the^feeUngs are primarily divisible ^mto^the centrally-initiated"" ancf tEe peripherallv- initiated 7 which last are re-divisibte into those which are initiated at; the outer surface of the body and those which THE FEELINGS. 473 are initiated within the body. On comparing these three great orders of feelings, we found that whereas the epiperipheral are relational to a very great extent, the entoperipheral, and still more the central, have but small aptitudes for entering into relations. Hence, by implication, it was shown that the relational element of Mind is in no case absent. But the relational element of Mind is the intellec- 1 tual element. "Obviously, then, nqjdnd of feeling, sensa-I tional or emotional, can be wholly freed from the intellectual f element.
Further, this conclusion is implied by the argument ela- borated in the foregoing chapters. If all mental phenomena are incidents of the correspondence between the organism and its environment; and if this correspondence passes in- sensibly from its lowest to its highest forms; then, we may be certain, a priori, thatjio orders of Feelings can be com- pletdy disentangled from other phenomena of consciousness. We may infer that they must arise gradually out of the lower forms of psychical action, by steps such as lead to the higher forms of psychical action already traced out; and that they must constitute another aspect of these. This is just what we shall find.
§ 210. Before proceeding to the synthetic interpretation, it may be well to remark that even in our ordinary experi-4 ences, the impossibility of dissociating the psychical states! classed as intellectual from those seemingly most unlike! psychical states classed as emotional, may be discerned, J While we continue to compare such extreme forms of the two as an inference and a fit of anger, we may fancy that they are entirely distinct. Butjfjve. ^exjamin§,,,iiLterme- j diate jriodes of consciousness, we shall quickly ^ which avo Jbofcli co^nitiv0_a]KL^motivp. the state oFTnmd produced by seeingja..b.ga^ Primarily, this is a co-ordination o£ the visual impressions which the statue gives, resulting in a consciousness of what 474 SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
they mean; and this we call a purely intellectual act. But usually this act cannot be performed without some pleasur- able feeling of the emotional order. Should it be said that this emotion arises from the many ideas associated with the human form, the rejoinder is,, that though these aid in its production,, it cannot be altogether so accounted for; seeing that we feel a kindred pleasure on contemplating a fine building. If it be urged that, even in this case, collateral states of consciousness are induced which suffice to explain the emotion, then, whence results the gratification given on looking at a simple curve — an ellipse or parabola? The manifest difficulty in disentangling the cognitive from the emotive in these cases, becomes, in other cases, an impossi- bility. Not only does the state of consciousness produced by a melody show us ££g£^^-2£^_ emotion ^ entangled, but the state of consciousness produced by a * singlebeautiful tone does so. Not only is a combination of colours, as in a landscape, productive of a pleasurable feeling beyond that due to mere sensations; but there is pleasure accompanying the perception of even one colour, when of great purity or brilliance. Nay, the touch of a perfectly smooth or soft surface causes an agreeable consciousness.
In all these cases the simple distinct feeling directly aroused by the outer agent, is joined with some compound vague feeling indirectly aroused. (See § 128.)
I Otherwise put, the matter stands thus. The materials I dealt with in every cognitive process are either sensations or I the representations of them. These sensations, and by implication the representations of them, are habitually in some ^degree agreeable or disagreeable. Hence, only in those rare jcases in which both its terms and its remote associations are \ absolutely indifferent, can an act of cognition be abso- Hutfily free from emotion. Conversely, as every emotion involves the presentation or representation of objects and ajctjon^; and as the perceptions, and by implication the /recollections, of objects and actions, all imply cognitions; THE FEELINGS. 475 it follows that no emotion can be absolutely free from cog- nition.
§ 211. The relation between intelligence and feeling will be most clearly understood on studying the relation between perception and sensation,, which are the simplest forms of the two.
Every sensation, to be known as one, must be perceived; and must so be in one respect a perception. Every percep- tion must be made up of combined sensations; and must so be in one respect sensational. But though they haye the same essential elements, these elements are not similarly dominant in the two. In sensation,, consciousness is occu- pied with certain affections of the organism. In percep* tion, consciousness is occupied with the relations among those affections. Sensations are primary undecomposable states of consciousness; while perceptions are secondary decomposable states, consisting of changes from one primary state to another. Hence, as continuance of the primary states is inconsistent with the occurrence of changes, it follows that consciousness of the changes is in antagonism with consciousness of the states between which they occur. So that perception and sensation are, as it were, ever tending to exclude each other, but never succeeding. Indeed, consciousness continues only in virtue of this conflict. Without the primary affections of consciousness, there can be no changes from one primary affection to another; and without changes from one to another, there can be no primary affections, since in the absence of changes con- sciousness ceases. Neither consciousness of the changes, nor of the affections between which they occur, can exist by itself. Nevertheless, either may so predominate as greatly to subordinate the other. When the changes are so rapid that the states forming their antecedents and consequents do not last for appreciable times, consciousness is almost wholly occupied with changes — with the relations among 470 SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.
sensations: sensations are present so far only as is needful for the establishment of relations among them; and we have that condition of consciousness called perception. On the other hand,, when the states forming the antecedents and consequents of the changes have considerable persistence, or rather when they are not permanently destroyed by the changes but continually return, and are thus broken by the changes only so far as is needful to maintain consciousness — when., therefore,, some one of them by its continuous recur- rence, greatly predominates over others; then there results the condition of consciousness called sensation.
Xow this is just the relationship which exists throughout between knowing in general and feeling in general. Though differing from Sir William Hamilton respecting.the inter- pretation of the antagonism between perception and sensa- tion, I agree with him in holding that the same antagonism holds between cognition and emotion. The differences are simply differences that arise from successive complications. As, out of those simple perceptions forming the lowest class of cognitions, the higher cognitions result by the com- pounding of perceptions; so, out of those simple sensations forming the lowest class of feelings, the higher feelings arise by the compounding of sensations. And as, when cognitions grow highly compound their elements become too nume- rous to be all present together, and so become partly repre- sentative, and afterwards sometimes wholly representative; so, when the feelings grow highly compound their elements become too numerous to be all present together, and so become partly representative, and afterwards sometimes wholly representative. These positions require elucidation.
It has been from time to time pointed out that, in the development of Mind, there is a progressive consoli- dation of states of consciousness. States of consciousness once separate become indissociable. Other states that were originally united with difficulty, grow so coherent as to follow one another without effort. And thus THE FEELIHGS. 477 there arise large aggregations of states,, answering to com- plex external things — animals, men, buildings — which are so welded together as to be practically single states. But this integration, by uniting a large number of related sensa- tions into one state, does not destroy them. Though sub- ordinated as parts of a whole, they still exist. And being severally in their original forms, feelings, this state which is composed of them is a feeling — a feeling produced by the fusing of a number of minor feelings. Hence a certain pleasure accompanying all kinds of perceptions; as every child shows us. Not only, however, does this hold with the groups of simple sensations that are united to form percep- tions; but it holds with groups of these groups. When the composite states of consciousness answering to single complex objects, become sufficiently consolidated; then, if the daily experiences present some constant assemblage of complex objects, such as those distinguishing a particular locality, there results a consolidation of these into a still larger aggregate of states: the feelings severally consti- tuted by these composite states, are, in their turn, merged into a more composite feeling, which in its mixed and com* paratively massive character verges on the emotional. And then from the union of this composite feeling with other composite feelings, the elements of which are mainly repre-;