There is not therefore the least reason for surprise that the Roman people through their emperors or praetors was able to grant to its subjects the right of occupying the shore. This public occupation, however, no less than private occu- pation, was subject to the restriction that it should not in- fringe on international rights. Therefore the Roman peo- ple could not forbid any one from having access to the seashore,1 and from spreading his fishing nets there to dry, and from doing other things which all men long ago decided were always permissible.
The nature of the sea, however, differs from that of the shore, because the sea, except for a very restricted space, can neither easily be built upon, nor inclosed; if the contrary were true yet this could hardly happen without hindrance to the general use. Nevertheless, if any small portion of the sea can be thus occupied, the occupation is recognized. The famous hyperbole of Horace must be quoted here: "The fishes note the narrowing of the waters by piers of rock laid in their depths." 2 Now Celsus holds that piles driven into the sea belong to the man who drove them.3 But such an act is not per- missible if the use of the sea be thereby impaired. And Ulpian says that whoever builds a breakwater must see to it that it is not prejudicial to the interests of any one; for if this construction is likely to work an injury to any one, the injunction ' Nothing may be built on public property ' would apply. Labeo, however, holds that in case any such construction should be made in the sea, the following in- junction is to be enforced: 'Nothing may be built in the sea whereby the harbor, the roadstead, or the channel be rendered less safe for navigation '.* 'Odes III, i, 33-34 [Bennett's (Loeb) translation, page 171].
'Digest XLIII, 12, 1.
32 MARE LIBERVM Quae autem navigationis eadem piscatus habenda est ratio, ut communis maneat omnibus. Neque tamen peccabit si quis in maris diverticulo piscandi locum sibi palis circum- sepiat, atque ita privatum facial; sicut Lucullus excise apud Neapolim monte ad villam suam maria admisit.1 Et huius generis, puto fuisse piscinas maritimas quarum Varro et Columella meminerunt. Nee Martialis alio spectavit, cum de Formiano Apollinaris loquitur: 2 Si quando NEEEVS sentit Aeoli regnum, Bidet procellas tut a de SVO mensa.
Et Ambrosius: 3 ' Inducis mare intra praedia tua ne desint belluae '. Hinc apparere potest quae mens Pauli fuerit, cum dicit/ si maris proprium ius ad aliquem pertineat, uti possidetis interdictum ei competere. Esse quidem hoc inter- dictum ad privatas causas comparatum, non autem ad publicas, (in quibus etiam ea comprehenduntur quae iure gentium communi facere possumus) sed hie iam agi de iure fruendo quod ex causa privata contingat, non publica, sive communi. Nam teste Marciano, quicquid occupatum est et occupari potuit,5 id iam non est iurisgentium, sicut est mare. Exempli causa, si quis Lucul- lum aut Apollinarem in private suo, quatenus diverticulum maris incluserant, piscari prohibuisset, dandum illis inter- 1 Pliny, Naturalis historia IX, 54, 170.
'De Nabuthe, cap. 3.
'Digest XLVII, 10, 14 (De iniuriis, L. Sane si maris).
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 32 Now the same principle which applies to navigation applies also to fishing, namely, that it remains free and open to all. Nevertheless there shall be no prejudice if any one shall by fencing off with stakes an inlet of the sea make a fish pond for himself, and so establish a private preserve. Thus Lucullus once brought the water of the sea to his villa by cutting a tunnel through a mountain near Naples.1 I suspect too that the seawater reservoirs for fish mentioned by Varro and Columella were of this sort. And Martial had the same thing in mind when he says of the Formian villa of Apollinaris: 2 ' Whenever Nereus feels the power of Aeolus, the table safe in its own resources laughs at the gale '. Ambrose also has something to say on the same subject: 8 ' You bring the very sea into your estates that you may not lack for fish '. In the light of all this the meaning of Paulus is clear when he says * that if any one has a private right over the sea, the rule uti possidetis applies. This rule however is applicable only to private suits, and not to public ones, among which are also to be included those suits which can be brought under the common law of nations. But here the question is one which concerns the right of use arising in a private suit, but not in a public or common one. For according to the authority of Marcianus what- ever has been occupied and can be occupied s is no longer subject to the law of nations as the sea is. Let us take an example. If any one had prevented Lucullus or Apolli- naris from fishing in the private fish ponds which they had made by inclosing a small portion of the sea, according to the opinion of Paulus they would have the right of bringing 'Pliny, Natural History IX, 54, 170.
• See note 1, page 31.
33 MARE LIBERVM dictum Paulus putavit non solum iniuriarum actionem, ob causam scilicet privatae possessionis.1 Immo in diverticulo maris, sicut in diverticulo flnminis, si locum talem occuparim, ibique piscatus sim, maxima si animum privatim possidendi plurium annorum continuatione testatus fuerim, alterum eodem iure uti prohibebo; ut ex Marciano colligimus, non aliter quam in lacu qui mei dominii est. Quod verum quam diu durat occupatio, quemadmodum in litore antea diximus. Extra diverticulum idem non erit, ne scilicet communis usus impediatur.2 Ante aedes igitur meas aut praetorium ut piscari aliquem prohibeant usurpatum quidem est, sed nullo iure, adeo quidem ut Vlpianus contempta ea usurpatione si quis pro- hibeatur iniuriarum dicat agi posse.3 Hoc Imperator Leo (cuius Legibus non utimur) contra iuris rationem mutavit, voluitque npoOvpa, hoc est, vestibula maritima eorum esse propria, qui oram habitarent, ibique eos ius piscandi habere; * quod tamen ita procedere voluit, ut septis quibusdam remoratoriis quas tnoxas Graeci vocant, locus ille occupa- retur; existimans nimirum non fore ut quis exiguam maris portionem alteri invideret qui ipse toto mari ad piscandum admitteretur. Certe ut quis magnam maris partem, etiam si possit, publicis utilitatibus eripiat, non tolerandae est improbitatis, in quam merito Vir Sanctus invehitur: 5 1 Digest XLIV, 3, 7 (De diversis, L. Si quisquam).
* Digest XLI, 3, 45 (De usucapionibus, L. Praescriptio).
* Digest XLVII, 10, 13 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum, § Si quis me). 4 Novella Leonis, 102, 103, 104; cf. Cuiacium XIV, 1.
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 88 an injunction, not merely an action for damages based on private ownership.1 Indeed, if I shall have staked off such an inclosure in an inlet of the sea, just as in a branch of a river, and have fished there, especially if by doing so continuously for many years I shall have given proof of my intention to establish private ownership, I shall certainly prevent any one else from enjoying the same rights. I gather from Marcianus that this case is identical with that of the ownership of a lake, and it is true however long occupation lasts, as we have said above about the shore. But outside of an inlet this will not hold, for then the common use of the sea might be hindered.2 Therefore if any one is prevented from fishing in front of my town house or country seat, it is a usurpation, but an illegal one, although Ulpian, who rather makes light of this usurpation, does say that if any one is so prevented he can bring an action for damages.' The Emperor Leo, whose laws we do not use, contrary to the intent of the law, changed this, and declared that the entrances, or vestibules as it were, to the sea, were the private property of those who inhabited the shore, and that they had the right of fishing there.4 However he attached this condition, that the place should be occupied by certain jetty or pile constructions, such as the Greeks call firoxal, thinking doubtless that no one who was himself allowed to fish anywhere in the sea would grudge any one else a small portion of it. To be sure it would be an intolerable outrage for any one to snatch away, even if he could do so, from public use a large area of the sea; an act which is justly reprehended by the Holy Man,5 who says: ' The lords of the earth claim for 4 XoveU of Leo, 109, 103, 104; See also Cujas XIV, 1.
• Hexameron V, 10, 27 [St Ambrose (c. 333-397), Bishop of Milan, is meant].
34 MARE LIBERVM ' SPATIA MARTS sibi vindicant IVRE MANCIPII, pisciumque iura sicut vernaculorum conditione sibi servitii subiecta commemorant. Iste, inquit, SINVS maris meus est; ille alterius. Dividunt elementa sibi potentes '.
Est igitur Mare in numero earum return quae in com- mercio non sunt,1 hoc est, quae proprii iuris fieri non possunt. Vnde sequitur si proprie loquamur, nullam Maris partem in territorio populi alicuius posse censeri. Quod ipsum Pla- centinus sensisse videtur, cum dixit: Mare ita esse com- mune, ut in nullius dominio sit nisi solius Dei; et loannes Faber, cum mare asserit relictum in suo iure, et esse pri- maevo, quo omnia erant communia.2 Alioquin nihil dif- ferent quae sunt omnium communia ab his quae publica proprie dicuntur, ut mare a flumine. Flumen populus occupare potuit, ut inclusum finibus suis, mare non potuit.
Territoria autem sunt ex occupationibus populorum, ut privata dominia ex occupationibus singulorum. Vidit hoc Celsus, qui clare satis distinguit inter litora,3 quae Populus Romanus occupare potuit, ita tamen ut usui communi non noceretur, et mare quod pristinam naturam retinuit. Nee ulla lex diversum indicat.4 Quae vero leges a contrariae 1 Donellus IV, 6.
* Joannes Faber on Institutes II, 1 (§ Litorum); Digest XIV, 2, 9 (De Lege Rhodia, L. 'Af iueif).
• Digest XLIII, 8, 3 (Ne quid in loco publico, L. Litora).
4 Digest V, 1, 9 (De iudiciis, L. Insulae); XXXIX, 4, 15 (De publicanis, L. Caesar); Gloss, on Digest I, 8, 2 (De divisione reran, L. Quaedam); Institutes II, 1; Baldus on Quaedam (above).
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 34 themselves a wide expanse of sea by jus mancipii, and they regard the right of fishing as a servitude over which their right is the same as that over their slaves. That gulf, says one, belongs to me, and that gulf to some one else. They divide the very elements among themselves, these great men'!
Therefore the sea is one of those things which is not an article of merchandise,1 and which cannot become private property. Hence it follows, to speak strictly, that no part of the sea can be considered as the territory of any people whatsoever. Placentinus seems to have recognized this when he said: ' The sea is a thing so clearly common to all, that it cannot be the property of any one save God alone '. Johannes Faber 2 also asserts that the sea has been left sui juris, and remains in the primitive condition where all things were common. If it were otherwise there would be no dif- ference between the things which are ' common to all ', and those which are strictly termed ' public '; no difference, that is, between the sea and a river. A nation can take posses- sion of a river, as it is inclosed within their boundaries, with the sea, they cannot do so.
Now, public territory arises out of the occupation of nations, just as private property arises out of the occupa- tion of individuals. This is recognized by Celsus, who has drawn a sharp distinction between the shores of the sea,3 which the Roman people could occupy in such a way that its common use was not harmed, and the sea itself, which retained its primitive nature. In fact no law intimates a contrary view/ Such laws as are cited by writers who are of 1 Donellus IV, 6.
* On Institutes II, 1; Digest XIV, 2, 9 [Johannes Faber (c. 1570-c. 1640) was Bishop of Vienna, and Court preacher to Emperor Ferdinand. He was known popularly as 'Malleus Haereticorum'].
35 MARE LIBERVM sententiae auctoribus citantur, aut de insulis loqunntur, quas clarum est occupari potuisse, aut de portu qui non communis est, sed proprie publicus.
Qui vero dicunt mare aliquod esse Imperi Romani, dictum suum ita interpretantur, ut dicant ius illud in mare ultra protectionem et iurisdictionem non procedere; quod illi ius a proprietate distinguunt; nee forte satis animadver- tunt idipsum quod Populus Romanus classes praesidio navigantium disponere potuit, et deprehensos in mari piratas punire, non ex proprio, sed ex communi iure acci- disse, quod et aliae liberae gentes in mari habent. Illud interim fatemur, potuisse inter gentes aliquas convenire, ut capti in maris hac vel ilia parte, huius aut illius reipublicae iudicium subirent, atque ita ad commoditatem distinguendae iurisdictionis in mari fines describi, quod ipsos quidem earn sibi legem ferentes obligat,1 at alios populos non item; neque locum alicuius proprium facit, sed in personas con- trahentium ius constituit.
Quae distinctio ut naturali rationi consentanea est, ita Vlpiani response quodam comprobatur, qui rogatus an duorum praediorum maritimorum dominus, alteri eorum quod venderet servitutem potuisset imponere, ne inde in •certo maris loco piscari liceret, respondet: rem quidem ipsam, mare scilicet, servitute nulla affici potuisse, quia per uaturam hoc omnibus pateret, sed cum bona fides contractus legem venditionis servari exposceret, personas possidentium et in ius eorum succedentium per istam legem obligari.
'Baldus, Quibus modis feudi amittuntur, c. In principio, 2 coL; Code XI, 13, 1; Angelus on Digest XLVII, 10, 14 (De iniuriis, L. Sane); Digest VIII, 4, 13 (Communia praediorum, L. Venditor fundi) et 4 (L. Caveri).
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 35 the contrary opinion apply either to islands, which evidently could be occupied, or to harbors, which are not ' common ', but ' public ', that is, ' national '.
Now those who say that a certain sea belonged to the Roman people explain their statement to mean that the right of the Romans did not extend beyond protection and jurisdiction; this right they distinguish from ownership. Perchance they do not pay sufficient attention to the fact that although the Roman People were able to maintain fleets for the protection of navigation and to punish pirates cap- tured on the sea, it was not done by private right, but by the common right which other free peoples also enjoy on the sea. We recognize, however, that certain peoples have agreed that pirates captured in this or in that part of the sea should come under the jurisdiction of this state or of that, and further that certain convenient limits of distinct jurisdiction have been apportioned on the sea. Now, this agreement does bind those who are parties to it,1 but it has no binding force on other nations, nor does it make the de- limited area of the sea the private property of any one. It merely constitutes a personal right between contracting parties.
This distinction so conformable to natural reason is also confirmed by a reply once made by Ulpian. Upon being asked whether the owner of two maritime estates could on selling either of them impose on it such a servitude as the prohibition of fishing in a particular part of the sea, he replied that the thing in question, evidently the sea, could not be subjected to a servitude, because it was by nature open to all persons; but that since a contract made in good faith demands that the condition of a sale be re- spected, the present possessors and those who succeed to 1 Baldus, Quibus inodis feudi amittuntur, chapter beginning In principle, second column; Code XI, 13, 1; Angeli on Digest XLVII, 10, 14; Digest VIII, 36 MARE LIBERVM Verum est loqui lurisconsultum de praediis privatis, et lege privata, sed in territorio et lege populorum eadem hie est ratio, quia populi respectu totius generis humani privatorum locum obtinent.
Similiter reditus qui in piscationes maritimas constituti Regalium numero censentur, non rem, hoc est mare, aut pis- cationem, sed personas obligant.1 Quare subditi, in quos legem ferendi potestas Reipublicae aut Principi ex consensu competit, ad onera ista compelli forte poterunt; sed exteris ius piscandi ubique immune esse debet, ne servitus imponatur mari quod servire non potest.
Non enim maris eadem quae fluminis ratio est: 2 quod cum sit publicum, id est populi, ius etiam in eo piscandi a populo aut principe concedi aut locari potest, ita ut ei qui conduxit, etiam interdictum Veteres dederint, de loco publico fruendo, addita condicione si is cui locandi ius fuerit, fruen- dum ah'cui locaverit;3 quae condicio in mari evenire non potest. Ceterum qui ipsam piscationem numerant inter Regalia, ne quidem ilium locum quern interpretabantur satis inspexerunt, quod Iserniam et Alvotum non latuit.
Demonstratum est * nee populo nee private cuipiam ius 1 C. Quae sint Regalia, in Feudis. • Balbus, De praescriptionibus IV, 5; 1, q. 6, n. 4.
•Digest XLVII, 10, 13 (De iniuriis, L. Iniuriarum, § 7, v. conducted); XLIII, 9, 1 (De loco publico fruendo).
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 36 their rights were bound to observe that condition. It is true that the jurist is speaking of private estates and of private law, but in speaking here of the territory of peoples and of public law the same reasoning applies, because from the point of view of the whole human race peoples are treated as individuals.
Similarly, revenues levied on maritime fisheries are held to belong to the Crown, but they do not bind the sea itself or the fisheries, but only the persons engaged in fishing.1 Wherefore subjects, for whom a state or a ruler is by com- mon consent competent to make laws, will perhaps be com- pelled to bear such charges, but so far as other persons are concerned the right of fishing ought everywhere to be exempt from tolls, lest a servitude be imposed upon the sea, which is not susceptible to a servitude.
The case of the sea is not the same as that of a river,2 for as a river is the property of a nation, the right to fish in it can be passed or leased by the nation or by the ruler, in such a way (and the like is true with the ancients) that the lessee enjoys the operation of the injunction de loco publico fruendo by virtue of the clause ' He who has the right to lease has leased the exclusive right of enjoyment '.s Such a condition cannot arise in respect to the sea. Finally those who count fishing among the properties of the Crown have not examined carefully enough the very passage which they cite to prove their contention, as Isernia * and Alvotus t have noticed.
It has therefore been demonstrated * that neither a nation nor an individual can establish any right of private owner- JC. Quae sint Regalia, in Feudis.
* [Andrea d'Isernia (c. 1480-1553), an Italian commentator, called often Feudistarum Patriarcha.]
t [Probably a misprint for Alvarus (Alvarez).]
37 MARE LIBERVM aliquod proprium in ipsum mare (nam diverticulum excipi- mus) competere posse, cum occupationem nee natura, nee usus public! ratio permittat. Huius autem rei causa instituta fuerat haec disputatio, ut appareret Lusitanos mare quo ad Indos navigatur sui iuris non fecisse. Nam utraque ratio quae proprietatem impedit, in hac causa est quam in ceteris omnibus infinito efficacior. Quod in aliis difficile videtur, in hac omnino fieri non potest; quod in aliis iniquum iudicamus, in hac summe barbarum est, atque inhumanum.
Non de mari interiore hie agimus, quod terris undique infusum alicubi etiam fluminis latitudinem non excedit, de quo tamen satis constat locutos Romanos lurisconsultos, cum nobiles illas adversus privatam avaritiam sententias edide- runt; de Oceano quaeritur, quern immensum, infinitum, rerum parentem, caelo conterminum antiquitas vocat, cuius perpetuo humore non f ontes tantum et flumina et maria, sed nubes, sed ipsa quodammodo sidera pasci veteres credide- runt; qui denique per reciprocas aestuum vices terram hanc humani generis sedem ambiens, neque teneri neque includi potest, et possidet verius quam possidetur.
In hoc autem Oceano non de sinu aut freto, nee de omni quidem eo quod e litore conspici potest controversia est. Vindicant sibi Lusitani quicquid duos Orbes interiacet, tantis spatiis discretes, ut plurimis saeculis f amam sui non potuerint transmitter. Quod si Castellanorum, qui in eadem sunt FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 37 ship over the sea itself (I except inlets of the sea), inas- much as its occupation is not permissible either by nature or on grounds of public utility. The discussion of this mat- ter has been taken up for this reason, namely, that it may be seen that the Portuguese have not established private ownership over the sea by which people go to the East Indies. For the two reasons that stand in the way of ownership are in this case infinitely more powerful than in all others. That which in other cases seems difficult, is here absolutely impossible; and what in other cases we recognize as unjust is here most barbarous and inhuman.
The question at issue then is not one that concerns an INNER SEA, one which is surrounded on all sides by the land and at some places does not even exceed a river in breadth, although it is well known that the Roman jurists cited such an inner sea hi their famous opinions condemn- ing private avarice. No! the question at issue is the OUTER SEA, the OCEAN, that expanse of water which antiquity describes as the immense, the infinite, bounded only by the heavens, parent of all things; the ocean which the ancients believed was perpetually supplied with water not only by fountains, rivers, and seas, but by the clouds, and by the very stars of heaven themselves; the ocean which, although surrounding this earth, the home of the human race, with the ebb and flow of its tides, can be neither seized nor inclosed; nay, which rather possesses the earth than is by it possessed.
Further, the question at issue does not concern a gulf or a strait in this ocean, nor even all the expanse of sea which is visible from the shore. [But consider this!!] The Portuguese claim as their own the whole expanse of the sea which separates two parts of the world so far distant the one from the other, that in all the preceding centuries neither one has so much as heard of the other. Indeed, if we take into account the share of the Spaniards, whose claim 38 MARE LIBERVM causa, portio accedat, parvo minus, omnis Oceanus duobus populis mancipatus est, aliis tot gentibus ad Septentrionum redactis angustias; multumque decepta est Natura, quae cum elementum illud omnibus circumfudit, omnibus etiam suffec- turum credidit. In tanto mari si quis usu promiscuo solum sibi imperium et dicionem exciperet, tamen immodicae do- minationis affectator haberetur; si quis piscatu arceret alios, insanae cupiditatis notam non effugeret. At qui etiam navigatum impedit, quo nihil ipsi perit, de eo quid statuemus? Si quis ab igni qui totus suus est, ignem capere, lumen suo de lumine, alterum prohiberet, lege hunc humanae so- cietatis reum peragerem: quia vis ea est istius naturae: Vt nihilo minus ipsi luceat, cum illi accenderit.1 Quid ni enim quando sine detrimento suo potest, alteri communicet, in iis quae sunt accipienti utilia, danti non molesta.2 Haec sunt quae Philosophi s non alienis tantum, sed et ingratis praestari volunt. Quae vero in rebus privatis invidia est, eadem in re communi non potest non esse immanitas, improbissimum enim hoc est, quod naturae institute, consensu gentium, meum non minus quam tuum est, id te ita intercipere, ut ne usum quidem mihi concedas, quo concesso nihilominus id tuum sit, quam antea fuit.
1 Kim ins: 'Nihilo minus ipsi lucet, cum illi accenderit '. Vahlen,' Fab. Inc. 398 (Telephus?).
1 Cicero, De officiis I, SI.
• Seneca, De beneflciis III, 28.
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 38 is the same as that of the Portuguese, only a little less than the whole ocean is found to be subject to two nations, while all the rest of the peoples in the world are restricted to the narrow bounds of the northern seas. Nature was greatly deceived if when she spread the sea around all peoples she believed that it would also be adequate for the use of them all. If in a thing so vast as the sea a man were to reserve to himself from general use nothing more than mere sov- ereignty, still he would be considered a seeker after un- reasonable power. If a man were to enjoin other people from fishing, he would not escape the reproach of monstrous greed. But the man who even prevents navigation, a thing which means no loss to himself, what are we to say of him? If any person should prevent any other person from taking fire from his fire or a light from his torch, I should accuse him of violating the law of human society, because that is the essence of its very nature, as Ennius has said: " No less shines his, when he his friend's hath lit." 1 Why then, when it can be done without any prejudice to his own interests, will not one person share with another things which are useful to the recipient, and no loss to the giver? 2 These are services which the ancient philosophers * thought ought to be rendered not only to foreigners but even rendered for nothing. But the same act which when private possessions are in question is jealousy can be nothing but cruelty when a common possession is in question. For it is most outrageous for you to appropriate a thing, which both by ordinance of nature and by common consent is as much mine as yours, so exclusively that you will not grant me a right of use in it which leaves it no less yours than it was before.
1 [Quoted in Cicero, De officiis I, 51, and here taken from Walter Miller's (Loeb) translation, page 55.]
• Cicero, De officiis I, 51.
• Seneca, De beneficiis III, 28.
39 MARE LIBERVM Turn vero etiam qui alienis incumbunt, aut communia intercipiunt, certa quadam possessione se tuentur. Quia enim prima, ut diximus, occupatio res proprias fecit, idcirco imagi- nem quandam dominii praefert quamvis iniusta detentio. At Lusitani nuni sicuti terras solemus, sic mare illud im- positis praediis ita undique cinxerunt, ut in ipsorum manu esset quos vellent excludere? An vero tantum hoc abest, ut ipsi etiam, cum adversus alios populos mundum dividunt, non ullis limitibus aut natura, aut manu positis, sed imagi- naria quadam linea se tueantur? quod si recipitur et dimensio talis ad possidendum valet, iamdudum nobis Geometrae terras, Astronomi etiam caelum eriperent.
Vbi hie igitur est ista, sine qua nulla dominia coeperunt, corporis ad corpus adiunctio? Nimirum apparet in nulla re verius dici posse, quod Doctores nostri prodiderunt,1 Mare cum sit incomprehensibile, non minus quam aer, nullius populi bonis potuisse applicari.
Si vero ante alios navigasse, et viam quodammodo aperuisse, hoc vocant occupare, quid esse potest magis ridiculum? Nam cum nulla pars sit maris, in quam non aliquis primus ingressus sit, sequetur omnem navigationem ab aliquo esse occupatam. Ita undique excludimus. Quin et illi qui terrarum orbem circumvecti sunt, totum sibi Oceanum acquisivisse dicendi erunt. Sed nemo nescit •Johannes Fabcr on Institutes II, 1, 5 (De rerum divisionc, § Litorum).
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 39