" This, then, is the form of being you speak of so con- .temptuously. And, because I ascribe to this form of being powers which, though not more wonderful than these, are more involved, you scowl at me. If, instead of saying that I degrade Mind to a level with Matter, you were to say that I elevate Matter to a level with Mind, you would express the fact more nearly.1" § 271. Such we may imagine to be the reply of a mate- rialist of the cruder sort., who failed to present his belief ,under its right aspect. Let us now listen to one of the same general school, whom we may suppose to understand better the meanings of these truths which science has revealed.
" The name you give me is intended to imply that I identify Mind with Matter. I do no such thing. I identify Mind 5fith Motion; and Motion is inconceivable by us as in :any"sense_m_ateri_al. Observe thisj$£igto. Now it is mo- tionless; now I relax my grasp and it begins to move to- RESULTS. 621 wards the Eartla. What lias suddenly entered into it?;« Though apparently nnclianged in all its properties., this, or any other mass,, needs but to have a quantity of motion im~ pressed on it by impact or otherwise, and it thereafter goes on changing its place in space at the same velocity; so long as it meets with no other matter and has no other motion impressed on it. What is this source of activity?: How does it dwell in.the weight? and in what manner does it cause the weight to take every instant a new place?i On the one hand,, we cannot assert that Motion exists as air something separate from Matter; since asserting this implied that we can think of it as having independent attributes. On the other hand,, we cannot assert that Motion has no separate^ existence • since, if it has not,, how can we think of it as* transferred from one body to another? Moreover, the ap^ pearance and disappearance of Motion raise the questions — I Where was it previously? and where is it now? When this weight falls, we have not only to ask — Whence has its motion come? but when it strikes the pavement we have to ask — Tc4 what place has its motion gone? Part of it was passed on* to the particles deranged by the blow; part of it, transformed^ into sound-waves, has been dispersed through the surround-l ing air; and, even while I speak, part of it has already: travelled millions of miles away in the shape of ethereal un- dulations. This Motion, then — now diffused and impercep- tible, now suddenly individualized and producing visible changes, now re-diffused in various forms and part of it inj- stantly transferred to immeasurable distances — is of a nature wholly inscrutable; andjfj^ identify Mind with it, I identify! Mind with something no less mysterious tha^ itself." < " You think of me as seeing no essential difference be- tween Mind and the material properties of brain. As well might I think of you as seeing no essential difference between music and the material properties of tbe piano from which it is evoked. Because you assert that music is produced from, the piano, do you therefore assert any goo PHYSICAL SYNTHESIS.
kizi.-liip in nature between a piano-string and the aeri Dulses it generates when struck? Or do you t-herefo ••assert an identity • between such pulses and the rel •lions among1 them which constitute cadences and ha T.i'.-nies? Xo more then do I, in asserting the depen "slice of ilind on nervous structure, assert any kinship nuruiv between the matter of a nerve-cell and the actio: tl.ar arise from it, or between these actions and tho r luri'jns among them which constitute thought. Do y< t~'; -•: to the? parallel because the piano remains silent t t<-iuhi?d, while the brain acts without external help? r^-plv iliTir in either case the power is derived from without, ai that the effect of the structure is simply that of transformii it. As the motion given to an automatic musical instr Bient passes through its specialized structure and comes o in the form of particular combinations of asrial pulse simultaneous and successive; so the motion locked up in man's food, added to. that directly received through his sense is transformed while passing through his nervous system in those combinations of nervous, actions which, on their su jective faces, are thoughts and feelings. ^ fk Bat this analogy is far too rude to convey a true co 'e^piion. Xot with sensible Motion, even though it be th ui the invisible air., has Mind any direct /...kinship; b I only with insensible Motion, of kinds inconceivably mo j subtle and "immeasurably more, rapid. Not, to cqmbini f, undulations of ponderable substance, however rare, is Mil <tr» be assimilated; _but only' to combined undulations...Yiie all-pervading imponderable substance which we knc fA only by inference from their effects. The activities of tit 'iiuponderaile substance, though far simpler, and in t'L Tuspect far lower, than the activities we call Mia are at the same time far higher than those we ci 'Mind im respect of their intensity, their velocity, tht subtlety. What has been gained in adaptability L Leen lost in vivacity. Though Mind brings into adjustme RESULTS.
the apparatus "by which certain etliereal undulations ema- nating from tlie Sun are brought to a focus, yet Mind cannon, like these concentrated undulations, dissipate the diamond placed in that focus. Though Mind is capable of devising an electric telegraph,, yet it remains wholly insensible to those slight molecular agitations on the other side of the Earth which transform themselves into sensible motions on this side. And now that the rates of our ideas and volitions have been measured, we learn that though jbhought is quick, light is many millions of times quicker.
"*" Your conception, 0 Spiritualist, is far too gross for me. I know not what may be the extent to which you have refined this creed which you inherit from aboriginal men. Disembodied spirit was conceived by your remote ancestors (as it is still conceived by various existing savages) as material enough to take part in battle, and even to be killed over again. Becoming less concrete and definite as know- ledge increased, the idea of a ghost continued, till quite modern days, to be that of a being which could cause alarm- ing noises and utter words. Even your quite-recent ancestors, transparent as they supposed the substance of a ghost to be, nevertheless supposed it visible. Possibly you Lave still further purified their belief. But whether you confess it or not, you cannot think of disembodied spirit without thinking of it as occupying a separate place in space — as having position, and limits, and such mate- riality as is implied by limits. This idea, not commended to me by its genealogy, quite unsatisfactory in its nature, and wholly unsupported by evidence, I cannot accept. Mind, I identify with that which ^js not relatively.. irmn ateria] but absolutely immaterial. It has not even the inconceivably refined* materiality of the ether which fills what you call empty space; but it is assimilable to the activities mani- fested by this* ether, as well^ as by_all sensible ft>rnL?, c-f being. Everywhere in unceasing influx and efflux, it ii that which is for ever dissolving and re-forming sensible ex- 524 PHYSICAL SYNTHESIS.
istefices of all orders — organic and inorganic. Pervading alike tlie smce which is occupied and the space which, seems to us unoccupied, it gives to the ponderable substance filling the one its powers of action and reaction, and to the inmonderable substance filling the other its powers o: convevins1 actions and reactions from one body to another. Sc that when there happens some vast catastrophe like that o: which the star near s Coronce was lately the seat, it is at once the airent bv which the transformation, is wrought and the fluent ijr which is conveyed, with almost infinite speed through the Universe, the resulting tremor felt on the sur- taees of its countless worlds/'' § 272. Comparatively consistent as is this answer, and serving though it does to throw back with added force the reproaches of the spiritualist, it is not the answer to be here iriven. In the closing paragraphs of First Principles, and as-'ain in the earlier parts of the present work, the position taken was, that the truth is not expressible either by Mate- rialism or by Spiritualism, however modified and however refined. Lee rne now, for the last time, set forth the ulti- mate implications of the argument running through this volume, as well as through preceding volumes.
Carried to whatever extent, the inquiries of the psycho- logist do not reveal the ultimate nature of Mind; any more than do the inquiries of the chemist reveal the ultimate I nature of Matter, or those of the physicist the ultimate 1 nature of Motion. Though the chemist is gravitating towards the belief that there is a primitive atom, out of which by variously-arranged unions are formed the so- called elements, as out of these by variously-arranged unions are formed oxides, acids,, and salts, and the multi- tudinous more complex substances; yet he knows no more than.h.e^id_at_first about this hypothetical/ primitive atom. And similarly, though we have seen* reason for thinking I that there is a primitive unit of consciousness, that sensations RESULTS.
RESULTS.
of all orders are formed of suck units combined in various relations, that by the compounding of these sensations and their various relations are produced perceptions and ideas., and so on up to the highest thoughts and emotions; yet this unit of consciousness remains inscrutable. Suppose it to have become quite clear that a shock in consciousness and a molecular motion, are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing; we continue utterly incapable of uniting the two, so as to conceive that reality of which they are the opposite faces. Lefc us consider how either face is framed in our thoughts.
The conception of a rhythmically-moving mass of sensible matter, is a synthesis of certain states of consciousness that stand related in a certain succession. The conception of a rhythmically-moving molecule, is one in which these states and their relations have been reduced to the extremes t limits of dimension representable to the mind, and are then assumed to be further reduced far beyond the limits of re- presentation. So that this rhythmically-moving molecule,/' which is our unit of composition of external phenomena, is; mental in a three-fold sense — our experiences of a rhythm i-- Gaily-moving BJ§SS, whence the conception of it is deriyed, are states of mind, having objective counterparts that are un- known; the derived conception of a rhythmically-moving -molecule, is formed of states of mind that have no directly- presented objective counterparts at all; and when we try to think of the rhythmically-moving molecule as we suppose it to exist, we do so by imagining that we have re-represented these representative states, en an infinitely-reduced scale. jSojhat the unit out of which we build pur interpretation of material phenomena, is^ triply ideal. > ' J On the other hand, what are we to think of this ideal unit, considered as a portion of Mind? It arises, a3 we have seen, by synthesis of many feelings, real arsd ideal,; and of the many changes among them. What are feelings? What is changed? And what changes it? If to avoid s s 626 PHYSICAL SYNTHESIS.
obvious implications of a materiality,, we call each element of this ideal unit, a state of consciousness, we only get into other similar implications. The con- ception of a state of consciousness implies the con- ception of an existence which has the state. "When on decomposing certain of our feelings we find them formed of minute shocks, succeeding one another with different rapidities and in different combinations; and when we conclude that all our feelings are probably formed of such units of consciousness variously combined, we are still obliged to conceive this unit of consciousness as a change wrought by some force in something. ISTo effort of imagination enables us to think of a shock, however minute, except as undergone by an entity. We are compelled, therefore, to postulate a substance of Mind that is affected, before we can think of its affections. But we can form no notion of a substance of Mind absolutely divested of attributes connoted by the word substance; and all such attributes are abstracted from our experiences of material phenomena. Expel from the conception of Mind every one of those attributes by which we distinguish a.n external something from an external nothing, and the conception of Mind becomes nothing. If to escape this difficulty we repudiate the expression " state of con- sciousness/' and call each undecomposable feeling ' c a con- sciousness," we merely get out of one difficulty into another. A consciousness, if not the state of a thing is itself a thing* And as many different consciousnesses as there are, so many different things there are. How shall we think of these so many independent things, having their differential charac- ters, when^we have excluded all conceptions derived from external phenomena? We can think of entities that differ from one another and from nonentity, only by bringing into oitr thoughts the remembrances of entities which we distinguished as objective and material. Again, how are we to conceive these consciousnesses as either being RESULTS.
changed one into another or as being replaced one by another? We cannot do this without conceiving of cause; and we know nothing of cause save as manifested in existences we class as material — either our own bodies or .surrounding things.
See then our predicament. "We can think of Matter only in terras, of Mind. We can thinTE of Mind only in terms of Matter. When we have pushed our explorations of the first to the uttermost limit, we are referred to the second for a final answer; and when we have got the final answer of the second we are referred back to the first for an inter- pretation of it. We find the value of x in terms of y; then we find the value of y in terms of &; and so on we may continue for ever without coming nearer to a solution. The antithesis of subject and object, never to be trans- cended wliile consciousness lasts,, renders impossible all knowledge of that Ultimate Keality in which subject and object are united.
§ 273. And this brings us to the true conclusion implied/ throughout the foregoing pages — the conclusion that it isjf ltimate Reality which_ is manifested to»S and objectively. For while the nature of that which is manifested under either form proves to b^ inscrutable, the order of its manifestations throughout all mental phenomena proves to be the same as the order of its * manifestations throughout all material phenomena.
The Law of Evolution holds of the inner world as it does of the outer world. On tracing up from its low and vague beginnings the intelligence which becomes so marvellous in the highest beings, we find that under whatever aspect! contemplated, it presents a, progressive transformation off like nature with the progressive transformation we trace in \ theJDmverse as a whole, no less than in each of it® parts.; If we study the development of the nervous system, we see ifcf advancing in integration, in complexity, in definiteness. If 628 PHYSICAL SYNTHESIS.
we turn to its functions, we find these similarly show an ever- increasing inter-depQndence, an augmentation in number and I heterogeneity,, and a greater precision. If we examine the relations of these functions to the actions going on in the world around, we see that the correspondence between ; them progresses in range and amount, becomes continually ;more complex and more special, and advances through differentiations and integrations like those everywhere going on. And when we observe the correlative states of consciousness, we discover that these, too, beginning as ^simple, vague, and incoherent, become increasingly-nume- rous in their kinds, are united into aggregates which are larger, more multitudinous, and more multiform, and even- jtually assume those finished shapes we see in scientific generalizations, where definitely- quantitative elements are '; co-ordinated in definitely- quantitative relations.
Such are the results of a synthesis which we shall pre- sently find verified by analysis. These are the conclusions to which Objective Psychology has brought us; and these are the conclusions to which we shall find ourselves led by that Subjective Psychology to.which we now pass.
APPENDICES.
APPENDIX.
ON THE ACTIONS OF ANAESTHETICS AND NARCOTICS.
WHILE omitting them from the text, I cannot refrain from here appending certain conclusions respecting the actions of Anaesthetics and Narcotics, to which I have been led while seeking an explanation of the anomalies referred to.
It is commonly supposed that these agents have special relations to nervous tissue, rather than to other tissues; and, because of the different effects they work, it is even assumed that some of them have elective affinities for the matter composing certain nervous centres rather than for that composing others. This last supposi- tion, made without other warrant than that it renders certain of the facts intelligible, must be carried much further to account for all the facts. As the same anesthetic does not act in the same way on all persons, but here affects one centre more and here another, it must be assumed that the chemical compositions of these centres are in such cases interchanged — nay, as one drunken man becomes morose while another becomes affectionate, it must be supposed that different parts of the cerebral hemispheres have iu such cases interchanged their chemical compositions. Nor is even this the extreme of the difficulty. For since in the same individual the same quantity of the same anaesthetic will produce quite different effects in different states of the circulation; the hypothesis requires us to suppose that these contrasts of chemical composition among the nervous centres interchange from hour to hour.
If instead of a gratuitous assumption that leaves many of the effects unaccounted for, we make an assumption that is not gratuitous and renders the facts, general and special, intelligible, there cannot be a doubt which of the two is preferable. Setting out, then, with the generalization that these various substances that affeftt the nervous system — the vegeto-alkalies, the alcohols and ethers, nitrous oxide, ammonia, arsenic, the mineral acids, &c. — are substances that pro- duce changes in albuminous matters, let us consider how their respective effects will be modified by the various conditions under which they act. Agents having powerful affinities for components of die tissues and fluids, given in small quantifies to avoid destruction 632 APPENDIX.
of the membranes can scarcely reach the nervous system in uncom- bined states; and may be expected to work their respective effects through the instrumentalities of the compounds they have formed. The most conspicuous effects will be wrought by those agents which, while they can produce molecular changes in albuminous substances, have not such powerful affinities for them, or for their Clements, as to be arrested on their way to the nervous system. The anaesthetics and narcotics may fairly be regarded as fulfilling this requirement. So much being premised, let us ask what will be the in- fluences of such substances carried indiscriminately through the body and acting indiscriminately on the tissues. If a blood-corpuscle, or a bile-cell, or a particle of mueous membrane, is affected by ether or by opium, and changed isomerically or otherwise, the implied molecular disturbance works little or no effect on the body at large, in the absence of a channel through which the disturbance can be conducted. But if the ether or opium affects a molecule of a nerve-corpuscle, the line of isonierically-changing molecules connected with the nerve-corpuscle, conveys the disturbance to some remote place; whence, by diffusion and re-diffusion, it is carried through the nervous system as a whole. That is to say, we need not suppose the anaesthetic or narcotic to have more affinity for the protein-substance of nerve-corpuscle or nerve-fibre, than for the other forms of protein-substance it comes in contact with; but its effect is comprehensible as resulting from the structural relations of nerve-corpuscle and nerve-fibre.
Carrying with us this conception, and not assuming that the anaesthetic or narcotic has any elective affinity for the matter of one nerve-corpuscle rather than for that of another, or for nerve- corpuscle rather than for nerve-fibre, let us consider what further differences in its actions will be entailed by further differences in the conditions of the parts. We have experimental proof that an agent which arrests the function of nerve, serves at the moment of its action to excite nerve. If nerve is cut in two, or constricted by a ligature, or seared, or touched by a powerful acid, it is, in the act of being incapacitated, made to convey a strong discharge. We have reason to expect, then, that whatever agent so acts on nerve- substance as to disable it, will, in working the implied molecular change, cause a molecular disturbance constituting excitement. To understand fully, however, why stimulation precedes narcosis, we must observe %e different relations of nerve-corpuseles and nerve- fibres to the blood.
As pointed out when treating of the nervous system, its vescicular tissue is far more vascular than its fibrous tissue; and further, while the niatter of nerve-vesicles is so arranged as to offer the least possible obstacle to the reception of fluid from the adjacent capillaries, the matter of nerve-fibres is shielded by a medullary APPENDIX. 633 sheath. Hence, when any agent capable of so changing the mole cular state of nerve-matter as to arrest its function, is carried into the blood, it first acts on the nerve-corpuscles. Each change produced in one of these (be it the decomposition of a molecule or, as is more probable, the isonieric transformation of a molecule) implies a disen- gagement of molecular motion, that is immediately propagated along the connected nerve-fibres, and excites the parts to which they run. Every nerve-corpuscle being thus quickly acted upon, and emitting successive discharges as the successive molecular transformations are wrought in it, there results a general exaltation of state; as shown physically in the invigorated p ulss and contractions of the muscles, and as shown psychically in the rush of vivid ideas and intensified feelings. But what is taking place with the rest of the nervous system f While some molecules of alcohol or ether or chloroform, as the case may be, have thus quickly passed from the closely- adjacent capillaries into the almost naked matter of the nerve- corpuscles, other such molecules are elsewhere on their way through the outer coats of the nerve-tubes and the medullary sheaths within these; and they presently reach the bundles of fibrilte forming the axis-cylinders. It may be concluded that the isomeric changes they immediately begin to produce in these, at first add to the general excitement. Though each molecule changed is thereafter incapacitated for taking part in the transfer of a nerve-wave; yet in the act of being changed, it becomes itself the initiator of a nerve- wave. Be this as it may, however, we must infer that as the anaesthetic invades a nerve-fibre more and more, a greater and greater number of its molecules are rendered unable to transfer a wave of the peculiar isomeric change which constitutes a nervous discharge; and, eventually, the fibre becomes impermeable.
Observe, now, the several implications. We have first an explana- tion of the fact that, other things being equal, the longer nerve- fibres become impermeable sooner than the shorter. Assuming, £s we may fairly do, that all the nerves conveying sensations of touch ar e equally permeable, it will naturally happen that at the expira- tion of a given interval, the probability that a nerve-fibre has been at some part of its course invaded by the anaesthetic, will be greater if the fibre is long than if it is short. Hence the fact that anaes- thesia occurs first in the hinder extremities; and that parts of the surface nearer to the nervous centres lose their sensibility later.* We are enabled also to account for those diversities of results produced by different doses and by the same dose under different conditions. Reaching easily the vescicular elements of the nervous system, and with more difficulty the fibrous elements, a small * * It is true that, according to Dr. Anstie, dogs and rats experimented upon, early lose sensation in the muzzle; but here the natural anaesthesia due to tha coldness caused by constant evaporation, aids the artificial anaesthesia.
634 APPENDIX.