whom they treated with great cruelty, and some they murdered in the streets.' " 9 Here, then, with absence of the looked-for benefit there went pi-eduction of unlooked-for evils, vast in amount. To recur to our figure, the original warp, instead of being made less by these direct blows, was made greater; while other dis tortions, serious in kind and degree, were created. And be yond the encouragement of fraud, lying, malice, cruelty, murder, contempt of law, and the other conspicuous crooked nesses named, multitudinous minor twists of sentiment and thought were caused or augmented. An indirect demoraliza tion was added to a direct increase of the vice aimed at.
Joining with the prevalent fallacy that results are propor tionate to appliances, the general political bias has the further effect of fostering an undue faith in political forms. This tendency to ascribe everything to a visible proximate agency, and to forget the hidden forces without which the agency is worthless— this tendency which makes the child gazing at a steam-engine suppose that all is done by the combination of parts it sees, not recognizing the fact that the engine is power less without the steam-generating boiler, and the boiler power less without the water and the burning fuel, is a tendency which leads citizens to think that good government can be had by shaping public arrangements in this way or that way. Let us frame our state-machinery rightly, they urge, and all will be well.
Yet this belief in the innate virtues of constitutions is as baseless as was the belief in the natural superiorities of royal personages. Just, as of old, loyalty to ruling men kept alive a faith in their powers and virtues, notwithstanding perpetual disproofs; so, in these modern days, loyalty to constitutional forms keeps alive this faith in their intrinsic worth, spite of re curring demonstrations that their worth is entirely conditional. That those forms only are efficient which have grown natural ly out of character, and that in the absence of fit character forms artificially obtained will be inoperative, is well shown by the governments of trading corporations. Let us contem plate a typical instance of this government.
The proprietors of a certain railway (I am here giving my THE POLITICAL BIAS. 249 personal experience as one of them) were summoned to a special meeting. The notice calling- them together stated that the directors had agreed to lease their line to another com pany; that everything had been settled; that the company taking the lease was then in possession; and that the pro prietors were to be asked for their approval on the day named in the notice. The meeting took place. The chairman gave an account of the negotiation and of the agreement entered into. A motion expressing approval of the agreement was proposed and to some extent discussed— no notice whatever being taken of the extraordinary conduct of the board. Only when the motion was about to be put, did one pro prietor protest against the astounding usurpation which the transaction implied. He said that there had grown up a wrong conception of the relation between boards of directors and bodies of proprietors; that directors had come to look on themselves as supreme and proprietors as subordinate, where as, in fact, directors were simply agents appointed to act in the absence of their principals, the proprietors, and remained subject to their principals; that if, in any private business, an absent proprietor received from his manager the news that he had leased the business, that the person taking it was then in possession, and that the proprietor's signature to the lease was wanted, his prompt return would be followed by a result quite different from that looked for — namely, a dismissal of the manager for having exceeded his duty in a very astonishing manner. This protest against the deliberate trampling down of principles recognized by the constitutions of companies, met with no response whatever — not a solitary sympathizer joined in the protest, even in a qualified form. Not only was the motion of approval carried, but it was carried without any definite knowledge of the agreement itself. Nothing more than the chairman's verbal description was vouchsafed: no printed copies of it had been previously circulated, or were to be had at the meeting. And yet, wonderful to relate, this proprietary body had been already once betrayed by an agree ment with this same leasing company! — had been led to un dertake the making of the line on the strength of a seeming guarantee which proved to be no guarantee! See, then, the lesson. The constitution of this company, like that of 250 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
companies in general, was purely democratic. The proprietors elected their directors, the directors their chairman; and there were special provisions for restraining directors and replacing them when needful. Yet these forms of free government had fallen into disuse. And it is thus in all cases. Save 011 occa sions when some scandalous mismanagement, or corruption bringing great loss, has caused a revolutionary excitement among them, rail way -proprietors do not exercise their power's. Retiring directors being re-elected as a matter of form, the boai'd becomes practically a close body; usually some one member, often the chairman, acquires supremacy; and so the government lapses into something between oligarchy and monarchy. All this, observe, happening not exceptionally but as a rule, happens among bodies of men mostly well educated, and many highly educated — people of means, merchants, law yers, clergymen, &c. Ample disproof, if there needed any, of the notion that men are to be fitted for the right exercise of power by teaching.
And now to return. Anyone who looks through these facts and facts akin to them for the truth they imply, may see that forms of government arc valuable only where they are products of national character. No cunningly -devised polit ical arrangements will of themselves do anything. No amount of knowledge respecting the uses of such arrange ments will suffice. Nothing will suffice but the emotional nature to which such arrangements are adapted — a nature which, during social progress, has evolved the arrangements. And wherever there is want of congruity between the nature and the arrangements — wherever the arrangements, suddenly established by revolution or pushed too far by reforming change, are of a higher type than the national character de mands, there is always a lapse proportionate to the incongru ity. In proof I might enumerate the illustrations that lie scattered through the modern histories of Greece, of South America, of Mexico. Or I might dwell on the lesson (before briefly referred to) presented us in France; where the political cycle shows us again and again that new Democracy is but old Despotism differently spelt — where now, as heretofore, we find Liberte, Egalite, Fraternitt, conspicuous on the public buildings, and now, as heretofore, have for interpretations of THE POLITICAL BIAS. 251 these words the extremest party-hatreds, vituperations and actual assaults in the Assemhly, wholesale arrests of men un friendly to those in power, forbiddings of public meetings, and suppressions of journals; and where now, as heretofore, writers professing to be ardent advocates of political freedom, rejoice in these acts which shackle and gag their antagonists. But I will take, instead, a case more nearly allied to our own. For less strikingly, and in other ways, but still with suffi cient clearness, this same truth is displayed in the United States. I do not refer only to such extreme illustrations of it as were at one time furnished in California; where, along with that complete political freedom which some think the sole requisite for social welfare, most men lived in perpetual fear for their lives, while others prided themselves on the notches which marked, on the hilts of their pistols, the num bers of men they had killed. Nor will I dwell on the state of society existing under republican forms in the West, where a white woman is burned to death for marrying a negro, where secret gangs murder in the night' men whose conduct they dislike, where mobs stop trains to lynch offending persons contained in them, where the carrying of a revolver is a matter of course, where judges are intimidated and the execu tion of justice often impracticable. I do but name these as extreme instances of the way in which, under institutions that nominally secure men from oppression, they may be intoler ably oppressed — unable to utter their opinions and to conduct their private lives as they please. Without going so far, we may find in the Eastern states proof enough that the forms of liberty and the reality of liberty are not necessarily commen surate. A state of things under which men administer justice in their own cases, are applauded for so doing, and mostly ac quitted if tried, is a state of things which has, in so far, retro graded towards a less civilized state; for one of the cardinal traits of political progress is the gradual disappearance of per sonal retaliation, and the increasing supremacy of a ruling power which settles the differences between individuals and punishes aggressors. And in proportion as this ruling power is enfeebled the security of individuals is lessened. How se curity, lessened in this general way, is lessened in more special ways, we see in the bribery of judges, in the financial frauds 252 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
by which many are robbed without possibility of remedy, in the corruptness of New York administration, which, taxing so heavily, does so little. And, under another aspect, we see the like in the doings of legislative bodies — in the unfair advan tages which some individuals gain over others by "lobbying," in Credit-Mobilier briberies, and the like. While the outside form of free government remains, there has grown up within it a reality which makes government not free. The body of professional politicians, entering public life to get incomes, organizing their forces and developing their tactics, have, in fact, come to be a ruling class quite different from that which the constitution intended to secure; and a class having inter ests by no means identical with public interests. This worship of the appliances to liberty in place of liberty itself, needs continually exposing. There is no intrinsic virtue in votes. The possession of representatives is not itself a benefit. These are but means to an end; and the end is the mainte nance of those conditions under which each citizen may carry on his life without further hindrances from other citizens than are involved by their equal claims — is the securing to each citizen all such beneficial results of his activities as his activi ties naturally bring. The worth of the means must be meas ured by the degree in which this end is achieved. A citizen nominally having complete means and but partially securing the end, is less free than another who uses incomplete means to more purpose.
But why go abroad for proofs of the truth that political forms are of worth only in proportion as they are vitalized by national character? We have proofs at home. I do not mean those furnished by past constitutional history— I do not merely refer to those many facts showing us that the nominal power of our representative body became an actual power only by degrees; and that the theoretically-independent House of Commons took centuries to escape from regal and aristocratic sway, and establish a practical independence. I refer to the present time, and to actions of our representative body in the plenitude of its power. This assembly of deputies chosen by large constituencies, and therefore so well fitted, as it would seem, for guarding the individual of whatever grade against trespasses upon his individuality, nevertheless itself THE POLITICAL BIAS. 253 authorizes new trespasses upon his individuality. A popular government has established, without the slightest hindrance, an official organization that treats with contempt the essential principles of constitutional rule; and since it has been made still more popular, has deliberately approved and maintained this organization. Here is a brief account of the steps leading to these results.
On the 20th June, 1864, just before 2 o'clock in the morn ing, there was read a first time an Act giving, in some locali ties, certain new powers to the police. On the 27th of that month, it was read a second time, entirely without comment — at what hour Hansard does not show. Just before 2 o'clock in the morning on. June 30th, there was appointed, without remark, a Select Committee to consider this proposed Act. On the 15th July the Report of this Committee was received. On the 19th the Bill was re-committed, and the Report on it received — all in silence. On the 20th July it was considered — still in silence — as amended. And on the 21st July it was read a third time and passed — equally in silence. Taken next day to the House of Lords, it there, in silence no less profound, passed through all its stages in four days (? three). This Act not proving strong enough to meet the views of naval and military officers (who, according to the testimony of one of the Select Committee, were the promoters of it), was, in 1866, "amended." At 1 o'clock in the morning on March 16th of that year, the Act amending it was read a first time; and it was read a second time on the 22nd, when the Secretary of the Admiralty, describing it as an Act to secure the better health of soldiers and sailors, said " it was intended to renew an Act passed in 1864, with additional powers." And now, for the first time, there came brief adverse remarks from two members. On April 9th there was appointed a Select Com mittee, consisting mainly of the same members as the previous one — predominantly state-officers of one class or other. On the 20th, the Report of the Committee was received. On the 26th, the Bill was re-committed just before 2 o'clock in the morning; and on the Report there came some short com ments, which were, however, protested against on the ground that the Bill was not to be publicly discussed. And here ob serve the reception given to the only direct opposition raised.
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When, to qualify a clause defining1 the powers of the police, it was proposed to add, " that the justices before whom such in formation shall be made, shall in all cases require corrobora tive testimony and support thereof, other than that of the members of the police force," this qualification was negatived without a word. Finally, this Act was approved and made more stringent by the present House of Commons in 1809.
And now what was this Act, passed the first time ab solutely without comment, and passed in its so-called amended form with but the briefest comments, made under protest that comments were interdicted? What was this measure, so conspicuously right that discussion of it was thought super fluous? It was a measure by which, in certain localities, one-half of the people were brought under the summary jurisdiction of magistrates, in respect of certain acts charged against them. Further, those by whom they were to be charged, and by whose unsupported testimony charges were to be proved, were agents of the law, looking for promotion as the reward of vigilance — agents placed under a permanent temptation to make and substantiate charges. And yet more, the substantiation of charges was made comparatively easy, by requiring only a single local magistrate to be convinced, by the testimony on oath of one of these agents of the law, that a person charged was guilty of the alleged acts — acts which, held to be thus proved, were punished by periodic examinations of a repulsive kind and forced inclusion in a degraded class. A House of Commons elected by large con stituencies, many of them chiefly composed of working-men, showed the greatest alacrity in making a law under which, in sundry districts, the liberty of a working-man's wife or daughter remains intact, only so long as a detective does not give evidence which leads a magistrate to believe her a pros titute! And this Bill which, even had there been some urgent need (which we have seen there was not) for dispens ing with precautions against injustice, should, at any rate, have been passed only after full debate and anxious criticism, was passed with every effort to maintain secrecy, on the pretext that decency forbade discussion of it; while Mor- daunt-cases and the like were being reported with a fulness proportionate to the amount of objectionable details they THE POLITICAL BIAS. 255 brought out! Nor is this all. Not only do the provisions of the Act make easy the establishment of charges by men who are placed under temptations to make them; but these men are guarded against penalties apt to be brought oil them by abusing their power. A poor woman who proceeds against one of them for making a groundless accusation ruinous to her character, does so with this risk before her; that if she fails to get a verdict she has to pay the defendant's costs; whereas a verdict in her favour does not give her costs: only by a special order of the judge does she get costs! And this is the " even-handed justice " provided by a government freer in form than any we have ever had! 10 Let it not be supposed that in arguing thus I am implying that forms of government are unimportant. While contend ing that they are of value only in so far as a national charac ter gives life to them, it is consistent also to contend that they are essential as agencies through which that national character may work out its effects. A boy cannot wield to purpose an implement of size and weight fitted to the hand of a man. A man cannot do effective work with a boy's implement: he must have one adapted to his larger grasp and greater strength. To each the implement is essential; but the results which each achieves are not to be measured by the size or make of the implement alone, but by its adap tation to his powers. Similarly with political instrumen talities. It is possible to hold that a political instrumentality is of value only in proportion as there exists a strength of character needful for using it, and at the same time to hold that a fit political instrumentality is indispensable. Here, as before, results are not proportionate to appliances; but they are proportionate to the force for due operation of which certain appliances are necessary.
One other still more general and more subtle kind of political bias has to be guarded against. Beyond that excess of faith in laws, and in political forms, which is fostered by awe of regulative agencies, there is, even among those least swayed by this awe, a vague faith in the immediate possi bility of something much better than now exists — a tacit assumption that, even with men as they are, public affairs 256 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
might be much better managed. The mental attitude of such may be best displayed by an imaginary conversation between one of them and a member of the Legislature.
" Why do your agents, with no warrant but a guess, mako this surcharge on my income-tax return; leaving me to pay an amount that is not due and to establish a precedent for future like payments, or else to lose valuable time in proving their assessment excessive, and, while so doing, to expose my affairs? You require me to choose between two losses, direct and indirect, for the sole reason that your assessor fancies, or professes to fancy, that I have under-stated my income. Why do you allow this? Why in this case do you invert the principle which, in cases between citizens, you hold to be an equitable one — the principle that a claim must be proved by him who makes it, not disproved by him against whom it is made? Is it in pursuance of old political usages that you do this? Is it to harmonize with the practice of making one whom you had falsely accused, pay the costs of his defence, although in suits between citizens you require the loser to bear all the expense? — a practice you have but lately re linquished. Do you desire to keep up the spirit of the good old rulers who impressed labourers and paid them what they pleased, or the still older rulers who seized whatever they wanted? Would you maintain this tradition by laying hands on as much as possible of my earnings and leaving me to get part back if I can: expecting, indeed, that I shall submit to the loss rather than undergo the worry, and hindrance, and injury, needful to recover what you have wrongfully taken? I was brought up to regard the Government and its officers as my protectors; and now I find them aggressors against whom I have to defend myself."
" What would you have? Our agents could not bring for ward proof that an income-tax return was less than it should be. Either the present method must be pursued, or the tax must be abandoned."
" I have no concern with your alternative. I have merely to point out that between man and man you recognize no such plea. When a plaintiff makes a claim but cannot pro duce evidence, you do not make the defendant submit if he fails to show that the claim is groundless. You say that if THE POLITICAL BIAS. 257 no evidence can be given, nothing can be done. Why do you ignore this principle when your agent makes the claim? Why from the fountain of equity comes there this inequity? Is it to maintain consistency with that system of criminal jurisprudence under which, while professing to hold a man innocent till proved guilty, you treat him before trial like a convict — as you did Dr. Hessel? Are your views really represented by these Middlesex magistrates you have ap pointed, who see 110 hardships to a man of culture in the seclusion of a prison-cell, and the subjection to prison-rules, on the mere suspicion that he has committed a murder? " " The magistrates held that the rules allowed them to make no distinctions. You would not introduce class-legislation into prison-discipline? " " I remember that was one of the excuses; and I cheerfully give credit to this endeavour to treat all classes alike. I do so the more cheerfully because this application of the principle of equality differs much from those which you ordinarily make — as when, on discharging some of your well-paid of ficials who have held sinecures, you give them large pensions, for the reason, I suppose, that their expensive styles of living have disabled them from saving anything; while, when you discharge dock-yard labourers, you do not give them compen sation, for the reason, I suppose, that out of weekly wages it is easy to accumulate a competence. This, however, by the way. I am here concerned with that action of your judicial system which makes it an aggressor on citizens, whether rich or poor, instead of a protector. The instances I have given are but trivial instances of its general operation. Law is still a name of dread, as it was in past times. My legal adviser, being my friend, strongly recommends me not to seek your aid in re covering property fraudulently taken from me; and I per ceive, from their remarks, that my acquaintances would pity me as a lost man if I got into your Court of Equity. Whether active or passive, I am in danger. Your arrangements are such that I may be pecuniarily knocked on the head by some one who pretends I have injured his property. I have the alternative of letting my pocket be picked by the scamp who makes this baseless allegation in the hope of being paid to desist, or of meeting the allegation in Chancery, and there 18