Industrial habits too, and habits of subordination to social requirements, are indirectly brought about by the same cause. The truth that the power of working continuously, wanting in the aboriginal man, could be established only by that per sistent coercion to which conquered and enslaved tribes are subject, has become trite. An allied truth is, that only by a discipline of submission, first to an owner, then to a personal governor, presently to government less personal, then to the embodied law proceeding from government, could there even tually be reached submission to that code of moral law by which the civilized man is more and more restrained in his dealings with his fellows.
Such being some of the important truths usually ignored by men too exclusively influenced by the religion of amity, 13 178 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
]et us now glance at the no less important truths to which men are blinded by the religion of enmity.
Though, during barbarism and the earlier stages of civiliza tion, war has the effect of exterminating the weaker societies, and of weeding out the weaker members of the stronger so cieties, and thus in both ways furthering the development of those valuable powers, bodily and mental, which war brings into play; yet during the later stages of civilization, the sec ond of these actions is reversed. So long as all adult males have to bear arms, the average result is that those of most strength and quickness survive, while the feebler and slower are slain; but when the industrial development has become such that only some of the adult males are drafted into the army, the tendency is to pick out and expose to slaughter the best-grown and healthiest: leaving behind the physically-in ferior to propagate the race. The fact that among ourselves, though the number of soldiers raised is not relatively large, many recruits are rejected by the examining surgeons, shows that the process inevitably works towards deterioration. Where, as in France, conscriptions have gone on taking away the finest men, generation after generation, the needful lower ing of the standard proves how disastrous is the effect on those animal qualities of a race which form a necessary basis for all higher qualities. If the depletion is indirect also — if there is such an overdraw on the energies of the industrial population that a large share of heavy labour is thrown on the women, whose systems are taxed simultaneously by hard work and child-bearing, a further cause of physical degen eracy comes into play: France again supplying an example. War, therefore, after a certain stage of progress, instead of furthering bodily development and the development of cer tain mental powers, becomes a cause of retrogression.
In like manner, though war, by bringing about social con solidations, indirectly favours industrial progress and all its civilizing consequences, yet the direct elfect of war on indus trial progress is repressive. It is repressive as necessitating the abstraction of men and materials that would otherwise go to industrial growth; it is repressive as deranging the com plex inter-dependencies among the many productive and dis- THE EDUCATIONAL BIAS. 179 tributive agencies; it is repressive as drafting off much ad ministrative and constructive ability, which would else have gone to improve the industrial arts and the industrial organi zation. And if we contrast the absolutely military Spartans with the partially-military Athenians, in their respective atti tudes towards culture of every kind, or call to mind the con tempt shown for the pursuit of knowledge in purely-military times like those of feudalism; we cannot fail to see that per sistent war is at variance not only with industrial develop ment, but also with the higher intellectual developments that aid industry and are aided by it.
So, too, with the effects wrought on the moral nature. While war, by the discipline it gives soldiers, directly culti vates the habit of subordination, and does the like indirectly by establishing strong and permanent governments; and while in so far it cultivates attributes that are not only tem porarily essential, but are steps towards attributes that are permanently essential; yet it does this at the cost of main taining, and sometimes increasing, detrimental attributes — attributes intrinsically anti-social. The aggressions which selfishness prompts (aggressions which, in a society, have to be restrained by some power that is strong in proportion as the selfishness is intense) can diminish only as fast as selfish ness is held in check by sympathy; and perpetual warlike activities repress sympathy: nay, they do worse — they culti vate aggressiveness to the extent of making it a pleasure to inflict injury. The citizen made callous by the killing and wounding of enemies, inevitably brings his callousness home with him. Fellow-feeling, habitually trampled down in mili tary conflicts, cannot at the same time be active in the rela tions of civil life. In proportion as giving pain to others is made a habit during war, it will remain a habit during peace: inevitably producing in the behaviour of citizens to one another, antagonisms, crimes of violence, and multitudinous aggressions of minor kinds, tending towards a disorder that calls for coercive government. Nothing like a high type of social life is possible without a type of human character in which the promptings of egoism are duly restrained by regard for others. The necessities of war imply absolute self-regard, and absolute disregard of certain others. Inevitably, there- 180 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
fore, the civilizing discipline of social life is antagonized by the uncivilizing discipline of the life war involves. So that beyond the direct mortality and miseries entailed by war, it entails other mortality and miseries by maintaining anti-social sentiments in citizens.
Taking the most general view of the matter, we may say that only when the sacred duty of blood-revenge, constituting the religion of the savage, decreases in sacredness, does there come a possibility of emei'gence from the deepest barbarism. Only as fast as retaliation, which for a murder on one side in flicts a murder or murders oil the other, becomes less impera tive, is it possible for larger aggregates of men to hold together and civilization to commence. And so, too, out of lower stages of civilization higher ones can emerge, only as there diminishes this pursuit of international revenge and re-re venge, which the code we inherit from the savage insists upon. Such advantages, bodily and mental, as the race derives from the discipline of war, are exceeded by the disadvantages, bodily and mental, but especially mental, which result aiter a certain stage of progress is reached. Severe and bloody as the process is, the killing-off of inferior races and inferior individuals, leaves a balance of benefit to mankind during phases of progress in which the moral development is low, and there are no quick sympathies to be continually seared by the infliction of pain and death. But as there arise higher societies, implying individual characters fitted for closer co operation, the destructive activities exercised by such higher societies have injurious re-active effects on the moral natures of their members— injurious effects which outweigh the bene fits resulting from extirpation of inferior races. After this stage has been reached, the purifying process, continuing still an important one, remains to be carried on by industrial war — by a competition of societies during which the best, physically, emotionally, and intellectually, spread most, and leave the least capable to disappear gradually, from failing to leave a sufficiently-numerous posterity.
Those educated in the religion of enmity — those who dur ing boyhood, when the instincts of the savage are dominant, have revelled in the congenial ideas and sentiments which classic poems and histories yield so abundantly, and have be THE EDUCATIONAL BIAS. 181 come confirmed in the belief that war is virtuous and peace ignoble, are naturally blind to truths of this kind. Rather should we say, perhaps, that they have never turned their eyes in search of such truths. And their bias is so strong that nothing more than a nominal recognition of such truths is possible to them; if even this. What perverted conceptions of social phenomena this bias produces, may be seen in the following passage from Gibbon:— " It was scarcely possible that the eyes of contemporaries should dis cover in the public felicity the causes of decay and corruption. The long peace, and the uniform government of the Romans, had introduced a slow and secret poison into the vitals of the empire." In which sentences there is involved the general proposition that in proportion as men are long held together in that mu tual dependence which social co-operation implies, they will become less fit for mutual dependence and co-operation. — the society will tend towards dissolution. While in proportion as they are habituated to antagonism and to destructive activities, they will become better adapted to activities requiring union and agreement.
Thus the two opposite codes in which we are educated, and the sentiments enlisted on behalf of their respective precepts, inevitably produce misinterpretations of social phenomena. Instead of acting together, now this and now the other sways the beliefs; and instead of consistent, balanced conclusions, there results a jumble of contradictory conclusions.
It is time, not only with a view to right thinking in Social Science, but with a view to right acting in daily life, that this acceptance in the unqualified forms of two creeds which con tradict one another completely, should come to an end. Is it not a folly to go on pretending to ourselves and others that we believe certain perpetually-repeated maxims of entire self- sacrifice, which we daily deny by our business activities, by the steps we take to protect our persons and property, by the approval we express of resistance against aggression? Is it not a dishonesty to repeat in tones of reverence, maxims which we not only refuse to act out but dimly see would be mischievous if acted out? Everyone must admit that the relation between parent and child is one in which altruism is 182 THE STUDY OP SOCIOLOGY.
pushed as far as is practicable. Yet even here there needs a predominant egoism. The mother can suckle her infant only on condition that she has habitually gratified her appetite in due degree. And there is a point beyond which sacrifice of herself is fatal to her infant. The bread-winner, too, on whom both depend — is it not undeniable that wife and child can be altruistically treated by their protector, only on condition that he is duly egoistic in his transactions with his fellow citizens? If the dictate — live for self, is wrong in one way, the opposite dictate — " live for others," is wrong in another way. The ra tional dictate is — live for self and others. And if we all do actually believe this, as our conduct conclusively proves, is it not better for us distinctly to say so, rather than continue enunciating principles which we do not and cannot practise: thus bringing moral teaching itself into discredit?
On the other hand, it is time that a ferocious egoism, which remains unaffected by this irrational altruism, professed but not believed, should be practically modified by a rational al truism. This sacred duty of blood-revenge, insisted on by the still-vigorous religion of enmity, needs qualifying actually and not verbally. Instead of senselessly reiterating in cate chisms and church services the duty of doing good to those that hate us, while an undoubting belief in the duty of retalia tion is implied by our parliamentary debates, the articles in our journals, and the conversations over our tables, it would be wiser and more manly to consider how far the first should go in mitigation of the last. Is it stupidity or is it moral cowardice which leads men to continue professing a creed that makes self-sacrifice a cardinal principle, while they urge the sacrificing of others, even to the death, when they trespass against us? Is it blindness, or is it an insane inconsistency, which makes them regard as most admirable the bearing of evil for the benefit of others, while they lavish admiration on those who, out of revenge, inflict great evils in return for small ones suffered? Surely our barbarian code of right needs revision, and our barbarian standard of honour should be somewhat changed. Let us deliberately recognize what good they represent and what mixture of bad there is with it. Courage is worthy of respect when displayed in the mainte nance of legitimate claims and in the repelling of aggressions, THE EDUCATIONAL BIAS. 183 bodily or other. Courage is worthy of yet higher respect when danger is faced in defence of claims common to self and others, as in resistance to invasion. Courage is worthy of the highest respect when risk to life or linih is dared in de fence of others; and becomes grand when those others have 110 claims of relationship, and still more when they have no claims of race. But though a bravery which is altruistic in its motive is a trait we cannot too highly applaud, and though a bravery which is legitimately egoistic in its motive is praiseworthy, the bravery that is prompted by aggressive egoism is not praiseworthy. The admiration accorded to the " pluck v of one who fights in a base cause is a vicious ad miration, demoralizing to those who feel it. Like the physi cal powers, courage, which is a concomitant of these, is to be regarded as a servant of the higher emotions — very valuable, indispensable even, in its place; and to be honoured when dis charging its function in subordination to these higher emo tions. But otherwise not more to be honoured than the like attribute as seen in brutes.
Quite enough has been said to show that there must be a compromise between the opposite standards of conduct on which the religions of amity and enmity respectively insist, before there can be scientific conceptions of social phenomena. Even on passing affairs, such as the proceedings of philan thropic bodies and the dealings of nation with nation, there cannot be rational judgments without a balance between the self -asserting emotions and the emotions which put a limit to self-assertion, with an adjustment of the corresponding beliefs. Still less can there be rational judgments of past social evolu tion, or of social evolution in the future, if the opposing actions which these opposing creeds sanction, are not both continuously recognized as essential. No mere impulsive recognition, now of the purely-egoistic doctrine and now of the purely-altruistic one, will suffice. The curve described by a planet cannot be understood by thinking at one moment of the centripetal force and at another moment of the tangential force; but the two must be kept before consciousness as acting simultaneously. And similarly, to understand social progress in the vast sweep of its course, there must be ever present to the mind, the egoistic and the altruistic forces as co-operative factors equally 184 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
indispensable, and neither of them to be ignored or repro bated.
The criticism likely to be passed on this chapter, that " The Educational Bias " is far too comprehensive a title for it, is quite justifiable. There are in truth few, if any, of the several kinds of bias, that are not largely, or in some meas ure, caused by education — using this word in an extended ssene. As, however, all of them could not be dealt with in one chapter, it seemed best to select these two opposite forms of bias which are directly traceable to teachings of opposite dogmas, and fosterings of opposite sentiments, during early life. Merely recognizing the fact that education has much to do with the other kinds of bias, we may now most con veniently deal with these each under its specific title.
CHAPTER IX.
THE BIAS OF PATRIOTISM.
" OUR country, right or wrong1," is a sentiment not unfre- quently expressed on the other side of the Atlantic; and, if I remember rightly, an equivalent sentiment was some years ago uttered in our own House of Commons, by one who rejoices, or at least who once rejoiced, in the title of philo sophical Radical.
Whoever entertains such a sentiment has not that equi librium of feeling required for dealing scientifically with social phenomena. To see how things stand, apart from personal and national interests, is essential before there can be reached those balanced judgments respecting the course of human affairs in general, which constitute Sociology. To be convinced of this, it needs but to take a case remote from our own. Ask how the members of an aboriginal tribe re gard that tide of civilization which sweeps them away. Ask what the North-American Indians said about the spread of the white man over their territories, or what the ancient Britons thought of the invasions which dispossessed them of England; and it becomes clear that events which, looked at from an un-national point of view, were steps towards a higher life, seemed from a national point of view entirely evil. Admitting the truth so easily perceived in these cases, we must admit that only in proportion as we emancipate ourselves from the bias of patriotism, and consider our own society as one among many, having their histories and their futures, and some of them, perhaps, having better claims than we have to the inheritance of the Earth — only in proportion as we do this, shall we recognize those sociological truths 186 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
which have nothing to do with particular nations or par ticular races.
So to emancipate ourselves is extremely difficult. It is with patriotism as we lately saw it to be with the sentiment causing political subordination: the very existence of a so ciety implies predominance of it. The two sentiments join in producing that social cohesion without which there cannot be co-operation and organization. A nationality is made possible only by the feeling which the units have for the whole they form. Indeed, we may say that the feeling has been gradually increased by the continual destroying of types of men whose attachments to their societies were relatively small; and who are therefore incapable of making adequate sacrifices on behalf of their societies. Here, again, we are reminded that the citizen, by his incorporation in a body politic, is in a great degree coerced into such sentiments and beliefs as further its preservation: unless this is the average result the body politic will not be preserved. Hence another obstacle in the way of Social Science. We have to allow for the aberrations of judgment caused by the sentiment of patriotism.
Patriotism is nationally that which egoism is individually —has, in fact, the same root; and along with kindred benefits brings kindred evils. Estimation of one's society is a reflex of self-estimation; and assertion of one's society's claims is an indirect assertion of one's own claims as a part of it. The pride a citizen feels in a national achievement, is the pride in belonging to a nation capable of that achievement: the be longing to such a nation having the tacit implication that in himself there exists the superiority of nature displayed. And the anger aroused in him by an aggression on his nation, is an anger against something which threatens to injure him also, by injuring his nation.
As, lately, we saw that a duly- ad justed egoism is essential; so now, we may see that a duly-adjusted patriotism is essen tial. Self-regard in excess produces twTo classes of evils: by prompting undue assertion of personal claims it breeds aggres sion and antagonism; and by creating undue estimation of personal powers it excites futile efforts that end in catastro- THE BIAS OF PATRIOTISM. 187 plies. Deficient self-regard produces two opposite classes of evils: by not asserting personal claims, it invites aggression, so fostering selfishness in others; and by not adequately valuing personal powers it causes a falling short of attain able benefits. Similarly with patriotism. From too much, there result national aggressiveness and national vanity. Along with too little, there goes an insufficient tendency to maintain national claims, leading to trespasses by other nations; and there goes an undervaluing of national capa cities and institutions, which is discouraging to effort and progress.
The effects of patriotic feeling which here concern us, are those it works on belief rather than those it works on conduct. As disproportionate egoism, by distorting a man's conceptions of self and of others, vitiates his conclusions respecting hu man nature and human actions; so, disproportionate patriot ism, by distorting his conceptions of his own society and of other societies, vitiates his conclusions respecting the natures and actions of societies. And from the opposite extremes there result opposite distortions; which, however, are com paratively infrequent and much less detrimental.
Here we come upon one of the many ways in which the corporate conscience proves itself less developed than the individual conscience. For while excess of egoism is every where regarded as a fault, excess of patriotism is nowhere regarded as a fault. A man who recognizes his own errors of conduct and his own.deficiencies of faculty, shows a trait of character considered praiseworthy; but to admit that our doings toward other nations have been wrong is reprobated as unpatriotic. Defending the acts of another people with whom we have a difference seems to most citizens something like treason; and they use offensive comparisons concerning birds and their nests, by way of condemning those who as cribe misconduct to our own people rather than to the people with whom we are at variance. Not only do they exhibit the unchecked sway of this reflex egoism which constitutes patriotism — not only are they unconscious that there is any thing blameworthy in giving the rein to this feeling; but they think the blameworthiiiess is in those who restrain it, and try to see what may be said 011 both sides. Judge, then, 188 THE STUDY OP SOCIOLOGY.
how seriously the patriotic bias, thus perverting our judg ments about international actions, necessarily perverts our judgments about the characters of other societies, and so vitiates sociological conclusions.
We have to guard ourselves against this bias. To this end let us take some examples of the errors attributable to it.
What mistaken estimates of other races may result from over-estimation of one's own race, will be most vividly shown by a case in which we are ourselves valued at a very low rate by a race we hold to be far inferior. Here is such a case supplied by a tribe of negroes: — " They amused themselves by remarking on the sly, ' The white man is an old ape.' The African will say of the European, ' He looks like folks,' [men], and the answer will often be, ' No, he don't.'...Whilst the Caucasian doubts the humanity of the Ilamite, the latter repays the compliment in kind." ' Does anyone think this instance so far out of the ordinary track of error as to have 110 instruction for us? To see the contrary he has but to look at the caricatures of Frenchmen that were common a generation ago, or to remember the pop ular statement then current respecting the relative strengths of French and English. Such reminders will convince him that the reflex self-esteem we call patriotism, has had, among ourselves, perverting effects sufficiently striking. And even now there are kindred opinions which the facts, when exam ined, do not bear out: instance the opinion respecting personal beauty. That the bias thus causing misjudgments in cases where it is checked by direct perception, causes greater mis- judgments where direct perception cannot check it, needs no proof. How great are the mistakes it generates, all histories of international struggles show us, both by the contradictory estimates the two sides form of their repective leaders and by the contradictory estimates the two sides form of their deeds. Take an example: — "Of the character in which Wallace first became formidable, the accounts of literature are distractingly conflicting. With the chroni clers of his own country, who write after the War of Independence, he is raised to the highest pinnacle of magnanimity and heroism. To the p]nglish contemporary chroniclers he is a pestilent ruffian; a dis- THE BIAS OF PATRIOTISM. 189 turber of the peace of society; an outrager of all laws and social duties; finally, a robber — the head of one of many bands of robbers and marauders then infesting Scotland." 2 That, along with such opposite distortions of belief about conspicuous persons, there go opposite distortions of belief 'about the conduct of the peoples they belong to, the accounts of every war demonstrate. Like the one-sidedness shown within our own society by the remembrance among' Protes tants of Roman Catholic cruelties only, and by the remem brance among1 Roman Catholics of Protestant cruelties only, is the one-sidedness shown in the traditions preserved by each nation concerning the barbarities of nations it has fought with. As in old times the Normans, vindictive themselves, were shocked at the vindictiveness of the English when driven to bay; so in recent times the French have enlarged on the atrocities committed by Spanish guerillas, and the Russians on the atrocities the Circassians perpetrated. In this conflict between the views of those who commit savage acts, and the views of those on whom they are committed, we clearly per ceive the bias of patriotism where both sides are aliens; but we fail to perceive it where we are ourselves concerned as actors. Every one old enough remembers the reprobation vented here when the French in Algiers dealt so cruelly with Arabs who refused to submit — lighting fires at the mouths of caves in which they had taken refuge; but we do not see a like barbarity in deeds of our own in India, such as the ex ecuting a group of rebel sepoys by fusillade, and then setting fire to the heap of them because they were not all dead,8 or in the wholesale shootings and burnings of houses, after the sup pression of the Jamaica insurrection. Listen to what is said about such deeds in our own colonies, and you find that habit ually they are held to have been justified by the necessities of the case. Listen to what is said about such deeds when other nations are guilty of them, and you find the same persons in dignantly declare that no alleged necessities could form a jus tification. Nay, the bias produces perversions of judgment even more extreme. Feelings and deeds we laud as virtuous when they are not in antagonism with our own interests and power, we think vicious feelings and deeds when our own in terests and power are endangered by them. Equally in the 190 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
mythical story of Tell and in any account not mythical, we read with glowing1 admiration of the successful rising of an oppressed race; but admiration is changed into indignation if the race is one held down by ourselves. We can see nothing save crime in the endeavour of the Hindus to throw off our yoke; and we recognize no excuse for the efforts of the Irish • to establish their independent nationality. We entirely ig nore the fact that the motives are in all such cases the same, and are to be judged apart from results.
A bias which thus vitiates even the perceptions of physical appearances, which immensely distorts the beliefs about con spicuous antagonists and their deeds, which leads us to repro bate when others commit them, severities and cruelties we applaud when committed by our own agents, and which makes us regard acts of intrinsically the same kind as wrong or right according as they are or are not directed against our selves, is a bias which inevitably perverts our sociological ideas. The institutions of a despised people cannot be judged with fairness; and if, as often happens, the contempt is un warranted, or but partially warranted, such value as their institutions have will certainly be under-estimated. When antagonism has bred hatred towards another nation, and has consequently bred a desire to justify the hatred by ascribing hateful characters to members of that nation, it inevitably happens that the political arrangements under which they live, the religion they profess, and the habits peculiar to them, become associated in thought with these hateful char acters — become themselves hateful, and cannot therefore have their natures studied with the calmness required by science.