erit, si aliquid intervenit novi: quid mi- raris, cum conditio promittentis mutata sit, mutatum esse consilium? eadem mihi omnia pr«sta et idem sum. Vadimo- nium promittimus, tamen deseritur. Non in omnes datur actio, deserentem vis ma- Jor ercusat. Usi siepe hoc effugio Angli. Vide Camdenum in anno clIo Io xcv. tum in controversia cum Batavis, tum in altera cum Anseaticis, cum promitterem: destituere levitas non that a promise may not oblige the promiser, it does not suffice that it brings some harm to the promiser; but it must be such harm as according to the nature of the act must be supposed to be excepted in the promiser. "Thus he who has promised his neighbour so many days' labour, is not bound if a critical and dangerous disease of his father or his son keeps him away. — So Cicero in his Offices. (1. 10.)
3 What Seneca says is to be taken in the same sense, and not to be pushed further: 7 must keep my promise if all things are the same: but if anything be changed, I am αἱ liberty to revise my decision. Thus I promised to advocate ὦ cause; but it appears that the cause is intended. to injure my father: I promised to accompany one on a journey; but it appears that the road is infested with robbers: I was to come at a certain. time; but my son is ill, my wife is in child- birth. All must be the same as it was when I promised, to oblige me to keep my word. Understand, a// things according to the nature of the act in question, as we have just explained.
Lib. ii. 10.
184 DE INTERPRETATIONE. (Liz. II. XXVIII. Diximus alia quoque esse posse signa volunta- tis quz ostendant casum eximendum. Inter ea signa nihil validius est quam verba alio loco posita, non ubi directe pug- nant, qus est avrivopia, cujus supra meminimus, sed cum velut insperato ex ipso rerum eventu inter se committuntur, quam Rhetores Grzeei vocant τὴν €x περιστάσεως μάχην. XXIX. 1 In hae disceptatione utra pars scripti cum ex casu fit collisio przevalere debeat, regulas quasdam ex antiquis auctoribus * Cieero posuit, quze ut spernendz neutiquam sunt, ita mihi non suo ordine videntur collocatae. Nos eas hune in modum digeremus.!Ut quod permittit cedat ei quod jubet: *quia qui permittit aliquid ita permittere videtur, nisi aliud quid obstet, quam de quo ibi agitur: ideoque, ut ait Scriptor ad Herennium, plus valet sanctio permissione. Ut quod faci- endum est certo tempore, ei przferatur quod quovis tempore fieri potest: unde sequitur, ut plerumque pactio vetans vincat jubentem, quia pactio vetans obligat ad quodvis tempus, jubens k Cicero posuit] De Inventione se- cundo, (cap. 49) et ibi Marius Victo- rinus.
) Ut quod permittit, cedat ei quod Jubet] Quintilianus declamatione ccc LXXIV. Semper potentior lex est quc velat, quam que permittit. Donatus Phormione actu 1. scen. 2 (vers. 76): Bene jubet: minorem enim vim habet ea ler que aliquid permittit, quam illa quce aliquid jubet. Wide Ciceronem Verrina 11. (cap. 51) et quae habet Con- nanus libro r. c. 9.
*^ Modo scilicet Permissio sit gene- ralis, jussum autem particulare: alias id quod jubetur universaliter cedit Permis- XXVIII.
We have said that there may also be other signs of the will, which shew that the case is to be excepted. Among these signs, nothing is more decisive than words used in another place; not when they directly oppose the promise, which is entinomy, as mentioned above; but when unexpectedly and by the very event of things they are in conflict, which the rhetoricians call ezreumstantial contradiction.
XXIX. 1 In the discussion, Which part of a document ought to prevail in ease of such a collision, Cieero has given certain rules from ancient authors; and these, though not, in my judgment, to be rejected, seem to me not to be placed in due order. We shall arrange them in this way: Permission gives way to command, or, as the writer to Herennius says, command outweighs permission *: What is to be done at a certain time, is to be preferred to what may be done at any time: and hence a prohibitive pact outweighs an imperative one: except either the time be expressed, or the command * Barbeyrac says, not always: a universal command gives way to a particular permission.
Car. XVI.] DE INTERPRETATIONE. 185 non item, nisi aut tempus sit expressum, aut jussio tacitam prohibitionem contineat. Inter eas pactiones, qu: supradictis qualitatibus pares sunt, ut przeferatur quod magis est peculiare, et ad rem propius accedit: nam solent specialia efficaciora esse generalibus: et in prohibitionibus, ut qu: poenam adjunc- tam habet, ei quze poena vacat, et quz majorem ponam mi- natur, οἱ, quae. minorem, przferatur. Tum vero, ut superet quod causas habet aut magis honestas, aut magis utiles. Ex- tremo loco, ut quod postremo dictum est vincat.
2 Illud ex superioribus hie repetendum est, pactorum ju- ratorum eam esse vim, ut intelligi debeant secundum receptis- simam proprietatem, et ut omnes restrictiones tacitas, et ex natura rei non omnino necessarias, quam maxime repudient. Quare et si juratum paetum cum non jurato pugnet certo eventu, "przferendum erit 9cui adest jurisjurandi religio.
XXX. Solet et hoe quzri, an in dubio contractus persioni particulari; ut ad PurENDOREFIUM observatum est. J. B.
5 Regula illa heic non bene aptatur. Illa enim valet, ubi omnimoda et per- petua est repugnantia inter utramque m Preferendum erit cui adest jurisju- randi religio] Acontius apud Ovidium: Promisit pater banc: hac et juravit amanti: Ille homines, hzc est testificata Deam. Hic metuit mendax, hzc et perjura vocari: Num dubitas, hic sit major, an ille metus? (Epist. Heroid. xx. 159. et seqq.) 5 Hoc nititur falsa hypothesi, de qua suoloco monuimus, J. B.
partem scripti: quum heic agatur de collisione in certis tantum casibus. Plura dicemus in Notis nostris Gallicis ad hune locum. J. D.
contains a tacit prohibition: Between those paets which are equal in the above qualities, that is to be preferred which is more peculiar, and comes nearer to the thing: for special expressions are commonly more efficacious than general: In prohibitions, that which has a penalty added is to be preferred to that which has not, and that with the greater penalty, to that with the less: That is to be preferred which rests upon causes more honourable or more useful: Lastly, that which was last said has most weight *.
2 We must repeat that some pacts are to be understood according to the most received propriety of language, repudiating all tacit and unnecessary restrictions. Whence if a sworn pact be at variance with an unsworn one in a certain event, that is to be preferred which has the sanction of an oath.
XXX. It is also made a question, Whether in a doubtful case a * Barbeyrac observes that this last tole is out of place here.
Appian.
Liv. xxxiv.
Ale. v. cons.
ix. Symp. 13.
186 DE INTERPRETATIONE. [118. II.
fectus censeri debeat antequam scriptura confecta sit, et tra- dita, Nam id Murena causabatur adversus ea, quz inter Syllam et Mithridatem convenerant. Mihi apertum videtur, ni aliud convenerit, "credendum, scripturam adhiberi, ut mo- numentum contractus, non ut substantie ejus partem. Alioqui exprimi id solet, ut in judieiis cum Nabide: JE» qua die de- scripte conditiones edite; INabidi forent.
XXXI. Illud vero non admittam quod quibusdam placuit, contractus regum et populorum quantum fieri potest interpre- tandos ex jure Romano: nisi appareat inter quosdam po- pulos jus illud civile in his, quse juris sunt gentium, etiam pro jure gentium receptum esse: quod temere przsumendum non est.
XXXII. De eo vero, quod Plutarchus in Symposiacis movet, conditionem offerentis, an accipientis verba attendi ma- gis debeant, ita videtur, eum accipiens hie sit qui promittit, ejus verba formam dare negotio, si absoluta et in se perfecta sint. Nam si per affirmationem respiciant verba offerentis, tune ea ipsa ex natura vocum relativarum repetita in promisn (Credendum scripturam adhiberi, ut monumentum contractus, non ut sub- stantie ejus partem] L. in re. 4. et l. si res gesta. 5. D. de fide instrumentorum. l. pactum quod bona fide, 17. C. de pac- tis: sic legem contractus quz est 17. C. de fide instrumentorum, interpretantur Bartolus et Johannes Faber, Salicetus, dum et Castrensem przvaluit. Mynsin- gerus decade x. cons. xcr. Neostadius de pactis antenuptialibus, observatione xvIHI. quare non satis probabile est, quod Ligniacus adfert de instrumento a rege subscripto, sed nondum addito si- gillo et secretarii manu, libro 11, rerum Italicarum Guicciardini, quorum sententia in judiciis contra Balcontract is to be held perfect before it is committed to writing and delivered. So Murena argued against the convention of Mithridates and Sylla. It appears plain to me that, except it be agreed otherwise, it must be supposed that writing is adopted as a monument of the contract, not as a part of it. If this is not so, it is expressed, as, From the day when the conditions are written and delivered.
XXXI Ido not admit, what many writers have held, that the contracts of kings and peoples are to be interpreted according to Roman Law; except when the Roman Law has been accepted as belonging to the Law of Nations; which is not lightly to be pre- sumed.
XXXII. As to the question which Plutarch discusses in his Sympo- sium, Whether the condition of the offerer or the words of the acceptor are more to be attended to; it appears that, since the acceptor is the pro- miser, his words must give force to the business, if they are absolute and Car. XVI.] DE INTERPRETATIONE. 187 sione videbuntur. Antequam vero accepta sit conditio, ne eum quidem teneri qui obtulit certum est; nullum enim adhue jus quzesitum est, ut ex his quze de promissione supra diximus apparet. Et hsec oblatio conditionis minus est promissione.
perfect. If by affirmation (as by saying yes) they respect the words of the offerer, then, from the nature of relative words, these are to be understood as repeated. PDut before the condition is aecepted, the offerer is not bound; tiil then, the other part acquires no right, even in a promise; and an offer is less than a promise.
CAPUT XVII.
DE DAMNO PER INJURIAM DATO, ET OBLIGATIONE QUZE INDE ORITUR.
I. Culpam obligare ad vestitu- tionem damni.
IL.Demmnum intelligi quod pugnat cum jure stricte dicto.
III. Accurate distinguendam aptitudinem a jure stricte dicto, ubi concurrunt: Damnum et ad, fructus pertinere.
V. Ad luerum cessans quomodo? Dainnum dare facientes pri- mario: . Et secundario: VIII. Ztem non facientes quod. debent: primario, IX. Et secundario: Qualis efficacia, circa, actum ad. hoc requiratur.
XL. Quo ordine teneantur.
. Obligationem. extendi etiam ad damnum consequens.
XIII. Eaemplwum in homicida: XIV. Zn eo qui alteri vim intulit: XV. In adultero et stupratore: XVI. 7n fure, raptore, et aliis: XVII. Zn eo qui causam promissioni dedit per dolum aut metum injustum.
XVIII Quid si metu justo naturaliter?
Quid de metu quem jus gentium pro justo habet?
XX. Potestates civiles quatenus te- neantur ev dammo per sub- ditos dato: ubi questio de predis in mari actis in so- cios contra imperium pub- licum.
XXI. Naturaliter ez animalis sui aut mavis suc facto sine culpa neminem teneri.
XXII. Damnwum dari, et adversus famam et honorem, et quo- modo reparetur.
πὰς, I QKUPRA diximus ejus, quod nobis debetur, fontes esse tres, pactionem, maleficium, legem.
De paetionibus satis tractatum. Veniamus ad id quod ex maleficio naturaliter 2 Er tali culpa obligatio naturaliter oritur] ᾿Αμελίου δίκη Grecis. [Apud HrEsYCHIUM, qui exponit, ζημίου δίκην. J. B.] Vide in decretalibus titulum de injuria et damno dato, et Digestis ad ἰ.
Aquiliam et vicinas rubricas.
Confer, in toto isto capite, Pv- FENDORFIUM nostrum, Ze Jure Nat. et Gent. Lib. 111. cap. 1. J. B.
b Damnum forte a, demendo dictum] CnuaAPTER XVII.
Of Damage with Wrong, and the Obligation thence arising.
I. We have said above that there are three sources of debts due to us; Pact, Wrong, Law.
Of pacts we have sufficiently treated: we come to what by Natural Law is due on account of Wrong.
We have given the name of wrong to every fault, either of doing or of omission, which is at variance with what men ought to do, either on the ground of their common connexion, or of some special quality. From such Car. XVII] DE DAMNO PER INJURIAM, ETC. 189 debetur. Malefieium hie appellamus culpam omnem, sive in faciendo, sive in non faciendo, pugnantem cum eo, quod aut homines communiter, aut pro ratione certz qualitatis facere debent.?Ex tali culpa obligatio naturaliter oritur, si damnum datum est,! nempe ut id resarciatur.
II. 1 "Damnum forte a demendo dictum, est τὸ ἔλατ- Tov, cum quis minus habet suo, sive illud suum ipsi competit ex mera natura, sive accedente facto humano, puta dominio, aut pacto, sive ex lege. Natura homini suum est vita, non quidem ad perdendum, sed ad custodiendum, corpus, membra, fama, honor, actiones proprite. Dominio et pactis quomodo suum quid euique sit, superior tractatio docuit, tum quoad res, tum quoad jus in actiones alienas. Simili modo ex lege jus guum euique oritur, quia idem aut plus lex potest quam in se ae sua singuli. Sic pupillus jus habet exactam quandam dili- gentiam exigendi a tutore, respublica ἃ magistratu, nec res- publiea tantum, sed et cives singuli, quoties lex id expresse aut per sufficientem consequentiam significat.
2 At ex sola aptitudine, quod jus minus proprie dicitur, et ab assignatrice justitia spectatur, non oritur verum domi- nium, ae proinde restitutionis obligatio: quia non id alieui Jta Varro libro 1v. Damnum a dem- αὖ ὕπνος, sopnus, somnus. Nec absurde tione, cum minus re factum quam quanti — deducas a grzeco δάμνω, quod est βιάζω, constat, (Pag. 41..Edit. H. Steph.) ^ aut ex ζημία, damia, damnum, ut regia, Alii magis probant derivari a graeco óa- — regnum.
πάνη, ut sit dapnum, deinde damnum, fault arises by Natural Law an obligation, if the wrong be aecompa- nied with damage: namely, the obligation of repairing the wrong.
IL 1 Damage, damnum (perhaps from demo,) is when a man has less than what is Ais, whether it be his by mere nature, or by some human act in addition, as ownership, pact, law. "Things which a man may regard as Ais by nature are life, not indeed to throw away, but to keep, his body, limbs, fame, honour, his own acts. What is his by ownership and pact, and how, we have shewn above, both as to things, and as to right over others' acts. In like manner the law determines for each what is his, for the law can do more for ἃ man than he can do for himself. "Thus a ward has a right to a certain care and dili- gence from his guardian; the State, from a magistrate; and not only the State, but each citizen, as often as the law expressly, or by clear implication, marks such a consequence.
2 But a mere Moral Claim, which is not properly a Right, and belongs to distributive or assignatory justice, does not produce true Nic. v. 4.
Cap. 4.
Thom. et Caj. art. 2.
Soto, iv. q. 6. Less. ii. 12. dub. 18. et Covar. ad c.
Soto, iv. q. 7. Less. ii.' 12.
190 DE DAMNO PER INJURIAM DATO, ET [Lis. II: suum est ad quod aptus est: πλεονεκτεῖ οὐδὲν, ait. Aristoteles, ὁ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι᾿ ἀνελευθερίαν" Contra proprie dictam justitiam nihil committit, qui pecunia sua alteri non succurrit, prc tenacitate. Cicero pro Cn. Plancio: Zst hec conditio liberorum populorum, posse suffragiis vel dare, vel detrahere quod. velit cuique; et tamen mox subdit, accidere ut populus faciat, quod velit, non quod debeat, voce debendi sumta in laxiore significatu.
III. Sed cavendum hie, ne confundantur qux diversi ge- neris sunt. Nam cui magistratus collatio mandata est, is rei- publiee tenetur ad eligendum eum qui dignus sit, et ad hoe exigendum respubliea Jus habet proprium: quare si ex indigni electione damnum fecerit respublica, ille resarcire tenebitur. Sie etiam civis aliquis non indignus, etsi Jus proprium ad offi- cium aliquod non habeat, habet tamen verum jus petendi Juxta alios: in quo jure si per vim aut. dolum impediatur, jam non totius rei expetitze sed incerti ilius damni zestimationem exi- gere poterit. Simile erit in eo, cui ne quid legaret testator, vi vel dolo fuit impeditus: nam capacitas legati jus quoddam ? Vide quz fuse notavimus ad Li- €* Laudat] 'Totilas in oratione ad bellum PurrEwponrir, De Offic. Hom. ^ Gotthos, apud Procopium Gotthicorum ei Civ. Lib. τ. cap. i. ὃ 27. tertiz et τι. ὁ ydp ἐπαινέσας τὸν δεδρακότα, quartze Edd. ubi de concursu ad facinus οὐδέν τι ἧσσον τῶν πεπραγμένων αὐ- alienum accuratius, quam uterque.Auc- — τουργὸς γίνεται" Nam qui facientem torum nostrorum, egimus. ὦ). 5. aliquid laudat, et ipse rei facie auctor ownership, and the consequent obligation of restitution: for that is not any one's to which he has merely a claim. —.4 man does not wrong any one when he refuses to give from illiberality, says Aristotle. So Cicero.
III. But here we must take care not to confound things of diverse kinds: for he who has to appoint a magistrate is bound to the repub- lic to elect one who is worthy; and the republic has a right to demand this: and therefore, if by an unworthy election he has produced damage to the republie, he is bound to make it good. So any citizen, not unworthy, although he has not a right to any office, yet has a right to be a candidate along with others; and if he is disturbed in this right by fraud or violence, he may demand, not the whole value of that which he sought, but the estimated value of his loss. So in the case of him to whom a testator was by force or fraud prevented from leaving a legacy; for the capacity to receive a legacy is a certain right, which has for its consequence this, that to impede the liberty of the testator as to that right, is a wrong.
IV. A person may have less than his own, and 50, have suffered Car. XVII] OBLIGATIONE QUZE INDE ORITUR. 191 est, cul id est consequens, ut libertatem testatoris in eo impe- dire injuria sit.
IV. Minus autem quis habere, ac proinde damnum fecisse intelligetur, non in re tantum, sed et in fructibus qui proprie rei fructus sunt, sive illi percepti sunt, sive non, si tamen ipse eos percepturus fuerat, deductis impensis quibus res melior facta est, aut quie ad fructus pereipiendos fuerunt necessaric, ex regula quae nos vetat locupletiores fieri cum aliena jactura.
V. Sed et spes lucri ex nostro zstimabitur, non ut illud ipsum, sed secundum propinquitatem ad actum, ut in semente I: τς - spes messis. Dia i VI. Tenentur autem, prztter ipsum qui per se et ἀμέσως Thom. 2, 2. damnum dat, alii quoque faciendo aut non faciendo.?Faci- Soto, iv. q. 6. endo alii primario, alii secundario: primario, qui jubet, qui ^ consensum requisitum adhibet, qui adjuvat, qui receptum prze- stat, aut qui alio modo in ipso erimine participat.
VIL Secundario, qui consilium dat, *laudat, assentatur. Quid, enim interest inter suasorem facti et probatorem? ait Cicero Philippiea secunda.
VIII. Non faciendo item primario aut secundario; prihabendus est. (Cap. 25.) Ulpianus in 4 Inter suasorem facti et probatorem] Lib. τ. c. de servo corrupto: Et si erat servus omnimodo fugiturus, vel furtum Jacturus, hic vero laudator ejus propo- siti fuerit, tenetur: non enim oportet lau- dando augeri malum.
Applieat hoc dictum Probo prefecto Ammianus, libro xxvir.(cap. 2.) Lege Langobardica, Lib. r. tit. 4. etiam con- sulens ad compositionem vocatur. Vide Rom. i. in fine, et ibi veteres scriptores.
loss, not only in the thing which belongs to him, but in the produce of the thing, whether he has collected such produce, or only would have collected it: and his loss consists in that produce, minus the expense of improving the thing, and of collecting the produce.
V. Also the hope of gain from a thing which is ours may be estimated, not as what it is simply, but according to its prospect; as the hope of the harvest in the sower.
VI. Besides him who immediately causes the loss, others may be bound, either by doing or not doing.
By doing, some primarily, others secondarily: Primarily, he who commands it, who gives the requisite consent, who helps, who receives what is taken, or who participates in the crime in any other way.
VIL Secondarily, who advises, praises, approves. See Cicero.
VIIL Also by not doing, primarily and secondarily. — Primarily, when one who by his proper right ought to forbid the act, or help the person wronged, does not, Less. ii. 13.
Soto, iv. q. 7. art. 3.
Cajet. ad q. Medin. q. 7.
192 DE DAMNO PER INJURIAM DATO, ET [Lr».II.
mario, qui cum ex jure proprie dicto debeat vetare przecepto, *aut opem ferre ei cui fit injuria, id non facit. Is Chaldzeo Paraphrastze Levit. xx. 5. 1yD obfirmator dicitur.
IX. Secundario, qui aut non dissuadet cum debeat, aut factum reticet quod notum facere debebat. lllud autem debere - in his omnibus referimus ad jus proprium quod justitia exple- trix respicit, sive illud ex lege sive ex qualitate exoritur. Nam si debeat ex caritatis norma, peccabit quidem omittendo, non tamen ad reparationem tenebitur, cujus origo est jus aliquod proprium, ut ante diximus, X. Sciendum quoque hos omnes quos diximus ita teneri, 51 vere causa fuerint damni, id est, momentum attulerint, aut ad totum damnum, aut ad partem damni. Nam sspe aceidit in agentibus vel negligentibus seeundarii ordinis, interdum etiam in quibusdam qui sunt ordinis primarii, ut etiam sine eorum actu aut neglectu is qui damnum dedit certus fuerit id ipsum dare: quo casu ili quos dixi non tenebuntur. Quod tamen non ita intelligendum est, ut si alii defuturi non fuerint, puta qui suaderent, aut juvarent, non teneantur qui suaserint, aut juverint, si absque ope aut consilio qui dedit damnum dae Aut opem ferre ei cui fit injuria, ὅὕλως μὴ βουληθέντος" Incendium mon id non facit] Nicetas Choniates Micha- ^ ei tantum imputatur qui facem intulit, ele Comneno: ὁ ἐμπρησμὸς, οὐ μόνον — sed et ei, qui prohibere cum posset, om- TOU ἀνάψαντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ kara- πῖπο noluit. (Lib. 1. c. 9.)
σβέσαι δυναμένου, δράσαι δέ τι τοιοῦτον f Si totus actus ab ipsis, quanquam IX. Secondarily he who does not dissuade when he ought, or keeps silence about a fact which he ought to make known. And this ought, in all these cases, we refer to proper rights and expletory justice, whether arising from law or quality. For if he ought by the law of charity only, he sins indeed in not doing it, but is not held to repara- tion; for this has its origin in a proper right, as we have said.
X. It is to be noted also, that all those of whom we have spoken are bound if they were really the cause of the damage, that is, if their influence shared in producing either the whole loss or a part of it. For it often happens in agents or negligents of the secondary order, and sometimes in those who are of the first order, that even without their act or neglect, the person who committed the damage was certain to commit it: in which case they will not be liable. Which answer is not so to be understood as, that if others would not have been want- ing to persuade or assist, those who did persuade or assist are not liable; if without suasion or assistance the author of the damage would not have done it. For those others who should have persuaded Car. XVIL.] OBLIGATIONE QUZE INDE ORITUR. 198 turus id non fuisset. Nam et illi alii si βιιδβίββοπε aut adju- vissent, tenerentur, XL. Tenentur autem primo loco ii, qui imperio aut alio modo aliquem impulerunt ad faetum: his deficientibus patrator facinoris: et post eum ceteri, in solidum singuli qui ad actum causam dederunt, si totus actus ab ipsis quamquam non solis processit.
XII. Qui vero de actu tenetur, simul tenetur de his quze ilum ex actus vi sunt consecuta. ἈΠ Senecm controversia quadam hoe tractatur in specie platani ineensz, ex qua domus arserat, ubi hane ponit sententiam: Etiamsi partem. damni dare noluisti, in totum quasi prudens dederis tenendus 68; €x toto enim moluisse debet, qui imprudentia defenditur. Ariarathes Cappadocum rex eo quod Melani amni exitum per lasciviam obstruxerat, cum ejus perrumpentis impetu elatus Euphrates rapta parte Cappadocum terrz, magna et Galatis et Phrygibus damna intulisset, permisso Romanis judicio, ta- lentis trecentis dispendium sarcivit.
XIIL. Exemplo hae sint. Homicida injustus tenetur sol- vere impensas, si quz facto» sunt in medicos, et iis quos occisus non solis, processit] Lex Langobardiea, si servus servum. 27. $ si quis insulam Lib. r. tit. ix. 5. 8. D. ad 1. Aquiliam, & Simul tenetur de his que illum ex h In Senece controversia] Excerptis » actus vi sunt consecuta] Vide Thomam — v, ἊΣ primz secundz quost. xx. art. 5 δὲ].
or assisted would have been liable.
XI. Those are liable in the first place, who, by command, or in any manner, impel any one to the act: failing these, the perpetrator of the deed; after him, the rest in any way concerned; and those jointly who gave cause to the act, if the whole act proceeded from them, though not from them alone.
XIL They who are liable for the act, are also liable for the natu- ral consequences of the act. Seneca puts a case of a man setting fire to a plane-tree, by which a house was burnt, and holds him liable. [See.] Ariarathes, having wantonly stopped the course of the river Melanus, caused a flood of the Euphrates, which produced great damage in Galatia and Phrygia: and the matter being referred to the Romans, paid 300 talents to make good the loss.
XIIL Take these examples: A person who unlawfully kills another is bound to pay the expenses of physicians, if any, and of those who depended for subsistence on the person killed, his parents, wives, children, as much as their hope of support was worth, con- [nor. rr.] s Less. ii. 13. εἴτε. 5. Ibid. dub. 4.
Excerp. Contr. v. 5.
Strabo, xii, Less. ii. 9, Diod. iv. 31.
Cap. 2.
Less. dub. 91.
Navar. c. 15.
L. ult. D. de his qui effud. vel dej.
Less ii. 10. dub. 6.
194 DE DAMNO PER INJURIAM DATO, ET Que enim wor ejus et. liberi et cognati accipiunt, ipse quodammodo accipit. Loquimur de homicida injusto, id est, qui non habuit jus id faciendi unde mors sequitur. Quare si quis jus habuerit, sed in caritatem peccaverit, ut qui fugere noluit, non tenebitur. γι autem in libero homine szestimatio non fit; secus 1n servo, qui vendi potuit.
XIV.!Qui mutilavit, similiter tenebitur ad impensas et ad sestimationem ejus quod jam, qui mutilatus est, minus po- terit lucrari. Sed sicut ibi vitz, ita et hic cicatricis in libero homine festimatio non fit. De conjectione in carcerem idem dicendum.
XV. Sie adulter et adultera tenentur non tantum indem- nem prestare maritum ab alenda prole, sed et legitimis liberis i Qui mutilavit, similiter tenebitur — lucrari] Idem apud Hebrzos servatum, ad impensas et ad cstimationem ejus, — Baba Kama, cap. 8. 8 1. et apud An- quod jam qui mutilatus est minus poterit — glos et Danos, quorum fedus vide apud sidering the age of the person killed. So Hercules paid a fine for the death of Iphitus. So Michael Ephesius on Aristotle. We say wunlawfully kills; for if a person was acting lawfully, as if he was assailed and did not run away, though he may have sinned against charity, he is not liable. "The life of a free man cannot be valued: it is different in a slave, who may be sold.
XIV. If a person maims another, he is similarly liable to the expenses, and to the estimated value of how much less the maimed man can earn. But as the free man's life, so his wound, is not capable of estimation. The same is to be said of unjust impri- Sonment.
XV. "The adulterer and adulteress are liable not only to in- demnify the husband for the expenses of rearing the progeny, but also to repay the legitimate offspring what loss they suffer from the concourse of the offspring so arising in the inheritance.
He who deflowers a virgin by force or fraud is bound to pay her as much as she loses by the diminished hope of marriage; and even to marry her if it was by such a promise that he became master Car. XVIL] OBLIGATIONE QUZE INDE ORITUR. 195 rependere, si quod damnum patiuntur ex concursu ita susceptze sobolis ad hereditatem. Qui virginem imminuit vi, aut fraude, tenetur ei rependere quanti minoris ipsi valet spes nuptiarum: imo et ducere tenetur, si ea promissione corporis usuram im- petraverit.
XVI. Fur et raptor tenentur rem subtractam reddere cum suo incremento naturali, e& cum sequente damno aut ces- sante lucro: et si res perierit, zstimationem non summam, non infimam, sed mediam. In hace classe ponendi et illi qui legitima vectigalia fraudant. Similiter tenentur qui judicio injusto, accusatione injusta, testimonio injusto damnum de- derunt.
XVII. — Sed et qui contraetui aut promissioni causam de- dit dolo, vi, aut metu injusto, tenetur eum quieum actum est in integrum restituere, quia ille jus habuit, tum ne decipere- tur, tum ne cogeretur; illud ex natura contractus, hoc ex naturali etiam libertate. His annumerandi sunt qui id quod ex officio facere tenebantur facere noluerunt, nisi pecunia accepta.
XVIIL Αὐ qui causam dedit, cur vim pati, aut metu cogi debeat, habet quod sibi imputet: nam involuntarium ex voluntario ortum habens moraliter pro voluntario habetur.
doctissimum Pontanum dissertatione de — rem faciat. Est tantum aliquid de mari. [.Discuss. Historic. &c. ΤῸ. τ. ^ muleta ab homicida heredibus occisi cap. 21. ubi tamen nillegitur, quod ad ^ pendenda, pag. 143. J. 8.]
of her person...XVI. The thief and the robber are bound to restore the thing subtracted, with its natural increase, and with the consequent loss, or consequent cessation of gain; and if the thing have perished, its estimated value, not the highest, nor the lowest, but the medium value. In this class are to be placed those who defraud the lawful taxes. Also those are liable who by false testimony have occasioned damage in an unjust sentence, or an unjust accusation.
XVII. Also he who has caused a contract or promise by fraud, trick, or violence, is liable to restore to his original condition him who has been thus dealt with: because he had a right not to be deceived, and not to be forced: the former, from the nature of a contract, the latter from natural liberty as well. "To these are to be reckoned those who would not do, except for money given, what they were bound to do for their office.
XVIII. Ie who gave cause why he should suffer force, or be compelled by fear, has himself to blame for what happens: for Less. ii. 10.
Ibid. c. 12.
Less. ii. 33. dub. 9. Covar. c. Pec.
Covar. c. Pec, ) Less. ii. 17. dub. 6.
Bodin. L. v. De Repub. 6 De Offic. iii.
Lib. iii. 13. et seqq.
Plut. in Cimon. p.
196 DE DAMNO PER INJURIAM DATO, ET [118. II.
XIX. At gentium consensu sicut introductum est, ut bella omnia summ:e potestatis auctoritate utrinque gesta et indicta pro justis habeantur, quoad effectus externos, qua de re infra dicemus: ita et hoc, ut talis belli metus hactenus pro justo habeatur, ne quod ita obtentum est repeti possit. Atque hoe sensu admitti potest distinctio Ciceronis, inter hostem, quicum multa jura habemus, ut ait, communia, ex gentium consensu scilicet, et piratas ac latrones. Nam hi si quid metu expres- serunt repeti potest, nisi jusjurandum intercesserit: quod illi, non item. Quare quod Polybio videtur justam fuisse Cartha- giniensibus causam belli Punici secundi, quod Romani ab ipsis mercenariorum seditione occupatis bello denuntiato Sardiniam insulam et pecuniam expressissent, habet naturalis zequitatis aliquam speciem, sed a jure gentium abit, ut alibi explicabitur.
XX. 1 Ex neglectu tenentur reges ae magistratus, qui ad inhibenda latrocinia et piraticam non adhibent ea quse pos- sunt ae debent remedia: quo nomine damnati olim ab Am- phietyonibus Seyri. Quiesitum memini ex facto, cum patris nostrze rectores potestatem praedarum in mari ex hoste agen- darum per codicillos plurimis dedissent, et eorum nonnulli res an involuntary aet arising from a voluntary one is held morally for a voluntary one.
XIX. As, by the consent of nations, a rule has been introduced, that all wars, conducted on both sides by authority of the sovereign power, are to be held just wars; so this also has been established, that the fear of such a war is held a justly imposed fear, so that what is obtained by such means cannot be demanded back. And here the distinction appears between an enemy and pirates or robbers*. For what these take, may be demanded back, except an oath have been introduced to prevent it; what those take, not so. Wherefore, what appears to Polybius to be a just cause for the Carthaginians beginning the second Punie war, that the Romans had before made war upon them when they were engaged with the mutiny of their mercenaries, and had wrung from them the island of Sardinia, and a money pay- ment, has some shew of natural equity, but is at variance with the Law of Nations, as we shall elsewhere explain.
XX. 1 Kings and magistrates are liable for neglect, who do not apply the remedies which they can and ought, to restrain robbery and piracy: on which ground the Seyrians were in ancient times con- demned by the Amphietyons. I recollect the question being pro- posed to me,—from the fact when the rulers of our country had given * And so the connexion between * private war" and publie war disappears, W.
Car. XVIL] OBLIGATIONE QUZE INDE ORITUR. 197 amicorum rapuissent, desertaque patria mari vagarentur, ac ne revocati quidem redirent, an rectores eo nomine tenerentur, aut quod malorum hominum usi essent opera, aut quod cau- tionem non exegissent. Dixi eos in nihil amplius teneri, quam ut noxios, si reperiri possent, punirent aut dederent: prseterea in bona raptorum jus reddi curarent. Nam ipsos injustze prze- dationis causam non fuisse, nec quiequam de ea participasse; prohibuisse etiam legibus ne amicis noceretur: cautionem ut exigerent nullo jure fuisse obligatos, cum possent, etiam sine codicillis, omnibus subditis hostem spoliandi potestatem facere, quod et factum olim esset: neque talem permissionem causam esse cur damnum datum esset sociis, cum possent privati etiam sine permissu tali naves armare et in mare progredi. Mali vero an futuri illi essent. provideri non potuisse; neque vero vitari posse quo minus et malorum opera utamur, alioqui nul- lum colligi posse exercitum.
2 Neque vero si quid milites, aut terrestres, aut nautici contra imperium amieis nocuissent, reges teneri: quod * Gallize et Angli» testimoniis probatum. Ut vero sine culpa sua ex ministrorum facto quisquam teneatur, non esse juris gentium, k Gallic] Vide etiam tomo constitutionum 111. tit. 2. constitutione anni cIo Io XLIII, cap. 44.