that the remote future has in store, forms of social life higher than any we have imagined: there comes a faith transcend ing that of the Radical, whose aim is some re-organization admitting of comparison to organizations which exist. And while this conception of societies as naturally evolved, be ginning with small and simple types which have their short existences and disappear, advancing to higher types that are larger, more complex, and longer-lived, coming to still-higher types like our own, great in size, complexity, and duration, and promising types transcending these in times after exist ing societies have died away — while this conception of so cieties implies that in the slow course of things changes almost immeasurable in amount are possible, it also implies that but small amounts of such changes are possible within short periods.
Thus, the theory of progress disclosed by the study of CONCLUSION. 365 CONCLUSION. 365 Sociology as science, is one which greatly moderates the hopes and the fears of extreme parties. After clearly seeing that the structures and actions throughout a society are de termined by the properties of its units, and that (external dis turbances apart) the society cannot be substantially and per manently changed without its units being substantially and permanently changed, it becomes easy to see that great altera tions cannot suddenly be made to much purpose. And when both the party of progress arid the party of resistance perceive that the institutions which at any time exist are more deeply rooted than they supposed — when the one party perceives that these institutions, imperfect as they are, have a tem porary fitness, while the other party perceives that the main tenance of them, in so far as it is desirable, is in great measure guaranteed by the human nature they have grown out of; there must come a diminishing violence of attack on one side, and a diminishing perversity of defence 011 the other. Evidently, so far as a doctrine can influence general conduct (which it can do, however, in but a comparatively-small de gree), the Doctrine of Evolution, in its social application, is calculated to produce a steadying effect, alike on thought and action.
If, as seems likely, some should propose to draw the seem ingly-awkward corollary that it matters not what we believe or what we teach, since the process of social evolution will take its own course in spite of us; I reply that while this corollary is in one sense true, it is in another sense untrue. Doubtless, from all that has been said it follows that, suppos ing surrounding conditions continue the same, the evolution of a society cannot be in any essential way diverted from its general course; though it also follows (and here the corollary is at fault) that the thoughts and actions of individuals, being natural factors that arise in the course of the evolution itself, and aid in further advancing it, cannot be dispensed with, but must be severally valued as increments of the aggregate force producing change. But while the corollary is even here par tially misleading, it is, in another direction, far more seriously misleading. For though the process of social evolution is in its general character so far pre-determined, that its successive stages cannot be ante-dated, and that hence no teaching or 3G6 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
policy can advance it beyond a certain normal rate, which is limited by the rate of organic modification in human beings; yet it is quite possible to perturb, to retard, or to disorder the process. The analogy of individual development again serves us. The unfolding of an organism after its special type, has its approximately-uniform course taking its tolerably-definite time; and no treatment that may be devised will fundamen tally change or greatly accelerate these: the best that can be done is to maintain the required favourable conditions. But it is quite easy to adopt a treatment which shall dwarf, or de form, or otherwise injure: the processes of growth and de velopment may be, and very often are, hindered or de ranged, though they cannot be artificially bettered. Similarly with the social organism. Though, by maintaining favour able conditions, there cannot be more good done than that of letting social progress go on unhindered; yet an immensity of mischief may be done in the way of disturbing and dis torting and repressing, by policies carried out in pursuance of erroneous conceptions. And thus, notwithstanding first ap pearances to the contrary, there is a very important part to be played by a true theory of social phenomena.
A few words to those who think these general conclusions discouraging, may be added. Probably the more enthusi astic, hopeful of great ameliorations in the state of mankind, to be brought about rapidly by propagating this belief or initiating that reform, will feel that a doctrine negativing their sanguine anticipations takes away much of the stimulus to exertion. If large advances in human welfare can come only in the slow process of things, which will inevitably bring them; why should we trouble ourselves?
Doubtless it is true that on visionary hopes, rational criti cisms have a depressing influence. It is better to recognize the truth, however. As between infancy and maturity there is no shortcut by which there may be avoided the tedious process of growth and development through insensible increments; so there is no way from the lower forms of social life to the higher, but one passing through small successive modifica tions. If we contemplate the order of nature, we see that everywhere vast results are brought about by accumulations CONCLUSION. 367 CONCLUSION. 367 of minute actions. The surface of the Earth has been sculp tured by forces which in the course of a year produce altera tions scarcely anywhere visible. Its multitudes of different organic forms have arisen by processes so slow, that, during the periods our observations extend over, the results are in most cases inappreciable. We must be content to recognize these truths and conform our hopes to them. Light, falling upon a crystal, is capable of altering its molecular arrange ments, but it can do this only by a repetition of impulses almost innumerable: before a unit of ponderable matter can have its rhythmical movements so increased by successive etherial waves, as to be detached from its combination and arranged in another way, millions of such etherial waves must successively make infinitesimal additions to its motion. Similarly, before there arise in human nature and human in stitutions, changes having that permanence which makes them an acquired inheritance for the human race, there must go in numerable recurrences of the thoughts, and feelings, and actions, conducive to such changes. The process cannot be abridged; and must be gone through with due patience.
Thus, admitting that for the fanatic some wild anticipation is needful as a stimulus, and recognizing the usefulness of his delusion as adapted to his particular nature and his particular function, the man of higher type must be content with greatly-moderated expectations, while he perseveres with un- diminished efforts. He has to see how comparatively little can be done, and yet to find it worth while to do that little: so uniting philanthropic energy wTith philosophic calm.
POSTSCKIPT.
POSTSCKIPT.
EVEN in conversations about simple matters, statements clearly made are often misconceived from impatience of at tention. The tendency to conclude quickly from small evi dence, which leads most people to judge of strangers on a first meeting, and which causes them to express surprise when to the question — " How do you like so and so," you reply that you have formed no opinion, is often betrayed in their habits as listeners. Continually it turns out that from the beginning of a sentence in course of utterance, they have inferred an entire meaning; and, ignoring the qualifying clauses which follow, quite misapprehend the idea conveyed. This impa tience of attention is connected with, and often results from, inability to grasp as a whole the elements of a complex propo sition. One who undertakes to explain an involved matter to a person of undisciplined intelligence, finds that though the person has understood each part of the explanation, he has failed to co-ordinate the parts; because the first has dropped out of his mind before the last is reached.
This holds not of listeners only, but of many readers. Either a premature conclusion positively formed from the earlier portions of an exposition, makes further reading seem superfluous; or else the explanations afterwards read do not adequately modify this conclusion which has already ob tained possession, and on behalf of which some amour propre is enlisted; or else there is an incapacity for comprehending in their totality the assembled propositions, of which the earlier are made tenable only by combination with the later.
I am led to make these remarks by finding how greatly misunderstood have been some of the doctrines set forth in 370 THE STUDY OP SOCIOLOGY.
this work. Where I had, as I believed, made my meaning clear, and where, on re-reading, the statements still seem to me adequate, I have been supposed to express views quite different from those I intended to express. The issue of this revised edition affords an opportunity for rectifying these misinterpretations, and I gladly take it.
I will begin with one which, partly ascribable to the causes just indicated, is partly ascribable to another cause. It shows in a striking manner, how established modes of con ceiving things hinder the formation of alien conceptions: even to the extent of producing an apparent inability to form them.
In Chapter XIV., I have contended that policies, legislative and other, which, while hindering survival of the fittest, further the propagation of the unfit, work grave mischiefs. In the course of the argument I have said: — " Fostering the good-for-nothing at the expense of the good, is an extreme cruelty. It is a deliberate stirring-up of miseries for future generations. There is no greater curse to posterity than that of be queathing them an increasing population of imbeciles and idlers and criminals. To aid the bad in multiplying is, in effect, the same as maliciously providing for our descendants a multitude of enemies. It may be doubted whether the maudlin philanthropy which, looking only at direct mitigations, persistently ignores indirect mischiefs, does not inflict a greater total of misery than the extremest selfishness inflicts."
After insisting on the blameworthiness of those who, by thoughtless giving, increase suffering instead of decreasing it, I have guarded myself against misinterpretation by say ing:— " Doubtless it is in the order of things that parental affection, the regard of relatives, and the spontaneous generosity of friends and even of strangers, should mitigate the pains which incapacity has to bear, and the penalties which unfit impulses bring round. Doubtless in many cases the reactive influence of this sympathetic care which the better take of the worse, is morally beneficial, and in a degree compensates by good in one direction for evil in another. It may be fully admitted that individual altruism, left to itself, will work ad vantageously — wherever, at least, it does not go to the extent of help ing the unworthy to multiply."
POSTSCRIPT. 371 And the reprobation I have expressed is mainly directed against the public agencies which do coercively what should be done voluntarily: as where I have said that "A mechanically-working State-apparatus, distributing money drawn from grumbling rate-payers, produces little or no moralizing effect on the capables to make up for multiplication of the incapables."
Little did I think that these passages would bring on me condemnation as an enemy to the poor. Yet in four French periodicals, representing divergent schools of French opinion, have I been thus condemned. Here is a passage from the Bulletin du Mouvement Social, 15 Juin, 1879: — "Qu'un economiste imbu exclusivement des principes du Dar- winisme se mette a raisonner sur la condition des miserables, votis le verrez arriver a un VCR mis&ris aussi barbare que le vce victis des an- ciens. II vous dira que, dans Finteret du progres de Fespecc, il faut sacrifier sans pitie ceux qui ne sont pas armes dans la lutte pour Fexistence. Je le ne leur fais pas dire. Ecoutez Spencer," &c. And here are passages from a review of the Study of Soci ology, published in the Revue des deux Mondes, Vol. VI. of " Condamner d'avance la faiblesse et Finfirmite, c'est revenir a la theorie lacedemonienne de 1'exposition des enfans. Si Ton etait meme consequent, il ne sufflrait plus de laisser mourir, il faudrait aller jusqu'a supprirner."
Then representing it as monstrous to "afficher ces conse quences barbares au nom d'une loi biologique," and reproach ing me with paying no regard to the social sentiments, to the tenderness for the feeble, and so on, the reviewer winds up by exclaiming: — k "Quelle ecole de philosophic que celle ou un Las Cases, un Vincent de Paul, un abbe de 1'fipee, un Wilberforce, seraient considered comme les ennemis de Fespece humaine! " M. Paul Janet, a member of the Institute of France, is the writer of these last passages. I have recognized, as who would not, the beneficence of " parental affection " as fostering the feeble; and yet he describes me as practically desiring a re turn to the Spartan practice of exposing infants! I have said that "the regard of relatives" may rightly "mitigate the pains which incapacity has to bear: " and yet he asserts that I would leave the infirm to die, and, logically, am bound to wish them destroyed! I have admitted that '' the spontaneous 372 THE STUDY OP SOCIOLOGY.
generosity of friends and even of strangers " should qualify " the penalties which unfit impulses bring round; " and yet the " consequences barbares " of my doctrine are represented as being not simply absence of aid to the inferior but active suppression of them! I have said that "individual altruism, left to itself, will work advantageously; " and yet it is alleged that I must consider the distinguished philanthropists he names as enemies of the human race!
That M. Janet's reproaches are unwarranted, and that he has circulated statements of my views widely at variance with the truth, is sufficiently manifest. A thing not so manifest is that he does not see, or will not see, that the general doctrine urged, is urged as being more humane instead of less humane. He is apparently blind to the fact that a kindness which con siders only proximate effects may be, and often is, much less in degree than a kindness which takes into account ultimate effects. A sympathy which thinks only of the suffering an operation will give, and exclaims at the cruelty of performing it, is a sympathy inferior to that which, equally affected by the pain inflicted, nevertheless inflicts it, that dying agonies may be escaped and restoration to health and happiness achieved. Anxiety for the welfare of the poor and efforts on their behalf may coexist with profound disapproval of, and strong opposition to, all policies which forcibly burden the worthy that the unworthy may be fostered. If an illustration of their coexistence be asked, I can furnish a conclusive one in the case of a late relative of mine, the Rev. Thos. Spencer, for many years clergyman of a rural parish in Somerset shire. Uncared-for as were his parishioners when he went among them, he established first a Sunday-school, then a vil lage day-school, then a village-library, then land-allotments for labourers, then a clothing club. To his local philanthropic actions were added general ones. He made efforts for church- reform (thus offending his bishop and destroying his chance of preferment); he publicly shared in a movement for extend ing the suffrage; he took an active part as writer and speaker in the Aiiti-Corn-Law agitation; he gave countless lectures in furtherance of temperance. When not otherwise occupied he wrote pamphlets (twenty-two in number) all directed in one or other way to improving the condition, bodily and mental, of POSTSCRIPT. 373 the masses; and he eventually died prematurely from the effects of over-work in seeking to ameliorate the lives of the less-happily placed and the less-happily constituted. And now what were his views on the question here at issue? Orig inally, while yet his experience of results was narrow, he was always on the side of the pauper and against the over seer; but as his experience widened, first in his own parish and then as chairman of the Bath Union, he became an avowed opponent to all compulsory charity. Of his four tracts under the title Reasons for a Poor-law considered, dated 1841, the first, setting out by adverting to the evils a Poor-law entails, asks, " whether there are any adequate rea sons that such a law should exist at all; " and the remaining three are occupied in showing that there are no adequate rea sons. In the course of the argument he gives cases, coming under his own observation, of the sufferings caused. He names industrious men for many weeks out of work, com pelled to pay rates and starve their children, that the idle might not be hungry; men invalided, whose allowances from sick clubs to which they had for years subscribed, were in part swept away by the overseer's agent; widows whose off spring had to be further pinched that support might be given to women with illegitimate offspring; artizans settled in other parishes, losing their goods by distraint for nonpayment of rates and obliged to return to their own parishes as paupers. These and other such atrocities committed in the name of Law, strengthened in him the conviction otherwise reached, that public charity is essentially vicious; and the evidence I have given proves that not lack of deep sympathy with the inferior and the miserable was the cause, but a still deeper sympathy with good men in adversity, whose difficulties, already great, were artificially made greater.
While to repudiate M. Janet's interpretation of my views has been one purpose of the foregoing paragraphs, a further purpose has been that of illustrating the truth set forth in Chapter III., that in every society there is maintained a gen eral congruity between the nature of the aggregate and the nature of the units — a truth which I have elsewhere (Data of Ethics, §§ 38, 50) reverted to as implying that always a gen eral harmony between institutions and opinions establishes 374 THE STUDY OP SOCIOLOGY.
itself. For with a clearness greater even than I was prepared to find, we are here shown how the form of a social organiza tion and the entailed social habits, generate a correlative mode of thinking from which it seems scarcely possible to escape. M. Janet and those various other French critics who have expressed the same view, are so habituated to the thought of State-control as extending over all social affairs, that they have become almost incapacitated for conceiving of social affairs as any of them otherwise regulated. Everything in their experience being administered, they are scarcely able to entertain the idea that anything can do without administra tion. The question with regard to each public matter is — Will it be better for the Government to take this course or that course? and the question— Will it be better for the Govern ment to do nothing? is a question which can scarcely find entrance. Hence in the case before us, it happens that the only possible alternatives recognized, are fostering the inferior or suppressing the inferior. Tbat public agency should neither foster nor suppress seems to have become inconceivable. For there is entirely ignored the conclusion I have urged, that the unworthy, and those whose defects bring evils on them, while they should be left free to do the best they can for themselves, should receive such help only as private sympathy prompts relatives, friends, and strangers to give them.
From the doctrines set forth in this work, some have drawn the corollary that effort in furtherance of progress is superfluous. " If," they argue, " the evolution of a society conforms general laws — if the changes which, in the slow course of things bring it about, are naturally determined; then what need is there of endeavours to aid it? The hy pothesis implies that the transformation results from causes beyond individual wills; and, if so, the acts of individuals in fulfilment of their wills are not required to effect it. Hence we may occupy ourselves exclusively with personal concerns; leaving social evolution to go its own way."
This is a misapprehension -naturally fallen into and not quite easy to escape from; for to get out of it the citizen must simultaneously conceive himself as one whose will is a factor in social evolution, and yet as one whose will is a product of POSTSCRIPT. 375 all antecedent influences, social included. How to unite these conceptions will best be seen on reverting to the rela tions between the social organism, and its components, as most generally stated.
In Chapter III. the truth that the nature of an aggregate is determined by the natures of its units, first illustrated in the cases of aggregates of simpler kinds, was then alleged of the social aggregate. It was pointed out that the particular set of relations into which the members of a community fall, depends on their characters — that where their characters are of a certain kind, no social structure at all arises; that where some ability to co-operate is shown, they habitually present some common traits implied by submission to control; and that, on comparing societies of all orders, those which differ widely in their structures are found to differ widely in the natures of their members, while those which are but little dissimilar do not present great dissimilarities of popular character. Further, we saw that there goes on a reciprocal action and reaction between each people and its institutions. If by altered circumstances, such as those which continuous war or prolonged peace involve, some social structures are rendered inactive and dwindle, while others are brought into greater activity and grow, the natures of citizens are modified into congruity with them. While, conversely, if changed modes of life change the characters of citizens, their changed characters presently cause responsive changes in their in stitutions.
But now under what condition alone can the changed characters of citizens work changes in their institutions? The condition is that their changed characters shall display them selves in changed actions. To expect that the society will evolve further while they remain passive, is to expect that it will evolve further without cause. Each man in whom dis satisfaction is aroused by institutions which have survived from a less civilized past, or whose sympathies make certain evils repugnant to him, must regard his feelings thus excited as units in the aggregate of forces by which progress is to be brought about; and is called on to expend his feelings in appropriate deeds. An analogy will best show how there may be reconciled the two propositions that social evolution 376 THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.
is a process conforming- to natural laws, and yet that it results from the voluntary efforts of citizens.
It is a truth statistically established, that in each com munity, while its conditions remain the same, there is a uni form rate of marriage: such variations in the numbers of marriages as accompany variations in the prices of food, serving to show that so long as the impediments to marriage do not vary the frequency of marriages does not vary. Sim ilarly, it is found that along with an average frequency of marriages there goes an average frequency of births. But though these averages show that the process of human multi plication presents uniformities, implying constancy in the action of general causes, it is riot therefore inferred that the process of human multiplication is independent of people's wills. If anyone were to argue that marriages and births, considered in the aggregate, are social phenomena statistically proved to depend on influences which operate uniformly, and that therefore the maintenance of population does not de pend on individual actions, his inference would be rejected as absurd. Daily experience proves that marrying and the rearing of cliildren in each case result from the pur suit of exclusively private ends. It is only by fulfilling their individual wills in establishing and maintaining the domestic relations, that citizens produce these aggre gate results which exhibit uniformities apparently inde pendent of individual wills. In this instance, then, it is ob vious that social phenomena follow certain general courses; and yet that they can do this only on condition that so cial units voluntarily act out their natures. While every one holds that, in the matter of marriage, his will is, in the ordinary sense of the word, free; yet he is obliged to rec ognize the fact that his will, and the wills of others, are so far determined by common elements of human nature, as to produce these average social resxilts; and that no such social results could be produced did they not fulfil their wills.
Similarly, then, with these changes constituting progress, which are desired by the philanthropic. Though higher in stitutions will evolve in conformity with general laws, when the natures of citizens permit; yet they will do this only in POSTSCRIPT. 377 proportion as each citizen manifests in action, that nature to which they are the correlatives.
But now instead of these reasons for passivity which may thus be met, there come from some, other reasons for passivity more difficult to meet. Admitting that social evolution can result only if the natures of citizens issue in appropriate con duct, and that therefore those who have human progress at heart must use fit means, some will put the question — What are fit means? Impressed by the evidence that legislative acts, and deeds prompted by benevolence, prove in multitu dinous cases injurious rather than advantageous, they hesitate lest they should work evil instead of good. They ask how the apparently beneficial but really mischievous measures, are to be distinguished from measures that are essentially and permanently beneficial. Let us listen to one of them.