civilized man, is less strong in the savage man. Among the lowest types the social groups are very small, and the bonds holding their units together are relatively feeble* Along with a tendency to disruption resulting from the ill- oontroUed passions of the individuals, there go^s com- paratively little of the sentiment causing cohesion: each of 80 THl DATA or SOCIOLOGY.
ihese traits tending, in fact, to perpetuate the other. So that^ mnder conditions famishing perpetual causes of dis- sension among men carried from one extreme to another by gusts of feeling — ^men often made more irritable by hunger, whieh^ as Livingstone remarks, " has a powerful effect on the temper'' — there exists at once a smaller tendency to cohere from mutual liking, and a greater tendency to resist an authority otherwise causing cohesion. Though, before there is much sociality, there cannot be much of any feeling to which the presence of other persons is a pre-requisite, and cannot therefore be much loye of appro- bation; yet, with a moderate progress iu social grouping, there comes a doTelopment of this simplest of the higher sentiments. The great, and quickly realized, benefits brought by the approval of fellow-savages, and the serious evils soon following their anger or contempt, are vivid early experiences which foster this ego-altraistic sentiment into predominance. And by it some subordination to tribal opinion is secured, and some consequent regulation of conduct, even before there arises a rudiment of political control. In social groups once permanently formed, the bond of union — ^here an increased love of so- ciety, there a subordination caused by admiration of superior power, elsewhere a dread of threatened penalties, and in most places a combination of these — may go along with a very variable amount of altruistic feeling. Though sociality fosters sympathy, yet the daily activities of the primitive man repress sympathy. Such fellow-feeling as results from that instinctive love of the helpless which he possesses in common with inferior animals, he naturally shows on occasions when antagonism, or strong egoistic desire, does not come into play. But active fellow-feeling, ever awake and ever holding egoism in check, does not characterize him; as we see conclusively shown by the treatment of women. And that highest form of altruistic sentiment distinguished by us as a sense of justice, implying clear THX PBIMITIYB MAN — lOfOTIOVAL. 81 and far»reachiTi g consciousness of effects which conduct will entail on others, is very little developed.
These emotional traits of the primitiye man^ exhibited by the evidence when averaged, are congruous with those which, drawing inferences from the principles of Psycho- logy, we anticipated would distinguish his imperfectly- evolved niind. A less extended and less varied corre- spondence vritb. the environment, less representativeness, less remoteness from reflex action, are observable in all these peculiarities. The cardinal trait of impulsiveness implies the sndden, or approximately-reflex, passing of a single passion into the conduct it prompts; implies, by the absence of opposing feelings, that the consciousness is formed of fewer and simpler representations; and implies that the adjustment of internal actions to external actions does not take account of distant consequences — ^has not so wide a range in space and time. So with the impro- vidence to which this impulsiveness conduces: desire goes at once to gratification; there is feeble imag^ination of secondary results; remote needs are not met. Passing over intolerance of restraint and defect of sociality, which are special traits that may or may not coexist with an emo- tional character otherwise inferior, we come to the ego- altruistic sentiment of love of approbation. This, gprowing as g^egariousness increases, involves increased representa- tiveness: since, instead of direct egoistic gratification it contemplates gratification indirectly caused by the behaviour of others; instead of immediate results it contemplates results a stage further off; instead of actions prompted by single desires, there come actions checked and modified by secondary desires. But though the emotional nature iR which this ego-altruistic sentiment becomes dominant, is made by its presence less reflex, more representative, and adjusted to a wider and more heterogeneous correspond* ence with surrounding requirements, it is still, in these respects, below that developed emotional nature of the 82 THE IMITA OF SOCIOLOGY.
civilized man, marked by activity of the altruistic senti- ments. Lacking these, the primitive man lacks the benevo- lence which adjusts condnct for the benefit of others distant in space and time, the equity which implies representation of highly complex and abstract relations among human actions, the self-sacrifice which puts a curb on egoism when there are none present to applaud.
To which congruity between the a priori and a posteriori conclusions, we may add the harmony of these with two others which the hypothesis of evolution suggests. That the child of the civilized man is impulsive, is improvi- dent, is in infancy without the love of applause but shows this in early childhood, and only afterwards begins to ex- hibit a sense of justice, are facts which verify the above inferences respecting the emotional nature of the primitive man. And we get further verification of them on observing that the leading emotional traits which distinguish the civilized man from him, are such as could arise only as society progressed. Impulsiveness could diminish only as social restraints became established; improvidence could decrease only as a settled social state made the benefits of providence tolerably certain; and sympathy, with the al- truistic sentiments resulting from it, could grow strong only in proportion as men were continuously held in close relations, involving co-operation, mutual benefit, and con- sequent mutual giving of pleasure.
CHAPTER Vn.
THE PRIMITIVE MAN — INTELLECTUAL.
§ 89. The. three measnres of mental evolation whiob, in the last chapter, helped us to delineate the emotional nattire of the primitive man, will, in this chapter, help as to delineate his intellectual nature. Degree of in- telligence is shown b^ degree of correspondence between Thoughts and Things; it is shown by degree of repre- sentativeness in the constitution of those thoughts; it is ehown by their degree of departure from the relatively- automatic intellectual processes — ^their remoteness from reflex action. Before surveying the &cts for purposes of induction, it will be well to contemplate, under their more concrete forms, the intellectual traits characterizing a lower evolution as compared with a higher. These traits, set forth at length in the Principles of Payehohgy (§§ 484 — 93), may here be briefly recapitulated in connection with the above-named standards.
Familiar only with the particular &cts coming within the narrow range of his experiences, the primitive man has no conceptions of general fads. Being something common to many particular truths, a general truth implies a wider and more heterogeneous correspondence than do particular truths; it implies higher representativeness, since it necessarily colligates more numerous and varied ideas under the general idea; and it is more remote from 84 -THS DATA or SOCIOLOGT.
reflex action — ^will not^ indeed^ of itself^ excite action at all. Haying only those indefinite measnrea of time yielded by the seasons^ having no records, bnt only statements carelessly made and randomly repeated in lang^ge that is very imperfect, man, in his nncivi- lized state, cannot recognize long sequences. Successions in which antecedents and consequents are tolerably near, can be fully grasped; but no others. Hence prevision of disicmt results, such as is possible in a settled society haying measures and written language, is impossible to him. That is to say, the correspondence in Time comes within nar- row limits. The representations include few relations of phenomena, and these not comprehensiye ones. And there is but a moderate departure from the reflex life in which stimulus and act stand in immediate connec- tion. The enyironment of the primitive man being such that his converse with things is relatively restricted in Space and Time, as well as in variety, it happens that the associations of ideas he forms are little liable to be changed. As experiences (multiplying in num- ber, gathered from a wider area, added to by those which other men record) become more heterogeneous, the narrow notions first framed, fixed in the absence of conflicting experiences, are shaken and made more plastic — ^there comes greater modifiahility of belief In the relative rigidity of belief characterizing undeveloped intelligence, we see a smaller correspondence with an environment containing facts destructive of that belief; we see less of that representativeness which simultaneously grasps and averages much evidence; and we see a smaller divergence from those lowest mental actions in which impressions cause, irresistibly, the appropriate mo- tions* While the experiences are few and but slightly varied, the concreteness of the corresponding ideas is but little qualified by the growth of ahstract ideas. An abstract idea, being one drawn from many concrete ideas^ THB PaiMITIVli KAN — ^INTBLLBOTUAL. 85 'becomes detacliable from these concrete ideas only as fast as their multiplicity and yariety leads to mutual cancellings of their differences, and leaves outstanding that which tliey have in common. Obviously an abstract idea so generated^ implies an increase of the correspondence in range and in heterogeneity; it implies increased repre- sentativeness in the consciousness of the many concretes whence the idea is abstracted; and it implies greater re- moteness from reflex action. It must be added that such abstract ideas as those of property and ca/use^ presuppose a still higher stage in this knowledge of objects and actions. For only after many special properties and many special causes have been thus abstracted, can there arise the re^bstracted ideas of property in gisneral and cause in general. The conception of v/niformity in » the order of phenomena, develops along with this pro- gpress in generalization and abstraction. Not uniformity but multiformity is the dominant trait in the course oi things as the primitive man witnesses it. No two places are alike, no two men, no two trees, rivers, stones, days, storms, quarrels. Only along with the use of meaaures, ^when social advance initiates it, does there grow up the means of ascertaining uniformity; and only after a great accumulation of measured results does the idea of law become possible. Here, again> the indiees of mental evo- Intion serve. The conception of natural order presupposes aji advanced correspondence; it involves a re-represen- tativeness that reaches a high degree; and the implied divergence from reflex action is extreme. Until there have grown up general ideas and abstract ideas, and until the notion of uniformity has developed along with the use of measures, thought cannot have much definite^ nes8. Inequality and unlikeness being characteristic of primitive experiences, there is little to yield the idea of agreement; and so long as there are few experiences of exact equality between objects, or perfect conformity 86 THE DATA OF SOGIOLOOT.
between statements and facts, or complete fulfilment of anticipations by resnlts, the notion of truth cannot become clear. This is a highly -evolred notion, arising only after the antithesis between definite agreement and definite dis- agreement has been made familiar; and the experiences of the primitive man do not make it familiar. Once more our general tests answer. The conception of truth, being the conception of correspondence between Thoughts and Things, implies advance of that correspondence; it in- volves representations which are higher, as being better adjusted to realities; and its growth causes a decrease of the primitive credulity allied to reflex action^ — allied, since it shows us single suggestions producing sudden beliefs that forthwith issue in conduct. Further, it should be remarked that only as this conception of truth advances, and there« fore the correlative conception of untruth, can there come scepticism and GrUicism. Lastly, such imagination as the primitive man has, small in range and heterogeneity, is reminiscent only, not constructive (see Prin.of Psy,, §492). In proportion as the mental development is low, the mind merely receives and repeats — cannot initiate, has no originality. An imagination which invents, shows us an extension of the correspondence from the region of the actual into that of the potential; it shows us a representa- tiveness not limited to combinations which have been, or are, in the environment, but including non-existing com- binations thereafter made to exist; and it exhibits the extremest remoteness from reflex action, since the stimulus issuing in movement is unlike any that ever before acted.
And now, having enumerated these leading traits of in- tellectual evolution in its latter stages, as deduced from psychological principles, we are prepared to observe the facts as described by travellers, and to see their significance. We will begin with some most general ones harmom'zing with, if not directly implied by, the above inferences.
TH£ PSimnVB XAN — DrrSLLECTUAL. 87 § 40. Testimonies to the acate senses and quick per- ceptions of the uncivilized, ate given by nearly everyone who describes them.
Take first the senses. According to Lichtenstein, the vision of the Bushmen is telescopic; and Barrow speaks of his ''keen eye always in motion.^' Of Asiatics may be named the Karens, who see as far with naked eyes as we do with opera-glasses; and the iuhabitants of the Siberian steppes are celebrated for their " distant and perfect sight.^' Similarly in America. Hemdon says of the Brazilians — ''The Indians have very keen senses, and see and hear things that are inaudible and invisible to us;" while Southey makes a like remark of the Tupis. After observing of the Abipones that, " like apes, they are always in motion,^' DobrizhofEer asserts that they discern things which escape " the most quick-sighted European.^' Respecting hearing^ too, there is similar, if less abundant, evidence. We have all heard of the feats of North American Indians in detect- ing faint sounds; and the extremely acute hearing of the Veddahs is shown by their habit of finding bees^ nests by the hum.
Still more abundant are the testimonies respecting the active and minute observation to which this keenness of vision and hearing is instrumental. From every quarter of the globe there come illustrations. " Excellent superficial observers,'^ is the characterization Palgrave gives of the Bedouins. Burton speaks of the "high organization of the perceptive faculties^' among them; and Petherick proved, by a test, their marvellous powers of tracking. Similarly in South Africa, the Hottentots show " astonishing qnickness in everything relating to cattle;'' and Galton says the Damaras "have a wonderful facility of recollecting any ox that they have once seen.'' Among the natives of North America it is the same. Burton, speaking of the Prairie Indians, comments on the "development of the perceptions which is produced by the constant and minute 88 THS DATA OF SOCIOLOOT.
obseiration of a limited number of objects/'. Listances are given showing what extremely exact topographers the Chippewayans are; and the like is alleged of the Dakotahs. It is, however, respecting the wild races of South Americsa that we have the most remarkable testimonies. Bates notices the extraordinary '' sense of locality '^ of the Bra- zilian Indians. Concerning the Arawaks, Hillhouse says — " Where an European can discover no indication whatever, an Indian will point out the footsteps of any number of negroes, and will state the precise day on which they have passed; and if on the same day he will state the hoar/' Brett asserts that a member of a Guiana tribe '^will tell how many men, women, and children have passed, where a stranger could only see faint and confused marks on the path.'' ''Here passes one who does not belong to our villag^,'^ said a native of Guiana searching for tracks; and Schomburgh, who gives this instance, remarks that their power " borders on the magical."
Along with this acuteness of perception there naturally goes a high degree of skill in those simple actions depend- ing on the immediate guidance of perception. The Esqui- maux show ^' invention and dexterity in all manual works." Kolben asserts that the Hottentots " are very dexterous in the use of their weapons." The Fuegians are said to be "remarkably expert with their slings." The skill of the Andamanese is shown in their unerring shots with ar- rows at forty or fifty yards. We are told of the Tongans that they ''are great adepts in managing their canoes." The accuracy with which the Australian propels a spear with his throwing-stick, is remarkable; while all have hecurd of his feats with the boomerang. And from the Hill-tribes of India, the Santals may be singled out as so " very expert with the bow and arrow " that they kill birds on the wing, and knock over hares at full speed.
Not omitting the fact that there are some exceptions to this expertness, as among the now extinct Tosmanians and THB PBmmTE MAN — INTBLI.SCTUAL. 89 the Yeddahs of Ceylon; and observing tliat soryiyal of the fittest most ever haye tended to establish these traits among men whose lives from hour to hour depended on their keen senses, quick observations, and efficient uses of their weapons; we have here to note this trait as significant in ifcs implications. For in virtue of a general antagonism between the activities of the simpler faculties and the acti- vities of the more complex faculties, it results that this dominance of the lower intellectual life hinders the higher intellectual life. In proportion as the mental energies go oat in restless and multitudinous perception, they cannot go out in calm and deliberate thought. This truth we will contemplate from another point of view.
§ 41. Not having special senses by which to discrimi- nate, the worm swallows bodily the mould containing vegetal matter partially decayed: leaving its alimentary canal to absorb what small quantity of nutriment it can, and to eject, in the shape of worm-cast, the 95 per cent, or so that is innutritive. Conversely, the higher annulose creature, with special senses and intelligence, as the bee, selects from plants concentrated nutritive matters where- with to feed its larvad, or, as the spider, sucks the ready- prepared nutritive juices from the flies it entraps. With- out tracing up through the lower VertebrcUa a kindred contrast, it will suffice to say that the progrress from the less intelligent to the more intelligent and the most intel* ligent, is similarly accompanied by increasing ability in the selection of food. Taking herbivorous mammals in g^eral, we see that the comparatively innutritive parts of plants have to be devoured by them in great quantities, that the requisite amounts of nutriment may be obtained; while, taking in general the carnivorous animals, which are mostly more sagacious, we see that they live on concen- trated foods of which small quantities suffice. Though the monkey ajud the elephant are not carnivorous, yet both 90 THX DAXA OF SOaOLOOT.
have powers wliich, oertamly by the one and probably by tbe other, are used in choosing the nntrifciye parts of plants when these are to be had. Coming to mankind, we observe that the diet is of the most concentrated kind obtainable; bnt that the nncivilized man, at the mercy of his conditions, is less choice in his diet than the civilized. Farther, it is to be noted that among the most civilized the most nntri« tiye food is carefully separated from waste matters: even to the extent that at table fragments of inferior quality are uneaten.
My purpose in drawing attention to these seemingly- irrelevant facts, is to point out that there is an analogy between progress in bodily nutrition and progress in mental nutrition. The higher types of mind, like the higher types of body, have greater powers of selecting materials fit for assimilation. Just as by appearance, texture, and odour, the superior animal is guided in the choice of food, and swallows only things which contain large amounts of organizable matter; so the superior intellect, aided by what we may figuratively call an intellectual scent, passes by multitudes of unorganizable facts, but quickly detects facts of significance, and takes them in as elements out of which cardinal truths may be elaborated. The less-deve- loped intelligences, unable to decompose these more complex facts and assimilate their components, and having therefore no appetites for them, devour with avidity facts which are mostly valueless; and out of the vast mass absorb extremely little material for general conceptions. Such concentrated diet as that furnished by the experiments of the physicist, the investigations of the political economist, the analyses of the psychologist, is intolerable to them, indigestible by them; but instead, they swallow with greediness the trivial details of table-talk^ the personalities of fashionable life, the garbage of the police and divorce courts; while their reading, in addition to trashy novels, includes memoirs of mediocrities, volumes of gossiping correspondence, with w THK PRIMITIVB MAN — ^INTELLECTUAL. 91 an occasional liistoiy, from wliieli they carry away a few facts aboot battles and the doings of conspicuous men. To such minds, devoid of structures for analyzing and systematizing, this kind of intellectual provender is alone available; and to feed them on a higher kind would be as impracticable as to feed a cow on moat.
Suppose this contrast exaggerated — suppose the descent from the higher to the lower intellects among ourselves, to be continued by a second descent of like kind, and we get to the intellect of the primitive man. A still greater atten- idon to minute meaningless details, and a still smaller capa* city for selecting facts from which conclusions of worth may be drawn, characterize the mind of the savage. Multi- tudes of simple observations are from moment to moment made by him; and such few as have significance, lost in ihe mass of insignificant ones, pass through his mind without leaving behind any materials for thoughts, worthy to be so called. Already in a foregoing section, the extreme perceptive activity of the lowest races has been illustrated; and here may be added a few illustrations showing the re- flective inactivity going along with it. In Mr. Bates' account of the Brazilian Indian he remarks — " I believe he thinks of nothing except the matters that immediately concern Ids daily material wants.'' " He observes well, but he can deduce nothing profitable from his perceptions," says Burton, describing the East African; and he adds that the African's mind ''will not, and apparently cannot, escape from the circle of sense, nor will it occupy itself with aught but the present/' Still more definite is the testimony of Hr.'Gralton respecting the Damara, who " never generalizes;" and who, indeed, seems to be exceptionally stupid. Thus he states that ''a Damara who knew the road perfectly from A to B and again from B to C would have no ideaof a straight cut from A to G: he has no map of the country in his mind, but an infinity of local details." Even of such a superior type of man as the Bedouin, the remark is made by Mr* Palgraye, that he '' judges of things as he sees them present before him^ not in their causes or consequences." Some semi-civilized peoples, as the Tahitians, Sandwich-Islanders, Javans, Sumatrans, Malagasy, etc., do, indeed, manifest ''quickness of apprehension, penetration and sagacity.^' But it is in respect of simple things that their capacity is shown; as witness the assertion of Mr. Ellis concerning the Malagasy, that " facts, anecdotes, occurrences, metaphors, or fables, relating to or derived from sensible and visible objects, appear to form the basis of most of their mental exercises.^^ And how general is this trait of unreflective- ness among inferior varieties of man, is impUed by Dr. Pibkering's statement that, in the course of much experience, the Fijians were the only savage people he had ever met with who could give reasons, and with whom it was possible to hold a connected conversation.
§ 42. '' The eccentricity of genius ^' is a current phrase implying the common experience that men of original powers are men prone to act in ways unlike the ordinary ways. To do what the world does, is to guide behaviour by imitation. To deviate from the usages of the world, is to decline imitation. And the noticeable fact is that a smaller tendency to imitate goes along with a greater tendency to evolve new idesiS. Under its converse aspect we may trace this relationship back through early stages of civilization. There was but little originality in the middle ages; and there was very little tendency to deviate from the habits, modes of living, and forms of dress, established for the various ranks. Still more was it so in the extinct societies of the East. Ideas were fixed; and the power of prescrip- tion was irresistible.
Among the partially -civilized inferior races, we find imi- tativeness a marked trait. Everyone has heard of the ludicrous ways in which Negroes, when they have oppor- tunities, dress and swagger in grotesque mimicry of the THB VBIMITIYE HAS — IHTBLLECTUAL. 93 wliites. A diaracteristic asserted of the New Zealanders is an aptitade for imitation. The Dyaks, too^ show **^ great love of imitation;'^ and of other Malajo-Polynesians tibe like is alleged. Mason says that ''while the Karens originate nothing thej show as great a capability to imitate as the Chinese.^' We read that the Kamtschadales have a " peculiar talent of mimicking men and animals;^' that the Nootka-Sonnd people *' are very ingenioos in imitating; " that the Mountain Snake Indians " imitate animal sounds a