belongs to the people or the king, that may be taken from them by the right of dominion, the exercise of that right operating collaterally to the punishment of the criminal. ΤῸ this we may refer the case of the children of Antiphon, who, as the children of a traitor, were excluded from honours; as at Rome were the children of those pro- scribed by Sulla. So in the law of Arcadius, that rule concerning children is not intolerable:.Let them be admitted to no honours mor public ofíces. How far slavery may pass to children without wrong, we have treated elsewhere.
XVII 1 What we have said of evil inflicted upon children for the deliets of fathers, may be applied also to a people really subject to their ruler: (for he who is not subject may be punished for his own fault, as we have said, that is, for neglecting to control the offender:) if it be asked whether such a people may be eviltreated on account of the crimes of the ruler or king. We do not now inquire if the Peo- 9 Car. XXL] DE POENARUM COMMUNICATIONE.
ligentia, puniri potest, ut diximus:) si qusratur an is populus malo possit affici ob regis aut rectorum facinora: non jam quarimus *si ipsius populi consensus accesserit, aut factum aliud quod per se sit poena dignum, sed agimus de eo contactu qui ex natura oritur ejus corporis cujus caput est rex, membra ceteri, Deus quidem ob Davidis peccatum populum pestilentia confecit, οὐ quidem ut David censet innocentem, sed Deus in vitam ipsorum jus habebat plenissimum.
2 Interim hze poena erat non populi, sed Davidis: nam, ut ait scriptor Christianus, πικροτάτη τιμωρία τῶν ἡμαρτη- κότων βασιλέων ἡ τιμωρία τοῦ λαοῦ" acerbissimum est delin- quentibus regibus supplicium id quod populis infligitur. Perinde enim hoc est, ait idem scriptor, ac si quis qui manu peccavit in tergo feriatur: quomodo in simili argumento Plu- tarchus non aliter id ait accipiendum quam si medicus ad curandam coxam urat pollicem, ^ Hominibus cur id non liceat jam antea diximus.
f Honoribus prohibiti sunt] Simile reperies in C, in quibusdam, 12. De Penis. (DrcRETAL. v. 97.)
8 Si ipsius populi consensus accesse- rit] Philo de ZEgyptii regis subditis Α - brahami tempore. (.De Abrah. pag. 963 D.) παραπήλαυσε δὲ τῆς τιμωρίας σύμ- πας αὑτῷ ὁ οἶκος, μηδενὸς ἐπὶ τῇ πα- ρανομίᾳ δυσχεράναντος, ἀλλὰ πάντων ἕνεκα τοῦ συναινεῖν μονονοὺ συγχει- ρουργησάντων τὸ ἀδίκημα" sensit et paomnes laudando pene et ipsi illud fecis- sent. Josephus, ubi vaticinium contra Jeroboamum prolatum narrat: μεθέξει δὲ τῆς τιμωρίας καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐκπεσὸν τῆς ἀγαθῆς γῆς, καὶ διασπαρὲν εἰς τοὺς πέραν Ἑὐφράτου πόπους, ὅτι TOUS τοῦ βασιλέως ἀσεβήμασι κατηκολούθησε" particeps pane εἰ populus erit, excidet quippe felice terra, sparsusque per loca, transeuphratensia exsulabit, quod impi- etati regis socium se fecerit. (Ant. Jud.
nam omnis cum eo familia, quod nemo indignatus esset super injuste facto, sed Lib. virr, cap. xi. 81, Ed. Hudson.)
ple's consent has been obtained, or if they have done anything which is by itself worthy of punishment; but we inquire concerning the con- nexion which naturally arises between that body of which the king is the head, and of which others are the members. God, on account of the sin of David, wasted the people with a pestilence; the people being innocent, as David judged: but God had a plenary right over their lives.
2 In the mean time, this was not the punishment of the people, but of David; for as a Christian writer says; 7e sharpest punish- ment of offending kings is the punishment of their people. It is, as the same writer says, as if one who has sinned with his hand were to be punished with strokes on his back: as Plutarch says, it is no otherwise than when a physician cauterizes the thumb to cure the hip. Why men may not lawfully do the same, we have already said.
Quest. ad orth. 139.
De sera Nwm. vind.
panis.
316 DE POGEINARUM COMMUNICATIONE. [Lir. II.
XVIII. Idem dicendum de singulis, qui non consenserunt, malo afficiendis circa ea qus ipsorum sunt, ob delictum universitatis.
XIX. Hszres vero cur de ceteris debitis teneatur, "de poena non teneatur, sicut à Paulo jurisconsulto scriptum est, s? poma. alicui irrogatur, receptum est commentitio jure ne ad lueredes transeat, vera causa hse est, quod hzres personam defuncti refert, non in meritis quze sunt mere personalia, 'sed in bonis, quibus ut cohzrerent ea quse alicui debentur ex ipsa rerum inzqualitate, simul cum dominio fuit introductum. Dion Pruscensis Zhodiaca: ἅπαντα ὀφείλουσι τὰ τῶν προγόνων οὐχ ἥττον αὐτῶν ἐκείνων εἰς οὗς ἄν ποτε καθήκετο “γένος. οὐ “γὰρ ἀφίστασθαι φήσετε τῆς διαδοχῆς" quce debuerunt majores, ea non minus debent posteri; neque enim dicere potestis repudiatam a mobis hereditatem.
XX. Et hine sequitur, ut si ultra meritum nova quzedam causa obligationis exstiterit, deberi jam possit id quod in pena erat, quanquam non proprie ut pcena. Sie alibi post senten- tiam, alibi post litem *^contestatam, quibus rebus vis contractus h De pena non teneatur] Maimo- nides titulo 321 c. vii. sectione 6. Ge- mara Baba Cama cap. x. $ 1.
i1 Sed in bonis] Vide Concilium To- letanum vin. in causa Recceswinthi: vide απὸ supra hoc libro, c. xiv. $ 10. Nulla est persona qua ad vicem ejus qui e vita emigraverit propius accedat quam hzres, ut Cicero ait secundo de Legibus, (cap. 19.)
9 Tta Jure Civili Romanorum. Vide L. 26 et 58..D. De Oblig. et act. L. 139, De Peculio.
XVIII The same may be said of the evil inflicted through their property, or the like, upon individuals who have not consented to the crime, on account of the delict of the general body.
XIX. If we ask why, since the heir is bound to the other debts of the deceased, he is not bound to his punishment, as Paulus says the commentators* have decided, this is the true cause; that the heir represents the person of the deceased, not in his deserts, which are matters merely personal, but in his possessions; and with them are inseparably connected his debts; and accordingly this rule came in as soon as ownership came in. So Dio Pruszensis.
* Commentitio jure] Difficile satis est definire, quid intelligat Paullus, dum illud jus commentitium vocat. Vide A. FABRUM, Jurispr. Papinian. Tit.1. Princip. II. Ilat. 5. Manc. LyckLAMAM, ZMembran. τ. 9. JaAc. GorHOorFRED. in Z. 1. -De Regg. Jur. pag. 5. Cl. ScnurrING. Jurisprud. Ante-Justin. pag. 675. col. 1. init. Expendi etiam potest nova interpretatio, ἀπὲ legitur in J4etis Eruditorum Lipsiensibus, ann. 1714. pag. 555. ubi vult Auctor Clar. WxcnrLERUS, jus com- mentitium esse, quod ex notione quadam communi oritur. J. P.
-——rn Car. XXL] DE POENARUM COMMUNICATIONE. 3971 datur, pena pecuniaria ab hzrede debebitur, ut et ea quz in *eonventionem deducta est. Jam enim nova accessit debendi causa.
7 Vide L. 47. D. de Actionib. emti et vend. Sed hoec est poena improprie dicta.
XX. And hence it follows that if, besides desert, some new cause of obligation should arise, that which was a part of the punishment may become debt, though not as a punishment of the heir. "Thus, after the sentence of a court, or after the decision of a lawsuit, to which events the power of a contract is given, the pecuniary penalty will be due from the heir, as also matters which were agreed to be so decided. For these events are a new cause of a debt being due.
Lib. ii. 1, CAPUT XXII.
DE CAUSIS INJUSTIS.
I Exmplicatur discrimen. inter causas justificas et sudso- vias.
IL.Bella, qwe wtroque causa- vum, genere carent, ferina III. Bella, quc suasorias causas habent, mon justificas, esse predonwum.
IV. Quasdam. esse causas, quce Jalsam habeant justi spe- ciem: V. Ut metum incertum: VI. Utilitatem sine necessitate: VII. Negatum. matrimonium in magna, foeminarwnm copia: VIII. Cupiditatem melioris soli: IX. Inventionem rerum occupa- tarum ab aliis.
X. Quid si priores occupatores amentes sint?
XI. JInjustam causam, esse et. li- bertatis desideriwm in popu- lo subdito: XII. Et voluntatem vegendi alios invitos quasi ad ipsorum bonwm.
XIII. Jtem titulum wniversalis im- peri quem, quidam. adscri- bunt Imperatori, qui vefelli- tur: XIV. Alii Ecclesice, qui item me- Jellitur.
XV. Item voluntatem | àmplendi vaticinia, sine Dei mandato.
XVI. Jtem, id, quod debetur non ex jure stricte dicto, sed. ali- wnde.
XVII. Distinctio belli cujus causa injusta, et ejus cui aliunde vitium accedit: et diversi utriusque effectus.
xl. IXIMUS supra, cum de causis agere institueremus, causas alias esse justificas, alias suasorias. Polybius, qui id discrimen primus notavit, *illas vocat προφάσεις, quia a Illas vocat προφάσεις, quia palam proferri solent, (titulum dixit aliquoties Livius) has generis nomine αἰτίας} Sic et Plutarchus distinguit in Galba, (pag. 1062 n.) et Dion in rebus Cesaris et Pompeii: [aut potius Xiphilin. p. 13. Ed. H. Steph.] et Polybius, ubi de Romanorum bello in Illyrios agit, ex- cerpto legationum 125. Cum Suetonio recte illas pretextum, has causas dix- eris. Ita enim ille de Julio Czesare: e£ pratextum quidem illi civilium armorum hoc fuit: causas autem alias fuisse opi- nantur, (cap. 30.) "Thucydides alibi distinguit πρόφασιν et τὸ ἀληθὲς, (Lib. vi. c. 6): ut in Atheniensium motu ad- versus Siciliam, przetextum fuit opitulari Egestanis, res ipsa, cupiditas Sicilie sibi acquirendz. Hermocrates in ora- tione de Atheniensibus loquens illud πρόφασιν preietextum vocat, hoe διάνοι- av propositum. Utrumque est in libro "Thucydidis vr. [postremum in cap. 33. ubi tamen est ἀληθὲς, ut in priori διά- CuaPTER XXII.
Of unjust Causes of War.
I. 1 We have said above, when we began to treat of the causes of war, that some are justificatory or justifying, some suasory or Car. XXII] DE CAUSIS INJUSTIS. 919 palam proferri solent, (titulum dixit aliquoties! Livius) has generis nomine αἰτίας. 2 Sicin bello Alexandri adversus Darium πρόφασις fuit ultio injuriarum quas Perse» Grzceis intulerant, αἰτία cupido glorize, imperii, divitiarum, cui accedebat spes magna facilitatis concepta ex Xenophontis et Agesilai expeditionibus, Sie πρό- acis belli Punici secundi controversia de Sagunto, causa in- dignatio Carthaginiensium, ob pactiones quas homani iniquis temporibus i ipsis expresserant, et aucti spiritus ex secundis per Hispaniam rebus; quz» Polybio notata. Similiter Thucydides Lib. iii. 6,7,8, belli Peloponnesiaci veram causam censet fuisse vires Atheni- i Li. i. 93, 56, ensium augescentes et Lacedsemoniis suspectas, obtentum vero controversiam Coreyrensium, Potideensium, et alia; voit, quie Auctor heie permutavit.] Appianus etiam προφάσεων vocem usurpat in Mithridatico, (pag. 209.) Idem civilium v. ubi de rupta pace inter Octavium et Sextum Pompeium agit, dicit αἰτίας causas alias intus fuisse, alias qu:e przeferebantur, (pag. 716. 4 ἃ. .H. Steph.) Agathias libro quinto id quod alii πρόφασιν, vocat σκῆψιν καὶ προκάλυμμα, figmentum et obtentum; cui opponit αἰτίαν in historia Hunni Zaberganis. (cap. 5.) Adde quz dixi- mus supra libri hujus capitei. S1. Pro- copius Persicorum 11. dicit, stultum esse non libere loqui ubi dux est justitia, comes utilitas (cap. 15.)
Exempli gratia, Lib. xxxvir. cap.
bubi b Ubi tamen ille αἰτίας et προφά- σεως nomina permiscet| Sic et libro v. (e. 53) de Argivis contra Epidaurios agens, quam prius vocaverat πρόφασιν, mox vocat αἰτίαν, quomodo et Graecum ἀρχῶν, Latinum principiorum vocem, aliasque ejus generis, esse sensus ambi- gui notavimus d. cap. i. ὃ. 1. hujus libri. Scriptores Constantiuopolitani Imperii id quod alii πρόφασιν sepe πάτροκλον vocant, nimirum ex Achillis historia, qui ad resumenda arma ex Patroclo sumpsit materiam. [De hoc vide MzvnstuM, Gloss. Greco-Barbar. pag. 415. SarMasiuM, in Achill. Tatium, pag.581. Duronr. Gnomolog..Home- ric. pag. 112.]
impelling. Polybius, who first noted this difference, calls the former pretexts, the latter, causes; Livy sometimes calls the former titulus *. 2 'Thus in the war of Alexander against Darius, the pretext was revenge for the injuries which the Persians had done to the Greeks; the cause was the desire of glory, empire, wealth, added to a great hope of the facility of the conquest, proved from the expeditions of Xenophon and Agesilaus. So the pretezt of the second Punic war was the controversy concerning Saguntum, the cause was the indig- nation of the Carthaginians excited by the terms which the Romans had imposed upon them in their evil times, and their courage exalted by their suecesses in Spain; as Polybius notes. In the same way Thucydides judges that the true cause of the Peloponnesian war was the strength of the Atheniaus, increasing and drawing the suspicion Liv. vii, 30.
Lib. xxxvi. 6.
Phil. ii, 92.
Ethic. Nic. vii. 1.
Lib. ii. de Clem. c. 4.
550 DE CAUSIS INJUSTIS. [Lan. II.
tamen ille αἰτίας et προφάσεως nomina permiscet. Est idem diserimen in oratione Campanorum ad Romanos, cum adversus Samnites pugnasse se aiunt, verbo pro Sidicinis, re pro seipsis: quod viderent ubi conflagrassent Sidicini ad se trajecturum esse incendium. Antiochum?quoque Livius memorat in Roma- nos bella suscepisse, in speciem causas habentem Dareillo necem et alia quzdam, revera quod ex labente Romanorum disciplina spem magnam econcepisset. Sic Plutarchus notat non ex vero objectum Antonio a Cicerone, quod causa esset belli civilis, cum Csesar bellandi certus ^prztextum tantum ab Antonio cepisset.
II. Sunt qui neutro causarum genere feruntur in bella, 3perieulorum,?ut Tacitus loquitur, propter ipsa avidi. Horum vitium humanum excedit modum, θηριότητα Aristoteles vocat. De his Seneca: possum. dicere non esse hanc crudelitatem, * sed. feritatem, cui voluptati sevitia est: possumus insaniam vocare: nam, varia sunt genera, ejus, et nullum certius quam 3 Auctor, dum festinans legeret, et ad verborum constructionem non adten- deret, Antiocho tribuit quod de Boeotis dicit Livius: 7n Boeotiam Zpse [Antio- chus] profectus est; caussas in speciem ire adversus Romanos eas, quas ante divi HABENTEM: Brachylhe necem, &c. Eumdem errorem, sine dubio hinc haus- tum, errat BoEcLERvs, Jissert. de Cla- rigatione, 'T'om. 11. pag. 1212. J. B.
€ Preotextum tantum ab Antonio ce- pisset] Ταῦτα πάλαι δεομένῳ προφάσεως σχῆμα καὶ λόγον εὐπρεπῆ τοῦ πολέμου πάρεσχεν" hac pridem pre- ierto opus habenti speciem aliquam et decorum titulum bellandi dedere. Verba sunt in hac historia Plutarchi, (Vit. M. Antonii, p. 918 c. n.) Lucani autem, ( PRharsal. τ. 268, ὅν.) Cunctasque pudoris Rumpunt fata moras. Justos fortuna laborat Esse ducis motus, et causas invenit armis.
ἃ Periculorum, ut Tacitus loquitur, propter ipsa avidi] De Alanis Ammiof the Lacedsemonians; the pretext, the controversy of the Corcy- reans, of the Potideans, and others things: where however he uses the terms pretezt and cause (πρόφασις and αἰτία) indiscriminately. [See Lib. v. e. 53. Gron.] "The same distinction occurs in the oration of the Campanians to the Romans, when they say that they fought against the Samnites, nominally for the Sidicini, really, for them- selves; because they saw that when the Sidicini were consumed, the conflagration would spread to them. So Livy says that Antiochus made war upon the Romans, having, as a pretence, the death of Barcilas, and other matters, but really, because he had conceived great hope from the relaxed discipline of the Romans. So Plutarch notes that it was not truly objected to Antony by Cicero that he was the cause of the civil war; since Cesar was already resolved upon war, and only took his pretext from Antony.
Car. XXII] DE CAUSIS INJUSTIS. 3881 quod in cedes hominum et laniationes pervenit. Cui senten- tice perquam similis est illa Aristotelis ultimo IVicomachiorum: δόξαι “γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μιαἰφονός τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνος γίγνοιντο" omnino enim crudelis habendus sit, qui ev amicis hostes faciat pug- nandi et παι sanguinis cupiditate. — Dion Prussensis: τὸ δὲ καὶ χωρὶς ὑποθέσεως πολεμεῖν καὶ μάχεσθαι, τί ἄλλο ἢ μανία παντελής ἐστι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην κακῶν ἐπιθυμία; nam sine causa in bella, ac pugnas ferri, mera est insania malum sibi querens. ldem ille Seneca epistola xiv: nemo αὐ hwmna- num sanguinem propter ipsum venit, aut admodum pauci. III. 1 Plerique vero bellantium causas suasorias habent, aut sine justificis aut cum justificis. Sunt qui justifieas plane non curant, de quibus diei potest illud quod ἃ Romanis juris- consultis est proditum, przdonem esse eum, fqui rogatus de possidendi causa, nullam aliam adfert nisi quod possideat. Aristoteles de belli suasoribus; ὡς ovx ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείanus libro xxxt.' Ut hominibus quietis — Ira c. 5. de Apollodoro locutus et Phaet placidis otium est voluptabile, ita illos pericula juvant et bella. (Cap. Z. p. 672. Edit. Gron. Vales.)
3 Dicit equidem Tacrrus Zist. 111. 41. et v. 19. periculorum avidi: Sed illud propter ipsa deest. Alibi: Non iam prcemiis periculorum, quam ipsis periculis letus. Hist. τι. 86. Propius SENECA: Periclitamur periculi caussa. Qua«st. Nat. v.18. J. B.
* Sed feritatem] Idem libro 1r. de laride: s non est ira, feritas est.
f Qui rogatus de possidendi causa, nullam aliam adfert nisi quod possideat] L. pro herede. 1r. $ ultimo et sequen- tibus legibus, D. de hereditatis peti- tione. 'Talis Herulorum in Langobar- dos πόλεμος ἀπροφάσιστος, bellum sine praetextu. [Apud PnocorivM, Gotih. 11. 14.] Galli apud Livium v. in armis se jus ferre, et omnia fortium virorum esse. (Cap. 30.)
IL Some there are who rush into war not actuated by either of these kinds of cause, being, as Tacitus says, greedy of danger for its own sake*. "These men are of a temper which does not lie within the proper limits of humanity, of a ferine nature. So Seneca, Oz Clemency, says, it is not mere cruelty but a ferine disposition, which delights in human blood and butchery. So Aristotle says that that is a sanguinary character, which makes a man break with his friends for the sake of fighting and shedding blood; and Dio Pruszcensis says it is mere madness. So Seneca, Epist. xiv.
III. 1 However, most parties, when thoy go to war, have impelling causes, either with or without justifying causes. "There are some who frankly do not trouble themselves about justificatory causes; to * As Barbeyrae shews, Grotius has put together two phrases of Tacitus: Periculorum avidi, Hist. 11. 41, and v. 19; and Non tam premiis periculorum, quam ipsis periculis letus, Hist. τι. 86.
Cap. 7.
Oral. xxxvii.
1 RAet. 3.
De Bell. Pun.
Sen. Herc.
Luc. vii. 260.
Tacit. Ann. ον ἐς Lib. iv. de Civ. Dei, 6.
382 DE CAUSIS INJUSTIS. [Las. II.
Tovas καταδουλοῦσθαι, kai τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντίζουσι; qui justum sit vicinos innoios in. servi- tutem redigere, et eos qui nullam faciunt injuriam, sepe nihil curant?
2 Talis Brennus, qui omnia dicebat esse validiorum. Talis Silio Annibal, cui Pro federe proque Justitia est ensis.
Talis Attila, et quibus illud in ore est: Qu:eritur belli exitus, Non causa.
Hsec acies victum factura nocentum est: Id in summa fortuna zequius quod validius.
Nec male his aptes illud Augustini: inferre bella, finitimis, et inde in cetera procedere, ac populos sibi non molestos sola regni cupiditate conterere ac subdere, quid. aliud quam grande latrocinium nominandum est? De talbus bellis £ Immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis] Agathias libro τι. ὅσοι δὲ κέρδους ἕκατι ἢ δυσμενείας ἀλόγου, μηδὲν ἔγκλημα ἔνδικον ἔχοντες, ἔπειτα φοιτῶσιν ἀνὰ τὴν ὀθνείαν τοὺς μηδὲν ἠδικηκότας σινόμενοι, οὗτοι δὲ ἀλά- ζονές εἰσι καὶ ἀτάσθαλοι" qui vero aut lucri causa, aut ceco odio, nullam ha- bentes justam. querelam, alienas terras invadunt innoriis novii, hi homines sunt et superbi et improbi. (Cap. 1.) Ex- emplum nobis dat illustre Menander Protector: ὅτε Βαιᾶνος ὁ τῶν Ἀβάρων σχάγανος οὐδεμιᾶς ἀφορμῆς ἢ σκήψεως λαβόμενος, οὐδὲ ψευδῆ γοῦν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων αἰτίαν ἀξιώσας τινὰ συν- θεῖναι, ἀναισχυντώτατα καὶ βαρβαρι- κώτατα παρέλυσε τὰς συνθήκας" Baia- nus Avarorum chaganus, nulla occa- sione aut obtentu, ne conatus quidem cau- sam vel falsam contra Romanos com- minisci, inverecunde plane, barbarum in morem exuitpacta. (Cap. 21.)
h Quales sunt tyranni] Bene Philo whom we may apply the maxim of the Roman jurists, that he who, when he is asked by what claim he possesses a thing, can assign no other than that he does possess it, is a robber. Aristotle speaks of those who give no care to the question whether it is just to enslave unoffending neighbours.
2 Such a man was Brennus, who said that everything belonged to the stronger: such is Annibal in Silius, whose sword is the mea- sure of right and justice: such Attila: and those who say, as in Seneca, Our thought the fortune not the cause of war; or as in Lucan, This das will make the conquered part the guilty; or as in Tacitus, that In the highest fortune what is strongest is most just. Yet as Augustine says, To make war on unoffending neighbours and to harass and, subju- gate them out. of mere love of honour, what name does it. deserve, ezcept Car. XXII.] DE CAUSIS INJUSTIS. 383 Velleius: bella non causis inita, sed prout eorum merces fuit. Apud Ciceronem legimus de Officiis primo: ea animi elatio, que cernitur in periculis et laboribus, si justitia vacat, non modo virtutis non est, sed potius 5*àmmamnitatis omnem Rhwmanitatem repellentis. | Andronicus Rhodius: οἱ μεγάλων ἕνεκα κερδῶν λαμβάνοντες ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ, πονηροὶ καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἄδικοι καλοῦνται" οἷοί εἰσιν οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ οἱ τὰς πόλεις πορθοῦντες" qui magni compendii sui causa ac- cipiunt unde non oportet, hi pravi, impii, injusti appellantur, hguales sunt tyranni et urbium vastatores.
IV. Alii causas quasi justificas adferunt, quse expensze ad rectam rationem injustzs reperiuntur: et, ut Livius loquitur, non certamen juris, sed vim quzsri apparet. Reges plerosque, ait Plutarchus, duobus nominibus, pacis et belli, tanquam num- mis uti non ad id quod justum est, sed ad id quod expedit. Qus autem sint causce injust?, cognosci aliquatenus potest ex justis causis quas hactenus explieavimus. Rectum enim obliqui est index. Sed perspicuitatis causa summa genera annotabimus.
in Decaloqum: ὅσοι τοίνυν τῶν kXerr- τῶν ἰσχὺν προσέλαβον, ὅλας συλῶσι penarum securi, quod supra, leges emi- nere videantur. Tales sunt homines inπόλεις, ἀλογοῦντες τιμωριῶν, διὰ τὸ — genio minime civili, dominatuum et poἐπικυδέστεροι τῶν νόμων εἶναι δοκεῖν" οὗτοι δέ εἰσιν οἱ ὀλιγαρχικοὶ τὰς φύ- σεις, οἱ τυραννίδος καὶ δυναστειῶν ἐπι- θυμοῦντες, οἱ τὰς μεγάλας ἐργαζόμενοι κλοπὰς, σεμνοῖς ὀνόμασι τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἐπικρύπτοντες ληστείαν τ᾽ ἀληθέστερον" qui vero furum vires nacti sunt, hi totas predantur urbes, that of α huge vobbery? Of such mot entered into for justice, but for tentatus avidi, magna furta commiltten- ies, qui pulchris nominibus magistra- tuum et imperiorum id obtegunt quod verius latrocinium appelletur. (Pag. 763 €. D.) Optime conveniunt hzc cum iis quz ex Curtio, Justino, Seneca et Au- gustino producta sunt ad dictum cap. 1, 8 1. libri hujus.
wars, Velleius says they are wars gain. So Cicero says that Courage without justice not only is not a part of virtue, but is. an. inhwman extravaganee. And Andronicus Rhodius speaks to the same effect.
IV. Other parties, in going to war, allege justificatory causes, which, when brought to the standard of right reason, turn out unjust; and then it appears, as Livy says, that what is aimed at is, not a trial of right, but of strength. Most kings, says Plutarch, use the two names, peace and war, only as coins, to procure, not what is just, but what is expedient. What are unjust causes, may be known in some measure from the just causes which we have been explaining: the straight line is the index of what is oblique. But for the sake of perspicuity we shall make some general remarks.
Lib. ii. 6.
In Eth. Nic.
Lib. xxi. 6. Vit. Pyrrh.
Zonar. ix. 15. Pausan. i. 10.
Germ. c. 35.
9384 DE CAUSIS INJUSTIS. -[Lar. II.
V. 1 Metum ergo ex vicina potentia non sufficere supra diximus. Ut enim justa sit defensio, necessariam esse oportet, qualis non est nisi constet, non tantum de potentia, sed et de animo, et quidem ita constet, ut certum id sit ea certitudine qui in morali materia locum habet.
2 Quare minime est probanda eorum sententia, qui justam belli causam statuunt, si vicinus nulla pactione impeditus in suo arcem faciat, aut munitionem aliam qus damnum aliquando dare possit. Nam adversus tales metus contrari» in suo mu- nitiones et siqua sunt similia remedia quzerenda sunt, non vis bellica. Injusta igitur bella Romanorum in Philippum Mace- donem, Lysimachi in Demetrium, ni alia causa adfuit. Valde mihi placet Taciti illud de Chaucis: populus inter Germanos nobilissimus, quique magnitudinem suam malit justitia tueri, sine cupiditate, sine dmpotentia: quieti, secretique: nulla provocant bella, nullis raptibus aut latrociniis populantur: idque precipuum virtutis ac virium argumentum est, quod, ut superiores agant, non per injurias assequuntur: prompta ^ Narrat id Dioponcus SricuLvus, —mRuw, Lib. rr. eap. 6. n. 1. exemplum Biblioth. Lib. rv. c. 31. unde Auctor huc non faciet, quum, secundum istum, habet. Nam si sequamur APorropo- ex pacto peteret Iolem Hercules: vio- V. 1 That fear from a neighbouring power is not a sufficient cause, we have said above. For, that defense may be just, it must be necessary; and it cannot be this, except there be clear evidence, not only of the power, but of the animus of the party; and such evidence as amounts to moral certainty.
2 Hence we can by no means approve the opinion of those who hold it to be a just cause of war, if a neighbour, being prevented therefrom by no pact, establish a fortress on his own ground, or any other munition of war, which may possibly at some time be mis- chievous to us. For the proper remedies against such fears are opposing munitions, and the like, not force of arms. Therefore unjust were the wars of the Romans against Philip of Macedon, and of Lysimachus against Demetrius, except there were some other reason. lI am much pleased with what Tacitus says of the Chauci: T'he «ost noble people among the Germans, and ὦ people that prefers to secure its greatness by its justice; mot greedy, mot passionate, but quiet and wetired. "They provoke mo wars, they practise mo robbery or plunder of their neighbours; and the great proof of their virtue and their strength is, that it is mot by wrong-doing that they preserve their superiority. Yet they can promptly use arms, and if need be, vaise armies: they are nwmerous in infantry and. cavalry, and. retain. their Car. XXII.] DE CAUSIS INJUSTIS. 385 tamen omnibus arma, ac, si res poscat, exercitus: plurimum virorum equorumque, et quiescentibus eadem fama.
VI. Nee utilitas par jus facit cum necessitate.
VII. Ita ubi laxa est matrimoniorum copia, negatum ali- quod matrimonium causam bello przbere non potest: qualem *olim Hercules arripuit in Eurytum,! Darius in 5Scythas.
VIII. Nee magis mutandz sedis amor, ut paludibus et solitudinibus relietis solum fecundius possideatur: quam Ger- manis veteribus bellandi causam fuisse ait Tacitus.
IX. /Eque est improbum, inventionis titulo sibi vindicare ea qu: ab alio tenentur, etiamsi is qui tenet sit improbus, de Deo male sentiens, aut hebetis ingenii. Nam inventio est eorum quz nullius sunt.
X. 1 Neque ad dominium requiritur aut virtus moralis, aut religiosa, aut intellectus perfectio: nisi quod hoe videtur posse defendi, siqui sint populi omnino destituti a rationis usu, eos dominium non habere, sed ex caritate tantum iis deberi qu» ad vitam sunt necessaria. Nam qus alibi diximus de latio autem fidei date justam bello gem: vide Xiphilinum (pag. 3506 c.
caussam przebet. J. B. Ed. H. Steph.) i Darius in Scythas] Antoninus Ca- 5 Vide JusriNUM, Lib. ir. cap. 5. racallai in Artabanum Parthorum re- n.9. J. 8.
reputation even in inaction.
VI. Nor does utility generate a right, in the way in which necessity does.
VIL — Thus when there is no want of opportunity of marriage, any marriage denied cannot supply a cause for war; though Hercules formerly took occasion to make war on Eurytus on such grounds, and Darius on the Scythians.
VIIL — Neither is the desire of migrating from one place to ano- ther a just ground of war; that a nation leaving marshes and deserts, may become possessed of a more fertile soil; which Tacitus mentions as the reason of making war among the old Germans.
IX. It is no less unjust to claim lands on the ground of having discovered them, when they are occupied by anóther, even though the possessors be bad men, with wrong notions of God, and dull intellects. For those lands only can be discovered which belong to nobody.
X. 1 Noris there required for ownership [to exclude such claim] either moral virtue, or religion, or perfection of intellect: except that this may, it would seem, be defended; that if there be any people altogether destitute of the use of reason, such may not have ownership, but out of charity those things ought to be given them Hist. iv. 73.
Viet. de Ind.
Vict. de Bello, Plato, de Rep. Arist. Pol. i. 2 Eurip. Iphig. in Aul. v. 1400, et seqq. Liv. xxxi. 29. Isoer. Panath.
Hoc libro e.
Senec. iii. contr. 21.
386 DE CAUSIS INJUSTIS. [Lis. II.
sustentatione dominii, quam pro infantibus et amentibus facit jus gentium, ad eos populos pertinet cum quibus est pactorum commercium: tales autem non sunt populi siqui reperiuntur toti amentes, de quo merito dubito.
2 Male ergo Grzci Darbaros ob morum diversitatem, forte et quod ingenio cedere viderentur, hostes sibi quasi naturaliter dicebant. Quatenus autem ob peccata gravia et naturam aut societatem humanam impugnantia, auferri dominium possit, alia est quzstio, et modo, cum de penarum jure ageremus, nobis tractata.
XI. Sed *nec libertas, sive singulorum sive civitatum, id est, avrovopta, quasi naturaliter, e£ semper quibusvis competat, jus bello praestare potest. Nam libertas cum natura competere hominibus aut populis dicitur, id intellimendum est de jure na- ture przcedente factum omne humanum, et de libertate κατὰ στέρησιν, non de ea quz est κατ ἐναντιότητα, hoc est, ut na- tura quis servus non sit, non ut jus habeat ne unquam serviat: nam hoc sensu nemo liber est: quo pertinet illud Albutii: neminem natum. liberum esse, neminem servum; hec postea k Nec libertas sive singulorum sive ^ bello prestare potest] Vide concilium civitatum, id est, avrovouía, quasinatu- — 1v. 'Toletanum, et qua nos supra cap. raliter et semper quibusvis competat, jus — 1v. hujus Lib. $ 14.
only which are necessary to life. For what we have said above, con- cerning the sustentation of ownership, which the law of nations per- forms for infants, and persons out of their mind, pertains to those peoples with whom others have an intercourse of pacts; and if there be any people altogether irrational, they are not such: but I much doubt the fact.
2 "Therefore it was unjust on the part of the Greeks to say, that the Barbarians were their natural enemies, merely on account of the diversity of manners, or because they seemed to be inferior in intel- lect. How far dominion may be taken away from a people on account of grave offenses, impugning nature or human society, is another question, and must soou be treated by us, when we speak of the right of punishing.
XI. Nor again can we say of the liberty, either of individuals, or of cities, or states, (that is, autonom; or self-government,) that it is either by natural law, and at all times, an attribute of all, or that in the cases in which it is, it furnishes just ground for war. For when we say that liberty by nature belongs to men or to peoples, we are to understand that, of a natural right preceding all human pacts; and of liberty by negation of slavery, not of liberty in opposition to slavery; Car. XXII] DE CAUSIS INJUSTIS. 387 nomina singulis inposuisse fortunam. ἘΠ Aristotelis illud: νόμῳ τὸν μὲν δοῦλον εἶναι, τὸν δ᾽ ἐλεύθερον" € lege venisse ut alius esset liber, alius servus. Quare qui legitima causa in servitutem sive personalem sive civilem devenerunt, con- tenti sua conditione esse debent, ut et Paulus Apostolus docet: δοῦλος ἐκλήθης; μή σοι μελέτω" vocatus es ad. servitutem? ne id te torqueat.
XII. Neque minus iniquum armis subigere aliquos vello, quasi dignos qui serviant, quos naturaliter servos interdum philosophi voeant. Non enim siquid alicui est utile, id statim mihi lieet ei per vim imponere. Nam his qui rationis habent usum libera esse debet utilium et inutilium electio, nisi alteri jus quoddam in eos quaesitum sit. Infantium plane alia est ratio, quorum regimen, cum ipsi jus exercendse αὐτοπραγίας actionumque suarum moderandarum non habeant, occupanti οὐ idoneo natura concedit, XIII. 1 Vix adderem stultum esse titulum, quem qui- dam tribuunt Imperatori Romano, quasi ipse etiam in remo- tissimos et incognitos hactenus populos jus imperandi habeat, so that man is not a slave by nature, but he is not by nature a crea- ture that cannot be a slave. For in this latter sense, no one is free. — And to this view pertains what is said by Albutius, that JVo one is born free, and mo one is born a slave; these names came afterwards to belong to men by their fortune. So Aristotle says, that it is a result of law that one man is free, another a slave. Therefore they who have, by a legitimate course, come into s'avery, either personal or civil, ought to be content with their condition; as St Paul teaches, Art thow called being ὦ servant? Care mot for it. 1 Cor. vii. 21.
XII. Nor is it less unjust to wish to subjugate any by arms, as being worthy to be slaves, or as philosophers sometimes speak, natu- rally slaves. For even if there be anything which is fit for me, it does not follow that any one has a right to impose it on me by force. For those who have the use of reason, ought to have a free election left them of what is useful to them and what is not, except another have a right over them. The case is plainly different with infants, the government of whom, since they themselves have not the right of independent action and self-direction, nature gives to those who have a claim to it, and can exercise it.