course, it is not asserted that the specialities of mind here de scribed as having been developed in women by the necessities of defence in their dealings with men, are peculiar to them: 344 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
in men also they have been developed as aids to defence in their dealings with one another. But the difference is that whereas, in their dealings with one another, men depended on these aids only in some measure, women in their dealings with men depended upon them almost wholly — within the domestic circle as well as without it. Hence, in virtue of that partial limitation of heredity by sex, which many facts through out Nature shows us, they have come to be more marked in women than in men.7 One further distinctive mental trait in women, springs out of the relation of the sexes as adjusted to the welfare of the race. I refer to the effect which the manifestation of power of every kind in men, has in determining the attachments of women. That this is a trait inevitably produced, will be manifest on asking what would have happened if women had by preference attached themselves to the weaker men. If the weaker men had habitually left posterity when the stronger did not, a progressive deterioration of the race would have resulted. Clearly, therefore, it has happened (at least, since the cessation of marriage by capture or by purchase has allowed feminine choice to play an important part), that, among women unlike in their tastes, those who were fasci nated by power, bodily or mental, and who married men able to protect them and their children, were more likely to sur vive in posterity than women to whom weaker men were pleasing, and whose children were both less efficiently guarded and less capable of self-preservation if they reached maturity. To this admiration for power, caused thus inevitably, is ascri- bable the fact sometimes commented upon as strange, that women will continue attached to men who use them ill, but whose brutality goes along with power, more than they will continue attached to weaker men who use them well. With this admiration of power, primarily hav ing this function, there goes the admiration of power in gen eral; which is more marked in women than in men, and shows itself both theologically and politically. That the emo tion of awe aroused by contemplating whatever suggests transcendent force or capacity, which constitutes religious feeling, is strongest in women, is proved in many ways. We read that among the Greeks the women were more religiously PREPARATION IN PSYCHOLOGY. 345 excitable than the men. Sir Rutherford Alcock tells us of the Japanese that " in the temples it is very rare to see any congregation except women and children; the men, at any time, are very few, and those generally of the lower classes." Of the pilgrims to the temple of Juggernaut, it is stated that "at least five-sixths, and often nine-tenths, of them are fe males." And we are also told of the Sikhs, that the women believe in more gods than the men do. Which facts, coming from different races and times, sufficiently show us that the like fact, familiar to us in Roman Catholic countries and to some extent at home, is not, as many think, due to the edu cation of women, but has a deeper cause in natural character. And to this same cause is in like manner to be ascribed the greater respect felt by women for all embodiments and sym bols of authority, governmental and social.
Thus the a priori inference, that fitness for their respec tive parental functions implies mental differences between the sexes, as it implies bodily differences, is justified; as is also the kindred inference that secondary differences are necessitated by their relations to one another. Those uiilike- nesses of mind between men and women, which, under the conditions, were to be expected, are the unlikenesses we actu ally find. That they are fixed in degree, by no means follows: indeed, the contrary follows. Determined as we see they some of them are by adaptation of primitive women's natures to the natures of primitive men, it is inferable that as civilization re adjusts men's natures to higher social requirements, there goes on a corresponding re-adjustment between the natures of men and women, tending in sundry respects to diminish their differences. Especially may we anticipate that those mental peculiarities developed in women as aids to defence against men in barbarous times, will diminish. It is probable, too, that though all kinds of power will continue to be attractive to them, the attractiveness of physical strength and the mental attributes that commonly go along with it, will de cline; while the attributes which conduce to social influence will become more attractive. Further, it is to be anticipated that the higher culture of women, carried 011 within such limits as shall not unduly tax the physique (and here, by higher culture, I do not mean mere language-learning and an 346 TEE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
extension of the detestable cramming-system at present in use), will in other ways reduce the contrast. Slowly leading to the result everywhere seen throughout the organic world, of a self-preserving power inversely proportionate to the race-preserving power, it will entail a less-early arrest of in dividual evolution, and a diminution of those mental differ ences between men and women, which the early arrest pro duces.
Admitting such to be changes which the future will prob ably see wrought out, we have meanwhile to bear in mind these traits of intellect and feeling which distinguish women, and to take note of them as factors in social phenomena- much more important factors than we commonly suppose. Considering them in the above order, we may note, first, that the love of the helpless, which in her maternal capacity wom an displays in a more special form than man, inevitably affects all her thoughts and sentiments; and this being joined in her with a less-developed sentiment of abstract justice, she responds more readily when appeals to pity are made, than when appeals are made to equity. In foregoing chapters we have seen how much our social policy disregards the claims of individuals to whatever their efforts purchase, so long as no obvious misery is brought on them by the disregard; but when individuals suffer in ways conspicuous enough to excite commiseration, they get aid, and often as much aid if their sufferings are caused by themselves as if they are caused by others—often greater aid, indeed. This social policy, to which men tend in an injurious degree, women tend to still more. The maternal instinct delights in yielding benefits apart from deserts; and being partially excited by whatever shows a feebleness that appeals for help (supposing antagonism has not been aroused), carries into social action this preference of generosity to justice, even more than men do. A further tendency having the same general direction, results from the aptitude which the feminine intellect has to dwell on the con crete and proximate rather than on the abstract and remote. The representative faculty in women deals quickly and clearly with the personal, the special, and the immediate; but less readily grasps the general and the impersonal. A vivid im agination of simple direct consequences mostly shuts out from PREPARATION IN PSYCHOLOGY. 347 her mind the imagination of consequences that are complex and indirect. The respective behaviours of mothers and fathers to children, sufficiently exemplify this difference, mothers thinking chiefly of present effects on the conduct of children, and regarding less the distant effects on their characters; while fathers often repress the promptings of their sympathies with a view to ultimate benefits. And this difference between their ways of estimating consequences, affecting their judgments on social affairs as on domestic affairs, makes women err still more than men do in seeking what seems an immediate pub lic good without thought of distant public evils. Once more, we have in women the predominant awe of power and au thority, swaying their ideas and sentiments about all institu tions. This tends towards the strengthening of governments, political and ecclesiastical. Faith in whatever presents itself with imposing accompaniments, is, for the reason above as signed, especially strong in women. Doubt, or criticism, or calling-in-question of things that are established, is rare among them. Hence in public affairs their influence goes towards the maintenance of controlling agencies, arid does not resist the extension of such agencies: rather, in pursuit of immedi ate promised benefits, it urges on that extension; since the concrete good in view excludes from their thoughts the re mote evils of multiplied restraints. Reverencing power more than men do, women, by implication, respect freedom less — freedom, that is, not of the nominal kind, but of that real kind which consists in the ability of each to carry on his own life without hindrance from others, so long as he does not hinder them.
As factors in social phenomena, these distinctive mental traits of women have ever to be remembered. Women have in all times played a part, and, in modern days, a very nota ble part, in determining social arrangements. They act both directly and indirectly. Directly, they take a large, if not the larger, share in that ceremonial government which supple ments the political and ecclesiastical governments, and as supporters of these other governments, especially the ecclesi astical, their direct aid is by no means unimportant. Indi rectly, they act by modifying the opinions and sentiments of men — first, in education, when the expression of maternal 348 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
thoughts and feelings affects the thoughts and feelings of boys, and afterwards in domestic and social intercourse, dur ing which the feminine sentiments sway men's public acts, both consciously and unconsciously. Whether it is desirable that the share already taken by women in determining social arrangements and actions should be increased, is a question we will leave undiscussed. Here I am concerned merely to point out that, in the course of a psychological preparation for the study of Sociology, we must include the- comparative psy chology of the sexes; so that if any change is made, we may make it knowing what we are doing.
Assent to the general proposition set forth in this chapter, does not depend on assent to the particular propositions un folded in illustrating it. Those who, while pressing forward education, are so certain they know what good education is, that, in an essentially-Papal spirit, they wish to force chil dren through their existing school-courses, under penalty on parents who resist, wTill not have their views modified by what has been said. I do not look, either, for any appreciable effect on those who shut out from consideration the reactive influence on moral nature, entailed by the action of a system of intellectual culture wrhich habituates parents to make the public responsible for their children's minds. Nor do I think it likely that many of those who wish to change funda mentally the political status of women, will be influenced by the considerations above set forth on the comparative psy chology of the sexes. But without acceptance of these illus trative conclusions, there may be acceptance of the general conclusion, that psychological truths underlie sociological truths, and must therefore be sought by the sociologist. For whether discipline of the intellect does or does not change the emotions; whether national character is or is not progres sively adapted to social conditions; whether the minds of men and women are or are not alike; are obviously psycho logical questions; and either answer to any one of them, im plies a psychological conclusion. Hence, whoever on any of these questions has a conviction to which he would give legis lative expression, is basing a sociological belief upon a psy chological belief; and cannot deny that the one is true only PREPARATION IN PSYCHOLOGY. 349 if the other is true. Having admitted this, he must admit that without preparation in Mental Science there can be no Social Science. For, otherwise, he must assert that the ran domly-made and carelessly-grouped observations on Mind, common to all people, are better as guides than observations cautiously collected, critically examined, and generalized in a systematic way.
No one, indeed, who is once led to dwell on the matter, can fail to see how absurd is the supposition that there can be a rational interpretation of men's combined actions, without a previous rational interpretation of those thoughts and feelings by which their individual actions are prompted. Nothing comes out of a society but what originates in the motive of an individual, or in the united similar motives of many individ uals, or in the conflict of the united similar motives of some having certain interests, with the diverse motives of others whose interests are diff erent. Always the power which initi ates a change is feeling, separate or aggregated, guided to its ends by intellect; and not even an approach to an explana tion of social phenomena can be made, without the thoughts and sentiments of citizens being recognized as factors. How, then, can there be a true account of social actions without a true account of these thoughts and sentiments? Manifestly, those who ignore Psychology as a preparation for Sociology, can defend their position only by proving that while other groups of phenomena require special study, the phenomena of Mind, in all their variety and intricacy, are best understood without special study; and that knowledge of human nature gained haphazard, becomes obscure and misleading in propor tion as there is added to it knowledge deliberately sought and carefully put together.
CHAPTER XVI.
CONCLUSION.
OF readers who have.accompanied me thus far, probably some think that the contents of the work go beyond the limits implied by its title. Under the head, Study of Sociology, so many sociological questions have been incidentally discussed, that the science itself has been in a measure dealt with while dealing' with the study of it. Admitting1 this criticism, my excuse must be that the fault, if it is one, has been scarcely avoidable. Nothing to much purpose can be said about the study of any science without saying a good deal about the general and special truths it includes, or what the expositor holds to be truths. To write an essay on the study of Astron omy in which there should be no direct or implied conviction respecting the Copernican theory of the Solar System, nor any such recognition of the Law of Gravitation as involved ac ceptance or rejection of it, would be a task difficult to execute, and, when executed, probably of little value. Similarly with Sociology — it is next to impossible for a writer who points out the way towards its truths, to exclude all tacit or avowed expressions of opinion about those truths; and, were it possi ble to exclude such expressions of opinion, it would be at the cost of those illustrations needed to make his exposition effective.
Such must be, in part, my defence for having set down many thoughts which the title of this work does not cover. Especially have I found myself obliged thus to transgress, by representing the study of Sociology as the study of Evolu tion in its most complex form. It is clear that to one who considers the facts societies exhibit as having had their origin in supernatural interpositions, or in the wills of individual CONCLUSION. 351 ruling men, the study of these facts will have an aspect wholly unlike that which it has to one who contemplates them as generated by processes of growth and development continuing through centuries. Ignoring, as the first view tacitly does, that conformity to law, in the scientific sense of the word, which the second view tacitly asserts, there can be but little community between the methods of inquiry proper to them respectively. Continuous causation, which in the one case there is little or no tendency to trace, becomes, in the other case, the chief object of attention; whence it follows that there must be formed wholly-different ideas of the ap propriate modes of investigation. A foregone conclusion respecting the nature of social phenomena, is thus inevitably implied in any suggestions for the study of them.
While, however, it must be admitted that throughout this work there runs the assumption that the facts, simultaneous and successive, which societies present, have a genesis 110 less natural than the genesis of facts of all other classes; it is not admitted that this assumption was made unawares, or without warrant. At the outset, the grounds for it were examined. The notion, widely accepted in name though not consistently acted upon, that social phenomena differ from phenomena of most other kinds as being under special providence, we found to be entirely discredited by its expositors; nor, when closely looked into, did the great-man-theory of social affairs prove to be more tenable. Besides finding that both these views, rooted as they are in the ways of thinking natural to primi tive men, would not bear criticism; we found that even their defenders continually betrayed their beliefs in the production of social changes by natural causes — tacitly admitted that after certain antecedents certain consequents are to be ex pected — tacitly admitted, therefore, that some prevision is possible, and therefore some subject-matter for Science. From these negative justifications for the belief that So ciology is a science, we turned to the positive justifications.
We found that every aggregate of units of any order, has certain traits necessarily determined by the properties of its units. Hence it was inferable, a priori, that, given the natures of the men who are their units, and certain charac ters in the societies formed are pre-determined — other charac- 352 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
ters being determined by the co-operation of surrounding conditions. The current assertion that Sociology is not possible, implies a misconception of its nature. Using the analogy supplied by a human life, we saw that just as bodily development and structure and function, furnish subject- matter for biological science, though the events set forth by the biographer go beyond its range; so, social growth, and the rise of structures and functions accompanying it, furnish subject-matter for a Science of Society, though the facts with which historians fill their pages mostly yield no material for Science. Thus conceiving the scope of the science, we saw, on comparing rudimentary societies with one another and with societies in different stages of progress, that they do present certain common traits of structure and of function, as well as certain common traits of development. Further comparisons similarly made, opened large questions, such as that of the relation between social growth and organization, which form parts of this same science;— questions of tran scendent importance compared with those occupying the minds of politicians and writers of history The difficulties of the Social Science next drew our atten tion. We saw that in this case, though in no other case, the facts to be observed and generalized by the student, are ex hibited by an aggregate of which he forms a part. In his capacity of inquirer, he should have no inclination towards one or other conclusion respecting the phenomena to be gen eralized; but in his capacity of citizen, helped to live by the life of his society, imbedded in its structures, sharing in its activities, breathing its atmosphere of thought and sentiment, he is partially coerced into such views as favour harmonious co-operation with his fellow-citizens. Hence immense ob stacles to the Social Science, unparalleled by those standing in the way of any other science.
From considering thus generally these causes of error, we turned to consider them specially. Under the head of objec tive difficulties, we«jglanced at those many ways in which evi dence collected by the sociological inquirer is vitiated. That extreme untrustworthiness of witnesses which results from carelessness, or fanaticism, or self-interest, was illustrated; CONCLUSION. 353 CONCLUSION. 353 and we saw that, in addition to the perversions of statement hence arising, there are others which arise from the tendency there is for some kinds of evidence to draw attention, while evidence of opposite kinds, much larger in quantity, draws no attention. Further, it was shown that the nature of socio logical facts, each of which is not observable in a single object or act, but is reached only through registration and compari son of many objects and acts, makes the perception of them harder than that of other facts. It was pointed out that the wide distribution of social phenomena in Space, greatly hin ders true apprehensions of them; and it was also pointed out that another impediment, even still greater, is consequent on their distribution in Time— a distribution such that many of the facts to be dealt with, take centuries to unfold, and can be grasped only by combining in thought multitudinous changes that are slow, involved, and not easy to trace. Beyond these difficulties which we grouped as distinguishing the science itself, objectively considered, we saw that there are other difficulties, conveniently to be grouped as subjective, which are also great. For the interpretation of human con duct as socially displayed, every one is compelled to use, as a key, his own nature — ascribing to others thoughts and feelings like his own; and yet, while this automorphic interpretation is indispensable, it is necessarily more or less misleading. Very generally, too, a subjective difficulty arises from the lack of intellectual faculty complex enough to grasp these social phenomena, which are so extremely involved. And again, very few have by culture gained that plasticity of faculty requisite for conceiving and accepting those immensely-varied actualities which societies in different times and places dis play, and those multitudinous possibilities to be inferred from them. Nor, of subjective difficulties, did these exhaust